Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`La.`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`En.`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., Cod. T, Vat., ed. 1).

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hac solutione Magistri, qua dicit, quod cognitio Dei est eius essentia, nec tamen omnia quae sunt in cognitione, sunt in essentia. Videtur enim male dicere, quoniam hoc argumentum videtur esse necessarium: si aliqua duo sunt omnino eadem; si aliquid est in uno, et in alio. Si dicas, quod differunt penes connotata: videtur falsum, quia Dei praescientia non connotat. — Vel si dicas, quod praescientia connotat; obiicitur de hoc nomine Deus, quod non connotat, et tamen dicuntur omnia esse in Deo: ergo pari ratione et in essentia. — Praeterea, contra Magistrum videtur esse verbum Anselmi in Monologio¹, quod «creatura in Creatore est creatrix essentia»: ergo videtur, quod vere sint in Dei essentia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod haec praepositio in aliquando connotat inhaerentiam, ut si dicatur accidens in subiecto: aliquando notat identitatem, ut si dicatur, ideae rerum sunt in Deo, quoniam sunt Deus, non a Deo; aliquando notat causalitatem, ut si dicatur, creaturae sunt in ipso Deo: et potest haec praepositio in dici secundum quatuor genera causarum, sed in Deo non dicitur nisi secundum tria². — Quoniam ergo causa dicit respectum ad creaturam secundum rationem intelligendi, ideo haec praepositio in, secundum quod dicit causalitatem, non additur nisi terminis dicentibus respectum ad creaturam. Et quoniam nomen substantiae vel naturae vel essentiae non dicit respectum, ideo si dicatur: creaturae sunt in Dei substantia, haec praepositio in aut notat identitatem, aut inhaerentiam, quorum utrumque falsum est: et ideo tales locutiones non recipiuntur; et in illo argumento est sophisma secundum accidens. Ideo dicit Magister, quod non valet; quamvis enim idem sint re, differunt tamen in modo significandi et intelligendi.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non dicit respectum; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia imponitur ab actu, quem habet ad creaturam, sicut dicit Damascenus³; unde bene dicitur: Deus creaturarum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod creatura in Creatore est creatrix essentia; dicendum, quod creaturam in Creatore esse est ideam vel similitudinem eius apud Deum esse; et Anselmus vult dicere, quod illa similitudo est creatrix essentia, non quod illa creatura sit essentia. Unde bene concedendum, quod ideae rerum sunt in divina essentia, quia in notat identitatem, et vere; sed hoc non potest dici de creatura secundum esse, quod habet in proprio genere.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod illa esse in Deo intelliguntur, quae ex ipso et per ipsum etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia cum talia non sint nisi praesentia, ergo in Deo non sunt nisi ea quae praesenter existunt; quod est manifeste falsum et contra Augustinum⁴, qui dicit, quod res sunt in Deo ab aeterno. Si dicas, quod accipit esse in Deo ut in conservante, quia sic accipit Apostolus in praefata auctoritate⁵: Ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso; tunc nihil facit ad propositum, quia Magister accipit esse in, secundum quod dicuntur res esse in Deo aeternaliter. — Si tu dicas, quod res actualiter sunt ex Deo vel per Deum ex tempore, sed habitualiter⁶ ab aeterno; tunc ego quaero, quare actualiter sunt in Deo ab aeterno et non ex Deo vel per Deum?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod esse ex⁷ Deo vel per Deum potest accipi vel secundum aptitudinem, vel secundum actum, vel secundum habitum. Si secundum actum; sic praedicta auctoritas non est intelligenda praecise, quod illa sola sint in Deo, quae sunt ex Deo vel per Deum, quia multa Deus cognoscit, quae sunt in Deo, quae tamen non sunt ex ipso nec per ipsum, nec erunt. Potest iterum accipi secundum habitum; et sic adhuc non est intelligenda praecise, quia multa Deus cognoscit et potest facere, quae non faciet; et tamen sunt in ipso, nec unquam erunt ex ipso nec per ipsum. Potest iterum intelligi secundum aptitudinem; et tunc praecise habet veritatem, quia nihil est in Deo, nisi sit aptum esse ex Deo et per ipsum; et sic valet ad propositum, et sic intelligit Magister; et per hoc excluduntur mala, quia Deus non potest facere mala, nec mala possunt esse ex ipso nec per ipsum.

Quod quaeritur, quare non dicuntur res aeternaliter esse ex Deo etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia aliae praepositiones significant per modum fieri et motus et actus, sed haec praepositio in per modum quietis⁸. Et quoniam Deus non fecit nisi ex tempore, nec fuit causa actualiter causans nisi ex tempore, licet habitualiter ab aeterno; ideo magis dicuntur res aeternaliter in Deo quam ex Deo⁹.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de ista ratione Magistri, qua dicit, quod mala non sunt in Deo, quia Deus non cognoscit ea per approbationem. Videtur enim male dicere, quia approbatio respicit voluntatem; sed esse in Deo respicit ab aeterno exemplaritatem: ergo notitia approbationis nihil ad hoc facit. — Item, Magister videtur insufficiens in divisione divinae cognitionis, quia sicut bona cognoscuntur notitia approbationis, ita mala notitia reprobationis. — Item, approbatio aut addit aliquid supra notitiam simpliciter, aut non; si non: ergo non est¹⁰ in Deo distinguere notitiam, et notitiam approbationis. Item, si nihil addit, ergo sicut sunt in Deo quae cognoscit approbando, ita etiam illa¹¹ quae cognoscit simpliciter. Si aliquid addit: ergo videtur, quod divina notitia sit composita. Si dicas, quod addit secundum intellectum — sed intellectus noster non facit res esse in Deo: ergo nec notitia approbationis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod approbatio supra cognitionem secundum intellectum addit beneplacitum voluntatis; hoc autem beneplacitum connotat bonitatem in eo¹², respectu cuius est; quia Deo non placet nisi bonum, et omne bonum in quantum huiusmodi Deo simile est. Si ergo idea dicit rationem cognoscendi secundum assimilationem, omnia quae Deus cognoscit notitia approbationis, sunt in ipso.

Sed notandum, quod approbatio potest connotare bonitatem in actu; et sic non est praecise verum, quod omne quod est in Deo, sit cognitum notitia approbationis. Potest iterum connotare bonitatem in potentia, sicut exemplar connotat rei entitatem, non quia sit, sed quia Deus potest eam facere; et sic nihil est in Deo, nisi quod cognoscit notitia approbationis, quia sic cognoscit omne bonum, quod est vel quod potest facere, et illius habet exemplar; et ideo illud tantum est in Deo.

Quod ergo obiicit, quod voluntas non facit, quod sint in Deo; dicendum, quod hoc non est quia voluntas in actu, sed quia Deus nihil potest facere, quod non approbet tanquam bonum; unde approbatio potius dicit ibi iudicium rationis quam affectum voluntatis¹³.

Quod quaerit, si addit; dicendum, quod addit a parte nostri intellectus et a parte connotati, a parte ipsius Dei non. Non sic autem addit reprobatio; et ideo Magister non ponit notitiam reprobationis pro membro.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Ambrosius: Eandem vim habent omnia haec, scilicet ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso. Obiicitur enim, quod si habent eandem vim, ergo videtur hic esse inculcatio verborum. — Item, aut accipitur esse in ipso sicut in exemplari, aut sicut in causa conservante. Si tanquam in exemplari, constat quod aliud est esse in ipso, et ex ipso, sicut praeostensum est¹⁴. Si tanquam in conservante, adhuc est aliud produci, aliud conservari. — Item, si eandem vim habent; sicut ex ipso appropriatur Patri, ita potest appropriari Filio, et similiter Patri erit appropriare in ipso.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est loqui de illis tribus circumlocutionibus quantum ad illud quod significant, aut quantum ad ordinem, quem connotant. Si loquamur quantum ad illud quod significant, sic omnia dicuntur esse ex Deo, tanquam ex principio primo non aliunde moto; omnia dicuntur esse per Deum, tanquam per principium sufficientissimum quod omnia agit per se ipsum; omnia dicuntur esse in Deo, tanquam in principio infinito, quod non potest facere aliquid extra se, sed omnia ambit eius virtus. Et in his tribus circumlocutionibus significatur, quod Deus est principium primum et sufficientissimum et infinitissimum. Et quia omnia haec in Deo sunt unum et conveniunt tribus, ideo quantum ad significatum dicit Ambrosius, quod habent eandem vim; nec tamen est inculcatio¹⁵, quia idem diversimode important secundum rationem intelligendi. — Si autem loquamur quantum ad ordinem, quem connotant praepositionum habitudines, sic sunt appropriata tribus: quia ex ipso dicit rationem primi, et per ipsum dicit rationem medii, et in ipso dicit rationem ultimi sive quietativi¹⁶. Et ideo ex ipso appropriatur personae Patris, quae est prima in Trinitate; per ipsum appropriatur Filio, qui est persona media; et in ipso Spiritui sancto, qui est persona tertia. Ex his patent obiecta.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning this solution of the Master, by which he says that the cognition of God is his essence, yet not all things which are in his cognition are in his essence. For he seems to speak ill, since this argument seems to be necessary: if any two are altogether the same; if anything is in the one, [it is] also in the other. If you say that they differ on the side of their connotata: it seems false, since God's foreknowledge does not connote. — Or if you say that foreknowledge connotes; it is objected concerning this name God, that it does not connote, and yet all things are said to be in God: therefore by parity of reasoning [they are] also in his essence. — Furthermore, against the Master there seems to be the word of Anselm in the Monologion¹, that «a creature in the Creator is a creating essence»: therefore it seems that they truly are in God's essence.

I respond: It must be said that this preposition in sometimes connotes inherence, as if one say an accident in a subject: sometimes it notes identity, as if one say the ideas of things are in God, since they are God, not from God; sometimes it notes causality, as if one say creatures are in God himself: and this preposition in can be said according to the four genera of causes, but in God it is said only according to three². — Therefore, since cause says a respect to the creature according to the account of understanding, this preposition in, insofar as it says causality, is added only to terms saying a respect to the creature. And since the name of substance or nature or essence does not say a respect, therefore if it be said: creatures are in God's substance, this preposition in either notes identity or inherence, both of which are false: and therefore such locutions are not received; and in that argument there is a sophism according to accident. Therefore the Master says that [the argument] is invalid; for although they be the same in reality, they yet differ in the mode of signifying and of understanding.

To that which is objected, that God does not say a respect; it must be said that this is false, because [the name] is imposed from the act which he has toward the creature, as Damascene says³; whence it is well said: God of creatures.

To that which is objected, that a creature in the Creator is a creating essence; it must be said that for a creature to be in the Creator is for the idea or likeness of it to be with God; and Anselm wishes to say that that likeness is a creating essence, not that that creature is the essence. Whence it is rightly to be conceded that the ideas of things are in the divine essence, because in notes identity, and truly so; but this cannot be said of the creature according to the being which it has in its proper genus.

DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that those things are understood to be in God which are from him and through him etc. For he seems to speak ill, because since such things are only [as] present, therefore in God there are only those things which presently exist; which is manifestly false and against Augustine⁴, who says that things are in God from eternity. If you say that he takes to be in God as in [a cause] conserving, because thus the Apostle takes [it] in the aforementioned authority⁵: From him and through him and in him; then [this] makes nothing to the proposition, because the Master takes to be in, according to which things are said to be in God eternally. — If you say that things are actually from God or through God in time, but habitually⁶ from eternity; then I ask, why are they actually in God from eternity and not from God or through God?

I respond: It must be said that to be from⁷ God or through God can be taken either according to aptitude, or according to act, or according to habit. If according to act; then the aforesaid authority is not to be understood precisely [as meaning] that those alone are in God which are from God or through God, because God knows many things which are in God, which yet are not from him nor through him, nor will be. It can again be taken according to habit; and so still it is not to be understood precisely, because God knows and can do many things which he will not do; and yet they are in him, nor will they ever be from him nor through him. It can again be understood according to aptitude; and then it has truth precisely, because nothing is in God unless it be apt to be from God and through him; and so it is valid for the proposition, and so the Master understands [it]; and through this evils are excluded, because God cannot do evils, nor can evils be from him nor through him.

As for what is asked, why things are not said eternally to be from God etc.; it must be said that there is no parallel, because the other prepositions signify by the mode of becoming and motion and act, but this preposition in by the mode of rest⁸. And since God did not make [things] except in time, nor was actually a cause causing except in time, although habitually from eternity; therefore things are said rather to be in God eternally than from God⁹.

DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that reasoning of the Master, by which he says that evils are not in God, because God does not know them by approbation. For he seems to speak ill, because approbation regards the will; but to be in God regards exemplarity from eternity: therefore the knowledge of approbation makes nothing to this. — Likewise, the Master seems insufficient in the division of the divine cognition, because just as goods are known by the knowledge of approbation, so evils [are known] by the knowledge of reprobation. — Likewise, approbation either adds something over knowledge simply, or not; if not: therefore there is not¹⁰ [reason] in God to distinguish knowledge and the knowledge of approbation. Likewise, if it adds nothing, therefore just as those things are in God which he knows by approving, so also those¹¹ which he knows simply [are in God]. If it adds something: therefore it seems that the divine knowledge is composite. If you say that it adds [something] according to the intellect — but our intellect does not make things to be in God: therefore neither does the knowledge of approbation.

I respond: It must be said that approbation, over cognition according to the intellect, adds the good-pleasure of the will; but this good-pleasure connotes goodness in him¹² with respect to whom it is; because nothing pleases God except the good, and every good as such is like to God. If therefore the idea says the account of knowing according to assimilation, all things which God knows by the knowledge of approbation are in him.

But it is to be noted that approbation can connote goodness in act; and so it is not precisely true that everything which is in God is known by the knowledge of approbation. It can again connote goodness in potency, as the exemplar connotes the entity of a thing, not because it is, but because God can make it; and so nothing is in God except what he knows by the knowledge of approbation, because thus he knows every good which is or which he can do, and of that he has the exemplar; and therefore that alone is in God.

Therefore as for what he objects, that the will does not make [things] to be in God; it must be said that this is not because [it is] the will in act, but because God can do nothing which he does not approve as good; whence approbation rather says here a judgment of reason than an affection of the will¹³.

As for what he asks, whether [approbation] adds [something]; it must be said that it does add — on the side of our intellect and on the side of the connotatum, on the side of God himself it does not. But reprobation does not add in this way; and therefore the Master does not place the knowledge of reprobation as a member [of the division].

DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what Ambrose says: All these have the same force, namely from him and through him and in him. For it is objected, that if they have the same force, therefore there seems to be here an inculcation of words. — Likewise, either to be in him is taken as in an exemplar, or as in a conserving cause. If as in an exemplar, it is established that it is one thing to be in him and another to be from him, as has been previously shown¹⁴. If as in a conserving [cause], still it is one thing to be produced, another to be conserved. — Likewise, if they have the same force; just as from him is appropriated to the Father, so it can be appropriated to the Son, and similarly for the Father it will [be possible] to appropriate in him.

I respond: It must be said that there is [a way of] speaking concerning those three circumlocutions either as regards what they signify, or as regards the order which they connote. If we speak as regards what they signify, then all things are said to be from God, as from a first principle not moved by another; all things are said to be through God, as through a most-sufficient principle which does all things through itself; all things are said to be in God, as in an infinite principle, which cannot make anything outside itself, but all things its power encompasses. And in these three circumlocutions it is signified that God is a principle first and most-sufficient and most-infinite. And because all these things in God are one and agree to the three [persons], therefore as regards the signified Ambrose says that they have the same force; nor yet is there an inculcation¹⁵, because the same things are imported in different ways according to the account of understanding. — But if we speak as regards the order which the relations of the prepositions connote, then they are appropriated to the three [persons]: because from him says the account of first, and through him says the account of middle, and in him says the account of last or quietative¹⁶. And therefore from him is appropriated to the person of the Father, who is first in the Trinity; through him is appropriated to the Son, who is the middle person; and in him to the Holy Spirit, who is the third person. From these the objections are plain.

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