Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 39
Quaestio III.
Utrum Deus possit scire plura, quam sciat.1
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Tertio quaeritur, utrum Deus possit scire vel praescire plura, quam sciat. Et quod possit plura scire, ostenditur sic.
1. Nihil scitur nisi ens et verum2; sed multa possunt esse, quae non sunt, et verificari, quae falsa sunt: ergo multa possunt sciri a Deo, quae tamen non sciuntur.
2. Item, quod possit plura praescire, videtur, quia praescientia est tantum futurorum; sed multa possunt esse futura, quae nunquam fient nec erunt: ergo multa possunt praesciri, quae non praesciuntur: ergo Deus potest plura praescire, quam sciat3.
Sed contra:
1. Quod non possit plura scire, videtur, quia scientia Dei est infinitorum, cum sit Infinita, sicut probatum est supra4; sed infinitis non possunt esse plura nec cogitari: ergo etc.
2. Item, si potest praescire plura, aut plura incomplexa sive plures res, aut plura complexa sive enuntiabilia. Non plura incomplexa, quia res scit Deus, etiamsi nunquam sint; scit enim omnia quae possunt fieri. Similiter non plura complexa, quia cuiuslibet contradictionis semper altera pars est vera, altera falsa5: ergo de complexis semper tot sunt vera quot sunt falsa: ergo qui scit omnia non potest scire plura, quia non possunt plura esse vera.
3. Item, quod non possit plura praescire, quam praesciat, videtur, quia quaecumque Deus praescit, simul praescit nec potest praescire nisi simul: si p. 691ergo potest plura praescire, quam praesciat, aut simul, aut successive. Simul est impossibile; ergo, quod successive similiter impossibile, quia in aeternitate non est successio: ergo nullo modo.
4. Item, si potest plura praescire, ergo cum maior sit praescientia plurium saltem extensive, et quod potest esse maius potest augeri, ergo divina praescientia potest augeri; sed ubi augmentum, ibi mutatio et variatio: ergo divina scientia potest mutari et variari.
Conclusio.
Scientia approbationis[^6] et visionis potest esse plurium, non autem scientia simplicis intelligentiae.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum Deus possit plura praescire vel scire, aliter est iudicandum de praescientia quam de scientia. Nam, sicut dici consuevit, triplex est Dei cognitio, non quantum ad diversitatem cognitionum, sed connotatorum7, scilicet cognitio approbationis, visionis et intelligentiae. Cognitio approbationis est solummodo de eis ad quae se extendit beneplacitum voluntatis, et hoc est solummodo de his quae fiunt et bona sunt; et haec absque dubio potest esse plurium. Cognitio vero intelligentiae dicitur cognitio, qua Deus cognoscit omne possibile et sibi et aliis, et hac cognoscit Deus infinita; et haec nullo modo potest esse plurium. Cognitio visionis est eorum quorum ab aeterno fuit praevisio8, et haec solum est eorum quae sunt vel fuerunt vel erunt; et haec cognitio potest esse plurium, quam sit. Et quia eiusdem est haec cognitio, cuius est praescientia, potest esse plurium. — Concedendum ergo, quod quaedam scientia potest esse plurium, quaedam non. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta de scientia.
Ad argumenta in oppositum:
Ad 1 et 2. Quod enim obiicit, quod scientia Dei est infinitorum, et quod nihil connotat circa incomplexum; dicendum, quod hoc verum est de scientia intelligentiae, sed non est verum de scientia visionis. — Quod autem obiicitur de praescientia, concedendum est, quod potest esse plurium.
Ad 3. Quod autem obiicitur ad oppositum, quod si potest scire plura, aut simul, aut non simul plura; dicendum, quod simultas potest attendi dupliciter9: aut quantum ad substantiam praescitorum sive cognitionem: sic est verum, quod simul, quia ab aeterno praescivit quaedam et ab aeterno potuit praescire plura et potest praescisse. Si autem attendatur simultas quantum ad rationem paucitatis et pluralitatis; sic est implicatio oppositorum, et sic est sensus, quod simul praesciat plura et pauciora. Et primo sensu obiectio habet veritatem.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, si potest plura praescire, quod potest praescientia augeri; dicendum, quod esto, quod praescita possent augeri, non tamen augeretur praescientia, quia uno et eodem praescit Deus et multa et unum, et plura et pauca. Tamen quamvis praescita possint esse plura, non tamen possunt augeri, quia augeri est de paucioribus fieri plura; sed haec: posse esse plura habet duas causas veritatis: aut quia de paucioribus possunt fieri plura, aut quia ab initio potuerunt esse plura; et hoc ultimo sensu est oratio vera. Et ideo, cum procedat a pluribus causis veritatis ad unam, facit sophisma secundum consequens10.
I. Ad hanc quaestionem solvendam distinctione utendum est inter scientiam simplicis intelligentiae et scientiam visionis. Eandem quaestionem S. Thom. (S. I. q. 14. a. 15.) proponit sub titulo: utrum scientia Dei sit variabilis. Differentia, quae est inter solutiones antiquorum doctorum, in solo modo loquendi consistere videtur. Communiter enim receptum est: 1. quod scientia simplicis intelligentiae est omnino invariabilis; 2. item, etiam scientia visionis et approbationis, quatenus consideratur ex parte cognoscentis; 3. sed quatenus consideratur ex parte rerum cognitarum, cum Deus ab aeterno plura in tempore creanda sibi proponere potuisset, scientia visionis et «praescientia potest esse plurium» (hic in corp., cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 14. a. 15. ad 2.). Hoc valet etiam de scientia approbationis, si accipitur respectu rerum unquam existentium. Alii idem sic dicunt: scientia visionis est invariabilis in sensu composito, id est supposita determinatione voluntatis iam facta; variabilis autem in sensu diviso, sive ut separata ab illa determinatione. — Pro meliore explicatione cfr. supra d. 38. a. 2. q. 2; infra d. 41. a. 2. q. 2; et quoad solut. ad 2. infra d. 42. a. 2. q. 1. 2. Nam, quod obiicitur quoad scientiam complexorum, quorum tot sunt falsa quot sunt vera, et falsa sunt praevisa sicut et vera, subp. 692tilitatem aliquorum posteriorum Scholasticorum non parum exagitavit eosque movit, ut solutionem hic datam negarent. Sed generalis responsio S. Doctoris sufficiens esse videtur. — Ad obiect. 4. duplex solutio datur. Prima patet, secunda procedit a distinctione inter esse plura et augeri sive fieri plura; illud potest concedi, quia locutio admittit sensum dictum, hoc autem non, quia importat sensum compositum.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 5. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2; S. I. q. 14. a. 15. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 8; S. p. I. tr. 15. q. 61. m. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.
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Question III.
Whether God can know more things than he knows.1
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Thirdly it is asked, whether God can know or foreknow more things than he knows. And that he can know more, is shown thus.
1. Nothing is known except being and the true2; but many things can be which are not, and many things which are false can be made true: therefore many things can be known by God which nevertheless are not known.
2. Likewise, that he can foreknow more things, seems clear, because foreknowledge is only of future things; but many things can be future which will never come about nor be: therefore many things can be foreknown which are not foreknown: therefore God can foreknow more than he knows3.
On the contrary:
1. That he cannot know more, seems so, because the knowledge of God is of infinite things, since it is itself infinite, as has been proved above4; but more cannot exist than the infinite, nor be thought: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, if he can foreknow more, then either more incomplex things, that is, more things, or more complex things, that is, propositions. Not more incomplex things, because God knows things even though they never exist; for he knows all things that can come about. Similarly not more complex things, because of any contradiction one part is always true, the other false5: therefore among complex things there are always as many true as there are false: therefore he who knows all things cannot know more, because more cannot be true.
3. Likewise, that he cannot foreknow more than he foreknows, seems so, because whatever God foreknows he foreknows simultaneously, nor can he foreknow except simultaneously: if p. 691therefore he can foreknow more than he foreknows, it must be either simultaneously, or successively. Simultaneously is impossible; therefore so is successively, equally impossible, because in eternity there is no succession: therefore in no way.
4. Likewise, if he can foreknow more, then since the foreknowledge of more is greater, at least extensively, and what can be greater can be increased, therefore divine foreknowledge can be increased; but where there is increase, there is change and variation: therefore divine knowledge can change and vary.
Conclusion.
The knowledge of approbation[^6] and of vision can be of more, but not the knowledge of simple intelligence.
I respond: It must be said that when it is asked whether God can foreknow or know more, it must be judged differently of foreknowledge than of knowledge. For, as it has been customary to say, threefold is God's cognition — not as to diversity of cognitions, but of things connoted7, namely the cognition of approbation, of vision, and of intelligence. The cognition of approbation is only of those things to which the good pleasure of his will extends, and this is only of the things which come about and are good; and this without doubt can be of more. The cognition called of intelligence is that by which God knows every possible, both for himself and for others, and by this God knows infinite things; and this in no way can be of more. The cognition of vision is of those of which there has been from eternity foreknowing8, and this is only of those things which are or have been or will be; and this cognition can be of more than there is. And because the cognition is the same as that of which foreknowledge is, foreknowledge can be of more. — It must therefore be granted that a certain knowledge can be of more, and a certain knowledge cannot. And by this is clear the response to the objections concerning knowledge.
To the arguments on the opposite side:
To 1 and 2. As to what he objects, that the knowledge of God is of infinite things, and that it connotes nothing about an incomplex; it must be said that this is true of the knowledge of intelligence, but not true of the knowledge of vision. — As to what is objected concerning foreknowledge, it must be granted that it can be of more.
To 3. As to what is objected on the opposite side, that if he can know more, either simultaneously or not simultaneously; it must be said that simultaneity can be considered in two ways9: either as to the substance of foreknown things, that is, the cognition: thus it is true that simultaneously, because from eternity he foreknew certain things and from eternity could have foreknown more and can have foreknown. But if simultaneity is considered as to the formal character of fewness and plurality; thus it is an entanglement of opposites, and the sense is that simultaneously he foreknows more and fewer. And in the first sense the objection has truth.
To 4. As to what is objected, that if he can foreknow more, then foreknowledge can be increased; it must be said that, granted that the foreknown things could be increased, foreknowledge nevertheless would not be increased, because by one and the same God foreknows both many and one, both more and fewer. Yet although the foreknown can be more, they nevertheless cannot be increased, because to be increased is, from being fewer, to become more; but this — to be able to be more — has two grounds of truth: either because from being fewer they can become more, or because from the beginning they could have been more; and in the latter sense the proposition is true. And therefore, since it proceeds from many grounds of truth to one, it commits the fallacy of the consequent10.
I. To solve this question one must use the distinction between the knowledge of simple intelligence and the knowledge of vision. The same question St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 14, a. 15) proposes under the title: whether the knowledge of God is variable. The difference between the solutions of the ancient doctors seems to consist only in the manner of speaking. For it is commonly received: 1. that the knowledge of simple intelligence is altogether invariable; 2. likewise, also the knowledge of vision and of approbation, insofar as it is considered on the side of the knower; 3. but insofar as it is considered on the side of the things known, since God from eternity could have proposed to himself more things to be created in time, the knowledge of vision and "foreknowledge can be of more" (here in the corpus; cf. St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 14, a. 15, ad 2). This holds also of the knowledge of approbation, if it is taken with respect to things at any time existing. Others say the same thing thus: the knowledge of vision is invariable in the composite sense, that is, given the determination of the will already made; variable, however, in the divided sense, that is, as separated from that determination. — For a better explanation cf. above d. 38, a. 2, q. 2; below d. 41, a. 2, q. 2; and as to the solution to 2, below d. 42, a. 2, q. 1. 2. For what is objected as to the knowledge of complexes — of which there are as many false as true, and the false are foreseen as well as the true — has not a little exercised the subp. 692tlety of certain later Scholastics and moved them to deny the solution here given. But the general response of the holy Doctor seems sufficient. — To objection 4 a twofold solution is given. The first is plain; the second proceeds from the distinction between to be more and to be increased or to become more; the former can be conceded, since the expression admits the sense divided, but the latter cannot, since it imports the sense composite.
II. Alex. of Hales, S. p. I, q. 23, m. 4, a. 5. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, 2; Summa I, q. 14, a. 15. — B. Albert, here a. 1, 8; S. p. I, tr. 15, q. 61, m. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 1, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here, I principal q. 2. — Durandus, here, q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 1. — Biel, here, q. unica.
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- Codd. hanc solutionem ultimo loco ponunt, forlasse quia respondet ad quaestionem incidentem.The codices place this solution in the last position, perhaps because it answers an incidental question.
- Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2., de conditionibus ad scire requisitis disserens ait: Vera (scil. principia) quidem igitur oportet esse, quoniam quod non est, non est scire.Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 2, discussing the conditions required for knowing, says: True (namely, principles) therefore must they be, since what is not, is not to be known.
- Vat. cum paucis mss. praesciat.The Vatican edition, with a few manuscripts, reads praesciat (he may foreknow).
- Dist. 35. q. 5.Distinction 35, question 5.
- Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis, et I. Periherm. c. 6. (c. 7.), et IV. Metaph. text. 9. seqq. (III. c. 3.). — In initio huius argumenti post Item auctoritate codd. II M V bb restituimus si, quod Vat. omittit, quae et deinde pro praescire exhibet scire.Cf. Aristotle, Categories, ch. On Opposites, and On Interpretation I, c. 6 (c. 7), and Metaphysics IV, text 9 ff. (III, c. 3). — At the beginning of this argument, after Item, on the authority of codices II M V bb, we have restored si, which the Vatican edition omits, and which thereafter, for praescire, displays scire.
- Cod. T praescientia.Codex T reads praescientia (foreknowledge).
- Pro connotatorum Vat. cum cod. cc cognitorum.For connotatorum the Vatican edition with codex cc reads cognitorum (of things known).
- Cod. T praevisor.Codex T reads praevisor (foreseer).
- Scilicet quatenus sunt praescita. — Pro praescitori sola Vat. praescientiae. Mox pro potest pra... quibus mss. potuit praescisse.That is, insofar as they are foreknown. — For praescitori the Vatican edition alone reads praescientiae. Shortly after, for potest pra..., certain manuscripts read potuit praescisse (could have foreknown).
- De quo vide Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 2.), ubi ad ostendendam falsitatem huius sophismatis inter alia et hoc exemplum affertur: Quemadmodum neque si febriens calidus, etiam calidum necesse est febrire. — Paulo ante verbis hoc ultimo cod. I praefigit in; deinde pro oratio codd. P Q Z omnino.On which see Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations I, c. 4 (c. 2), where, to show the falsity of this sophism, this example among others is brought forward: Just as, even if a feverish person is hot, it is not necessary that what is hot be feverish. — A little before, before this last word, codex I prefixes in; then, for oratio, codices P Q Z read omnino (altogether).