Bonaventure

Quaestio II.

Utrum in ideis ponenda sit pluralitas secundum rem.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit ponere in ideis pluralitatem secundum rem. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia Augustinus dicit, quod «ideae sunt formae aeternae et incommutabiles»¹. Si sunt formae plures, cum forma dicat ipsum quod est idea absolute, tunc videtur, quod sint plures, secundum id quod sunt absolute.

2. Item, idea est similitudo exprimens ideatum secundum totum; sed quaecumque uni et eidem secundum totum sunt similia, nullo modo ad invicem differunt²: ergo si idea omnium, secundum id quod est, esset una, tunc omnia essent indifferentia.

3. Item, si idea est unum quid, aut una communis aut una propria similitudo: si una communis: ergo per ipsam nunquam res distinguuntur; si una propria: ergo per ipsam nunquam plura cognoscuntur.

4. Item, si idea est ratio cognoscendi; sed unumquodque cognoscens cognoscit secundum exigentiam rationis cognoscendi: ergo si idea est unum quid, cum in uno non cadat distinctio, Deus non cognoscit res distincte, sed indistincte.

Contra:

1. Augustinus sexto de Trinitate³: «Filius est ars quaedam omnipotentis Dei plena omnium rationum viventium, et omnia in ipso unum sunt».

2. Item, quod perfectius est Deo est attribuendum: sed perfectius est uno posse cognoscere plura et operari quam pluribus⁴: ergo Deo est attribuendum: ergo Deus una idea omnia cognoscit.

3. Item, in omni genere causae status est in uno simplici, utpote in genere efficientis et finis⁵: ergo cum Deus sit exemplar, in quo est omnimode status, est ergo in Deo summa unitas. Sed exemplar, quod continet multa, non est omnino unum et simplex: ergo in divino exemplari non est nisi una idea secundum rem.

Conclusio.

Ideae in Deo sunt ipsa divina veritas, et ideo secundum rem est una idea.

Respondeo: Ad intelligentiam praedictorum est notandum, quod hic fuit duplex opinio.

Quidam enim dixerunt, quod ideae in Deo secundum rem habent distinctionem. Dixerunt enim, quod est considerare universitatem formarum in Deo, in anima et in mundo sive in materia. Et in materia sive in universo habent distinctionem, compositionem et oppositionem, quia sunt ibi materialiter. In anima vero humana habent distinctionem et compositionem, sed non habent oppositionem, et hoc, quia sunt aliquo modo⁶ spiritualiter, non tamen omnino, quia sunt a rebus extra; ideo est compositio: differunt enim ab anima. In Deo habent distinctionem, sed non compositionem, nec oppositionem propter summam simplicitatem. Et quamvis in Deo sint distinctae, sunt tamen unum exemplar, sicut plures formae particulares in sigillo faciunt unum sigillum. — Sed ista positio, quamvis in sui initio videatur probabilis, in fine tamen continet errorem. Nam si in Deo esset ponere ideas realiter differentes sive distinctas, tunc esset ibi alia pluralitas realis, quam sit pluralitas personalis; quod abhorrent aures piae. Si dicas, quod non est pluralitatem aliam⁷ absolutam ponere, sed respectivam; tunc quaero de illo respectu: aut est aliquid, aut nihil: si nihil, nulla est ibi realis distinctio; si aliquid, non est dare nisi divinam essentiam; sed omnia essentialia in Deo unum sunt.

Et ideo est alia positio, quod ideae sunt unum secundum rem. Et hoc patet sic: idea in Deo dicit similitudinem, quae est ratio cognoscendi; illa autem secundum rem est ipsa divina veritas, sicut

supra⁸ monstratum est; et quia illa est una, patet, quod secundum rem omnes ideae unum sunt. Et hoc dicit Augustinus expresse, quod in illa arte omnia sunt unum.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod sunt formae; dicendum, quod forma duplex est, scilicet forma, quae est perfectio rei, et forma exemplaris. Et Augustinus accipit ideas in ratione formae pro forma exemplari. Utraque tamen relative dicitur⁹, illa ad materiam, quam informat, sed ista ad exemplatum. Et ideo, quia forma dicit ut ad alterum, sicut similitudo, quando dicuntur plures formae, non ex hoc notatur, quod in ideis sit pluralitas secundum rem sive secundum id quod sunt, sed secundum id ad quod sunt¹⁰.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idea est similitudo exprimens secundum totum: ergo etc.; ad hoc est unus modus dicendi, quod idea non dicit similitudinem aliquam, per quam cognoscens assimiletur aliis, sed cui multa assimilantur; et multa possunt assimilari uni, sicut si a forma sigilli eadem fiat expressio figurae in cera, poterunt¹¹ esse ab eadem forma una multae et variae impressiones, secundum quod sigillum magis et minus imprimitur. Sic in Deo intelligunt: quoniam multitudo in rebus venit secundum gradus et approximationem ad ipsum esse divinum. — Sed illud non sufficit dicere, quia Deus facit omnia diversa secundum formam, non tantum secundum gradum et dignitatem; et illa cognoscit per unum secundum rem, quod quidem est similitudo cogniti. — Si tu dicas, quod hoc est, quia Deus se ipso cognoscit, sicut se ipso agit, ideo, sicut uno agit multa, ita uno cognoscit multa; adhuc non est solutum, quia adhuc manet quaestio, quomodo ipse Deus possit assimilari multis.

Propter hoc dicendum, quod similitudo quaedam est secundum proprietatem generis; et de hac non est dubium, quod non potest esse una plurium genere differentium; et haec est similitudo, quae exprimitur et causatur a re generis determinati¹². Alia est similitudo simpliciter extra genus; et haec, quia ad hoc genus non arctatur, qua ratione est huius ea ratione est illius, et qua ratione est huius secundum partem, eadem ratione secundum totum; et talis similitudo est divina veritas et idea in Deo. — Si tu quaeras, quomodo hoc possit intelligi; aliqualiter intelligi potest, quamvis non possit aptari omnino simile. Cum enim illa similitudo sit actus purus et ipsa veritas, sicut dictum est¹³, et omnia alia cognoscibilia, quantumcumque nobilia secundum id quod sunt, comparentur ad ipsam per modum possibilis: sicut unum secundum formam potest assimilari pluribus secundum materiam¹⁴ diversis, sic in proposito una realis similitudo potest esse omnium cognoscibilium. Et potest poni exemplum in luce aliquo modo, quae una secundum numerum exprimit multas et varias species colorum. In cognitione autem nostra, quoniam se habet per modum possibilis respectu cogniti et quodam modo informabilis ab illo, non potest inveniri similitudo, immo invenitur dissimilitudo; et ideo aspiciendo ad cognitionem nostram videtur nobis in Deo non esse intelligibile.

3. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum illa similitudo sit propria vel communis; dicendum, quod Deus non dicitur causa universalis nec particularis simpliciter; sed aliquid habet de nobilitate causae universalis, quia potest in plurimos effectus; similiter¹⁵ aliquid de causa particulari, quia immediate et sufficienter potest in effectum quemlibet. Sic in cognitione Dei intelligendum, quod nec omnino est in universali, nec omnino in particulari. Similiter de similitudine et idea intelligendum est, quod communis est quantum ad indifferentiam et amplitudinem, propria¹⁶ vero quantum ad discretissimam expressionem. Ratio huius est, quia est similitudo exprimens, non impressa nec expressa:

quia omnino exprimens, ideo summe exprimit et secundum omnes conditiones. Et rursus, ex hoc quod non est expressa, ideo non est arctata nec limitata, sed extendit se ad omnia, sicut divina essentia; quamvis tota sit in uno, non tamen sic est in uno, quod non sit in alio.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quod cognoscit secundum exigentiam rationum; dicendum, quod sicut ratio cognoscendi est una, et tamen plura cognita distinctissime repraesentat secundum proprias conditiones; sic divina cognitio quantum ad modum cognoscendi, qui est in ipsa, est una et simplex non distincta; sed in comparatione ad obiectum distincte cognoscit. Quando ergo dicitur: Deus cognoscit omnia distincte; si distinctio ponitur in cognitione per comparationem ad cognoscentem, falsa est; si autem per comparationem ad cognitum, sic habet veritatem.

Question II.

Whether plurality according to the thing is to be posited in the ideas.

Secondly it is asked, whether a plurality is to be posited in the ideas according to the thing. And that there is, appears thus:

1. Because Augustine says that "the ideas are eternal and unchangeable forms"¹. If they are several forms, since form states the very thing which the idea is absolutely, then it appears that they are several according to that which they are absolutely.

2. Likewise, the idea is a likeness expressing the ideated thing according to the whole; but whatever things are similar to one and the same according to the whole differ in no way from one another²: therefore if the idea of all things, according to that which it is, were one, then all things would be indifferent.

3. Likewise, if the idea is one thing, [it is] either one common or one proper likeness: if one common: therefore through it things are never distinguished; if one proper: therefore through it many [things] are never known.

4. Likewise, if the idea is a ground of knowing; but every knower knows according to the requirement of the ground of knowing: therefore if the idea is one thing, since in what is one no distinction falls, God does not know things distinctly, but indistinctly.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine, On the Trinity, book six³: "The Son is a certain art of the omnipotent God, full of all the living accounts, and all things in him are one."

2. Likewise, that which is more perfect is to be attributed to God: but it is more perfect to be able to know and to operate many things by one than by many⁴: therefore it is to be attributed to God: therefore God knows all things by one idea.

3. Likewise, in every kind of cause there is a stop in one simple [thing], as in the kind of efficient and of end⁵: therefore since God is the exemplar in which there is in every way a stop, there is therefore in God supreme unity. But an exemplar which contains many is not altogether one and simple: therefore in the divine exemplar there is, according to the thing, only one idea.

Conclusion.

The ideas in God are the very divine truth, and therefore according to the thing there is one idea.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that here there has been a twofold opinion.

For some have said that the ideas in God have a distinction according to the thing. They said indeed that one can consider the totality of forms in God, in the soul, and in the world, that is, in matter. And in matter, that is, in the universe, they have distinction, composition, and opposition, since they are there materially. In the human soul they have distinction and composition, but they do not have opposition, and this because they are in some way⁶ spiritually, yet not altogether [so], since they are from things outside; and so there is composition: for they differ from the soul. In God they have distinction, but not composition, nor opposition, on account of the supreme simplicity. And although in God they are distinct, they are nonetheless one exemplar, just as several particular forms in a seal make one seal. — But this position, although in its beginning it appears probable, in the end nevertheless contains an error. For if in God ideas were to be posited as really differing or distinct, then there would be there another real plurality, beyond what the personal plurality is — which pious ears abhor. If you say that there is no other⁷ absolute plurality to posit, but a respective one; then I ask about that respect: it is either something or nothing: if nothing, there is no real distinction there; if something, nothing can be given but the divine essence; but all the essentials in God are one.

And therefore there is another position, that the ideas are one according to the thing. And this is clear thus: an idea in God states a likeness, which is a ground of knowing; but that, according to the thing, is the very divine truth, as

was shown above⁸; and since that is one, it is clear that according to the thing all ideas are one. And this Augustine expressly says, that in that art all things are one.

1. Therefore to that which is objected, that they are forms; it must be said that form is twofold, namely the form which is the perfection of a thing, and the exemplar form. And Augustine takes ideas in the account of form for exemplar form. Yet each is said relatively⁹, the former to the matter which it informs, but the latter to the exemplated thing. And therefore, since form states [something] as toward another, like a likeness, when several forms are spoken of, it is not from this noted that there is in the ideas a plurality according to the thing or according to that which they are, but according to that toward which they are¹⁰.

2. To that which is objected, that the idea is a likeness expressing according to the whole: therefore etc.; to this there is one mode of speaking, that the idea does not state some likeness through which the knower is assimilated to other things, but [a likeness] to which many things are assimilated; and many can be assimilated to one, just as if from the form of a seal the same expression of the figure should be made in wax, there can be¹¹ from the same one form many and varied impressions, according as the seal is more or less impressed. Thus they understand it in God: that the multitude in things comes according to grades and approximation to the divine being itself. — But that does not suffice to say, since God makes all things diverse according to form, not only according to grade and dignity; and he knows them through one [thing] according to the thing, which indeed is the likeness of the known. — If you say that this is because God knows by himself, just as he acts by himself, therefore, just as by one [thing] he acts many, so by one he knows many; still it is not solved, since the question still remains, how God himself can be assimilated to many.

On account of this it must be said that one likeness is according to the property of a genus; and concerning this there is no doubt that there cannot be one [likeness] of many things differing in genus; and this is the likeness which is expressed and caused by a thing of a determinate genus¹². Another is the likeness simply outside [any] genus; and this, since it is not constricted to this genus, by what account it is of this by that account it is of that, and by what account it is of this in part, by the same account [it is so] in whole; and such a likeness is the divine truth and the idea in God. — If you ask how this can be understood; it can be in some way understood, although a wholly similar [example] cannot be fitted. For since that likeness is pure act and the very truth, as has been said¹³, and all other knowables, however noble according to that which they are, are compared to it after the manner of a possible: just as one [thing] according to form can be assimilated to several diverse [things] according to matter¹⁴, so in the proposition one real likeness can be of all knowables. And an example can be given in a way in light, which, being one according to number, expresses many and varied species of colors. In our knowledge, however, since it is had after the manner of a possible with respect to the known, and in some way informable by it, no likeness can be found, rather a dissimilarity is found; and therefore looking to our knowledge it seems to us that in God [this] is not intelligible.

3. To that which is asked, whether that likeness is proper or common; it must be said that God is not called a universal cause nor a particular [one] simply; but he has something of the nobility of a universal cause, since he is able for very many effects; likewise¹⁵ something of a particular cause, since immediately and sufficiently he is able for any effect whatever. Thus in the knowledge of God it is to be understood that it is neither altogether in the universal, nor altogether in the particular. Likewise concerning the likeness and the idea it is to be understood that it is common as to indifference and amplitude, but proper¹⁶ as to most-discrete expression. The reason of this is that it is an expressing likeness, not impressed nor expressed:

since it is altogether expressing, therefore it expresses in the highest [degree] and according to all conditions. And again, from this, that it is not expressed, therefore it is not constricted nor limited, but extends itself to all things, like the divine essence; although the whole is in one, yet it is not so in one that it is not in another.

4. To that which is objected lastly, that [God] knows according to the requirement of the grounds; it must be said that just as the ground of knowing is one, and yet represents many known [things] most distinctly according to their proper conditions; so the divine knowing as to the mode of knowing, which is in itself, is one and simple, not distinct; but in comparison to the object it knows distinctly. When therefore it is said: God knows all things distinctly; if the distinction is placed in the knowing by comparison to the knower, it is false; but if by comparison to the known, thus it has truth.