Bonaventure

Articulus unicus.

De potentia in comparatione ad possibilia, quae potest.

Quaestio IV.

Utrum possibile simpliciter dicatur secundum causas superiores, an inferiores.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`). Quaracchi restarts footnote numbering on each printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially `<sup>1</sup>`–`<sup>28</sup>` across the four printed pages (756, 757, 758, 759).

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum possibile simpliciter dicatur aliquid secundum causas superiores, vel secundum causas inferiores, hoc est secundum potentiam divinam, an secundum potentiam creatam. Et quod secundum potentiam creatam sive secundum causas inferiores, videtur.

1. Ab eodem enim est in rebus potestas¹, a quo est necessitas et contingentia simpliciter; sed necessitas et contingentia attenditur in rebus non tantum secundum causas superiores, immo secundum inferiores causas proximas et particulares: ergo et potestas.

2. Item, sicut aliquis dicitur potens a potestate activa, ita dicitur possibile a potestate passiva: sed potestas passiva primo est in eo, in quo primo est potentia ad fieri, et per illud in aliis²: ergo cum hoc sit principium materiale et causa creata, possibile simpliciter dicitur secundum causas inferiores.

3. Item, si possibile simpliciter diceretur secundum causas superiores tantum, tunc, cum apud Deum non sit impossibile omne verbum³, nihil iudicandum esset impossibile.

4. Item, si secundum causas superiores, tunc cum Deus possit facere, quod caecus recipiat visum, possibile est caecum videre; sed si possibile esset videre, posset videre, et si posset, haberet potentiam visivam: sed hoc falsum: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Possibile dicitur denominative a potentia; ergo possibile simpliciter a potentia simpliciter⁴; sed potentia, quae summe et simpliciter est potentia, est potentia divina, quae dicitur secundum causas superiores: ergo possibile simpliciter dicitur secundum causas superiores.

2. Item, mundum creari et animam antichristi creari vel esse, et consimilia, simpliciter dicuntur possibilia; et sunt possibilia solum secundum causas superiores: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ostenditur, quia si aliquid sequitur ad aliquid⁶, si antecedens est possibile, et consequens; sed demonstrato aliquo impossibili, ut truncum fieri ex vitulo, sequitur: Deum facere hoc, est possibile: ergo hoc, scilicet truncum fieri ex vitulo, est possibile simpliciter⁵.

4. Item, omne verum est possibile, et omne quod erat verum, potest esse verum, et omne quod potest esse verum, est simpliciter possibile; et est possibile solum secundum causas superiores: ergo etc.⁷

Conclusio.

Simpliciter possibile aliquando dicitur praescindendo a suis causis, aliquando dicitur secundum causas et inferiores et superiores in comparatione ad potentiam activam, ad quam refertur, aliquando etiam ad passivam, dummodo non sit potentia obedientialis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc fuerunt diversi modi dicendi.

Quidam enim dixerunt quod secundum utrasque causas accipitur possibile simpliciter; et fundant se super illud primae ad Corinthios primo⁸: Stultam Deus fecit sapientiam etc., Glossa: «Stultam fecit possibile declarando quod ipsa impossibile iudicat», quia possibile dicit commune ad utramque. — p. 757Tamen illud non videtur convenienter posse stare, quia⁹ non admittitur, quod possibile sit simpliciter de caeco fieri videntem, immo dicitur impossibile: ergo simul esset possibile et impossibile, quod est inconveniens. Tamen illud est possibile secundum causas superiores. Et fundamentum positionis eorum non est conveniens, quia Glossa non dicit tantum declarando, sed etiam dicit faciendo possibile: ergo prius non erat possibile. Et iterum dicit: stulta facta est, quia sapientia mundana iudicabat ita impossibile, quod nulli esset possibile, et Deus declaravit sibi possibile esse.

Et ideo est alia positio, quod secundum quod descendunt scientiae, ita et nomina scientiarum: et ita in naturali philosophia iudicandum est possibile simpliciter secundum causas inferiores, sed in theologia secundum causas superiores. — Tamen adhuc non videtur conveniens esse positio, quia ipse Anselmus¹⁰, et theologus, dicit, quod impossibile est, de trunco fieri vitulum, et quod impossibilia simpliciter Deo sunt possibilia.

Propter hoc aliter dicendum, quod possibile simpliciter potest dicere ordinem substantiae¹¹ ad illud respectu cuius est, ordinem, inquam, qui est, vel qui futurus est, sive potentiam praesentem, vel futuram. Si dicat futuram, tunc est sensus: possibile est hominem currere, hoc est habere potentiam ad currendum. Si dicat potentiam praesentem, tunc est sensus: possibile est hominem currere, id est, homo habet potentiam ad currendum; et iste duplex modus dicendi accipitur a Philosopho¹², qui istam exponit dupliciter: «Omne B contingit esse A, id est omne quod est B, vel omne quod potest esse B, contingit esse A».

Prout autem dicit potentiam de futuro, sic potest accipi possibile secundum quascumque causas, sive superiores sive inferiores. Et hoc patet, quia nihil aliud dicitur tunc, nisi quod habebit potentiam ad hoc: et a quocumque habeat, sive a Deo sive ab Angelo sive a se, verum est, quod potentiam habebit. Et sic dicendum, quod possibile est istum videre, demonstrato caeco illuminando, et virginem parere, et cetera talia, quia talibus dari potest potentia.

Alio autem modo hoc quod est possibile dicit actualiter potentiam in re, quae significatur ad alterum ordinari: et sic generalis est regula, quod si conclusio in re, cui attribuitur possibile simpliciter¹³, est potentia simpliciter, tunc dicitur possibile simpliciter; si autem potentia secundum quid, tunc dicitur possibile secundum quid. Cum enim possibile dicat ordinem potentiae ad actum sive alicuius ad aliquid mediante potentia; ideo ratio dicendi in ipso possibili sumitur a potentia.

Nomen autem potentiae dicitur dupliciter, scilicet de potentia activa, quae est principium transmutandi aliud, et de potentia passiva, quae est principium transmutandi ab alio¹⁴. Et potentia activa reperitur et in Deo et in creatura, et utraque est potentia simpliciter completa respectu sui actus. Nam potentia activa, eo ipso quod activa, dicit ordinationem completam ad actum, quantum est de se. Potentia vero passiva reperitur solum in creatura. Et haec quidem potentia potest esse actui propinqua, et ab actu remota; ideo potentia passiva dicitur simpliciter, et secundum quid. Quaedam enim potentia est nata reduci ad actum a potentia inferiori cooperante superiori, ut quando est cum dispositione propinqua, ut potentia, quae est in ligno ad ignitionem¹⁵. Quaedam est nata reduci a potentia superiori aliquo modo consonante inferiori, ut potentia impii ad iustificationem, et utraque dicitur propinqua. Quaedam ita distat ab actu, quod si reducatur, non potest nisi a potentia superiori reduci, et hoc quidem omnino deficiente vel nullo modo consonante potentia activa inferiori, ut puta quod ex mortuo possit fieri vivus, et ex trunco fieri vitulus²⁸, et haec est potentia secundum quid.

p. 758Ex quo patet, quod potentia passiva simpliciter attenditur secundum causas superiores et inferiores. Et quia secundum quod dicit potentiam respectu obedientialem[?], potestas passiva, quae sumitur per relationem ad agens transmutans, potestas activa, secundum quod actum respicit, secundum quod refertur ad recipiens, sive secundum quod respicit actum elicitum, [?] in eo quod ex parte recipientis: dicitur etiam, quod illud, quod respicit causam moventem; sive de hoc[?] causa transitur. Et de hoc vagiendo respicit eam, dicitur de futuro; non dicit aliquid in eo[?], nisi quod habebit potentiam, si dicat de praesenti, vel de futuro, sic potest accipi possibile secundum quascumque causas, sive superiores sive inferiores, deficiente potentia activa[?] vel non consonante, est potentia vocata[?] potentia obedientiae. Vel de hac, quae[?] sic est quod erat costa, posset, immo posset[?], unde fieri posset, scilicet potentia[?]. Possibile igitur, quod dicitur a potentia, non dicitur univoce nec dicitur omnino aequivoce, sed analogice, sicut sanum: et ideo eius acceptio determinatur per adiunctum.

Potest ergo hoc quod est possibile dicere ordinem substantiae ad agere; et hinc dicit potentiam activam, et haec determinatur per adiunctum. Nam si dicat ordinem substantiae increatae ad actum, dicit potentiam activam increatam, ut illuminare caecum. Si autem dicat ordinem substantiae creatae¹⁶, dicit potentiam activam creatam, ut si dicatur: possibile est antichristum currere, vel caecum possibile est videre, significatur potentia in caeco; ideo falsa est simpliciter.

Potest iterum¹⁷ dicere ordinem alicuius ad fieri, et hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut in comparatione ad aliquid ex quo, aut sine comparatione. Si in comparatione ad aliquid ex quo, ut cum dicitur, possibile est ex aere fieri ignem, tunc importat potentiam passivam secundum rem. Et si sit¹⁸ potentia passiva simpliciter, ut illa quae est secundum causas superiores et inferiores¹⁹, dicitur possibile simpliciter. Si autem sit potentia passiva reducibilis solum secundum causas superiores, est solum possibile secundum quid; ut si dicatur: ex trunco possibile est fieri vitulum, negandum²⁰ est simpliciter, nisi addatur determinatio contrahens, ut si dicatur possibile potentia obedientiae vel possibile Deo. — Si autem dicat ordinem alicuius ad fieri sine comparatione ad principium ex quo, tunc importat potentiam passivam secundum modum, sed activam secundum rem; ut si dicatur: possibile est, animam antichristi creari, vel possibile est, vitulum fieri, hoc est dicere, aliquis potest facere; et ideo sine determinatione est possibile sive secundum causas superiores, sive secundum causas inferiores, quia ratione potentiae activae utrobique salvatur simpliciter.

Potest etiam tertio hoc quod est possibile dicere ordinem vel comparationem nullius ad esse, ut cum dicitur: hoc potest esse quodcumque demonstrato; et sic nec potentiam activam nec potentiam passivam dicit determinate, nec secundum causas superiores nec secundum causas inferiores, unde simpliciter dicitur quocumque²¹ horum modorum sit.

Solum ergo in uno casu possibile secundum quid dicitur secundum causas superiores, videlicet cum dicit potentiam passivam secundum modum et rem, ut cum dicitur: ex caeco potest fieri videns, et ex trunco potest fieri vitulus, et ex asino possibile est fieri hominem.

Ex his patent omnia obiecta ad utramque partem: nam obiecta ad primam partem procedunt de possibili passivo, et talia non sunt vera, nisi sint reducibilia per potentiam non obedientialem sive ad superiorem causam ratione complementi vel ad inferiorem.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, ad oppositum, quod possibile dicitur denominative a potentia; dicendum, quod possibile potest dici denominative a potentia activa vel passiva; et quia in Deo proprie est potentia activa, ideo dicitur²² possibile simpliciter, secundum quod ab illa denominatur, non secundum quod a passiva.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de hoc, quod est mundum creari; dicendum, quod quamvis dicat potentiam per modum passionis, tamen secundum rem non dicit nisi potentiam activam, quia ante mundi creationem nihil est nisi potentia activa; et ideo dicitur simpliciter secundum causas superiores.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod sequitur: si Deus potest facere, quod res potest fieri; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod potest dicit eandem potentiam per modum passionis, et hoc dicit²³, cum simpliciter dicitur. Si autem vere dicat potentiam passivam, non sequitur, quia variatur hoc quod est possibile, ut patet, si dicatur: Deus potest facere de caeco videntem: ergo caecus potest esse videns, vel ex caeco potest fieri videns. Prius enim dicebat potentiam activam simpliciter et postmodum passivam; et ideo non sequitur. Ergo quando dicitur: si antecedens est possibile, et consequens, intelligendum est eadem possibilitate.

Ad 4. Ad illud ergo quod ultimo obiicitur, quod omne verum potest esse verum, antequam sit: dicendum, quod verum est, et demonstrato caeco fieri videns, secundum quod potest ponit potentiam actu in isto; quia dicit potentiam passivam dispositam. Sed tunc non sequitur de re: ergo iste potest videre²⁴²⁵²⁶, quia dicit potentiam activam creatam, scilicet potentiam visivam. Nec sequitur: ergo de caeco poterit fieri videns, secundum quod potest ponit potentiam actu in isto; quia dicit potentiam passivam dispositam, immo est ibi fallacia consequentis; quia cum possibile accipiatur in sua generalitate, habet tres causas veritatis: aut quia in caeco est potestas ad videndum, aut potestas ad recipiendum, aut quia in alio est potestas ad dandum²⁶; ratione huius dictum est possibile, et fiet aliquando verum, sicut patet; et ita patent cetera obiecta.

Article unique.

On power in comparison to the possibles, [those things] which it can [do].

Question IV.

Whether something is said to be possible without qualification according to higher causes, or to lower.

Fourthly and lastly it is asked whether something possible without qualification (possibile simpliciter) is said [to be such] according to higher causes, or according to lower causes — that is, according to divine power or according to created power. And that [it is said to be such] according to created power, or according to lower causes, [thus] appears.

1. For from the same [source] is power (potestas) in things¹, from which is necessity and contingency without qualification; but necessity and contingency are observed in things not only according to higher causes, but rather according to lower, proximate, and particular causes: therefore [so is] power (potestas) also.

2. Likewise, just as a thing is called able-to-act (potens) from active power, so it is called possible from passive power: but passive power is first in that in which there is first potency to coming-to-be (potentia ad fieri), and [is in others] through that²: therefore since this [potency] is a material principle and a created cause, possibile simpliciter is said [to be such] according to lower causes.

3. Likewise, if possibile simpliciter were said [to be such] according to higher causes only, then, since with God no word is impossible³, nothing would be judged to be impossible.

4. Likewise, if [it is said to be such] according to higher causes, then since God can make a blind man receive sight, it is possible for the blind to see; but if it were possible to see, [he] could see, and if he could, he would have a visual power: but this is false: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. Possibile is said denominatively from potentia; therefore possibile simpliciter [is said] from potentia simpliciter⁴; but the power which is supremely and without qualification power is the divine power, which is said [to be] according to higher causes: therefore possibile simpliciter is said [to be such] according to higher causes.

2. Likewise, that the world be created, and that the soul of antichrist be created or be, and like things, are said to be possible without qualification; and they are possible only according to higher causes: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this is shown thus: because if something follows upon something⁶, if the antecedent is possible, [so is] the consequent; but, having demonstrated some impossible [thing], such as that a tree-stump come to be from a calf, it follows: that God do this is possible: therefore this, namely that a tree-stump come to be from a calf, is possible without qualification⁵.

4. Likewise, every true [thing] is possible, and every [thing] which was true can be true, and every [thing] which can be true is possible without qualification; and it is possible only according to higher causes: therefore etc.⁷

Conclusion.

**Simpliciter possibile is sometimes said by prescinding from its causes, sometimes is said according to causes both lower and higher in comparison to active power, to which it is referred, sometimes also to passive [power], provided that it is not [merely] obediential power.*

I respond: It must be said that there have been different ways of speaking on this point.

For some said that possibile simpliciter is taken according to both [kinds of] causes; and they ground themselves on that [text] of the First [letter] to the Corinthians, chapter one⁸: God hath made foolish the wisdom etc., Gloss: «He hath made foolish the possible by declaring that [that wisdom] itself judges [it] impossible», because possibile signifies what is common to both. — p. 757However, this does not seem to be able to stand suitably, since⁹ it is not granted that it be possible without qualification that of a blind man there come to be a seeing man, but rather it is said to be impossible: therefore it would be simultaneously possible and impossible, which is incongruous. Yet this is possible according to higher causes. And the foundation of their position is not suitable, since the Gloss does not only say by declaring, but also says [it] by making possible: therefore beforehand it was not possible. And again it says: foolish has it been made, because worldly wisdom was judging [as] so impossible that it was possible to none, and God declared it to be possible to himself.

And therefore there is another position, that as the sciences descend, so also [do] the names of the sciences: and so in natural philosophy possibile simpliciter is to be judged according to lower causes, but in theology according to higher causes. — Yet still the position does not appear to be suitable, since Anselm himself¹⁰, and as a theologian, says that it is impossible that of a tree-stump there come to be a calf, and that things impossible without qualification are possible to God.

For this reason it must be said otherwise that possibile simpliciter can signify the order of a substance¹¹ toward that with respect to which it is — an order, I say, which either is or is to be, that is, a power present or future. If it signify [a power] future, then the sense is: it is possible for a man to run — that is, to have power to run. If it signify a power present, then the sense is: it is possible for a man to run — that is, the man has power to run; and this twofold way of speaking is taken from the Philosopher¹², who expounds it in a twofold way: «Every B happens to be A, that is, every [thing] that is B, or every [thing] that can be B, happens to be A».

Now insofar as it signifies a power of the future, in this way possibile can be taken according to any causes whatsoever, whether higher or lower. And this is plain, because nothing else is then said except that [the thing] will have power to this: and from whomever it have it, whether from God or from an Angel or from itself, it is true that it will have the power. And so it must be said that it is possible that this man see, having designated a blind man being illuminated, and that a virgin give birth, and other such things, since to such [things] power can be given.

In another mode, that which is possibile signifies actually a power in the thing, which [power] is signified to be ordered to another: and so the general rule is, that if the conclusion in the thing to which possibile simpliciter is attributed¹³ is power without qualification, then it is said possibile simpliciter; but if [it is] a power [only] in a certain respect (secundum quid), then it is said possibile secundum quid. For since possibile signifies the order of power to act, or of something to something else by means of a power; therefore the ground of [its] being said in the possibile itself is taken from the power.

Now the name of power is said in two ways, namely of active power, which is the principle of transmuting another, and of passive power, which is the principle of being transmuted by another¹⁴. And active power is found both in God and in a creature, and either is power simpliciter complete with respect to its own act. For active power, by the very fact that it is active, signifies a complete ordering to act, as far as is from itself. But passive power is found only in a creature. And this power can be proximate to act, and remote from act; therefore passive power is said [to be such] simpliciter, and secundum quid. For a certain power is born to be reduced to act from a lower power cooperating with a higher — as when it is in a proximate disposition, such as the power that is in wood toward ignition¹⁵. A certain [power] is born to be reduced from a higher power, [the lower power] being in some way consonant [with the higher], such as the power of an unrighteous man unto justification; and either is said [to be] proximate. A certain [power] is so distant from act that, if it be reduced, it can be reduced only by a higher power, and this indeed with the lower active power wholly failing or in no way consonant — such as that of the dead there be made a living [thing], and of a tree-stump a calf²⁸: and this is power secundum quid.

p. 758From which it is plain that passive power simpliciter is observed according to higher and lower causes ^?. And because insofar as it signifies a power having the character of obediential [potency] [?], passive power, which is taken by relation to a transmuting agent, [and] active power, insofar as it regards the act, insofar as it is referred to the recipient, or insofar as it regards the act elicited, [?] inasmuch as on the part of the recipient: it is also said that that which regards the moving cause; or [thus]: a cause is transferred [?]. And of this [power], moving outward, regards it [?]; it is said of the future; it does not signify anything in it [?], except that it will have power, if it signify [a power] of the present, or of the future, thus possibile can be taken according to whatever causes, whether higher or lower; the active power failing or not being consonant, it is a power called[?] the power of obedience. Or of this [power], which[?] thus is, [as] of what was the rib, would be able [to be], indeed it would be able, whence it could come to be, namely [obediential] power [?]. Possibile therefore, that which is said from a power, is not said univocally nor is it said wholly equivocally, but analogically, like sanum (healthy): and therefore the acceptation of it is determined by what is adjoined.

Editorial note: the preceding paragraph (in the Latin column) is the page-top of p. 758 and is heavily garbled in the OCR underlay. The five `[?]` flags mark spots where the OCR strings have collapsed multiple columns or marginal scholia into the running text and the 600 dpi PDF render is also worn in the inner gutter; the resolution is logged in `manual-review/d41-d50-polish-resolution-log.md`.

[Reset to clean reading from here:]

Therefore that which is possibile can signify the order of substance to acting; and from this it signifies active power, and this is determined by what is adjoined. For if it signify the order of an uncreated substance to act, it signifies an uncreated active power, as to illuminate the blind man. If however it signify the order of a created substance¹⁶, it signifies a created active power, as if it is said: it is possible for antichrist to run, or it is possible for the blind man to see — a power in the blind man is signified; therefore [the second] is false without qualification.

Again¹⁷ it can signify the order of something to coming-to-be (fieri), and this can be twofold: either in comparison to some [terminus] from which, or without [such] comparison. If in comparison to something from which — as when it is said it is possible for fire to come to be from air — then it imports passive power according to the thing. And if it be¹⁸ passive power simpliciter, such as that which is according to higher and lower causes¹⁹, it is said possibile simpliciter. But if it be passive power reducible only according to higher causes, it is only possibile secundum quid; as if it is said: of a tree-stump it is possible that a calf come to be, it must be denied²⁰ without qualification, unless there be added a contracting determination, as if it is said possible by the power of obedience, or possible to God. — But if it signify the order of something to coming-to-be without comparison to a principle from which, then it imports passive power according to mode, but active [power] according to the thing; as if it is said: it is possible that the soul of antichrist be created, or it is possible that a calf come to be, this is to say someone can make [it]; and therefore without [further] determination it is possibile, whether according to higher causes or according to lower causes, since by reason of the active power [the sense] is preserved on either side without qualification.

It can also, thirdly, signify the order or comparison of nothing to being, as when it is said: this can be whatsoever has been designated; and in this mode it signifies determinately neither active power nor passive power, neither according to higher causes nor according to lower causes; whence simpliciter is said whichever²¹ of these modes it be.

Only therefore in one case is possibile secundum quid said [to be such] according to higher causes, namely when it signifies passive power according to mode and thing, as when it is said: of the blind man there can come to be a seeing man, and of a tree-stump there can come to be a calf, and of an ass it is possible that a man come to be.

From these things all the objections to either side are plain: for the objections to the first part proceed from passive possibile, and such [things] are not true unless they are reducible through a non-obediential power, either to a higher cause by reason of completion, or to a lower [cause].

To the arguments:

To 1. To that which is objected on the opposite [side], that possibile is said denominatively from potentia; it must be said that possibile can be said denominatively from active or passive power; and because in God there is properly active power, therefore²² possibile simpliciter is said [to be such] according to that from which it is denominated, not according to that from passive [power].

To 2. To that which is objected concerning this, that the world is created; it must be said that, although it signifies power by mode of passion, nevertheless according to the thing it signifies nothing but active power, since before the creation of the world there is nothing except active power; and therefore it is said simpliciter according to higher causes.

To 3. To that which is objected, that it follows: if God can make [it], that the thing can come to be; it must be said that it is true insofar as potest signifies the same power by mode of passion, and this it signifies²³ when it is said simpliciter. But if it truly signify passive power, it does not follow, because that which is possibile is varied, as is plain, if it is said: God can make of a blind man a seeing man: therefore the blind man can be a seeing man, or of the blind man there can come to be a seeing man. For at first it was signifying active power simpliciter and afterwards passive [power]; and therefore it does not follow. Therefore when it is said: if the antecedent is possible, [so is] the consequent, it is to be understood with the same possibility.

To 4. To that therefore which is objected last, that every true [thing] can be true, before it is: it must be said that it is true, and, having designated a blind man becoming seeing, insofar as potest posits a power in act in that [man]; since it signifies a passive power disposed. But then it does not follow regarding the thing: therefore this man can see²⁴²⁵²⁶, because it signifies a created active power, namely a visual power. Nor does it follow: therefore of the blind man there will be able to come to be a seeing man, insofar as potest posits a power in act in that [man]; since it signifies a passive power disposed, indeed there is here a fallacy of the consequent; since when possibile is taken in its generality, it has three grounds of truth: either because in the blind man there is power to see, or [the] power to receive, or because in another there is power to give²⁶; by reason of this it has been said possibile, and it will some time become true, as is plain; and so the other objections are plain.