Bonaventure

I. Doctrina de ideis, quae et gravitate rei et controversiarum multitudine celebris est, a Scholasticis ex S. Augustino, praecipue ex libro 83 Quaest. q. 46, et de Civ. Dei, VII. c. 28, desumpta est. In primo loco S. Augustinus asserit, Platonem primo nomen ideae usurpasse, non autem rem ipsam primo intellexisse; deinde (n. 2.) docet: «Ideas igitur Latine possumus vel formas vel species dicere, ut verbum e verbo transferre videamur. Si autem rationes eas vocemus, ab interpretandi quidem proprietate discedimus — rationes enim Graece λόγοι appellantur, non ideae — sed tamen quisquis hoc vocabulo uti voluerit, a re ipsa non aberrabit. Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur. Et cum ipsae neque oriantur neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit». — Omnes autem doctores catholici in hoc conveniunt, ponendas esse ideas in Deo, quia alias sequeretur, eum agere vel a casu, vel necessitate naturae, non arbitrio voluntatis. Nam agere per voluntatem praesupponit, quod per intellectum agenda praedefiniantur. «Nam agens secundum naturam producit per formas, quae sunt vere naturae, sicut homo hominem et asinus asinum; agens per intellectum producit per formas quae non sunt aliquid rei, sed ideae in mente, sicut artifex producit arcam» (S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3.). «Creatura egreditur a Creatore, sed non per naturam, quia alterius naturae est, ergo per artem, cum non sit alius modus emanandi nobilis quam per naturam, vel per artem sive ex voluntate; et ars illa non est extra ipsum: ergo est agens per artem et volens: ergo necesse est, ut habeat rationes expressivas. Si enim dat formam huic rei, per quam distinguitur ab alia re, vel proprietatem, per quam distinguitur, necesse est, ut habeat formam idealem, immo formas ideales» (Hexaem. Serm. 12, in princ.). Cum doctrina de ideis maximi momenti sit, ut sententia S. Bonaventurae de praescientia et scientia Dei (infra d. 38. 39.) recte intelligatur, nonnulla praemittimus tum de pluribus terminis, qui hic occurrunt, tum de opinionum principalium differentiis, quae fere in eo fundantur, quod de formali idearum ratione auctores non idem sentiunt.

II. De variis terminis fere synonymis Seraphicus in Breviloq. (p. I. c. 8.) sic ait: «Sapientia divina, in quantum est ratio cognoscendi omnia cognita, dicitur lux; in quantum est ratio cognoscendi visa et approbata, dicitur speculum; in quantum est ratio cognoscendi praevisa et disposita, dicitur exemplar; in quantum est ratio cognoscendi praedestinata et reprobata, dicitur liber vitae. Est igitur liber vitae respectu rerum ut redeuntium, exemplar ut exeuntium, speculum vel lux vero respectu omnium. Ad exemplar autem spectat idea, verbum, ars et ratio: idea secundum actum praevidendi, verbum secundum actum proponendi, ars secundum actum prosequendi, ratio secundum actum perficiendi, quia superaddit intentionem finis. Quia vero haec omnia unum sunt in Deo, ideo frequenter accipitur unum pro alio». — Paulo aliter de iisdem loquitur Uldaricus (apud Dionys. Carth., hic I. Sent. d. 36. q. 1.): «Vocatur idea, id est prima forma, quia idea est forma omnium formarum, cuius participatione formalitas omnibus eis inest; exemplar, in quantum ipsam omnia imitantur; ratio, in quantum est similitudo rerum in intellectu; species, in quantum est medium cognoscendi; paradigma, in quantum secundum respectum eius ad rem Deus operatur — paradigma enim dicitur a para, quod iuxta, et dogma (!), quasi docens operari [παράδειγμα ἀπὸ παραδείκνυμι]. Vocatur etiam mundus archetypus a Platone in Timaeo, id est principale exemplar». — Similia leguntur apud Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. 1, et p. II. q. 3. m. 3; et B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 55. m. 2. a. 1. — Notandum autem, quod proprie loquendo ratio cognoscendi accipitur potius ex parte potentiae ut dispositio, qua ipsa redditur expedita ad intelligendum, sive est id quo cognoscitur. Haec in intellectu humano est tum species intelligibilis, tum lumen intellectus agentis, vel etiam illuminatio a superiore causa effecta. In Deo autem ipsa eius essentia sola est ratio cognoscendi se et omnia. Idea autem, ut ex sequentibus patebit, a plerisque nunc accipitur ut id quod cognoscitur, sive ut id quod intellectui obiicitur ut terminus ipsius, ad quem respiciens agens operatur et rem producit; et sic proprie est exemplar. Nihilominus S. Thomas et praecipue S. Bonaventura ideam accipiunt etiam ut principium, quo cognoscitur; et sic est idem quod ratio cognoscendi.

III. Circa formalem idearum significationem existit magna in scholis opinionum pugna.

1. Secundum sententiam Scoti (hic q. unica), cum qua fere conveniunt Durandus (I. Sent. d. 36. q. 3.) multique Nominales, et quam non improbabilem aestimat Richard. a Med. (I. Sent. d. 36. a. 2. q. 2.), ideae sunt ipsae creaturae secundum esse possibile, cognitum in mente divina, sive, ut dicit Mastrius (Disputationes theol. t. 1. disp. 3. q. 2.) «sunt creaturae praecognitae a Deo ut factibiles, adeo ut obiective tantum in divina intelligentia contineantur tanquam reales conceptus obiectivi». Docet enim Scotus (IV. Sent. d. 50. q. 3. n. 1.): «Si idea ponitur respectus essentiae divinae ad extra, cognitio illorum, ad quae est respectus ille, necessario praesupponitur: essentia enim nunquam est comparata, nisi prius intelligatur illud ad quod fit comparatio; non enim fit comparatio ad ignotum». — In hac sententia ideae non sunt praecise divina essentia (quae tamen praesupponitur), nec quatenus essentia divina absolute accipitur, nec quatenus includit relationem ad creaturas sive respectum imitabilitatis. Idem tamen dicit (loc. cit.), quod omnia cognoscantur «per illam essentiam, quae perfectissime omnia repraesentat, quae, ut sic repraesentans illa ut obiecta cognita, habet rationem ideae». — Inde sequitur, quod in via Scoti ideae non possint poni tanquam ratio cognoscendi creaturas (nisi terminative et secundario), sed tantum tanquam ratio sive principium producendi easdem, et quidem non effective, sed tantum exemplariter. — Sequitur etiam, ideas per se non habere respectum nisi ad res conceptas ut possibiles, non ut productas vel producendas in tempore. — Cum autem Scotus illud esse cognitum, quod res habent in intellectu divino, nominet esse diminutum et esse secundum quid, haec verba non debent intelligi in sensu Wiclefii, qui fertur docuisse, creaturas in Deo ab aeterno habuisse reale esse essentiae et existentiae; neque in sensu Henrici Gand., qui creaturis in Deo attribuit quoddam esse essentiae, non autem existentiae (quam sententiam Scotus multis argumentis impugnat), neque in hoc sensu, quem Caietanus (ad S. I. q. 14.) aliique Scoto imponunt, quod illud esse teneat medium inter ens reale et ens rationis. Nam ex ipsius Scoti verbis (loc. cit. et d. 36. q. unica, n. 5; d. 3. q. 4. n. 18.) nec non ex praecipuis Scotistis satis apparet, illud esse diminutum ponendum esse inter entia rationis (cfr. Mastrius, loc. cit.; Rada, loc. cit. a. 3; et inter nostrae aetatis auctores cl. P. Kleutgen: Die Philosophie der Vorzeit, tom. II. Abhandl. 6. n. 582. 583.).

2. Alii doctores in hoc conveniunt, quod statuunt, ideas creaturarum esse divinam essentiam, sed de modo, quo est idea, sive de ratione formali dissentiunt. S. Thomas (de Verit. q. 3. a. 2.) primum dicit: «Essentia (Dei) est idea rerum ut est intellecta», et deinde: «Divina essentia, cointellectis diversis proportionibus rerum ad eam, est idea uniuscuiusque» (cfr. S. I. q. 15. a. 1. 2; S. c. Gent. 1. c. 54.). Secundum S. Thomam igitur, ut Caietanus eum interpretatur, idea est divina essentia, ut formativa est rei medio intellectu, sive est divina essentia, quatenus a Deo intelligitur ut imitabilis a creatura. Unde essentia, considerata in se cum omnibus suis attributis, est obiectum divini intellectus primarium, proprium et motivum; at considerata in comparatione ad alia extra Deum producenda, est obiectum intellectus secundarium. — Porro, ideae referuntur tum ad res mere possibiles, tum ad res in qualibet differentia temporis existentes, attamen non eodem modo (de Verit. q. 3. a. 6; S. p. I. q. 15. a. 3. ad 2.). — Item, idea non tantum est principium producendi, sed etiam cognoscendi (S. I. q. 15. a. 3.). Exemplar autem sunt ideae, quatenus sunt in intellectu ut aliorum similitudo; ratio vero sunt quatenus sunt in intellectu ut in se intellectae, scilicet actu quasi reflexo (ibid. a. 2. ad 2.). — Denique distinctio idearum resultat ex diversis ad divinam essentiam respectibus, qui in rebus sunt.

Haec omnia saltem quoad substantiam approbantur ab Alex. Hal., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. et etiam a S. Bonaventura.

3. Nihilominus S. Bonaventura in nonnullis alium modum loquendi et procedendi adhibet, quem ob rei gravitatem ex multis locis contracte exhibemus:

a) Pater se intelligendo exprimit se et omnia in Verbo. «Pater Verbo suo quod ab ipso procedit, dicit se et omnia, quia Verbo suo se ipsum declarat» (supra d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. arg. 5. in fundam.). «Summus Spiritus, cum sit purus actus et sit non tantum intelligens, sed et intellectus, non potest se non intelligere. Cum igitur intellectus aequetur intelligenti, intelligit quidquid est et quidquid potest: ergo et ratio intelligentis aequatur intellectui, quia similitudo eius est. Haec autem cognitio similitudo Verbum est, quia secundum Augustinum et Anselmum similitudo mentis convertentis se super se, quae in acie mentis est, verbum est. Si ergo haec similitudo aequalis est, Deus est. Igitur species originata repraesentat originantem secundum omne quod est, et secundum omne quod potest: ergo repraesentat multa. Item, cum virtutem Patris repraesentat, repraesentat virtutem immensissimam» etc. «Igitur cum summus intellectus sit activum principium, in similitudine sua omnia disponit, omnia exprimit, omnia agit» (Hexaem. Serm. 3.).

b) Idea est divina essentia in comparatione ad creaturas. Ipsa significat «divinam essentiam in comparatione ad creaturam» (hic q. 3. in corp.), sive «in respectu ad id quod futurum est, vel etiam potest esse» (ibid. ad 5.).

c) Idea autem non est essentia, praecise quatenus est essentia, sed cum ordine ad intellectum, quatenus est veritas (hic in corp. et passim). Veritas autem concipitur ut proprietas divinae essentiae, quatenus se exprimit intellectui, sive ut «proprietas, quae est ratio significandi et intelligendi essentiam increatam» (supra d. 8. p. I. a. I. q. I. ad ult.; cfr. d. 3. p. I. dub. 4.). Sicut enim ens dicitur bonum per comparationem ad causam finalem, sic verum per comparationem ad causam exemplarem. «Sicut dicitur bonum ratione ordinis (in finem), sic verum ratione expressionis, et ratio exprimendi est ipsius exemplaris» (ibid. ad 4. 7.).

d) Divina veritas est lux et summe expressiva. «Veritas est lux summa, cui nihil potest occultari, nec etiam tenebrae obscurantur ab ipsa» (infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 2.), ipsa est «expressiva omnium» (hic in corp.). «Divina veritas una et summa expressione exprimit se et alia; ideo summa assimilatio est non tantum respectu sui, sed etiam respectu aliorum» (infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.).

e) Idea est similitudo cogniti expressiva. «Idea dicitur similitudo rei cognitae» (hic in corp.). «Idea secundum rem est divina veritas, secundum rationem intelligendi est similitudo cogniti» (hic q. 4. in corp.). Non autem «similitudo impressa vel expressa» (ut aliqui posteriores Scholastici putarunt), sed exprimens. «Quia omnino exprimens, ideo summe exprimit secundum omnes conditiones» (hic q. 2. ad 3.); ipsa dicit «immensitatem divinae veritatis in exprimendo et cognoscendo omne quod est Deo possibile» (hic q. 5. ad 3.) et aliis (d. 39. a. 1. q. 2; d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1. 2. 3.).

f) Haec similitudo differt a similitudine univocationis et imitationis. Non est similitudo univocationis, qua utrumque extremum per participationem convenit in aliquo tertio, nec solum similitudo imitationis, qua finitum in modico imitatur infinitum, sed potius similitudo expressionis, et quidem summa, «quia causatur ab intentione veritatis, quae est ipsa expressio» (hic ad 2.).

g) Idea ut similitudo est ratio cognoscendi, sed differt a similitudine, quae est in nostro intellectu. «Aliter est in nobis, aliter in Deo. In nobis quidem ratio cognoscendi est similitudo, cognitum est veritas. Nam in nobis est similitudo accepta et impressa ab extrinseco… In Deo autem est e converso, quia ratio cognoscendi est ipsa veritas, et cognitum est similitudo veritatis, scilicet ipsa creatura» etc. (hic in corp.).

h) Haec similitudo est ratio cognoscendi omnium expressiva. «Haec similitudo est ratio expressiva cognoscendi non tantum universale, sed etiam singulare» (hic q. 4. in corp.). «Haec est ipsa veritas expressiva cogniti, et eo similitudo, quo veritas… melius exprimit rem, quam ipsa res se ipsam exprimat» (hic ad 3.); ipsa «est actus purus et ipsa veritas»; est «extra genus», «non arctata nec limitata, sed extendit se ad omnia, sicut divina essentia»; ipsa est «similitudo communis (universalis) quantum ad indifferentiam et amplitudinem, propria vero quantum ad discretissimam expressionem» (hic q. 2. ad 3.). Dum igitur res creata per similitudinem (speciem) ab ipsa causatam non potest exprimere nisi se ipsam (II. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 2. q. 1.), et ne hoc quidem nisi ex parte; e contra «divina veritas una et summa expressione exprimit se et alia; ideo summa assimilatio est, non tantum respectu sui, sed etiam respectu aliorum» (infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4.).

i) A prima veritate omnia vera dependent. Sicut omnia entia dependent a primo et summo ente, ita omnes veritates a primo et summo vero. «Omnia enim vera sunt et nata sunt se exprimere per expressionem illius summi luminis; quod si cessaret influere, cetera desinerent esse vera. Ideo nulla veritas creata est vera per essentiam, sed per participationem» (supra d. 8. p. I. a. I. q. 1. ad 4. 7.). In eodem sensu dicit S. Thom. (S. c. Gent. I. c. 68.): «Sicut prima essentia omnis essentiae, ita prima intellectio et volitio omnis intellectionis et volitionis principium est».

k) Idea est similitudo rei, per quam res cognoscitur et producitur (hic arg. 2. in fundam.). Ipsa igitur non tantum est terminus cognitionis (id quod cognoscitur) et principium exemplare producendi ut «ratio, secundum quam artifex producit opera sua» (III. Sent. d. 14. a. 1. q. 2.), sed etiam principium cognitionis (id quo cognoscitur), sive ratio, qua Deus omnia alia cognoscit (cfr. d. 39. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3.).

l) Proprietates idearum. «Idea quamvis in Deo sit absolutum, tamen secundum modum intelligendi dicit respectum medium inter cognoscens et cognitum», qui «secundum rem plus se tenet ex parte cognoscentis, quia est ipse Deus, tamen secundum rationem intelligendi sive dicendi similitudo plus se tenet ex parte cogniti» (hic q. 3. in corp.). Pluralitas idearum est secundum rationem intelligendi (ibid.).

m) Definitio ideae. Ad mentem igitur Seraphici videtur esse definitio ideae, quae legitur in anecdoto compendio Commentarii eiusdem, scripto a Fr. Gulielmo de Marra, in I. Sent. d. 33. q. 3. (biblioth. Nationali Florentiae, cod. n. 727, A. 2.): «Idea est essentia divina seu aeterna veritas determinato modo imitabilis et expressiva huius imitabilitatis apud intellectum divinum; quoniam imitabilis, hoc materiale in ratione ideae; quod expressiva imitabilitatis, hoc formale. Unde in ratione ideae est considerare quod est, scilicet divina essentia vel veritas; ad quod est, scil. ideata; et quo est, et hoc est ratio exprimendi apud intellectum divinum».

IV. Si quaeritur, utrum doctrina S. Bonaventurae omnino conveniat cum sententia S. Thomae, P. Trigosus (Sum. q. 14. a. 3. dub. 2.) aliique expositores asseruerunt, utrumque S. Doctorem idem aliis verbis docere; sed P. Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus theol. t. 1. disput. 3. q. 2, et q. 6.) late probare nititur, notabilem differentiam esse inter utramque positionem. Hanc differentiam explicat asserens, secundum «Thomistas» ideam esse essentiam Dei, quatenus ipse sit ratio eminenter continens omnes creaturas tantum in essendo, «sive prout contineat eas eminenter et virtualiter per modum causae aequivocae, et prout cognita directe ab intellectu divino sub diversis respectibus imitabilitatis a creaturis». Hanc autem continentiam rerum in Deo secundum eminentiam et causativam potentiam non sufficere, ut sit ratio perfecte cognoscendi creaturas in individuo, quatenus sunt per finitatem contractae, sed sub hac ratione essentiam divinam tantum radicaliter et quasi sub ratione materiali esse ideam; atque ipsas res sic esse in Deo non actu, sed potentia. S. Bonaventuram autem praeter illam continentiam eminentiae et causalitatis in essendo requirere continentiam eminentialem in cognoscendo, quam habet divina essentia ex duplici capite: primo, quatenus est prima et summa veritas summe et infinite exprimens se et omnes alias veritates; secundo, quatenus habet rationem universalis et particularis causae et communis et propriae similitudinis (speciei), ut explicatur hic q. 2. ad 2. 3. Hanc esse rationem, quare S. Bonav. toties connectat duplicem rationem, scilicet continentiam virtualem rerum in potentia Dei, et continentiam exemplarem in summa veritate (ut I. Sent. d. 36. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2, a. 2. q. 1; d. 39. a. 1. q. 2.), et quare (hic ad 2.) non praecise similitudinem imitationis, sed similitudinem expressionis ad ideam spectare asserat. Porro dicit, ideam esse simul rationem cognoscendi rem ideatam et producendi eam, ipsamque secundum primam rationem proprie ideam dici, secundum aliam exemplar. Haec ex longiore discursu huius auctoris excerpsimus.

Utrum autem doctrina Angelici et Seraphici Doctoris praeter differentiam in modo loquendi et procedendi revera ita differat, ut vult de Barberiis, subtiliore et longiore disquisitione indigeret, quam libenter sapientioribus relinquimus. Tamen manifestum est, S. Thomam, S. Bonaventuram ipsumque Scotum concorditer docere haec: ideae sunt in divino intellectu per modum formarum sive similitudinum — ipsae habent triplicem comparationem, scilicet ad essentiam divinam, ad intellectum, ad res ideatas extra Deum, quas connotant — realiter in Deo idem sunt essentia, intellectus, veritas, idea. Manifestum est etiam ex praedictis, a S. Bonaventura praecipue urgeri illa increatae essentiae proprietas (in qua ultima omnis veritatis radix quaerenda est), qua essentia divina se sibi ut intelligenti infinite exprimit ac declarat; unde est, quod increata essentia est prima et infinita veritas. Sicut autem a prima essentia res creatae acceperunt, ut sint, ita a prima veritate, ut se ipsas possint exprimere, sive ut sint verae per participationem primae veritatis. Ipsae autem non possunt exprimere nisi se ipsas, et per imperfectam similitudinem. Prima autem veritas, quae est per essentiam, exprimendo se exprimit etiam omnia alia a se, et sic est eorum idea. — Doctrina haec est profundissima.

V. Quoad primam opinionem in respons. improbatam est notandum, quod cognoscere per causam intelligi debet sub additione in ratione causae sive inferendo effectum ex causa. Hoc observat Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 23. m. 2. a. 2.) ita dicens: «Potest considerari Deus velut id quod est causa, vel in ratione causae. Si consideratur ipse, qui est causa, omnia scit per causam, quia omnia scit per se, qui est causa omnium. Non autem scit omnia in ratione causae. Nam ubi intelligens et intellectum sunt idem, non est necessarium medium causa, ut patet, cum anima intelligit se, non intelligit se per causam» etc. Ceterum cognitio per causam non opponitur cognitioni per ideam, quae potius in causalitate nititur (cfr. S. Thom. de Verit. q. 2. a. 4.).

VI. Praeter auctores iam citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 23. m. 2. a. 1. 4, et m. 4. a. 1. — Scot., de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. unica; Report., de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. p. I. tr. 13. m. 2. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., d. 36. q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. Med., a. 2, d. 36. a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 36. princ. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 68. q. 3. n. 6. seq. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 36. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 3.

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I. The doctrine concerning ideas, which is famous both for the gravity of the matter and for the multitude of controversies, has been drawn by the Scholastics from St. Augustine, especially from the book 83 Questions, q. 46, and On the City of God, VII, c. 28. In the first place St. Augustine asserts that Plato first used the name idea, but did not first understand the thing itself; then (n. 2) he teaches: "We may then in Latin call ideas either forms or species, that we may seem to translate word for word. But if we call them accounts, we depart, as to propriety of interpretation — for accounts are in Greek called λόγοι, not ideae — yet whoever wishes to use this term will not stray from the thing itself. For ideas are certain principal forms or accounts of things, stable and unchangeable, which themselves have not been formed, and through this are eternal and always have themselves in the same way, [and] which are contained in the divine intelligence. And since they neither arise nor pass away, yet according to them is said to be formed everything that can arise and pass away, and everything that arises and passes away." — But all the Catholic doctors agree in this, that ideas are to be posited in God; for otherwise it would follow that he acts either by chance, or by the necessity of nature, not by the choice of will. For to act by will presupposes that what is to be done is predefined through the intellect. "For an agent acting according to nature produces through forms which are truly natures, as a man [produces] a man, and an ass an ass; an agent acting through intellect produces through forms which are not anything of the thing, but ideas in the mind, as the artisan produces the chest" (S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3.). "The creature goes forth from the Creator, but not by nature, since it is of another nature, therefore by art, since there is no other noble mode of emanating except by nature, or by art, that is, from will; and that art is not outside himself: therefore he is an agent through art and willing: therefore it is necessary that he have expressive accounts. For if he gives a form to this thing, by which it is distinguished from another thing, or a property by which it is distinguished, it is necessary that he have an ideal form, indeed ideal forms" (Hexaemeron Sermon 12, in the beginning). Since the doctrine on ideas is of the greatest moment, that the opinion of St. Bonaventure on the foreknowledge and knowledge of God (below d. 38, 39) may be rightly understood, we set forth a few things, both about several terms which here occur, and about the differences of the principal opinions, which are founded almost entirely in the fact that authors do not think the same about the formal account of ideas.

II. Concerning various nearly synonymous terms, the Seraphic [Doctor] in the Breviloquium (p. I, c. 8) speaks thus: "The divine wisdom, insofar as it is the account of knowing all things known, is called light; insofar as it is the account of knowing things seen and approved, it is called mirror; insofar as it is the account of knowing things foreseen and disposed, it is called exemplar; insofar as it is the account of knowing things predestined and reprobated, it is called book of life. The book of life, then, is with respect to things as returning; the exemplar, as going forth; the mirror or light, with respect to all. And to the exemplar belongs idea, word, art, and account: idea, according to the act of foreseeing; word, according to the act of proposing; art, according to the act of carrying through; account, according to the act of perfecting, since it adds the intention of the end. But because all these are one in God, therefore frequently one is taken for another." — A little differently of these same things speaks Uldaricus (apud Dionysius the Carthusian, here I. Sent. d. 36, q. 1): "It is called idea, that is, first form, since the idea is the form of all forms, by participation of which formality is in all of them; exemplar, insofar as all things imitate it; account, insofar as it is the likeness of things in the intellect; species, insofar as it is the medium of knowing; paradigm, insofar as according to its respect to the thing God works — for paradigma is named from para, that is, iuxta [beside], and dogma (!), as if teaching to operate [παράδειγμα from παραδείκνυμι]. It is also called archetypal world by Plato in the Timaeus, that is, the principal exemplar." — Similar things are read in Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 23, m. 4, a. 1, and p. II, q. 3, m. 3; and B. Albert, S. p. I, tr. 13, q. 55, m. 2, a. 1. — But it is to be noted that, properly speaking, account of knowing is rather taken on the side of the power as a disposition, by which it itself is rendered ready to understand, that is, that-by-which there is knowing. This in the human intellect is now the intelligible species, now the light of the agent intellect, or even illumination effected by a higher cause. In God, however, his very essence alone is the account of knowing himself and all things. Idea, however, as will appear from what follows, is now taken by most as that-which-is-known, or as that which is set before the intellect as its terminus, looking unto which the agent operates and produces the thing; and so it is properly exemplar. Nonetheless, St. Thomas and especially St. Bonaventure take idea also as the principle by which there is knowing; and so it is the same as account of knowing.

III. Concerning the formal signification of ideas there exists in the schools a great battle of opinions.

1. According to the opinion of Scotus (here the single q.), with which Durandus (I. Sent. d. 36, q. 3) and many Nominalists almost agree, and which Richard of Mediavilla (I. Sent. d. 36, a. 2, q. 2) judges not improbable, ideas are the creatures themselves according to possible being, known in the divine mind; or, as Mastrius (Theological Disputations, t. 1, disp. 3, q. 2) says, "they are creatures foreknown by God as makeable, in such a way that they are contained only objectively in the divine intelligence as real objective concepts." For Scotus teaches (IV. Sent. d. 50, q. 3, n. 1): "If idea is posited as a respect of the divine essence to-the-outside, the knowing of those things, to which that respect is, is necessarily presupposed: for the essence is never compared, unless first there is understood that to which the comparison is made; for there is no comparison to the unknown." — In this opinion ideas are not precisely the divine essence (which, however, is presupposed), nor as the divine essence is taken absolutely, nor as it includes a relation to creatures or a respect of imitability. The same [Scotus] nevertheless says (loc. cit.) that all things are known "through that essence which most perfectly represents all things, which, as so representing those [things] as objects known, has the account of idea." — Hence it follows that, in Scotus's way, ideas cannot be posited as the account of knowing creatures (except terminatively and secondarily), but only as the account or principle of producing the same, and indeed not effectively, but only exemplarily. — It also follows that ideas of themselves have no respect except to things conceived as possible, not as produced or to be produced in time. — But since Scotus calls that being-known which things have in the divine intellect diminished being and being-according-to-something, these words must not be understood in the sense of Wycliffe, who is reported to have taught that creatures had in God from eternity real being of essence and existence; nor in the sense of Henry of Ghent, who attributed to creatures in God a certain being of essence, but not of existence (which opinion Scotus impugns with many arguments); nor in this sense, which Cajetan (on S. I, q. 14) and others impose on Scotus, that that being hold a middle place between real being and being of reason. For from Scotus's own words (loc. cit. and d. 36, q. unica, n. 5; d. 3, q. 4, n. 18), as well as from the chief Scotists, it sufficiently appears that that diminished being is to be placed among beings of reason (cf. Mastrius, loc. cit.; Rada, loc. cit. a. 3; and among authors of our age, the noted Father Kleutgen: Die Philosophie der Vorzeit, t. II, treatise 6, n. 582–583).

2. Other doctors agree in this, that they hold the ideas of creatures to be the divine essence, but they disagree on the mode in which it is the idea, that is, on the formal account. St. Thomas (De Veritate, q. 3, a. 2) first says: "The essence (of God) is the idea of things as it is understood"; and then: "The divine essence, with the diverse proportions of things to it co-understood, is the idea of each thing" (cf. S. I, q. 15, a. 1, 2; Summa contra Gentes 1, c. 54). According to St. Thomas, then, as Cajetan interprets him, idea is the divine essence, as it is formative of the thing through the medium of the intellect, that is, [as] the divine essence insofar as it is understood by God as imitable by a creature. Whence the essence, considered in itself with all its attributes, is the primary, proper, and motive object of the divine intellect; but considered in comparison with other things to be produced outside God, it is the secondary object of the intellect. — Further, ideas refer both to things merely possible, and to things existing in any difference of time, yet not in the same way (De Verit. q. 3, a. 6; S. p. I, q. 15, a. 3, ad 2). — Likewise, idea is not only a principle of producing, but also of knowing (S. I, q. 15, a. 3). Ideas are exemplars, insofar as they are in the intellect as the likeness of others; they are accounts insofar as they are in the intellect as understood in themselves, namely by an act as it were reflex (ibid., a. 2, ad 2). — Finally, the distinction of ideas results from diverse respects to the divine essence, which are in things.

All these things, at least as to substance, are approved by Alex. Hal., B. Albert, Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., and also by St. Bonaventure.

3. Nevertheless, St. Bonaventure in some [places] employs another mode of speaking and proceeding, which, on account of the gravity of the matter, we set forth in compressed form from many places:

a) The Father, by understanding himself, expresses himself and all things in the Word. "The Father, by his Word who proceeds from himself, says himself and all things, since by his Word he declares himself" (above d. 32, a. 1, q. 1, arg. 5 in fundam.). "The supreme Spirit, since he is pure act and is not only intelligent but also intellect, cannot not understand himself. Since therefore the intellect is equal to the intelligent, he understands whatever is and whatever can be: therefore the account of the intelligent is also equal to the intellect, since it is its likeness. But this knowing-likeness is the Word, since according to Augustine and Anselm, the likeness of the mind turning itself upon itself, which is in the gaze of the mind, is word. If therefore this likeness is equal, [it] is God. Therefore the originated species represents the originator according to all that he is, and according to all that he can: therefore it represents many. Likewise, when it represents the power of the Father, it represents an immense power" etc. "Therefore since the supreme intellect is the active principle, in his likeness he disposes all, expresses all, does all" (Hexaemeron Sermon 3).

b) Idea is the divine essence in comparison with creatures. It signifies "the divine essence in comparison with the creature" (here q. 3, in corp.), or "in respect to that which is to be, or even can be" (ibid., ad 5).

c) Idea, however, is not essence precisely insofar as it is essence, but with order to the intellect, insofar as it is truth (here in corp. and passim). But truth is conceived as a property of the divine essence, insofar as it expresses itself to the intellect, that is, as "a property which is the account of signifying and understanding the uncreated essence" (above d. 8, p. I, a. I, q. 1, ad ult.; cf. d. 3, p. I, dub. 4). For just as being is called good by comparison with the final cause, so [is being called] true by comparison with the exemplary cause. "As it is called good by reason of order (to an end), so [it is called] true by reason of expression; and the account of expressing is of the exemplar" (ibid., ad 4, 7).

d) The divine truth is light and most expressive. "Truth is the supreme light, to which nothing can be hidden, nor are even shadows obscured by it" (below d. 39, a. 1, q. 2); it is "expressive of all things" (here in corp.). "The divine truth by one and supreme expression expresses itself and others; therefore the supreme assimilation is not only with respect to itself, but also with respect to others" (below d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4).

e) Idea is the expressive likeness of the known. "Idea is called the likeness of the thing known" (here in corp.). "Idea according to the thing is the divine truth; according to the mode of understanding, it is the likeness of the known" (here q. 4, in corp.). Not however a likeness impressed or expressed (as some later Scholastics thought), but expressing. "Since [it is] altogether expressing, therefore it most expresses according to all the conditions" (here q. 2, ad 3); it itself bespeaks "the immensity of the divine truth in expressing and knowing all that is possible to God" (here q. 5, ad 3) and elsewhere (d. 39, a. 1, q. 2; d. 40, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1, 2, 3).

f) This likeness differs from the likeness of univocation and of imitation. It is not a likeness of univocation, by which each extreme by participation agrees in some third; nor only the likeness of imitation, by which the finite in a small [degree] imitates the infinite, but rather the likeness of expression, and indeed supreme, "since it is caused by the intention of truth, which is the very expression" (here ad 2).

g) Idea as likeness is the account of knowing, but it differs from the likeness which is in our intellect. "It is otherwise in us, otherwise in God. In us indeed the account of knowing is likeness, the known is truth. For in us there is a likeness received and impressed from outside… But in God it is the converse, since the account of knowing is the very truth, and the known is the likeness of the truth, namely the very creature" etc. (here in corp.).

h) This likeness is the expressive account of knowing all. "This likeness is the expressive account of knowing not only the universal, but also the singular" (here q. 4, in corp.). "This is the very expressive truth of the known, and is a likeness in that it is truth… [it] expresses the thing better than the thing itself expresses itself" (here ad 3); it "is pure act and very truth"; is "outside genus", "not constricted nor limited, but extends itself to all, like the divine essence"; it is "a common (universal) likeness as to indifference and amplitude, but proper as to the most distinct expression" (here q. 2, ad 3). While, then, the created thing through the likeness (species) caused from itself can express only itself (II. Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 2, q. 1), and not even this except in part; on the contrary, "the divine truth by one and supreme expression expresses itself and others; therefore the supreme assimilation is, not only with respect to itself, but also with respect to others" (below d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4).

i) On the first truth all true things depend. As all beings depend on the first and supreme being, so all truths on the first and supreme true. "For all true things are, and have it from their nature to express themselves through the expression of that supreme light; and if it ceased to flow in, the rest would cease to be true. Therefore no created truth is true by essence, but by participation" (above d. 8, p. I, a. I, q. 1, ad 4, 7). In the same sense St. Thomas says (Summa contra Gentes I, c. 68): "As the first essence is the principle of every essence, so the first intellection and volition is the principle of every intellection and volition."

k) Idea is the likeness of the thing, through which the thing is known and produced (here arg. 2 in fundam.). It is therefore not only the terminus of knowing (that-which-is-known) and the exemplary principle of producing, as "the account, according to which the artisan produces his works" (III. Sent. d. 14, a. 1, q. 2), but also the principle of knowing (that-by-which there is knowing), or the account by which God knows all others (cf. d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3).

l) Properties of ideas. "Idea, although in God it is something absolute, nevertheless according to the mode of understanding bespeaks a respect intermediate between knower and known," which "according to the thing holds itself more on the side of the knower, since it is God himself, yet according to the mode of understanding, that is, of speaking, the likeness holds itself more on the side of the known" (here q. 3, in corp.). The plurality of ideas is according to the mode of understanding (ibid.).

m) Definition of idea. To the mind, then, of the Seraphic [Doctor] there appears to be the definition of idea, which is read in an unpublished compendium of his Commentary, written by Brother William of Marra, on I. Sent. d. 33, q. 3 (in the National Library of Florence, codex no. 727, A. 2): "Idea is the divine essence or eternal truth in a determinate manner imitable, and expressive of this imitability with [literally: apud] the divine intellect; because imitable, this is the material in the account of idea; that it is expressive of imitability, this is the formal. Whence in the account of idea is to be considered that which is, namely the divine essence or truth; that to which it is, namely the ideated; and by which it is, and this is the account of expressing with the divine intellect."

IV. If it be asked whether the doctrine of St. Bonaventure entirely agrees with the opinion of St. Thomas, P. Trigosus (Sum. q. 14, a. 3, dub. 2) and other expositors have asserted that each holy Doctor teaches the same in different words; but P. Bartholomew of Barberiis (Cursus theol. t. 1, disp. 3, q. 2 and q. 6) at length seeks to prove that there is a notable difference between the two positions. He explains this difference by asserting that, according to "Thomists," idea is the essence of God, insofar as he himself is the account eminently containing all creatures only in the order of being, "or insofar as he contains them eminently and virtually after the manner of an equivocal cause, and insofar as known directly by the divine intellect under diverse respects of imitability by creatures." But this containment of things in God according to eminence and causative power does not suffice that he be the account of perfectly knowing creatures individually, insofar as they are contracted by finitude; but under this account the divine essence is only radically and as it were under a material aspect idea; and the things themselves are so in God not in act but in potency. But St. Bonaventure, beyond that containment of eminence and causality in being, requires an eminential containment in knowing, which the divine essence has from a twofold head: first, insofar as it is the first and supreme truth supremely and infinitely expressing itself and all other truths; second, insofar as it has the account of universal and particular cause and of common and proper likeness (species), as is explained here q. 2, ad 2, 3. This is the reason why St. Bonaventure so often connects the twofold account, namely the virtual containment of things in the power of God, and the exemplary containment in the supreme truth (as I. Sent. d. 36, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2; a. 2, q. 1; d. 39, a. 1, q. 2), and why (here ad 2) he asserts that not precisely the likeness of imitation but the likeness of expression belongs to idea. Further, he says that idea is at once the account of knowing the ideated thing and of producing it, and that according to the first account it is properly called idea, according to the other, exemplar. These things we have excerpted from a longer discussion of this author.

But whether the doctrine of the Angelic and Seraphic Doctors, beyond a difference in the mode of speaking and proceeding, really differs so [much] as de Barberiis wishes, would need a more subtle and longer disquisition, which we gladly leave to the more wise. Yet it is manifest that St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus himself concordantly teach these [points]: ideas are in the divine intellect after the manner of forms or likenesses — they themselves have a threefold comparison, namely to the divine essence, to the intellect, [and] to the ideated things outside God, which they connote — really in God essence, intellect, truth, [and] idea are the same. It is also manifest from what has been said that, by St. Bonaventure especially, that property of the uncreated essence is urged (in which the ultimate root of all truth is to be sought), by which the divine essence expresses and declares itself to itself as to one understanding, infinitely; whence it is that the uncreated essence is the first and infinite truth. Just as from the first essence created things received that they might be, so from the first truth that they might express themselves, that is, that they might be true by participation of the first truth. They themselves, however, can express only themselves, and through an imperfect likeness. But the first truth, which is by essence, by expressing itself expresses also all others apart from itself, and so is their idea. — This doctrine is most profound.

V. As to the first opinion improbated in the Response, it is to be noted that to know through cause must be understood with the addition in the account of cause, that is, by inferring the effect from the cause. Alex. Hal. observes this (S. p. I, q. 23, m. 2, a. 2), saying thus: "God can be considered either as that which is cause, or in the account of cause. If he himself, who is the cause, is considered, he knows all things through a cause, since he knows all things through himself, who is the cause of all. But he does not know all things in the account of cause. For where the intelligent and the understood are the same, a medium of cause is not necessary, as is clear when the soul understands itself, it does not understand itself through a cause" etc. Moreover, knowing through cause is not opposed to knowing through idea, which rather rests upon causality (cf. St. Thomas, De Verit. q. 2, a. 4).

VI. Besides the authors already cited: Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 23, m. 2, a. 1, 4, and m. 4, a. 1. — Scot., On this and the two following questions here q. unica; Reportata, on this and the two following questions here q. 2. — B. Albert., here a. 7; S. p. I, tr. 13, m. 2, a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., d. 36, q. 2, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., a. 2, d. 36, a. 2, q. 1, 2. — Aegidius Romanus, I. Sent. d. 36, princ. 2, q. 1. — Henr. of Ghent, S. a. 68, q. 3, n. 6 ff. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 36, q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1. — Biel, here q. 3.

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