Bonaventure

Quaestio VI.

Utrum ideae ordinem habeant.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Sexto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum in ideis sit ponere numerum ordinatum. Et quod sic,

1. Videtur Augustinus¹ dicere: «Alia ratione conditus est homo quam equus», quia alius est homo, alius equus: ergo cum homo sit nobilior equo, pari ratione nobiliori idea vel ratione est conditus homo quam equus. Sed ubi est magis nobile et minus, ibi est ordo: ergo etc.

2. Item, sicut Deus per ideas cognoscit et producit res distinctas, ita² cognoscit et producit res ordinatas: ergo sicut ponitur pluralitas in ideis ex pluralitate cognitorum et ideatorum, ita debet poni ordo ex ordine.

3. Item, ubi pluralitas sive distinctio, aut est ordo, aut inordinatio; sed in Deo non cadit inordinatio nec confusio: ergo in Deo habent ordinem.

Contra:

1. Ideae sunt plures, quia per eas Deus distincte cognoscit; sed³ Deus non cognoscit unum post aliud, sed omnia simul: ergo ideae habent in Deo simultatem.

2. Item, si est ordo, aut ergo⁴ prioritatis, aut dignitatis, aut originis⁵: non prioritatis, quia tunc esset una idea altera posterior, quod est inconveniens dicere; non nobilitatis, quia quaelibet in Deo est summe nobilis; non originis, quia si una de altera oriretur, tunc esset ibi vera distinctio secundum rem⁶: ergo nullo modo, ut videtur, est in eis ordo.

3. Item, omnis infinitas aut omnino privat ordinem, aut tollit perfectionem ab ordine, quia tollit statum et complementum; sed in ideis est infinitas, ut visum est in alio problemate⁷: ergo aut nullus ordo, aut incompletus; sed non incompletus, ergo nullus.

Conclusio.

In ideis non est ordo ad invicem, nec secundum rem, nec secundum rationem, sed tantum ad ideata.

Respondeo: Dicendum⁸, sicut tactum est in opponendo, non est ordo in ideis sive rationibus cognoscendi ad invicem, nec secundum rem, nec secundum rationem. Habent quippe ordinem ideae ad ideata, sed ad invicem non, quoniam nec una prior altera, nec posterior, nec est una ab alia, nec nobilior est; et ideo non ponitur ibi ordo. — Et ratio huius est, quia ideae dicunt respectum ad res cognitas de ratione sui nominis⁹. Et quia illae sunt plures, ideo ideae ex primo respectu nominis plures sunt. Sed ordo dicit novum respectum et novam habitudinem, cum una idea comparatur ad aliam. Et quoniam, illo¹⁰ respectu circumscripto, qui est ad ideata, in Deo ideae simpliciter sunt unum nec habent ordinem ad invicem; ideo non est concedendum, quod ideae habeant pluralitatem cum ordine ad invicem.

Ad argumenta:

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod alia est idea, quia homo alius: ergo nobilior, quia homo nobilior equo; dicendum, quod non est simile. Similitudo enim, eo quod ad alterum comparatur, habet distingui, sed non habet nobilitari ab illo, nisi aliquid recipiat ab illo ad quod comparatur. Et quoniam idea hominis nihil recipit ab homine, nec idea equi ab equo: ideo una non dicitur altera nobilior.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus cognoscit res ordinatas; dicendum, quod quamvis ordinatas cognoscat, tamen simul et aeque nobiliter cognoscit; et ideo, sicut ponebatur distinctio in ideis, quia distincte per eas cognoscebat, ita debet poni simultas et aequalis nobilitas, quia simul et aeque nobiliter cognoscit; et ita non debet poni ordo. Sicut enim, quamvis Deus cognoscat res albas, non sunt ideae albae in Deo, sic quamvis cognoscat ordinatas, non oportet, quod sint in Deo ordinatae.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi est pluralitas sine ordine, est confusio et inordinatio; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia potest ibi esse simultas; et sic est in ideis. — Vel dicendum, quod illud habet locum, ubi est pluralitas realis; non talis est in ideis, quia omnes unum sunt; et ideo non potest esse inordinatio.

Question VI.

Whether the ideas have an order.

Sixth and last, it is asked whether in the ideas an ordered number is to be posited. And that [it is], appears thus.

1. Augustine¹ seems to say: "By another account was man created than horse," since man is one thing, horse another: therefore, since man is nobler than horse, by parity of reason man was created by a nobler idea or account than horse. But where there is a more noble and a less, there is order: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, just as God by ideas knows and produces distinct things, so² he knows and produces ordered things: therefore, just as plurality is posited in the ideas from the plurality of things known and ideated, so order ought to be posited [in them] from order.

3. Likewise, where there is plurality or distinction, there is either order or disorder; but in God there falls no disorder nor confusion: therefore in God they have an order.

On the contrary:

1. Ideas are several, since by them God distinctly knows; but³ God does not know one [thing] after another, but all things at once: therefore the ideas have in God simultaneity.

2. Likewise, if there is order, then either of priority, or of dignity, or of origin⁴⁵: not of priority, since then one idea would be posterior to another, which it is unfitting to say; not of nobility, since each in God is supremely noble; not of origin, since if one arose from another, there would then be a true distinction there according to the thing⁶: therefore in no way, as it seems, is there order in them.

3. Likewise, every infinity either altogether takes away order, or removes perfection from order, since it takes away [its] state and completion; but in the ideas there is infinity, as has been seen in another problem⁷: therefore either no order, or an incomplete one; but not incomplete, therefore none.

Conclusion.

In the ideas there is no order among themselves, neither according to thing nor according to reason, but only [an order] toward the ideated.

I respond: It must be said⁸, as was touched upon in [the arguments] on the opposite side, that there is no order in the ideas or accounts of knowing among themselves, neither according to thing nor according to reason. The ideas indeed have an order to the ideated, but not among themselves, since neither is one prior to another, nor posterior, nor is one from another, nor is [one] more noble; and therefore no order is posited there. — And the reason of this is that ideas, of the very account of their name, bespeak a respect to things known⁹. And because those [things] are several, therefore the ideas, from the first respect of their name, are several. But order bespeaks a new respect and a new disposition, when one idea is compared to another. And since, when that¹⁰ respect is set aside which is toward the ideated, in God the ideas are simply one and have no order among themselves; therefore it is not to be conceded that the ideas have plurality with order among themselves.

To the arguments:

1. To that which is objected, that the idea is other, since man is other: therefore nobler, since man is nobler than horse; it must be said that the case is not similar. For likeness, since it is compared to another, has [to be] distinguished, but is not [thereby] ennobled by it, unless it receive something from that to which it is compared. And since the idea of man receives nothing from man, nor the idea of horse from horse: therefore the one is not called more noble than the other.

2. To that which is objected, that God knows ordered things; it must be said that, although he knows ordered things, yet he knows them at once and equally nobly; and therefore, just as distinction was posited in the ideas, since by them he distinctly knew, so simultaneity and equal nobility ought to be posited, since he knows at once and equally nobly; and so order ought not to be posited. For just as, although God knows white things, the ideas are not white in God, so although he knows ordered things, it is not necessary that they be ordered in God.

3. To that which is objected, that where there is plurality without order, there is confusion and disorder; it must be said that this is false, since there can be simultaneity there; and so it is in the ideas. — Or it may be said that that [rule] holds where there is real plurality; such is not [the case] in the ideas, since all are one; and therefore there cannot be disorder.