Bonaventure

Quaestio IV.

Utrum ideae plurificentur per comparationem ad ideata, quatenus haec in specie vel in individuo diversa sunt.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Quarto quaeritur, utrum ideae plurificentur per comparationem ad ideata secundum multitudinem ideatorum quantum ad diversitatem universalium aut singularium. Et quod singularium, videtur:

1. Quoniam per ideas est ratio distinguendi, sed Deus non tantum distinguit universale ab universali, sed etiam singulare a singulari. Sed quia distinguit universale ab universali, ideo habet plurium universalium ideas plures et rationes. Unde «alia ratione conditus est equus, alia ratione conditus est homo»¹: ergo etc.

2. Item, cognitio rei verissima est secundum rei totalitatem²; sed singulare aliquid addit supra universale: ergo cum Deus totum cognoscat, non tantum habet ideam universalis, sed etiam superadditi, scilicet singularis; similiter et alterius singularis. Ergo si addita sunt diversa secundum rationem sive multitudinem idealem, patet etc.

3. Item, Deus quosdam ex hominibus praedestinat, quosdam reprobat; sed alia ratione praedestinat, et alia ratione reprobat: ergo secundum aliam rationem et ideam sunt praesciti et praedestinati in Deo. Sed haec est diversitas individualis sive numeralis: ergo etc.

4. Item, idea multiplicatur in divinis ratione respectus et relationis ad ideatum, ergo multiplicato uno³, multiplicatur et reliquum: cum ergo homo qui est ideatum, multiplicetur in diversis individuis secundum rem, multiplicabitur idea respectu illorum secundum rationem.

Contra:

1. Augustinus ad Nebridium⁴: «Dico, quantum ad hominem pertinet, tantum quidem hominis, non meam vel tuam, ibi esse rationem»: ergo multiplicatio vel distinctio idearum attenditur solum secundum diversitatem universalium.

2. Item, artifex creatus per unam ideam producit multa: ergo cum hoc sit nobilitatis, Deus per unam ideam re et ratione multa diversa⁵ numero producit.

3. Item, singulare ut singulare est compositius universali: ergo si est idea in Deo singularis ut singularis, tunc ergo est una idea altera simplicior; sed hoc est inconveniens: ergo etc.

4. Item, singulare magis proprium est quam universale⁶: si ergo in Deo est idea universalis ut universalis, et singularis ut singularis, ergo una idea communis, altera propria. Sed commune prius est et simplicius est quam proprium: ergo una idea est altera prior et simplicior: ergo in Deo est ponere ordinem et compositionem essentialem, ergo etc.

Conclusio.

Ideae plurificantur non solum secundum multitudinem universalium, sed etiam singularium.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod idea in Deo secundum rem est divina veritas, secundum rationem intelligendi est similitudo cogniti. Haec autem similitudo est ratio expressiva cognoscendi non tantum universale, sed etiam singulare, quamvis ipsa non sit universalis nec singularis, sicut nec Deus⁷. Et ideo non tantum est similitudo universalis, ut universale est, sed etiam singularis ut singulare, et ideo, quia similitudo est utrorumque, non solum multiplicatur secundum multitudinem universalium, sed etiam singularium. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus ad Nebridium: «Dico, quantum ad hominem faciendum⁸ hominis tantum esse rationem, quantum vero ad orbem temporis varias hominum rationes in illa sinceritate vivere».

Ad argumenta:

1. Et ex hoc patet solutio illius verbi Augustini, quia Augustinus dicit, quod quamvis universalis, ut universale est, una sit idea, tamen singularium ut singularia sunt plures. Unde ibidem dicit⁹, «quod si quis velit facere angulum, sufficit habere anguli rationem. Si quis autem velit pingere quadrangulum, necesse est, quod rationem habeat quatuor angulorum».

2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod artifex creatus producit multa per unam ideam; dicendum, quod hoc facit per applicationem ipsius ad diversas materias. Unde si habet solum ideam unam, impossibile est intelligere, quod secundum illam simplici aspectu cognoscat diversa; Deus autem simplici aspectu cognoscit singularia ut diversa¹⁰, ita quod secundum totum et secundum proprias differentias et proprietates; ideo non est simile.

3. 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de compositione et prioritate, dicendum, quod nec secundum rem nec secundum rationem oportet quod idea habeat ideati proprietates. Nam corporalis¹¹ est similitudo spiritualis, et compositi est similitudo simplex, etiam in creaturis; ideo non oportet, quod una idea sit altera simplicior vel prior. Similitudo tamen secundum rationem intelligendi habet proprietatem ideati secundum distinctionem, tum propter correlationem, quia oportet quod, uno relativorum¹² multiplicato, multiplicetur et reliquum, saltem secundum rationem, ubi est relatio secundum rationem; tum etiam, quia similitudo illa est ratio exprimendi et distinguendi; et ideo, quamvis recipiatur proprietas distinctionis, non oportet tamen de aliis¹³.

Question IV.

Whether the ideas are pluralized by comparison to the ideated, insofar as these differ in species or in individual.

Fourthly it is asked whether the ideas are pluralized by comparison to the ideated according to the multitude of the ideated, as to the diversity of universals or of singulars. And that [they are pluralized as to the diversity] of singulars, appears thus:

1. Since through the ideas there is the ground of distinguishing, but God distinguishes not only universal from universal, but also singular from singular. But since he distinguishes universal from universal, therefore he has many ideas and accounts of many universals. Hence "by one account the horse is constituted, by another account the man is constituted"¹: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the truest cognition of a thing is according to the totality of the thing²; but a singular adds something beyond the universal: therefore since God knows the whole, he has not only the idea of the universal, but also of what is superadded, namely of the singular; and likewise of another singular. Therefore if the things added are diverse according to reason or according to the ideal multitude, the point is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, God predestines some among men, and reprobates others; but he predestines by one account, and reprobates by another account: therefore according to another account and idea they are foreknown and predestined in God. But this is an individual or numerical diversity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, idea is multiplied in the divine by reason of respect and relation to the ideated; therefore, with one [relatum] multiplied³, the other also is multiplied: since therefore man, who is ideated, is multiplied in diverse individuals according to the thing, the idea will be multiplied with respect to those [individuals] according to reason.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine, to Nebridius⁴: "I say that, as far as concerns man, there is there an account of the man only, not of mine or of yours": therefore the multiplication or distinction of the ideas is taken only according to the diversity of the universals.

2. Likewise, a created artisan produces many things through one idea: therefore since this is of nobility, God through one idea — in thing and in reason — produces many things diverse⁵ in number.

3. Likewise, the singular as singular is more composite than the universal: therefore if there is in God an idea of the singular as singular, then one idea is simpler than another; but this is unfitting: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the singular is more proper than the universal⁶: if therefore in God there is an idea of the universal as universal, and of the singular as singular, then one idea is common, the other proper. But the common is prior and simpler than the proper: therefore one idea is prior and simpler than another: therefore in God there is to be posited an essential order and composition: therefore etc.

Conclusion.

The ideas are pluralized not only according to the multitude of universals, but also of singulars.

I respond: It must be said that the idea in God, according to the thing, is the divine truth; according to the mode of understanding, it is the likeness of the known. But this likeness is the expressive ground of cognizing not only the universal, but also the singular, although it itself is neither universal nor singular, just as neither is God⁷. And therefore it is not only the likeness of the universal as universal, but also of the singular as singular, and therefore, since the likeness is of both, [the idea] is multiplied not only according to the multitude of the universals, but also of the singulars. And this is what Augustine says to Nebridius: "I say that, as far as regards the making⁸ of man, there is an account of the man only, but as regards the round of time, the various accounts of men live in that sincerity."

To the arguments:

1. And from this is clear the solution to that saying of Augustine, since Augustine says that, although of the universal as universal there is one idea, yet of singulars as singulars there are several. Hence in the same place he says⁹, "that if anyone wishes to make an angle, it suffices to have the account of an angle. But if anyone wishes to paint a quadrangle, it is necessary that he have the account of four angles."

2. To that therefore which is objected, that a created artisan produces many things through one idea; it must be said that he does this through the application of [the idea] to diverse matters. Hence if he has only one idea, it is impossible to understand that according to it he should know diverse things by a single regard; but God by a single regard knows the singulars as diverse¹⁰, in such a way that [he knows them] according to the whole and according to their proper differences and properties; therefore the case is not similar.

3. 4. To that which is objected concerning composition and priority, it must be said that neither according to the thing nor according to reason is it necessary that the idea have the properties of the ideated. For the likeness of the spiritual is corporeal¹¹, and the likeness of the composite is simple, even in creatures; therefore it is not necessary that one idea be simpler or prior to another. The likeness, however, according to the mode of understanding, has the property of the ideated as to distinction, both on account of the correlation — since it is necessary that, with one of the correlatives multiplied¹², the other also be multiplied, at least according to reason, where the relation is according to reason — and also, because that likeness is the ground of expressing and distinguishing; and therefore, although the property of distinction be received [into the idea], it is not necessary nevertheless concerning the others¹³.