Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`). Quaracchi numbers its footnotes per printed page; this chunk renumbers them sequentially ¹–¹⁷ across the three printed pages (759, 760, 761). The earlier notes on p. 759 (Quaracchi notes 1–3) anchor in the q. 4 scholion of `bon-sent-I-d42-a1-q4.md`, not here; only Quaracchi note 4 on p. 759 (the Psalm reference) belongs to this chunk.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc verbo Augustini: Non facit Deus, nisi quod convenit eius veritati et iustitiae. Videtur enim falsum, quia in Psalmo¹ dicitur: Miserationes Domini super omnia opera eius: ergo magis deberet dicere, quod non facit, nisi quod convenit misericordiae. Et iterum, quae differentia est inter veritatem et iustitiam?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod iustitia uno modo est idem quod exigentia meritorum, et sic dividitur contra misericordiam; alio modo dicit condecentiam bonitatis, et hoc modo comprehendit misericordiam et iustitiam proprie dictam. Et sic accipit Augustinus in praedicto verbo, et hoc modo differt a veritate secundum rationem dicendi, quamvis idem sit secundum rem. Nam veritas respicit unamquamque rem secundum se; sed iustitia respicit unam rem comparatam ad aliam, secundum quod per leges debitas colligatur una alteri².

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Potuit Deus simul cuncta facere, sed ratio prohibuit. Videtur enim male dicere, quia posse prohiberi est impotentiae: ergo si divina potentia potest prohiberi, est impotens. — Item, illa ratio aut est quid creatum, aut increatum. Si creatum: ergo aliquid aliud a Deo prohibuit divinam virtutem, ergo aliquid potest resistere Deo. Si increatum: quomodo potest prohibere, cum sit omnino idem? — Praeterea, hoc non videtur prohibendum, quia Ecclesiastici decimo octavo³ dicitur: Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ratio hic vocatur voluntas rationalis, et rationabilitas in voluntate⁴, quamvis non dicat aliud quantum ad principale significatum a divina essentia, connotat tamen aliud, scilicet congruitatem aliquam in volito, quae quidem non reperitur in eius opposito. Quod patet. Si omnia simul producta essent quantum ad esse singulare, nulla creatura aliquid faceret, et non esset rerum⁵ cursus in universo, qui est. Voluntas ergo rationalis hoc exigebat, ut Deus non faceret omnia simul, quamvis posset; unde prohibitio non accipitur hic pro repugnantia, sed pro arctatione potentiae quantum ad actum, non quantum ad posse. Et haec est determinatio indifferentiae ad hoc opus, non ad oppositum; et sic patent obiecta. Nam Ecclesiasticus intelligit quantum ad partes principales sive priores, sed Augustinus loquitur quantum ad individua⁶.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de differentia horum quatuor, quae removet Augustinus⁷ a Deo, scilicet mori, falli, miserum esse et vinci.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ista dicunt defectus ipsius hominis sive animae in corpore. Quadruplex autem est actus et quadruplex potentia. Prima est vivificativa, et huius actus est vivere, et contra hunc est defectus mori. Secunda est cognitiva, cuius actus est nosse, et contra hunc est falli. Tertia est affectiva, et huius actus est velle sive amare et delectari, et contra hunc est miserum esse. Quarta est operativa, et huius actus est agere, et contra hunc est vinci et superari. — Et nota, quod ex his quae dicuntur, quatuor genera actuum removentur a Deo, scilicet corporales sive instrumentales⁸, ut currere; actus culpabiles, ut peccare, mentiri; actus passivi, ut vinci et superari; actus defectivi, ut mori et falli, quia habent potentiam coniunctam defectui. Et inde elicit Magister⁹ perfectam rationem potentiae, quod potest omnia facere et nihil pati.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus, quod omnia tam ample accepit, ut etiam mala includeret. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia aut malum includitur ratione substrati, aut ratione deformitatis. Ratione substrati includitur etiam proprie¹⁰, quia actio mala ratione actionis substratae est a divina potentia. Si ratione deformitatis, cum illa sit simpliciter non ens, non videtur posse includi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod malum accipitur ratione deformitatis; et quoniam omnia distribuit¹¹ ibi pro possibilibus, et possibile potest accipi generaliter, tam a potentia activa quam defectiva, et sic accipitur ample, et comprehendit malum; et sic intelligit Augustinus. Alio modo ut possibile dicatur a potentia, quae secundum rem et modum est potentia, et tunc proprie accipitur, et tunc non con-p. 761tinetur ibi malum, et sic accipitur in communi usu, cum dicimus Deum omnipotentem. Et sic patet, quod quamvis non contineatur sub ente, non¹² est simile de potentia.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod homo vel Angelus gratuitam habet potentiam, qua potens est. Videtur enim male dicere, quia generatio est actus naturalis, cum quis generet similem in natura¹³, ergo est potentia naturalis; sed non Dei, quia Deus non naturaliter producit hominem: ergo est hominis, ergo homo habet potentiam naturalem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod naturale dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo dicitur naturale quod habetur a natura et secundum consonantiam naturae; et sic creaturae multae habent potentias naturales. Alio modo dicitur naturalis potentia, quae inest alicui per propriam naturam, ita quod non per aliam naturam, nec dantem nec conservantem; et hoc modo sola virtus divina est naturalis, omnis autem alia a Deo est liberaliter data, et liberaliter conservatur et adiuvatur, ut agat, et ideo dicitur gratuita¹⁴.

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod vere ac proprie dicitur Trinitas Deus omnipotens. Videtur enim non verum dicere, quia non dicitur proprie omnisciens: ergo nec omnipotens. — Item, Matthaei ultimo¹⁵: Data est mihi omnis potestas in caelo et in terra. Et de aliis videtur, quia Marci nono¹⁶: Si potes credere, omnia possibilia sunt credenti.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod omnipotentia est solius Dei proprie, quia dicit potentiam infinitam, quae in nulla potest esse creatura, nec in Christo nec in alio secundum humanam naturam. Et hoc melius patebit alibi¹⁷. Unde si dicatur de Christo omnipotentia, hoc intelligitur secundum idiomatum communicationem. Si autem dicatur de credentibus, distributio est accommoda solum de miraculis. Et sic patet illud.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that saying of Augustine: "God does not do anything except what befits his truth and justice." For it seems false, because in the Psalm¹ it is said: "The mercies of the Lord are over all his works": therefore he ought rather to say that God does nothing except what befits his mercy. And again, what is the difference between truth and justice?

I respond: It must be said that justice, in one mode, is the same as the exigency of merits, and in this way it is divided against mercy; in another mode it states the befittingness of [God's] goodness, and in this mode it comprehends [both] mercy and justice properly so called. And so Augustine takes it in the foregoing saying, and in this mode it differs from truth according to the manner of speaking, although in reality it is the same. For truth regards each thing in itself; but justice regards one thing as compared to another, insofar as by due laws one is bound together with another².

DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: "God was able to make all things at once, but reason prohibited [it]." For it seems wrong to say [this], because being-able-to-be-prohibited belongs to impotence: therefore if the divine power can be prohibited, it is impotent. — Likewise, that "reason" is either something created or uncreated. If created: then something other than God prohibited the divine power, [and] therefore something can resist God. If uncreated: how can it prohibit, since it is altogether the same [as God]? — Furthermore, this does not seem to be something prohibited, because in Ecclesiasticus 18³ it is said: "He who lives in eternity created all things at once."

I respond: It must be said that reason is here called the rational will, and rationality in the will⁴, which, although it does not state anything other than the principal signified [thing] from the divine essence, yet connotes something other, namely a certain congruity in the willed [thing], which indeed is not found in its opposite. Which is plain. If all things were produced at once as to their singular being, no creature would do anything, and there would be no course of things⁵ in the universe, which there is. Therefore the rational will required this — that God should not make all things at once, although he could; whence prohibition is not here taken for repugnance, but for the restraining of power as to act, not as to being-able. And this is the determination of indifference to this work, not to its opposite; and so the objections are clear. For Ecclesiasticus understands [it] as to the principal or prior parts, but Augustine speaks as to individuals⁶.

DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning the difference of those four things which Augustine⁷ removes from God, namely dying, being-deceived, being-wretched, and being-overcome.

I respond: It must be said that these state defects of the man himself, or of the soul in the body. Now there is a fourfold act and a fourfold power. The first is vivifying, and its act is to live, and against this is the defect of dying. The second is cognitive, whose act is to know, and against this is being-deceived. The third is affective, and its act is to will, that is, to love and to delight, and against this is being-wretched. The fourth is operative, and its act is to act, and against this is being-overcome and being-vanquished. — And note that, from what is said, four kinds of acts are removed from God, namely bodily or instrumental [acts]⁸, such as running; culpable acts, such as sinning, lying; passive acts, such as being-overcome and being-vanquished; defective acts, such as dying and being-deceived, because they have power conjoined with defect. And from this the Master⁹ draws the perfect account of power, [namely] that it can do all things and suffer nothing.

DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Augustine says, that "he received all things so amply that he included even evils." For it seems false to say [this], because evil is included either by reason of the substrate, or by reason of the deformity. By reason of the substrate it is included even properly¹⁰, because an evil action by reason of the substrate of the action is from divine power. If by reason of the deformity, since that is simply non-being, it does not seem possible to be included.

I respond: It must be said that evil is taken by reason of deformity; and since all things there distributes¹¹ [the term] for possibles, and possible can be taken generally, [as proceeding] both from an active and from a defective power, in this way it is taken amply and comprehends evil; and so Augustine understands [it]. In another mode, possible is said [to come] from a power which according to reality and mode is a power, and then it is taken properly, and then evil is not con-p. 761tained there, and in this way it is taken in common use, when we say God-omnipotent. And so it is plain that, although [evil] is not contained under being, [it is] not¹² similar concerning power.

DOUBT V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that man or an Angel has a gratuitous power, by which he is powerful. For it seems wrong to say [this], because generation is a natural act, since one generates [something] like in nature¹³, therefore it is a natural power; but [it is] not [a power] of God, because God does not naturally produce man: therefore it is of the man, [and] therefore the man has a natural power.

I respond: It must be said that natural is said in two ways. In one way, that is called natural which is had from nature and according to the consonance of nature; and in this way many creatures have natural powers. In the other way, that power is called natural which is in someone through his own nature, in such wise that [it is] not through another nature, neither [a nature] giving nor preserving [it]; and in this mode the divine power alone is natural, but every other [power], [being] from God, is given freely, and is freely preserved and assisted, that it may act, and therefore is called gratuitous¹⁴.

DOUBT VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that truly and properly the Trinity is called God-omnipotent. For it seems not true to say [this], because [the Trinity] is not called properly omniscient: therefore neither omnipotent. — Likewise, in the last [chapter] of Matthew¹⁵: "All power is given to me in heaven and on earth." And concerning others it likewise seems [so], because in Mark 9¹⁶: "If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth."

I respond: It must be said that omnipotence belongs to God alone properly, because it states an infinite power, which can be in no creature, neither in Christ nor in any other according to human nature. And this will appear better elsewhere¹⁷. Hence if omnipotence is said of Christ, this is to be understood according to the communication of idioms. If however it is said of believers, the distribution is accommodated only to miracles. And so that [text] is plain.

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