Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 36
Quaestio II.
Utrum res sint in Deo ratione essentiae, vel personae.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Secundo quaeritur, utrum res sint in Deo ratione essentiae, vel personae. Et quod ratione essentiae, videtur1:
1. Quia quod inest ratione personae est proprium, quod inest ratione essentiae est commune: si ergo hoc2 est commune tribus, patet etc.
2. Praeterea, res in Deo sunt ratione exemplaritatis3; sed exemplar creaturae in Deo est divina essentia, quia Deus se ipso cognoscit et producit: ergo etc.
3. Item, regula est, quod quidquid de Deo dicitur in relatione ad creaturam, est essentialiter dictum4; sed res esse in Deo est taliter dictum: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Quod ratione personae videtur, quia res sunt in Deo, in quantum possunt ab ipso exire; sed producere, cum sit actus, est ipsius suppositi5: ergo personae.
2. Item, sicut dicit Augustinus libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum6: «Verbum dicit operativam potentiam»: si ergo res sunt in Deo ratione potentiae operativae, sunt in eo ratione Verbi: ergo cum Verbum sit persona, sunt in Deo ratione personae.
3. Item, Augustinus de Civitate Dei undecimo, capitulo vigesimo quarto7 dicit, quod «cum dicitur: Dixit, ut fiat, intelligitur Pater: in verbo dicendi Filius, in visione Spiritus sanctus»: ergo cum eius sit producere, in quo sunt, patet ergo, quod sunt ratione personae.
Conclusio.
Res sunt in Deo non ratione essentiae nec ratione personae, sed sunt in Deo ut in causa.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in divinis est considerare essentiam, quae est communis ut communis et absoluta, est considerare proprietates, et est considerare commune ut in relatione ad propria. Primum dicitur in omnimoda absolutione; secundum, scilicet proprietas, dicit relationem ad personam; tertium dicit relationem ad res; et illa appropriata significant Deum ut causam. — Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum res sint in Deo ratione essentiae, vel personae, dicendum, quod proprie loquendo nec sic nec sic, sed sunt in Deo ut in causa, et sic ratione appropriatorum, quae sunt essentialia considerata in personis.
Cum ergo obiicitur, quod8 sint in essentia: dicendum, quod illae rationes concludunt, quod sunt in essentia communiter dicta, secundum quod comprehendit appropriata, non secundum quod in omnimoda absolutione consideratur.
Quod obiicitur ad oppositum, non concludit de persona ratione propriorum, sed ratione appropriatorum9.
I. Cum creaturae sint in Deo ratione triplicis causalitatis, scilicet efficientis, exemplantis, finientis, et cum actiones sint suppositorum (hic arg. 1. ad opposit.), dubium ortum est, utrum res esse in Deo attribuendum sit ipsi ratione essentiae, an personae, an utriusque, id est ratione appropriatorum. Hanc quaestionem, sic positam, non invenimus discussam, nisi a paucis, nempe a Scoto, Collationes, col. 31, et II. Sent. q. I; B. Albert., hic a. 11, et Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. Tota ratio responsionis fundatur in his duobus principiis, quod res sint in Deo ut causa, et quod appropriata significent Deum ut causam.
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Question II.
Whether things are in God by reason of essence, or of person.
Secondly it is asked, whether things are in God by reason of essence, or of person. And that [they are] by reason of essence, it appears thus1:
1. Because that which is in [something] by reason of person is proper, [whereas] that which is in [something] by reason of essence is common: if therefore this2 is common to the three [persons], it is plain, etc.
2. Furthermore, things are in God by reason of exemplarity3; but the exemplar of the creature in God is the divine essence, since God knows and produces by his very self: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, it is a rule that whatever is said of God in relation to a creature is said essentially4; but for things to be in God is so said: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. That [it is] by reason of person it appears, because things are in God insofar as they can come forth from him; but to produce, since it is an act, belongs to the supposit itself5: therefore [by reason] of person.
2. Likewise, as Augustine says in On Eighty-Three Questions6: "The Word states an operative power": if therefore things are in God by reason of operative power, they are in him by reason of the Word: therefore, since the Word is a person, they are in God by reason of person.
3. Likewise, Augustine, On the City of God, book eleven, chapter twenty-four7, says that "when it is said: He said, that it might be made, the Father is understood: in the word of saying [is understood] the Son, in the seeing the Holy Spirit": therefore, since to him in whom they are belongs producing, it is plain that they are by reason of person.
Conclusion.
Things are in God not by reason of essence nor by reason of person, but they are in God as in a cause.
I respond: It must be said that in the divine [things] there is to consider the essence, which is common as common and absolute, [and] to consider the properties, and to consider the common as in relation to the proper [things]. The first is said in every-mode absoluteness; the second, namely property, states a relation to person; the third states a relation to things; and those appropriated [terms] signify God as cause. — When therefore it is asked, whether things are in God by reason of essence, or of person, it must be said that, properly speaking, neither so nor so, but they are in God as in a cause, and thus by reason of the appropriated [terms], which are essential [things] considered in the persons.
When therefore it is objected8 that they are in the essence: it must be said that those reasons conclude that they are in the essence taken in the common sense, according as it comprehends the appropriated [terms], not according as it is considered in every-mode absoluteness.
What is objected to the contrary does not conclude concerning person by reason of the proper [terms], but by reason of the appropriated [ones]9.
I. Since creatures are in God by reason of a threefold causality, namely efficient, exemplar, and final, and since actions belong to supposits (here arg. 1 ad opp.), a doubt has arisen whether to be in God is to be attributed to him by reason of essence, or of person, or of both, that is, by reason of the appropriated [terms]. This question, so posed, we do not find discussed, except by a few, namely by Scotus, Collationes, col. 31, and II Sent. q. I; B. Albert here a. 11, and Ægidius Romanus here 2 princ. q. 2. The whole reason of the response is founded on these two principles, that things are in God as in a cause, and that the appropriated [terms] signify God as cause.
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- Codd. aa bb subiiciunt omnino.Codices aa bb subjoin omnino ("altogether").
- Verba illud quod est in aliquo in multis mss. desiderantur. Aliquanto inferius pro potest dici codd. L V cc potest esse.The words illud quod est in aliquo are missing in many manuscripts. A little further down, in place of potest dici, codices L V cc [read] potest esse.
- Vat. exemplaritatis.The Vatican [edition reads] exemplaritatis.
- Vide supra d. 22. dub. 2, ubi inter quinque regulas, ex verbis Augustini derivatas, haec quartum tenet locum. — Mox pro taliter cod. T essentialiter.See above d. 22, dub. 2, where among the five rules derived from the words of Augustine, this one holds the fourth place. — Soon, in place of taliter, codex T [reads] essentialiter.
- Iuxta illud axioma: actiones sunt suppositorum.According to that axiom: actions belong to supposits.
- Quaest. 63. Integrum textum habes supra d. 27. p. II. q. 2. fundam. 2.Question 63. You have the integral text above, d. 27, p. II, q. 2, fundam. 2.
- Verba Augustini haec sunt: Pater quippe intelligitur Verbi, qui dixit: Fiat. Quod autem illo dicente factum est, procul dubio per Verbum factum est. In eo vero quod dicitur: Vidit Deus, quia bonum est, satis significatur, Deum nulla necessitate... sed sola bonitate fecisse quod factum est... Quae bonitas si Spiritus sanctus recte intelligitur, universa nobis Trinitas in suis operibus intimatur. — In cod. F (et T in margine) textus sic incipit: Dixit, vidit, fiat; per fiat intelligitur etc. Mox verbo producere codd. P Q V praefigunt res. Dein post quod sunt cod. O non incongrue addit in Deo.The words of Augustine are these: "For the Father indeed is understood [as the Father] of the Word, who said: Let it be made. But what was made when he so spoke, was without doubt made through the Word. But in this, that it is said: God saw that it is good, it is sufficiently signified that God by no necessity... but by goodness alone made what was made... If this goodness is rightly understood as the Holy Spirit, the whole Trinity is intimated to us in its works." — In codex F (and T in the margin) the text begins thus: "He said, he saw, let it be made; by 'let it be made' is understood etc." Soon, before the verb producere, codices P Q V prefix res. Then after quod sunt, codex O not incongruously adds in Deo.
- Pro quod multi codd. minus recte utrum, et in fine responsionis pro consideratur perperam considerantur.In place of quod, many codices less correctly [read] utrum, and at the end of the response, in place of consideratur, [they] wrongly [read] considerantur.
- In cod. V (W in margine) additur: Quod dicit, quod producere est actus personae, verum est, secundum quod est proprium, scilicet respectu personae; sed secundum quod est communis, scilicet respectu creaturae, est essentiae, quia idem est essentia et habens essentiam.In codex V (W in the margin) is added: "That it says that to produce is an act of the person, is true, according as it is proper, namely with respect to person; but according as it is common, namely with respect to creature, [it is] of the essence, since the essence and the one having the essence are the same."