Bonaventure

Quaestio II.

Utrum Deus mutabilia immutabiliter cognoscat.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus cognoscat mutabilia immutabiliter. Et quod sic, ostenditur:

1. Primo auctoritate Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus¹: «Cognoscit Deus omnia immaterialiter materialia, impartite partita, uniformiter multa, immutabiliter mutabilia».

2. Item, Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate²: «Eius scientia inamissibilis est et invariabilis»; sed omne tale immutabile: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione, quia quod nobilius est Deo attribuendum est; sed nobilior est cognitio, qua cognoscitur res immutabiliter, quam qua cognoscitur mutabiliter: ergo etc.

4. Item, quod est in aliquo est in eo per modum eius, in quo est³, et hoc verum est maxime in Deo, in quo omne quod est, est ipsum sive Deus: ergo cum scientia rerum et ipsae res cognitae sint in Deo, et ipse sit omnino immutabilis: ergo in Deo immutabiliter.

5. Item, ad hoc est ratio Augustini⁴, ducens ad impossibile: «Dei enim scire est suum esse, et scientia sua est sua essentia»: si ergo sciret mutabiliter, esset mutabilis, quod omnino in ipso est impossibile.

6. Item, ubi est mutabilitas, ibi nulla est certitudo, si ergo Deus sciret res mutabiliter, sciret incerte; sed incertitudo est conditio dedecorans cognitionem: ergo non haberet Dei cognitio perfectam nobilitatem.

Contra: 1. Cum res est praesens, scit Deus, eam esse praesentem; et cum praeterita, scit eam esse praeteritam; et cum est futura, scit eam esse futuram, non praeteritam: ergo videtur, quod sicut nos cognoscimus res mutabiliter, ita et Deus cognoscat⁵.

2. Item, ad hoc quod scientia sit vera, necesse est, scibile et scientiam proportionari, alioquin non est vera scientia: cum igitur mutabilis ad immutabile non sit proportio, sed mutabilis ad mutabile, ergo Deus non cognoscit res mutabiles immutabiliter, sed mutabiliter; alioquin non vere cognosceret, ut videtur.

3. Item, «quidquid scitur, est verum»⁶, ergo quod immutabiliter scitur, immutabiliter est verum; sed res mutabiles non habent veritatem immutabilem: ergo non possunt sciri immutabiliter.

4. Item, quia res sunt contingentes, ideo Deum praescire futura contingentia est contingens, sicut in praecedentibus ostensum est⁷; ergo quia res sunt mutabiles, Deum scire res mutabiles est mutabile: ergo mutabiliter cognoscit Deus mutabilia. Aut si non est hoc verum, quaero quare non? Et iterum, quomodo potest illud intelligi, quod rei mutabilis sit scientia immutabilis?

Conclusio.

Deus mutabilia cognoscit immutabiliter secundum actum sciendi, licet res secundum actum essendi sint mutabiles.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum Deus sciat res immutabiliter, hoc est dupliciter: quia haec dispositio⁸ immutabiliter potest determinare actum sciendi Dei, vel actum essendi rerum. Si actum sciendi Dei, sic omnino verum est, quod immutabiliter scit, quia circa eius actum et cognitionem non cadit transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio⁹. Si autem determinet actum essendi rerum, sic falsum est de rebus mutabilibus, quia Deus scit eas mutabiles et novit ipsarum mutabilitatem, et scit, se habere nunc aliter¹⁰ quam prius; sed tamen novit immutabiliter.

Et ratio huius est, quoniam in eius cognitione non est receptio, non est successio, nec est oblivio; et ideo, quantumcumque res sint mutabiles, ipse¹¹ non mutatur in cognoscendo mutabilitatem earum. Et quamvis nullum sit simile, potest tamen cogitari, si intelligatur vel cogitetur oculus fixus in pariete, qui se ipso videat transeuntes sine receptione et unico aspectu omnes videat et omnes motus ipsorum, quantumcumque res mutentur, tamen nec oculus mutatur nec eius cognitio; et sic est in Deo¹². Exemplum autem ad hoc intelligendum potest sumi a contrario sic. Quia enim scientia causata pendet a scibili, et non e converso, ideo potest esse mutatio circa scientiam per oblivionem et errorem et successivam considerationem, nulla facta mutatione in scibili. Sic contrario modo¹³, quia scientia divina non pendet ex re scita, potest esse mutatio circa scibile, nulla mutatione existente in divina scientia; et tamen illa scientia totum scit.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primo obiectum de hoc quod scit fuisse, et esse. Dicendum enim, quod hoc dicit mutationem a parte scibilis, non scientiae.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de proportione, dicendum, quod in specialibus conditionibus non oportet proportionari etiam scientiam causatam, quia rei corporalis est scientia spiritualis; sed sufficit, quod sit proportio in veritate.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quidquid scitur, est verum; ergo quod scitur immutabiliter, immutabiliter est verum; dicendum, quod hoc est accidens. Quamvis enim scientia respectu veritatis in scito de ratione suae intentionis generalis, maxime scientia respectu enuntiabilis; tamen scientia non dicit semper conformitatem in immutabilitate, maxime divina scientia, quae a scibili non dependet.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod futurum contingens non praescit Deus necessario; dicendum, quod non est simile tum ex parte actus praesciendi, tum ex parte dispositionis. Ex parte actus non est simile, quia praescire semper notat rei eventum; sed scire non semper connotat rei existentiam; scit enim Deus quae potest facere, et nunquam faciet. Praeterea, non est simile de dispositione, quia modus immutabilitatis respicit actum, sed contingens respicit non tantum actum, sed ordinationem ad futurum; et actus quidem divinae cognitionis est immutabilis et necessarius, sed comparatio ad futurum contingens est contingens.

Question II.

Whether God knows changeable things unchangeably.

Secondly it is asked whether God knows changeable things unchangeably. And that this is so, is shown:

1. First by the authority of Dionysius On the Divine Names¹: "God knows all things — material things immaterially, partite things impartitely, many things uniformly, changeable things unchangeably."

2. Likewise, Augustine in book XV On the Trinity²: "His knowledge is unlosable and invariable"; but everything of this sort is unchangeable: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this same point is shown by reason, since what is more noble must be attributed to God; but more noble is the cognition by which a thing is known unchangeably than that by which it is known changeably: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, what is in something is in it according to the mode of that in which it is³, and this is true most of all in God, in whom everything that is, is himself or God: therefore, since the knowledge of things and the things known themselves are in God, and he is altogether unchangeable: therefore [they are] in God unchangeably.

5. Likewise, to this purpose is the argument of Augustine⁴, leading to an impossible conclusion: "For God's knowing is his being, and his knowledge is his essence": if therefore he were to know changeably, he would be changeable, which is altogether impossible in him.

6. Likewise, where there is changeability, there is no certitude; if therefore God were to know things changeably, he would know with uncertainty; but uncertainty is a condition disgracing cognition: therefore the cognition of God would not have perfect nobility.

On the contrary: 1. When the thing is present, God knows that it is present; and when past, he knows that it is past; and when it is future, he knows that it is future, not past: therefore it seems that, just as we know things changeably, so also does God know [them]⁵.

2. Likewise, in order that knowledge be true, it is necessary that the knowable and the knowledge be proportioned, otherwise it is not true knowledge: since therefore there is no proportion between the changeable and the unchangeable, but between changeable and changeable, therefore God does not know changeable things unchangeably, but changeably; otherwise he would not know truly, as it seems.

3. Likewise, "whatever is known, is true"⁶, therefore what is known unchangeably is unchangeably true; but changeable things do not have unchangeable truth: therefore they cannot be known unchangeably.

4. Likewise, since things are contingent, therefore for God to foreknow contingent futures is contingent, as has been shown in the preceding [questions]⁷; therefore since things are changeable, for God to know changeable things is changeable: therefore God knows changeable things changeably. Or if this is not true, I ask why not? And again, how can this be understood, that of a changeable thing there is unchangeable knowledge?

Conclusion.

God knows changeable things unchangeably according to the act of knowing, although things, according to the act of being, are changeable.

I respond: It must be said that when it is asked whether God knows things unchangeably, this is twofold: because this disposition⁸ unchangeably can determine either the act of God's knowing or the act of the things' being. If [it determines] the act of God's knowing, then it is altogether true that he knows unchangeably, since concerning his act and cognition there falls no transmutation nor shadow of vicissitude⁹. But if it determines the act of the things' being, then it is false in the case of changeable things, since God knows them as changeable and knows their changeability, and knows that he is now otherwise¹⁰ than before; yet nevertheless he knows unchangeably.

And the reason for this is that in his cognition there is no reception, no succession, nor any forgetting; and therefore, however much things are changeable, he himself¹¹ is not changed in cognizing their changeability. And although there is no [perfect] likeness, it can yet be thought, if there be understood or imagined an eye fixed in a wall, which by itself would see those passing without reception and at one glance would see all things and all their motions: however much the things are changed, yet neither does the eye change nor its cognition; and so it is in God¹². An example for understanding this can be drawn from the contrary thus. For because caused knowledge depends on the knowable, and not vice versa, therefore there can be change concerning knowledge through forgetting and error and successive consideration, with no change made in the knowable. So in the contrary mode¹³, because divine knowledge does not depend on the thing known, there can be change concerning the knowable, with no change existing in the divine knowledge; and yet that knowledge knows the whole.

To the arguments for the affirmative side:

To 1. And by this is plain the reply to what was first objected, concerning the fact that he knows it to have been and to be. For it must be said that this expresses change on the side of the knowable, not of the knowledge.

To 2. To that which is objected concerning proportion, it must be said that in special conditions it is not necessary that the caused knowledge also be proportioned, since of a corporeal thing there is spiritual knowledge; but it suffices that there be proportion in truth.

To 3. To that which is objected, that whatever is known is true; therefore what is known unchangeably is unchangeably true; it must be said that this is accidental. For although knowledge has respect to the truth in the known by reason of its general intention, especially knowledge concerning the enunciable; yet knowledge does not always express conformity in unchangeability — most especially divine knowledge, which does not depend on the knowable.

To 4. To that which is objected, that God does not foreknow the contingent future of necessity; it must be said that the case is not similar, both on the side of the act of foreknowing and on the side of the disposition. On the side of the act it is not similar, because to foreknow always notes the event of the thing; but to know does not always connote the existence of the thing; for God knows the things which he can do and which he will never do. Moreover, it is not similar concerning the disposition, because the mode of unchangeability respects the act, but the contingent respects not only the act but also the ordering toward the future; and the act indeed of divine cognition is unchangeable and necessary, but [its] comparison to a contingent future is contingent.