Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 5
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 35
Quaestio V.
Utrum ideae in Deo sint numero finitae, an infinitae.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Quinto quaeritur, utrum in Deo sit ponere multitudinem idearum secundum numerum finitum, vel infinitum. Et quod secundum numerum infinitum, videtur.
1. Augustinus de Civitate Dei undecimo1: «Una est sapientia, in qua infiniti sunt thesauri omnium rerum intelligibilium».
2. Item, Augustinus sexto de Trinitate2 dicit, quod «Filius est ars plena omnium rationum viventium»; sed constat, quod ars illa est infinita: ergo non impletur nisi infinitis, ergo sunt ibi infinitae rationes.
3. Item, ratione videtur, quia constat, quod Deus cognoscit omnes species numeri, ergo omnes habent ideas in Deo; sed species numeri sunt infinitae3: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod sunt infinitae species quoad nos, non secundum rem; contra: ponatur quod omnes species numeri sint in re; hoc posito, de necessitate sequitur, quod infinita simpliciter actu sunt: ergo si omnium specierum numeri sunt in Deo ideae actu, patet etc.
4. Item, Deus potest infinita producere4; sed nihil potest producere, cuius non habeat cognitionem et ideam: ergo habet ideas infinitorum. Sed plurium sunt ideae plures: ergo infinitorum sunt infinitae.
5. Item, omnibus finitis possunt excogitari plura, quia omni finito potest excogitari aliquid maius; sed nec Deus, nec homo habet plura cogitare his quae Deus cognoscit, quia tunc Dei scientia non esset summa: et si hoc, cum cognoscat per ideas, patet etc.
Contra:
1. Augustinus de Civitate Dei duodecimo5: «Quidquid scitur, scientis comprehensione finitur»; sed constat, quod rationes cognoscendi sciuntur: ergo finiuntur. Sed quaecumque finiuntur, sunt finita: ergo etc.
2. Item, multitudo idearum est secundum multitudinem ideatorum; sed constat, omnia alia a Deo de necessitate esse finita actu: ergo similiter et ideas.
3. Item, ubi est infinitas, ibi est confusio et inordinatio; sed in exemplari aeterno nulla cadit confusio nec inordinatio: ergo etc.
4. Item, ponere infinitatem actu in creatura est ponere imperfectionem, unde omne creatum eo est finitum, quo perfectum6; sed omnis conditio imperfectionis est a Deo releganda: ergo etc.
Conclusio.
Ideae divinae non sunt in numero finito, sed infinito.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicitur in Psalmo7, divinae sapientiae non est numerus, ac per hoc nec rationum, per quas divina sapientia cognoscit; et quoniam non habent numerum, non sunt numerabiles: ideo non sunt in numero finito, sed infinito. Et concedendae sunt rationes et auctoritates ad hoc inductae.
Ad argumenta in oppositum:
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod omne scibile est finitum, ergo etc.; dicendum, quod omne scibile per comprehensionem est finitum comprehendenti; rationes autem aeternae per comprehensionem a solo Deo sciuntur, ideo soli Deo sunt finitae. Sed quemadmodum non sequitur: hoc aequatur infinito, ergo est finitum; immo est ibi quid et simpliciter8, et potius sequitur oppositum: ergo non est finitum; sic etiam in proposito iudicandum. Rationes autem illae non sunt comprehensibiles ab aliquo intellectu finito; ideo patet illud.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod multitudo idearum est a multitudine ideatorum; dicendum, quod sicut dictum est9, non venit a multitudine ideatorum in quantum creata, sed in quantum connotata. Idea autem non connotat ideatum secundum actualem existentiam, sed solum secundum potentiam. Et quia Deus potest facere infinita, quamvis nunquam faciat nisi finita, ideo ideae vel rationes cognoscendi sunt in Deo infinitae, quia non tantum sunt entium vel futurorum, sed omnium Deo possibilium. Nihil enim potest Deus, quod non actu cognoscat.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod infinitas ponit confusionem; dicendum, quod est ponere infinitatem secundum diversitatem realem; et sic privat et distinctionem et ordinem, si ponatur actu. Sed multitudo idearum non est rerum diversarum, sed dicit immensitatem divinae veritatis in exprimendo10 et cognoscendo omne quod est Deo possibile, et hoc quidem secundum rem et actum est unum: ideo non est confusio.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imperfectionis est infinitas in creatura; dicendum, quod quamvis sit imperfectionis in creatura, non tamen est in Creatore, quia est intelligere infinitatem per defectum et per excessum. Infinitas per defectum potest esse in creatura ut in materia, et hoc est imperfectionis; haec autem nullatenus est in Creatore. Infinitas autem per excessum non potest simpliciter esse in creatura, quoniam habet esse creatum et compositum et limitatum; Deus autem nihil horum habet, et ideo habet infinitatem, et haec est summae perfectionis.
I. Solutio huius quaestionis dependet a solutione alterius quaestionis, scil. utrum etiam rerum mere possibilium sint ideae in Deo statuendae; quod omnes concedunt, sed cum quadam differentia explicant. S. Thomas (S. I. q. 15. a. 3. ad 2.) distinguit ideam in sensu strictiore ut exemplar et principium operandi, et in sensu largiore ut principium seu rationem cognoscendi. Idem dicit (de Verit. q. 3. a. 6.): «Quod idea proprie dicta respicit practicam cognitionem non solum in actu, sed in habitu. Unde cum Deus de his quae facere potest, quamvis nunquam sint facta nec futura, habeat cognitionem virtualiter practicam; relinquitur, quod idea possit esse eius, quod nec est, nec fuit, nec erit» etc. Ex principiis hic positis solvi potest alia quaestio, utrum idea pertineat ad scientiam speculativam, an ad practicam. Resolvendum enim est, quod ad practicam pertinet, quatenus est principium operandi; ad speculativam vero, quatenus est principium cognoscendi. Convenit S. Thom., de Verit. q. 3. a. 3; addit tamen etiam alium modum loquendi, secundum quem proprie loquendo idea respiciat scientiam practicam vel actu vel virtute, dum vocabula similitudo et ratio tam speculativam quam practicam scientiam respiciunt.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 23. m. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 36. a. 2. q. 5. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 43. q. 2. n. 12. seq. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 36. q. 3.
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Question V.
Whether the ideas in God are finite or infinite in number.
Fifthly it is asked, whether in God a multitude of ideas is to be posited according to a finite number, or an infinite. And that [it is] according to an infinite number, [thus] it appears.
1. Augustine, On the City of God, book eleven1: "There is one wisdom, in which are infinite treasures of all intelligible things."
2. Likewise, Augustine in book six On the Trinity2 says, that "the Son is the art full of all the accounts of living things"; but it is established that that art is infinite: therefore it is not filled except with infinite [accounts], therefore the accounts there are infinite.
3. Likewise, it appears by reason, since it is established that God knows all the species of number, therefore all have ideas in God; but the species of number are infinite3: therefore etc. If you say that they are infinite species as far as we are concerned, not according to the thing; on the contrary: let it be supposed that all species of number are in reality; this supposed, it follows of necessity that infinite [things] are in act simply: therefore if there are ideas in God in act of all species of number, [the conclusion] is clear, etc.
4. Likewise, God can produce infinite [things]4; but he can produce nothing of which he does not have cognition and idea: therefore he has ideas of infinite [things]. But of more [things] there are more ideas: therefore of infinite [things] there are infinite [ideas].
5. Likewise, beyond all finite [things] more can be thought up, since beyond every finite [thing] something greater can be thought up; but neither God nor man has [the power] to think more than those things which God knows, since then God's knowledge would not be supreme: and if so, since he knows through ideas, [the conclusion] is clear etc.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine, On the City of God, book twelve5: "Whatever is known is bounded by the comprehension of the knower"; but it is established that the accounts of knowing are known: therefore they are bounded. But whatever things are bounded, are finite: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the multitude of ideas is according to the multitude of things-ideated; but it is established that all things other than God are of necessity finite in act: therefore likewise also the ideas.
3. Likewise, where there is infinity, there is confusion and disorder; but in the eternal exemplar no confusion or disorder falls: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, to posit infinity in act in a creature is to posit imperfection, whence every created thing is finite by that by which it is perfect6; but every condition of imperfection is to be banished from God: therefore etc.
Conclusion.
The divine ideas are not in a finite number, but in an infinite [one].
I respond: It must be said that, as is said in the Psalm7, of the divine wisdom there is no number, and through this neither [is there a number] of the accounts by which the divine wisdom knows; and since they have no number, they are not numerable: therefore they are not in a finite number, but in an infinite [one]. And the reasons and authorities adduced for this must be conceded.
To the arguments to the opposite:
1. To that which is objected, that everything knowable is finite, therefore etc.; it must be said that everything knowable by comprehension is finite to him who comprehends; but the eternal accounts are known by comprehension by God alone, therefore they are finite to God alone. But just as it does not follow: this is equated to the infinite, therefore it is finite; rather, there is there something simply [infinite]8, and the opposite rather follows: therefore it is not finite; so also is it to be judged in the proposition. But those accounts are not comprehensible by any finite intellect; therefore that is clear.
2. To that which is objected, that the multitude of ideas is from the multitude of things-ideated; it must be said that, as has been said9, it does not come from the multitude of things-ideated insofar as [they are] created, but insofar as [they are] connoted. But the idea does not connote the thing-ideated according to actual existence, but only according to potency. And since God can make infinite [things], although he never makes [anything] except finite [things], therefore the ideas or accounts of knowing are in God infinite, since they are not only of beings or of future things, but of all things possible to God. For God can [do] nothing which he does not actually know.
3. To that which is objected, that infinity posits confusion; it must be said that one can posit infinity according to real diversity; and so it deprives [the thing] of both distinction and order, if it be posited in act. But the multitude of ideas is not of diverse things, but expresses the immensity of divine truth in expressing10 and knowing all that is possible to God, and this indeed according to thing and act is one: therefore there is no confusion.
4. To that which is objected, that infinity in a creature is of imperfection; it must be said that, although it be of imperfection in a creature, yet it is not [of imperfection] in the Creator, since one can understand infinity by defect and by excess. Infinity by defect can be in a creature, as in matter, and this is of imperfection; but this is in no way in the Creator. But infinity by excess cannot simply be in a creature, since it has being which is created and composite and limited; but God has none of these, and therefore he has infinity, and this [infinity] is of supreme perfection.
I. The solution of this question depends on the solution of another question, namely whether ideas are also to be posited in God of merely possible things; which all concede, but they explain it with a certain difference. St. Thomas (S. I, q. 15, a. 3, ad 2) distinguishes the idea, in the stricter sense as exemplar and principle of operating, and in the broader sense as principle or account of knowing. He says the same (On Truth, q. 3, a. 6): "That the idea, properly so called, regards practical knowledge not only in act, but in habit. Whence, since God has a virtually practical cognition concerning those things which he can do, although they may never be done or be future; it remains that there can be an idea of that which neither is, nor was, nor shall be," etc. From the principles here laid down another question can be solved, namely whether the idea pertains to speculative or to practical science. For it must be resolved that it pertains to the practical insofar as it is the principle of operating; but to the speculative insofar as it is the principle of knowing. St. Thomas agrees, On Truth, q. 3, a. 3; nevertheless he adds also another mode of speaking, according to which, properly speaking, the idea regards practical science either in act or in power [virtute], whereas the words similitudo and ratio regard both speculative and practical science.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 23, m. 3, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., I. Sent. d. 36, a. 2, q. 5. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 43, q. 2, n. 12 seq. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 36, q. 3.
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- Cap. 10. Loco citato textus originalis post in qua adiungit quidam atque.Chapter 10. In the place cited, the original text after in qua adds quidam atque.
- Cap. 10. n. 11.Chapter 10, n. 11.
- Aristot., III. Phys. text. 36 (c. 5.), et XI. Metaph. c. 9 (X. c. 10.) infinitum vocat passionem (proprietatem) numeri.Aristotle, Physics III, text 36 (c. 5), and Metaphysics XI, c. 9 (X, c. 10), calls the infinite a passion (property) of number.
- Quod tamen in se non est possibile. Licet enim Deus actu cognoscat infinitos numeros, non sequitur, quod actu infinitos ad extra producere possit. Cfr. infra d. 43. q. 3. — Proxime ante pro non secundum rem cod. T sed finitae secundum rem, cod. V finitae secundum rem. In fine argumenti post ideae Vat. interponit et sunt infinitae, quae accessio habetur et in ed. 1, omissa tamen vocula et ac posita ante ideae virgula.Which however is not possible in itself. For although God knows in act infinite numbers, it does not follow that he could produce infinite [numbers] in act outside [himself]. Cf. below d. 43, q. 3. — Just before, in place of non secundum rem, codex T [reads] sed finitae secundum rem, codex V finitae secundum rem. At the end of the argument, after ideae, the Vatican interposes et sunt infinitae, which addition is found also in edition 1, the small word et however being omitted and a comma placed before ideae.
- Intellige: infinita in potentia, id est, non potest producere tot, quin non possit plura. Cfr. infra d. 43. q. 3. — Cod. T cum ed. I potest. — Cap. 18. Loci citati textus originalis hic est: Quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis etc.Understand: infinite in potency, that is, he cannot produce so many that he could not [produce] more. Cf. below d. 43, q. 3. — Codex T with edition I [reads] potest. — Chapter 18. The original text of the place cited is this: Whatever is comprehended by knowledge, [is bounded] by the comprehension of the knower, etc.
- Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 21 (IV. c. 16.), ubi inter alia ea dicuntur perfecta, quae finem habent sive acquirunt.Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 21 (IV, c. 16), where among other things those things are said to be perfect which have or acquire an end.
- Psalm. 146, 5. — Paulo inferius verba sed infinito in sola Vat. desiderantur.Psalm 146:5. — A little below, the words sed infinito are missing in the Vatican alone.
- Codd. V W secundum quid et simpliciter, de quo ibi vide supra pag. 343, nota 7. Mox pro sic etiam codd. A S T X et alii nonnulli cum ed. 1 solummodo sic.Codices V W [read] secundum quid et simpliciter, on which see there above p. 343, n. 7. Soon, in place of sic etiam, codices A S T X and several others with edition 1 [read] solummodo sic.
- Quaest. praeced. — Paulo inferius pro ideatum plurimi codd. cum edd. 2, 3 ideitatem, et subinde exigentiam pro existentiam; corrupte. — Cod. sic: sed dicit infinitatem vel modorum imitandi divinam essentiam, sicut alias dictum est, divinae veritatis imprimendo et cognoscendo etc.The preceding question. — A little below, in place of ideatum, very many codices with editions 2, 3 [read] ideitatem, and subsequently exigentiam in place of existentiam; corruptly. — One codex thus: sed dicit infinitatem vel modorum imitandi divinam essentiam, sicut alias dictum est, divinae veritatis imprimendo et cognoscendo, etc.
- In cod. T et aliis nonnullis omittitur est. — Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 40 (VI. c. 11.): Cum materia namque non est, indefinitum (ἀόριστον) etenim etc.In codex T and several others est is omitted. — Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 40 (VI, c. 11): "For when matter is not [present], [the thing is] indefinite (ἀόριστον), for [matter]" etc.