Bonaventure

Quaestio III.

Utrum in ideis sit pluralitas secundum rationem.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in ideis sit pluralitas secundum rationem. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Augustinus libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum¹: «Alia ratione conditus est homo, alia equus»: ergo si idea dicit ipsam rationem cognoscendi, necesse est, quod plurificetur secundum rationem.

2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ex modo loquendi et definiendi, quia Augustinus² loquitur in plurali et definit in plurali ipsas ideas dicens, quod sunt formae: ergo plurificantur re, vel ratione; sed non re; ergo ratione.

3. Item, idea dicit similitudinem ad cognitum, et similitudo, quamvis in Deo sit quid absolutum, habet modum dicendi ad alterum sive respectum; sed plurificatio similitudinis relativae est a re, cui assimilatur³: ergo cum res ideatae sint plures, ideae sunt plures secundum rationem dicendi.

4. Item, Deus, antequam res producat, distincte cognoscit et actu; sed non est distinctio in Deo cognoscente nec in cognito: ergo oportet, quod sit in ratione cognoscendi.

Contra:

1. Si est⁴ plurificatio secundum rationem, cum non sit re, tunc videtur illa pluralitas non esse aliud quam vanitas.

2. Item, si est in hoc nomine idea pluralitas, aut ratione eius quod est, aut ratione eius ad quod est: non ratione eius quod est, quia est divina essentia; si ratione eius ad quod est, ergo cum verbum et exemplar et ars dicant respectum ad creaturam, saltem secundum nomen debent plurificari, quod tamen falsum est.

3. Item, si ideae sunt plures, non propter significatum, sed propter connotatum, tunc quaero: aut connotatum illud est aeternum, aut temporale: si aeternum, ergo videtur, quod plura sint ab aeterno; si temporale, ergo videtur, quod idea non dicatur de Deo nisi ex tempore, sicut nec dominus nec creator dicuntur nisi ex tempore.

4. Item, ideae, si sunt plures propter ideata, aut ergo secundum esse, quod habent ideata in Deo, aut in proprio genere. Si propter esse, quod habent in Deo; contra: in Deo sunt unum, ergo ratione illius esse non possunt dici plures. Si propter esse, quod habent in proprio genere; sed⁵ non habent nisi ex tempore: ergo vel ideae non sunt plures nisi ex tempore, vel temporale est causa aeterni; quorum utrumque est inconveniens.

5. Item, idea aut dicit aliquid, aut nihil: si nihil, ergo nec pluralitatem habet nec unitatem; si aliquid dicit, ergo si sunt plures ideae, sunt plures res: ergo si plures ideae sunt ab aeterno, plures res sunt ab aeterno; sed non plures res personaliter, quia idea non dicit quid personale: ergo plures essentialiter.

Conclusio.

Ideae in Deo sunt unum secundum rem, sed plures secundum rationem intelligendi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut patet ex praedictis distinctione trigesima⁶, quamvis in Deo nullus sit respectus ad creaturam a parte rei, tamen contingit, ipsam essentiam significari in respectu ad creaturam per multa nomina. Nec tamen nomen sive vocabulum⁷ est vanum. Intelligendum igitur est, quod hoc nomen idea significat divinam essentiam in comparatione sive in respectu ad creaturam. Idea enim est similitudo rei cognitae, quae quamvis in Deo sit⁸ absolutum, tamen secundum modum intelligendi dicit respectum medium inter cognoscens et cognitum. Et quamvis ille respectus secundum rem plus se teneat ex parte cognoscentis, quia est ipse Deus, tamen secundum rationem⁹ intelligendi sive dicendi similitudo plus se tenet ex parte cogniti. Et quoniam cognoscens est unum, et cognita sunt multa; ideo omnes ideae in Deo sunt unum secundum rem, sed tamen plures secundum rationem intelligendi sive dicendi. Unde concedendum est¹⁰, omnes rationes in Deo esse unum quid, sed non unam ideam sive rationem, sed plures.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod isti rationi nihil subest ex parte rei; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia respectui¹¹ subest ex parte Dei essentia, non respectus; ex parte vero creaturae subest verus respectus, et ideo respectus ille significatus non inducit falsitatem. Sic pluralitati respectuum, quamvis non subsit pluralitas ex parte Dei, subest tamen ex parte connotatorum; unde respectus ille sic plurificatus non habet falsitatem nec vanitatem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod verbum et ars dicunt respectum; dicendum est, quod dicunt, sed aliter quam idea vel ratio¹². Nam idea sive ratio cognoscendi plus se tenet secundum rationem intelligendi ex parte cogniti. Similitudo enim, secundum quod huiusmodi, non dicit respectum ad id in quo est, sed cuius est; sed verbum plus se tenet a parte dicentis, similiter et ars et exemplar ex parte producentis: et quia multa sunt cognita, et unum cognoscens, ideo ideae sunt plures, et ars tantum una. — Vel aliter, ratio et idea dicunt respectum ad res in quantum distinctae sunt, non sic alia vocabula.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod connotata non¹³ sunt plura ab aeterno; dicendum, quod pluralitas est in ideis ratione connotatorum. Sed de connotatis est loqui dupliciter: aut in quantum sunt, aut in quantum sunt connotata. In quantum sunt, sic sunt solum ex tempore; in quantum autem connotantur, sic possunt connotari et aeternaliter et temporaliter: aeternaliter, quando¹⁴ respectus importatur ut in habitu, sicut per hoc nomen praedestinatio — ideo praedestinatio est aeterna, quia connotat effectum non in actu, sed in habitu — temporaliter vero, quando respectus importatur in actu, sicut per hoc verbum creare. Quoniam igitur sic connotantur temporalia, ut futura sunt, et futura sunt multa; ideo connotantur ut multa. Sed tamen sic connotata, quamvis ab aeterno connotentur¹⁵, non sunt ab aeterno, sed ex tempore; ita multitudo connotatorum, quamvis ab aeterno dicatur, tamen non ponit realem multitudinem nisi ex tempore.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum secundum esse ideatorum sint ideae plures; dicendum, quod

secundum esse, quod habiturae sunt res ideatae in proprio genere¹⁶. Et quamvis illud non habeant nisi ex tempore, tamen ab aeterno fuerunt habiturae: et ideae sunt rerum ut futurae sunt: ideo intelliguntur non tantum plures ex tempore, verum etiam ab aeterno. Sic differt intelligere praedestinationem fuisse ab aeterno et reprobationem, non ratione eius quod fuit ab aeterno, sed ratione eius quod futurum erat ex tempore.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur: si plures ideae, ergo plures res¹⁷; dicendum, quod idea non dicit tantum quod est, sed respectum ad id quod futurum est, vel etiam potest esse: et ratione illius respectus recipit plurificationem. Et quia ille nihil ponit in actu, sed solum in potentia, hinc est, quod pluralitas idearum aeterna non ponit aliquam pluralitatem actualem; sicut non ponitur, si dicatur, quod¹⁸ potest facere plura. Sed hoc nomen res quod dicit importat absolute; et ideo cum dicitur, plures res esse, ponitur pluralitas in actu; et ideo argumentum illud non valet, immo est ibi quid et simpliciter¹⁹, sicut si dicatur: plura sunt possibilia Deo, vel plura sunt cognita: ergo plura sunt. Sic nec valet, plures ideae sunt: ergo plures res sunt; quia ideae non sunt plures ratione eius quod sunt, sed ratione eius ad quod sunt.

Question III.

Whether there is plurality according to reason in the ideas.

It is asked thirdly whether there is plurality according to reason in the ideas. And that there is, is shown in this way.

1. Augustine, in the book of Eighty-Three Questions¹: "By one account man was made, by another the horse": therefore if idea names the very account of knowing, it is necessary that it be plurified according to reason.

2. Likewise, this same point is shown from the mode of speaking and defining, since Augustine² speaks in the plural and defines the ideas themselves in the plural, saying that they are forms: therefore they are plurified either in the thing, or in reason; but not in the thing; therefore in reason.

3. Likewise, idea names a likeness to the thing known, and likeness, although in God it is something absolute, has a mode of speaking-toward-another, that is, a respect; but the plurification of a relative likeness is from the thing to which it is assimilated³: therefore since the things ideated are many, the ideas are many according to the reason of speaking.

4. Likewise, God, before he produces things, knows them distinctly and in act; but there is no distinction in God knowing nor in the [thing] known: therefore it is necessary that it be in the account of knowing.

On the contrary:

1. If there is⁴ a plurification according to reason, since there is none in the thing, then it seems that that plurality is nothing other than vanity.

2. Likewise, if there is in this name idea a plurality, [it is] either by reason of that which it is, or by reason of that to which it is: not by reason of that which it is, since it is the divine essence; if by reason of that to which it is, then since word and exemplar and art name a respect to the creature, they ought, at least according to the name, to be plurified, which however is false.

3. Likewise, if the ideas are many, not on account of the signified, but on account of the connoted, then I ask: that connoted [thing] is either eternal or temporal: if eternal, then it seems that many things are from eternity; if temporal, then it seems that idea is not said of God except from time, just as neither Lord nor Creator are said [of him] except from time.

4. Likewise, the ideas, if they are many on account of the things ideated, [are so] either according to the being which the things ideated have in God, or [the being they have] in their proper genus. If on account of the being which they have in God; on the contrary: in God they are one, therefore by reason of that being they cannot be called many. If on account of the being which they have in their proper genus; but⁵ this they do not have except from time: therefore either the ideas are not many except from time, or the temporal is the cause of the eternal; either of which is unfitting.

5. Likewise, idea names either something or nothing: if nothing, then it has neither plurality nor unity; if it names something, then if there are many ideas, there are many things: therefore if many ideas are from eternity, many things are from eternity; but not many things personally, since idea does not name something personal: therefore [many] essentially.

Conclusion.

The ideas in God are one according to the thing, but many according to the reason of understanding.

I respond: It must be said that, as is clear from what has been said in the thirtieth distinction⁶, although in God there is no respect to the creature on the side of the thing, nevertheless it happens that the essence itself is signified in respect to the creature by many names. Nor however is the name or word⁷ vain. It must therefore be understood that this name idea signifies the divine essence in comparison or in respect to the creature. For idea is a likeness of the thing known, which, although in God it is⁸ something absolute, nevertheless according to the mode of understanding names a respect midway between knower and known. And although that respect according to the thing holds itself more on the side of the knower, since it is God himself, nevertheless according to the reason⁹ of understanding or of speaking the likeness holds itself more on the side of the known. And since the knower is one, and the known are many; therefore all the ideas in God are one according to the thing, but nevertheless many according to the reason of understanding or of speaking. Whence it must be conceded¹⁰ that all the accounts in God are one something, but not one idea or account, but many.

1. To that therefore which is objected, that nothing underlies that account on the side of the thing; it must be said that this is false, since under the respect¹¹ there underlies, on God's side, the essence, not a respect; on the creature's side, however, there underlies a true respect, and therefore that signified respect does not introduce falsity. Thus, although the plurality of respects is not undergirded by a plurality on God's side, it is yet undergirded on the side of the connoted [terms]; whence that respect, thus plurified, has neither falsity nor vanity.

2. To that which is objected, that word and art name a respect; it must be said that they do, but otherwise than idea or account [ratio]¹². For idea or account of knowing holds itself more, according to the reason of understanding, on the side of the known. For likeness, considered as such, does not name a respect to that in which it is, but [to that] whose it is; but word holds itself more on the side of the speaker, and likewise art and exemplar on the side of the producer: and since the known are many, and the knower is one, therefore ideas are many, and art only one. — Or alternatively, account and idea name a respect to things insofar as they are distinct; the other words do not so [name].

3. To that which is objected, that the connoted [terms] are not¹³ many from eternity; it must be said that the plurality is in the ideas by reason of the connoted [terms]. But of the connoted [terms] one may speak in two ways: either insofar as they are, or insofar as they are connoted. Insofar as they are, thus they are only from time; but insofar as they are connoted, they can be connoted both eternally and temporally: eternally, when¹⁴ the respect is borne as in habit, as by this name predestination — therefore predestination is eternal, since it connotes the effect not in act, but in habit — but temporally, when the respect is borne in act, as by this verb to create. Since therefore the temporal [things] are thus connoted, as they are future, and many things are future; therefore they are connoted as many. Yet thus connoted, although they be connoted from eternity¹⁵, they are not from eternity, but from time; and so the multitude of the connoted, although it be said [to be] from eternity, nevertheless does not posit a real multitude except from time.

4. To that which is asked, whether according to the being of the things ideated the ideas are many; it must be said, that

according to the being which the things ideated are to have in their proper genus¹⁶. And although they have it only from time, nevertheless from eternity they were going to have it: and the ideas are of things as they are future: therefore they are understood as many not only from time, but also from eternity. Thus it differs to understand that predestination has been from eternity and reprobation, not by reason of that which has been from eternity, but by reason of that which was going to be from time.

5. To that which is objected: if many ideas, therefore many things¹⁷; it must be said that idea does not name only that which is, but a respect to that which is to be in the future, or also can be: and by reason of that respect it receives plurification. And since that [respect] posits nothing in act, but only in potency, hence it is that the eternal plurality of ideas does not posit any actual plurality; just as none is posited if it is said that¹⁸ [God] can make many things. But this name thing names what it imports absolutely; and therefore when it is said that there are many things, plurality is posited in act; and therefore that argument does not hold; rather, there is a [fallacy] secundum quid et simpliciter [i.e., from a qualified to an unqualified sense]¹⁹, as if one were to say: many things are possible to God, or many things are known [by him]: therefore many things are. So neither does it hold: many ideas are: therefore many things are; since the ideas are not many by reason of that which they are, but by reason of that to which they are.