Bonaventure

Quaestio II.

Utrum imperfecta sint in Deo.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum imperfecta, secundum quod huiusmodi, sint in Deo. Et videtur quod non:

1. Quia mala ut mala non possunt habere similitudinem cum summo bono: ergo pari ratione, cum imperfecta non habeant similitudinem cum perfectissimo, non erunt in Deo.

2. Item, illa sola sunt in Deo, quae possunt esse a Deo et per Deum; sed imperfecta a Deo

non sunt, quia dicitur Deuteronomii trigesimo secundo¹: Dei perfecta sunt opera.

3. Item, specialiter obiicitur de materia et passione², diversitate et compositione. Cum enim exemplar sub ratione exemplaris sit forma, sit actus purus, et ita omnino simplex, videtur quod rationes materiae et passionis et diversitatis et compositionis repugnent exemplari; et si hoc, cum nihil dicatur esse in Deo nisi ratione exemplaris, patet etc.

4. Item, sicut veritas et bonitas³ est generalis conditio entium, ita et unitas; sed oppositum veritatis non habet ideam in Deo, similiter et bonitatis: ergo pari ratione oppositum unitatis. Sed oppositum unitatis est multitudo: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Augustinus ad Nebridium⁴: «Qui totum condidit non potuit et partium non habere rationes»: ergo cum partes sub ratione partium sint imperfectae, patet quod habet rationes imperfectorum.

2. Item, omnis cognitio divina est a priori: cum ergo in omni creatura prius cadat ratio imperfecti quam perfecti, ut materiae quam formae, principiorum quam principiati, partium quam totius, ergo per prius haec cognoscit Deus. Ergo si perfecta habent ideam in Deo, necesse est, quod habeant etiam imperfecta.

3. Item, divinum exemplar exprimit rem secundum totum, alioquin non perfecte cognosceret, ergo quidquid est de re, habet exemplar; sed materia est de rei constitutione, et imperfecta de constitutione perfecti: ergo etc.

4. Item, omnis effectus assimilatur suae causae aliqua assimilatione; sed minima assimilatio sufficit ad rationem exemplaris: ergo omne quod est a Deo, habet ideam in Deo, per quam, priusquam fiat, est in Deo. Sed materia est a Deo et passio et compositio et diversitas, quia omnia dicunt ens: ergo omnia sunt in Deo.

Conclusio⁵.

Imperfecta sunt in Deo, non ratione imperfectionis, quae privationem dicit, sed ratione illius quod imperfectioni subest.

Respondeo: Ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod imperfecta non sunt in Deo, nec cognoscuntur a Deo per aliquam ideam propriam, sed per ideam suorum oppositorum, ut materia per ideam formae, passio per ideam actus, multitudo per ideam unitatis. — Sed illud stare non potest. Cum enim omnia dicant aliquam entitatem et ita veritatem, de necessitate aliquam assimilationem habent ad primam veritatem, et ita rationem exemplaritatis; et ideo necessario sunt in Deo.

Propterea intelligendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum imperfecta habeant ideam in Deo, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: aut ratione ipsius quod subest, aut ratione imperfectionis. Si ratione imperfectionis, cum imperfectio sit privatio, et privatio non dicat ens nec aliquid a Deo nec assimilabile, sic non habet ideam. Si autem ratione eius quod subest, sicut materia dicitur quid imperfectum, et materia aliquam essentiam dicit, sic habet ideam, sed non imperfectam, sed perfectam⁶; quoniam, sicut non viventium est idea vivens, et corporalium spiritualis, sic temporalium aeterna, et imperfectorum perfecta⁷.

Nec tamen malorum est idea bona. Unde notandum, quod idea, sicut supra dictum fuit in quaestione de ideis⁸, dicit assimilationem extra genus. Prima autem assimilatio est in ratione entitatis in Deo. Omne ergo quod de se dicit rationem entitatis, sive sit compositum, sive imperfectum, sive materiale, sive passibile, sive in actu, sive in potentia, potest Deo assimilari et produci; et ideo habet esse in Deo. Quod autem dicit privationem, hoc ipso amittit rationem veri effectus et rationem assimilationis; et ideo falsitas et malitia ideam non habent nec sunt in Deo nec a Deo. — Ex his patet, quod imperfecta sunt in Deo; patent etiam quaesita.

Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:

Ad 1. Quod enim obiicitur de malo, patet responsio, quia malum dicit simpliciter privationem in eo quod malum, non sic imperfectum.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod imperfecta non sunt a Deo; dicendum, quod imperfecta, secundum id quod sunt, a Deo sunt, licet in eis non remaneat imperfectio, quia Deus perficit⁹.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non habent assimilationem; dicendum, quod quamvis non habeant in conditionibus specialibus, habent tamen in generalibus; et hoc sufficit. Omnia enim habent rationem boni et pulcri et entis¹⁰.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de opposito unitatis, dicendum, quod non est simile. Nam unitas salvatur in multitudine, non sic bonitas in malitia, nec veritas in falsitate, quia illae sunt privationes; non sic autem unitatis privatio est multitudo¹¹; et ideo patet totum.

Question II.

Whether imperfect things are in God.

Secondly it is asked whether imperfect things, as such, are in God. And it appears that they are not:

1. Because evils as evils cannot have a likeness with the highest good: therefore by parity of reasoning, since imperfect things do not have a likeness with the most perfect, they will not be in God.

2. Likewise, those alone are in God which can be from God and through God; but imperfect things from God

are not, since it is said in Deuteronomy 32¹: The works of God are perfect.

3. Likewise, it is specially objected concerning matter and passion², diversity and composition. For since the exemplar, under the account of exemplar, is form, is pure act, and so altogether simple, it appears that the accounts of matter and of passion and of diversity and of composition are repugnant to the exemplar; and if so, since nothing is said to be in God except by reason of the exemplar, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, just as truth and goodness³ is a general condition of beings, so also is unity; but the opposite of truth has no idea in God, and likewise [the opposite] of goodness: therefore by parity of reasoning [neither has] the opposite of unity. But the opposite of unity is multitude: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine to Nebridius⁴: "He who founded the whole could not but have also the accounts of the parts": therefore since the parts under the account of parts are imperfect, it is clear that he has the accounts of imperfect things.

2. Likewise, every divine knowing is a priori: since therefore in every creature the account of the imperfect falls before that of the perfect — as of matter before form, of principles before what is principled, of parts before the whole — therefore God knows these prior. Therefore if perfect things have an idea in God, it is necessary that imperfect things have one as well.

3. Likewise, the divine exemplar expresses the thing according to the whole, otherwise it would not perfectly know it; therefore whatever is of the thing has an exemplar; but matter is of the thing's constitution, and the imperfect [is] of the constitution of the perfect: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, every effect is assimilated to its cause by some assimilation; but the least assimilation suffices for the account of an exemplar: therefore everything which is from God has an idea in God, through which, before it comes to be, it is in God. But matter is from God, and passion and composition and diversity, since all of them state being: therefore all are in God.

Conclusion⁵.

Imperfect things are in God, not by reason of the imperfection (which states a privation), but by reason of that which underlies the imperfection.

I respond: To this some have said that imperfect things are not in God, nor are they known by God through any proper idea, but through the idea of their opposites — as matter through the idea of form, passion through the idea of act, multitude through the idea of unity. — But this cannot stand. For since all things state some entity and so [some] truth, of necessity they have some assimilation to the first truth, and so [have] the account of exemplarity; and therefore they are necessarily in God.

For this reason it must be understood that when it is asked whether imperfect things have an idea in God, this can be understood in two ways: either by reason of that which underlies, or by reason of the imperfection. If by reason of the imperfection, since imperfection is a privation, and a privation states neither being nor anything from God nor anything assimilable, in this way it has no idea. But if by reason of that which underlies — as matter is called something imperfect, and matter states some essence — in this way it has an idea, yet not an imperfect one, but a perfect one⁶; since, just as the idea of non-living things is a living [idea], and that of bodily things [is] a spiritual [idea], so [the idea] of temporal things [is] eternal, and [the idea] of imperfect things [is] perfect⁷.

Yet there is no good idea of evils. Whence it must be noted that idea, as was said above in the question on ideas⁸, states an assimilation outside [any] genus. The first assimilation, however, is in the account of entity in God. Therefore everything which of itself states the account of entity — whether it be composite, or imperfect, or material, or passible, or in act, or in potency — can be assimilated to God and produced; and therefore it has being in God. But what states a privation, by that very fact loses the account of a true effect and the account of assimilation; and therefore falsity and malice have no idea, nor are they in God nor from God. — From these things it is clear that imperfect things are in God; the things asked are also clear.

To the arguments of the negative side:

To 1. As to what is objected concerning evil, the reply is clear, since evil states simply a privation in that which it is evil — not so the imperfect.

To 2. To that which is objected, that imperfect things are not from God; it must be said that imperfect things, according to that which they are, are from God, although the imperfection does not remain in them, since God perfects [them]⁹.

To 3. To that which is objected, that they have no assimilation; it must be said that although they do not have it in their special conditions, they nevertheless have it in their general [conditions]; and this suffices. For all things have the account of the good and the beautiful and of being¹⁰.

To 4. To that which is objected concerning the opposite of unity, it must be said that it is not similar. For unity is preserved in multitude — not so goodness in malice, nor truth in falsity, since those are privations; but the privation of unity is not multitude in this way¹¹; and so the whole is clear.