Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 36
Articulus I.
De existentia rerum in Deo.
Quaestio I.
Utrum res fuerint in Deo ab aeterno.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Quod autem res fuerint in Deo ab aeterno, videtur:
1. Quia agens cognoscens agit per speciem rei, quam penes se habet1; sed res est in anima, quia similitudo eius est in ea: ergo et in Deo similiter.
Si dicas, quod illud exemplar nihil est rei, ergo secundum illud non deberet dici, res esse in Deo; contra: plus facit ad esse rei exemplar, quod est cognitivum et productivum, quam quod est productum a re2: si ergo ratione exemplaris producti a re res est in anima, multo fortius debet dici in Deo esse ratione exemplaris producentis; sed hoc ab aeterno: ergo etc.
2. Item, similitudo producta non est vere aliquid, sed alicuius3; sed exemplar, per quod cognoscit Deus, vere est ipse Deus: ergo verius est exemplar rei in Deo quam in anima: ergo multo fortius res est in Deo quam in anima, et sic etc.
3. Item, quia res potest exire de materia, res est in materia, et tamen non totaliter est in potentia materiae, immo agentis4: ergo si res, quae sunt in potentia Dei, totaliter ibi sunt, multo fortius debent dici esse in ipso, et sic etc.
Contra:
1. Quod exit per creationem omnino nihil est, antequam creetur; sed creaturae sic exeunt: ergo omnino nihil sunt, antequam producuntur. Sed quod non est nec est hic nec ibi5: ergo non est in aliquo, et ita nec in Deo.
2. Item, quod est in aliquo est in illo vel secundum se, vel secundum aliquid sui; sed res non est in Deo secundum se, quia tunc essentia rei esset in Deo6; nec secundum aliquid sui, quia nihil de ipsa est aeternum sed totum ex tempore: ergo etc.
3. Item, quod est in aliquo est in illo secundum esse actuale, vel7 potentiale; sed creatura non est in Deo secundum esse actuale, quia tunc actu esset: ergo si est in Deo, est secundum esse potentiale. Sed omne esse potentiale, secundum quod huiusmodi, est permutabile: si ergo creatura ab aeterno est in Deo secundum esse potentiale, ab aeterno est in Deo secundum esse mutabile. Sed hoc falsum: ergo et primum.
4. Item, si creatura dicitur esse in Deo, quia potest esse a Deo: ergo cum ab aeterno esse a Deo sit impossibile8, non erit creatura ab aeterno in Deo ratione potentiae.
Conclusio.
Res sunt in Deo ab aeterno secundum similitudinis praesentiam atque secundum causativam potentiam, sed non secundum realem existentiam.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur esse in aliquo tripliciter: vel secundum actualem
existentiam, vel secundum similitudinis praesentiam, vel secundum causativam potentiam. Primo modo sunt res in universo, secundo modo in cognitiva substantia, tertio modo in sua causa9. His duobus modis ultimis res sunt in Deo, quia est cognoscens res, antequam fiant, et potens producere. Unde quia ab aeterno cognovit, et potentia, qua produxit ex tempore, in Deo fuit ab aeterno, ideo dicuntur res fuisse in Deo ab aeterno.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur: quod nihil est non est in aliquo; dicendum, quod verum est secundum primum modum existendi10, sed falsum secundum secundum et secundum tertium, quia illud quod nihil est modo, Deus potest facere.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod est in aliquo11, est in illo secundum se etc.; dicendum, quod quantum ad secundum modum res sunt in Deo secundum aliquid sui, quia secundum exemplar. Sed aliquid rei potest dici tripliciter, scilicet essentialiter, effective et causative, sicut pars, effectus vel causa. Hoc tertio modo est illud exemplar aliquid rei. — Quantum ad tertium modum, scilicet potentiam causativam, est res secundum se non in actu, sed potentia, quia suum esse potest produci a Deo.
3. Similiter ad sequens, dicendum, quod ratione exemplaris12 res actualiter sunt in Deo; ratione creationis potentialiter, quia possunt produci.
Quod obiicitur: quod est in Deo est immutabile; dicendum, quod hoc est verum de eo quod est actu in Deo; sed quod potest produci a Deo est mutabile. Vel dicendum, quod possibile13 habet comparationem ad divinam potentiam, quae est immutabilis, et sic est immutabile; vel ad connotatum temporale extra, et sic habet esse mutabile.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de creatione, dicendum, quod quamvis actus creandi non potuerit esse ab aeterno, tamen potentia creandi fuit in Deo14 ab aeterno.
I. In hac distinctione tota doctrina de existentia rerum in Deo a S. Bonaventura accuratissime tractatur. — Pro intelligentia primae quaestionis notandum est, quod tripliciter intelligi potest locutio esse in Deo, ut bene explicatur hic dub. I. — Deinde observandum est, in triplici sensu accipi posse vocem esse, scil. pro esse essentiae (sive quidditativo, ut dixerunt Scholastici), pro esse existentiae, et pro eo esse, quod significat veritatem propositionis sive connexionem subiecti et praedicati, quae connexio est in rebus fundamentaliter, in intellectu vero formaliter. In propositionibus, quae habent necessariam terminorum relationem — unde vocantur perpetuae veritatis — existentia actualis subiecti non requiritur ad veritatem propositionis. Nec tamen idealis illa et aeterna necessitas supponit, aliquid esse ab aeterno, nisi in Deo. Contraria doctrina, scil. «quod multae sunt veritates ab aeterno, quae non sunt Deus», est septimus articulus reprobatus ab Universitate Magistrorum Parisiensium, ut refert S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. q. 3. in fine (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 16. a. 7, et q. 10. a. 3. ad 3.). — De sententia Henrici Gand. aliorumque, quod Deus essentiis rerum aliquod esse intelligibile ab aeterno communicaverit, et de esse diminuto secundum doctrinam Scoti cfr. supra d. 35. q. 1. Scholion.
II. Duobus modis, quibus res sunt in Deo, scil. ut in causa exemplari et efficiente, addendus est tertius («ut in fine conservante») ex a. 2. q. 1. huius dist. — Argumentum 4. ad opposit. false applicat principium, a Seraphico firmiter stabilitum, scil. creationem ab aeterno actu factam esse impossibilem. De hac sententia cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. I. q. 2, et I. Sent. d. 43. q. 3.
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 23. m. 4. a. I. § 5. 6. — Scot., hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 3; S. I. q. 18. a. 4. ad 1. — B. Albert., hic a. I. 2; S. p. I. tr. 15. q. 60. m. 4. a. I. partic. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. I. q. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3, et d. 35. q. 5. — Ægid. R., hic I. princ. q. unica. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — Biel, hic q. unica.
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Article I.
On the existence of things in God.
Question I.
Whether things were in God from eternity.
That things, however, were in God from eternity, appears thus:
1. Because a knowing agent acts through the species of a thing which it has within itself1; but a thing is in the soul, since its likeness is in it: therefore likewise also in God.
If you say that that exemplar is nothing of the thing, therefore according to it the thing ought not to be said to be in God; on the contrary: the exemplar which is cognitive and productive contributes more to the being of a thing than that which is produced by the thing2: if therefore by reason of an exemplar produced by the thing the thing is in the soul, much more strongly ought it to be said to be in God by reason of the producing exemplar; but this from eternity: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, a produced likeness is not truly something, but [is] of something3; but the exemplar through which God knows is truly God himself: therefore the exemplar of a thing is more truly in God than in the soul: therefore much more strongly is a thing in God than in the soul, and so etc.
3. Likewise, since a thing can come forth from matter, the thing is in matter, and yet it is not totally in the potency of matter, but rather of the agent4: therefore if things which are in the potency of God are totally there, much more strongly ought they to be said to be in him, and so etc.
On the contrary:
1. What comes forth through creation is utterly nothing before it is created; but creatures so come forth: therefore they are utterly nothing before they are produced. But what is not is neither here nor there5: therefore it is not in anything, and thus not in God either.
2. Likewise, what is in something is in it either according to itself, or according to something of itself; but a thing is not in God according to itself, since then the essence of the thing would be in God6; nor according to something of itself, since nothing of it is eternal but the whole [is] from time: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, what is in something is in it according to actual being, or7 potential; but a creature is not in God according to actual being, since then it would actually be: therefore if it is in God, it is according to potential being. But every potential being, insofar as it is such, is changeable: if therefore a creature is in God from eternity according to potential being, from eternity it is in God according to changeable being. But this is false: therefore so is the first.
4. Likewise, if a creature is said to be in God because it can be from God: therefore since for anything to be from God from eternity is impossible8, a creature will not be in God from eternity by reason of potency.
Conclusion.
Things are in God from eternity according to the presence of a likeness and according to causative potency, but not according to real existence.
I respond: It must be said that something is said to be in something else in three ways: either according to actual
existence, or according to the presence of a likeness, or according to causative potency. In the first way things are in the universe, in the second way in a knowing substance, in the third way in their cause9. In these last two ways things are in God, since he is one knowing things before they come to be, and able to produce [them]. Hence because he knew from eternity, and the potency by which he produced [them] in time was in God from eternity, therefore things are said to have been in God from eternity.
1. To that which is objected: that what is nothing is not in anything; it must be said that this is true according to the first mode of existing10, but false according to the second and according to the third, since that which now is nothing, God can make.
2. To that which is objected, that what is in something11, is in it according to itself etc.; it must be said that as to the second mode things are in God according to something of themselves, since according to an exemplar. But "something of a thing" can be said in three ways, namely essentially, effectively, and causatively, as a part, an effect, or a cause. In this third way that exemplar is something of the thing. — As to the third mode, namely causative potency, the thing in itself is not in act, but in potency, since its being can be produced by God.
3. Likewise to the next [objection], it must be said that by reason of the exemplar12 things are actually in God; by reason of creation potentially, since they can be produced.
What is objected: that what is in God is unchangeable; it must be said that this is true of that which is actually in God; but what can be produced by God is changeable. Or it must be said that the possible13 has comparison to the divine potency, which is unchangeable, and thus is unchangeable; or to the connoted temporal [thing] outside, and thus has changeable being.
4. To that which is objected concerning creation, it must be said that although the act of creating could not have been from eternity, nevertheless the potency of creating was in God14 from eternity.
I. In this distinction the whole doctrine on the existence of things in God is most carefully treated by St. Bonaventure. — For the understanding of the first question it is to be noted that the locution to be in God can be understood in three ways, as is well explained here in dubium I. — Then it must be observed that the word being (esse) can be taken in a threefold sense, namely for the being of essence (or quidditative, as the Scholastics said), for the being of existence, and for that being which signifies the truth of a proposition or the connection of subject and predicate, which connection is fundamentally in things, but formally in the intellect. In propositions which have a necessary relation of terms — whence they are called of perpetual truth — the actual existence of the subject is not required for the truth of the proposition. Yet that ideal and eternal necessity does not suppose that anything be from eternity, except in God. The contrary doctrine, namely, "that there are many truths from eternity which are not God," is the seventh article reproved by the University of the Masters of Paris, as St. Bonav. reports, II Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, at the end (cf. St. Thomas, S. I, q. 16, a. 7, and q. 10, a. 3, ad 3). — On the opinion of Henry of Ghent and others, that God communicated to the essences of things some intelligible being from eternity, and on diminished being according to the doctrine of Scotus, cf. above d. 35, q. 1, Scholion.
II. To the two modes by which things are in God, namely as in an exemplar and efficient cause, a third is to be added ("as in a conserving end") from a. 2, q. 1, of this distinction. — Argument 4 ad oppositum falsely applies a principle firmly established by the Seraphic [Doctor], namely that creation actually made from eternity is impossible. On this opinion cf. II Sent. d. 1, p. I, a. I, q. 2, and I Sent. d. 43, q. 3.
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 23, m. 4, a. I, § 5–6. — Scotus, here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 3; S. I, q. 18, a. 4, ad 1. — B. Albert., here a. I, 2; S. p. I, tr. 15, q. 60, m. 4, a. I, partic. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here a. I, q. I. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 3, and d. 35, q. 5. — Ægid. R., here I, princ. q. unica. — Durand., here q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 5. — Biel, here q. unica.
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- Cfr. supra d. 35. q. 1. — De minori huius argumenti vide Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 38. (c. 8.).Cf. above d. 35, q. 1. — On the minor of this argument see Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 38 (c. 8).
- In hac propositione idea in mente creata dicitur esse aliquid productum a re, quatenus species intelligibilis, ab obiecto in anima producta, concurrit ut principium quo cum actione animae ad productionem exemplaris sive ideae. Hoc non convenit divinis ideis. Cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 8. § 8.In this proposition the idea in the created mind is said to be something produced by the thing, inasmuch as the intelligible species, produced in the soul from the object, concurs as the principle by which together with the action of the soul for the production of the exemplar or idea. This does not apply to the divine ideas. Cf. Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 8, § 8.
- Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 8. (VI. c. 3.) ait: καὶ γὰρ τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῇ οὐσίᾳ[?], quae verba in antiqua versione Veneta (1489) sic Latinis redduntur: «Etenim separabile et hoc aliquid inesse videtur maxime substantiae». Cfr. etiam lib. de Praedicam. c. de Substantia, ex quo plura citantur infra d. 37. p. I. a. 2. q. I. fundam. 3. Hinc Scholastici substantiam vocant hoc aliquid. Similiter etiam Aristoteles eam vocat quod vere est, de quo vide supra pag. 407, nota 1. Accidens autem dicitur esse alicuius. Similiter et Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 2. (VI. c. 1.) docet, accidentia non tam esse entia, quam quid entis, scil. vel quantitatem vel qualitatem substantiae. Sensus verborum S. Doctoris est, similitudo (exemplar, idea) producta in anima non est substantia, sed accidens. — In fine argumenti pro et sic cod. V et si sic.Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 8 (VI, c. 3) says: καὶ γὰρ τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῇ οὐσίᾳ[?], which words in the old Venetian version (1489) are rendered into Latin thus: "For the separable and the this something seems most of all to be in substance." Cf. also the book On the Categories, c. On Substance, from which more is cited below at d. 37, p. I, a. 2, q. I, fundam. 3. Hence the Scholastics call substance hoc aliquid ("this something"). Likewise Aristotle also calls it what truly is, on which see above p. 407, n. 1. An accident, however, is said to be of something. Likewise Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 2 (VI, c. 1) teaches that accidents are not so much beings as something of being, namely either a quantity or a quality of a substance. The sense of the words of the holy Doctor is that a likeness (exemplar, idea) produced in the soul is not a substance, but an accident. — At the end of the argument, in place of et sic, codex V [reads] et si sic.
- Nam agens actione sua transmutando materiam educit sibi similem formam ex ipsa, quae per se est indifferens ad diversas formas.For the agent, by its action transmuting the matter, draws forth from it a form similar to itself, [a matter] which in itself is indifferent to diverse forms.
- Aristot., IV. Phys. text. I. (c. 1.): Etenim quae sunt omnes existimant alicubi esse, quod vero non est, nusquam esse. — Mox pro et ita codd. T X ergo.Aristotle, Physics IV, text I (c. 1): "For all consider that what is, is somewhere, but what is not, is nowhere." — Soon, in place of et ita, codices T X [read] ergo.
- Et per consequens essentia creaturae esset essentia Dei. — Pro essentia rei, quae lectio habetur in codd. C F K T et aliis, non pauci codd. falso essentia Dei, Vat. essentialiter. Paulo superius pro in illo multi codd. ab illo, cui lectioni contextus repugnat. — De maiori huius argumenti cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 24. (c. 3.).And consequently the essence of the creature would be the essence of God. — In place of essentia rei, which reading is found in codices C F K T and others, not a few codices wrongly [read] essentia Dei; the Vatican [edition] [reads] essentialiter. A little earlier, in place of in illo, many codices [read] ab illo, a reading to which the context is repugnant. — On the major of this argument cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, text 24 (c. 3).
- Pro vel codd. T Z scilicet. Iidem codd. cum pluribus aliis subinde secundum vel omittunt, et pro tertio vel substituunt et.In place of vel, codices T Z [read] scilicet. The same codices with several others sometimes omit secundum or, and in place of the third vel substitute et.
- Sive cum repugnet, res a Deo creari ab aeterno.Or, since it is repugnant that things be created by God from eternity.
- Vat. hic interserit videlicet ut causa, scilicet. Mox post est res cod. W addit in Deo, et subinde pro secundum se cod. V exhibet secundum esse ac post pauca verbis suum esse, cod. M praemittit secundum.The Vatican [edition] here interjects videlicet ut causa, scilicet. Soon after est res codex W adds in Deo, and then in place of secundum se codex V exhibits secundum esse, and shortly thereafter, before the words suum esse, codex M prefixes secundum.
- Codd. aa bb subiiciunt omnino.Codices aa bb subjoin omnino ("utterly").
- Verba illud quod est in aliquo in multis mss. desiderantur. Aliquanto inferius pro potest dici codd. L V cc potest esse.The words illud quod est in aliquo are missing in many manuscripts. A little below, in place of potest dici, codices L V cc [read] potest esse.
- Vat. exemplaritatis.The Vatican [edition] [reads] exemplaritatis.
- Pro possibile, quod ex praestantioribus codd. revocavimus, alii codd. potentiale; Vat. autem, pro possibile substituta voce potentia, hunc locum sic transformavit: quod potentia se habet per comparationem etc.In place of possibile, which we have restored from the more excellent codices, other codices [read] potentiale; but the Vatican [edition], with the word potentia substituted for possibile, transformed this passage thus: quod potentia se habet per comparationem etc.
- Supple cum Vat. ab aeterno.Supply with the Vatican [edition] ab aeterno ("from eternity").