Bonaventure

Quaestio I.

Utrum omnia sint in Deo vita.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Quod autem omnia sint in Deo vita, videtur.

1. Ioannis primo¹: Quod factum est in ipso vita erat; sed omnis creatura est facta: ergo omnis creatura est in ipso vita.

2. Item, Augustinus quinto super Genesim ad litteram²: «Omnia dicuntur in ipso fuisse vita, non in sua natura, quia omnia noverat, antequam fierent».

3. Item, ratione videtur, quia divina essentia est vita, ergo quod est divina essentia etiam vita est; sed creatura in Deo est divina essentia, quia quidquid est in Deo est Deus: ergo est vita. Et hoc est quod dicit Anselmus in Monologio³: «quod creatura in Deo creatrix essentia est».

4. Item, intelligere est una differentia eius quod est vivere, cum vivere dicatur quadrupliciter secundum Philosophum⁴: si igitur intelligere est vivere, ergo omnis ratio intelligendi est ratio vivendi. Sed res sunt in Deo secundum suas rationes intelligendi, ergo sunt in Deo viventes; sed non per participationem: ergo sunt vita simpliciter.

Contra:

1. Actuum decimo septimo⁵: In ipso vivimus, movemur et sumus. Ergo si quia vivimus, sumus in Deo vita, ergo et quia movemur, sumus in eo motus; sed hoc non dicitur: ergo nec illud debet dici.

2. Item, si res dicuntur in Deo vita, aut ergo ratione potentiae, aut notitiae, aut voluntatis. Non ratione potentiae, quia res ex hoc, quod potest produci per creationem, antequam producitur, nihil omnino est, quia secundum totum producitur; si nihil est, ergo nec vita. Nec ratione notitiae, quia tunc, cum mala sint a Deo cognita, tunc mala essent in Deo vita; quod absurdum est. Si ratione voluntatis; sed voluntas Dei non est nisi futurorum: ergo sola futura viverent in Deo. Sed alia quam futura sunt in Deo per ideam: ergo non omne quod est in Deo, est in ipso vita.

3. Item, hoc⁶ videtur, quia exemplar aeternum repraesentat res expressissime, secundum quod sunt et ab ipso exeunt: ergo cum quaedam vivant, quaedam non, quaedam repraesentat per modum viventium, quaedam per modum non viventium: ergo quaedam sunt in Deo vita, quaedam non.

4. Ratione huius quaeritur, quare magis dicuntur res esse in Deo vita, quam sapientia, vel essentia, vel intelligentia.

Conclusio.

Omnia quae sunt in Deo tanquam in exemplari, in ipso vita sunt.

Respondeo: Ad hoc voluerunt aliqui dicere, quod non omnia quae dicuntur esse in Deo, sunt in illo vita, sed ea solum, quae sic sunt in Deo ut disposita fieri⁷. Et ratio huius est, quoniam verbum et vita dicunt actum et dispositionem. Et ideo dicit Anselmus⁸, quoniam verbum non est nisi eorum quae sunt, vel futura sunt; et ideo ea solum sunt in Deo vita. Et ideo dicunt, quod ad rationem dicendi vitam concurrit necessario, quod res sint in Deo quantum ad potentiam, notitiam et voluntatem producendi.

— Sed hoc non potest stare secundum Augustinum. Filius enim, ut ipse dicit sexto de Trinitate⁹, «est ars plena omnium rationum viventium»; sed constat, quod non impletur nisi rationibus infinitis: ergo infinitae rationes rerum vivunt in Deo, ergo non solum entium vel futurorum, sed etiam omnium possibilium. Et iterum Augustinus libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum¹⁰ dicit, quod «ratio est, etiamsi nunquam aliquid per illam fiat»; sed constat, quod ratio in mente artificis vivit, non quia res extra producitur: vivit enim, etiamsi res corrumpatur, et exterius esse omnino nihil facit ad vitam. Et ideo patet, quod non solum praesentia vel futura vivunt in Deo.

Et propterea aliter dicendum, quod res tripliciter sunt in Deo, videlicet ut in principio producente, et sic sunt in ratione potentiae; ut in exemplari exprimente, et sic sunt in ratione notitiae; et ut in fine conservante, in ratione¹¹ voluntatis. Primo modo — quia in principio producente — cum totum ex nihilo producat Deus, nihil omnino sunt, nec vita nec aliquid. Quia vero sunt in Deo tanquam in fine conservante, cum conserventur secundum esse, quod habent, sic sunt quaedam vita, quaedam non. Unde quaedam tantum sunt, quaedam sunt et moventur, quaedam, ut homines, et sunt et moventur et vivunt. Quia vero sunt¹² ut in exemplari exprimente, sic sunt in ipso vita. Et quia non solum in illo exemplari exprimuntur entia, sed etiam omnia cognoscibilia¹³ Deo, ideo omnia sunt in Deo vita, quae in ipso sunt. Et ideo dicit beatus Ioannes: Quod factum est in ipso vita erat. Et sic patet, quod esse in Deo attenditur secundum triplex genus causae; et similiter patet, quomodo ratione potentiae et notitiae, et voluntatis; et¹⁴ solvitur illa quaestio, secundum quod genus causae, vel secundum quam trium conditionum dicuntur res esse in Deo. Patet etiam, quae in Deo dicuntur vita, scilicet omnia quae sunt in ipso tanquam in exemplari.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod in Deo movemur etc.; intelligendum est quantum ad tertium modum essendi in Deo, scilicet per conservationem. Deus enim conservat in nobis vitam et operationem et essentiam; et quantum ad hoc intelligitur dictum illud verbum.

2. Ad illud quod dicitur: ratione cuius res dicuntur in Deo vita etc.; dicendum, quod ratione potentiae et notitiae simul, quia ista duo concurrunt ad rationem exemplaris; non enim est exemplar Deus nisi eorum quae cognoscit et potest.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod res in illo exemplari repraesentantur ut sunt; dicendum, quod verum est; tamen non oportet, quod ratio repraesentationis sit talis omnino, quale est repraesentatum, sicut supra ostensum est: et ideo sicut corporalium est idea spiritualis, ita non viventium vivens.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, quare magis dicuntur res esse in Deo vita quam alia¹⁵; dicendum, quod quamvis praedictum verbum multas habeat expositiones, quo dicitur: Quod factum est in ipso vita erat; tamen specialiter circa hoc verbum consideranda est veritas dicti, et ratio dicendi. Veritas dicti, ut dicit Augustinus¹⁶, est, quod omnes res, factae a Deo vel etiam possibiles fieri, habent rationes in Deo, per quas intelliguntur; quae quidem rationes vivere dicuntur, quia sunt in substantia vivente, secundum quod vivens, et sunt etiam ratio intelligendi, qui est actus vitae: et ideo in artifice creato dicuntur vivere, sed in Deo non tantum dicuntur vivere, sed etiam ipsa vita, quia ipsa ratio cognoscendi in Deo est ipsa intelligentia. — Ratio autem dicendi fuit haec. Cum enim res habeant esse in Deo et etiam in universo et diversimode, quia aliquas proprietates habent secundum existentias in mundo, quae non competunt eis, secundum quod sunt in Deo: ideo non solum dixit: Quod factum est in ipso erat, sed vita, ut omnes illae conditiones excluderentur. Creaturae enim in mundo habent esse corporale, variabile et corruptibile. Quoniam enim «vita est actus spiritualis et continuus, fluens ab ente quieto et sempiterno¹⁷», perfecte dictum est, quod res sunt in Deo vita, ut per spiritualitatem excludatur corporeitas, per quietem variabilitas, per sempiternitatem corruptibilitas.

Question I.

Whether all things are in God as life.

That all things are in God as life appears [thus]:

1. John, chapter one¹: That which was made, in him was life; but every creature is made: therefore every creature is in him as life.

2. Likewise, Augustine, on Genesis according to the letter, book five²: "All things are said to have been in him as life, not in their own nature, since he knew all things before they came to be."

3. Likewise, by reason it appears [so], since the divine essence is life, therefore that which is the divine essence is also life; but the creature in God is the divine essence, since whatever is in God is God: therefore it is life. And this is what Anselm says in the Monologion³: "that the creature in God is the creating essence."

4. Likewise, to understand is one differentia of to live, since to live is said in four ways according to the Philosopher⁴: if therefore to understand is to live, then every ground of understanding is a ground of living. But things are in God according to their grounds of understanding, therefore they are living in God; but not by participation: therefore they are life simply.

On the contrary:

1. Acts, chapter seventeen⁵: In him we live, and move, and are. Therefore if [from the fact] that we live, we are in God as life, then also [from the fact] that we move, we are in him as motion; but this is not said: therefore neither ought that to be said.

2. Likewise, if things are said to be in God as life, then it is either by reason of power, or of knowing, or of will. Not by reason of power, since a thing, by the fact that it can be produced through creation, before it is produced is altogether nothing, since it is produced according to the whole; if it is nothing, then neither is it life. Nor by reason of knowing, since then, since evils are known by God, evils would then be in God as life; which is absurd. If by reason of will: but the will of God is only of future things: therefore future things alone would live in God. But things other than future are in God by an idea: therefore not everything that is in God, is in him as life.

3. Likewise, this⁶ appears, since the eternal exemplar represents things most expressly, according as they are and proceed from him: therefore since some things live and some do not, [and] he represents some after the manner of living things, others after the manner of non-living things: therefore some things are in God as life, others not.

4. By reason of this it is asked, why things are said to be in God as life rather than as wisdom, or essence, or intelligence.

Conclusion.

All things which are in God as in an exemplar, in him are life.

I respond: To this some have wished to say that not all things which are said to be in God are in him as life, but only those which are so in God as disposed to come to be⁷. And the reason of this is that word and life state act and disposition. And therefore Anselm says⁸ that the word is only of those things which are, or are to be; and therefore those alone are in God as life. And therefore they say that to the account of speaking life it necessarily concurs that things be in God as to the power, the knowing, and the will of producing.

— But this cannot stand according to Augustine. For the Son, as he himself says in On the Trinity, book six⁹, "is an art full of all the living accounts"; but it is established that it is not filled save with infinite accounts: therefore infinite accounts of things live in God, therefore not only of beings or of future things, but also of all possible things. And again Augustine, in the book Eighty-three Questions¹⁰, says that "an account [ratio] is, even if nothing is ever made through it"; but it is established that the account in the mind of the artificer lives, not because the thing is produced outside: for it lives even if the thing is corrupted, and the outward being makes nothing at all to [its] life. And therefore it is clear that not only present or future things live in God.

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that things are in God in three ways, namely as in a producing principle, and thus they are in the account of power; as in an expressing exemplar, and thus they are in the account of knowing; and as in a conserving end, in the account¹¹ of will. In the first mode — namely as in a producing principle — since God produces the whole from nothing, [things] are altogether nothing, neither life nor anything. But because they are in God as in a conserving end, since they are conserved according to the being which they have, in this way some are life, others not. Whence some merely are, some are and are moved, some, like men, both are and are moved and live. But because they are¹² [in God] as in an expressing exemplar, in this way they are in him as life. And since not only beings are expressed in that exemplar, but also all things knowable¹³ to God, therefore all things which are in him are in God as life. And therefore the blessed John says: That which was made, in him was life. And thus it is clear that being-in-God is attended to according to a threefold kind of cause; and likewise it is clear how [it is so] by reason of power and of knowing, and of will; and¹⁴ that question is solved, according to which kind of cause, or according to which of the three conditions, things are said to be in God. It is also clear which [things] are called life in God, namely all those which are in him as in an exemplar.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that in God we are moved etc.; it must be understood as to the third mode of being-in-God, namely through conservation. For God conserves in us life and operation and essence; and as to this is that saying [of the Apostle] understood.

2. To that which is said: by reason of what are things called life in God etc.; it must be said, by reason of power and of knowing together, since these two concur to the account of an exemplar; for God is exemplar only of those things which he knows and is able [to make].

3. To that which is objected, that things are represented in that exemplar as they are; it must be said that this is true; yet it is not necessary that the account of representation be altogether such as that which is represented, as was shown above: and therefore, just as the idea of corporeal things is spiritual, so [the idea] of non-living things is living.

4. To that which is asked lastly, why things are said to be in God as life rather than as something else¹⁵; it must be said that, although the aforesaid word [Quod factum est in ipso vita erat] has many expositions, by which it is said: That which was made, in him was life; yet specially around this word the truth of what is said and the reason of saying it must be considered. The truth of what is said, as Augustine says¹⁶, is that all things, made by God or even possible to be made, have grounds [rationes] in God, through which they are understood; which grounds indeed are said to live, since they are in a living substance, insofar as it is living, and they are also a ground of understanding, which [understanding] is an act of life: and therefore in the created artificer they are said to live, but in God they are said not only to live, but [to be] life itself, since the very ground of knowing in God is the very intelligence. — But the reason for the [manner of] saying was this. For since things have being in God and also in the universe and in different ways, since they have certain properties according to [their] existences in the world which do not belong to them as they are in God: therefore [the Evangelist] did not say only: That which was made, in him was, but life, that all those conditions might be excluded. For creatures in the world have a being corporeal, variable, and corruptible. For since "life is a spiritual and continuous act, flowing from a being at rest and everlasting¹⁷", it has been perfectly said that things are in God as life, so that by spirituality corporeality may be excluded, by rest variability, by everlastingness corruptibility.