Bonaventure

Articulus III. De numero sive generalitate existentiae, quam res habent in Deo.

Tertio loco est quaestio de tertio articulo, scilicet de generalitate existentiae rerum in Deo, et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum mala sint in Deo. Secundo, utrum in Deo sint imperfecta, secundum quod huiusmodi.

Quaestio I.

Utrum mala sint [in Deo].

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Quod autem mala non sint in Deo, videtur.

1. Augustinus de Libero Arbitrio: «In tantum res recte vituperantur, in quantum earum vituperator artem, in qua factae sunt, videt, ut hoc in eis vituperet, quod in arte non videt». Si ergo vituperantur quantum ad malitiam sive in quantum mala; et hoc modo non videntur in Deo: ergo hoc modo non sunt in Deo.

2. Item, «omne quod est in Deo, est ex ipso et per ipsum», ut dicit Augustinus, et Magister in littera¹; sed mala numquam sunt ex Deo nec per Deum: ergo nec in Deo.

3. Item, omne quod est in Deo, aut est sicut in principio producente, aut sicut in exemplari exprimente, aut sicut in fine² conservante; sed constans est, quod Deus non est principium producens mala, nec etiam conservans. Item, non est exemplar exprimens, quia ratio exemplaris attenditur secundum assimilationem; sed Dei ad malum nulla est assimilatio: ergo mala nullo modo sunt in Deo.

4. Item, quanto aliquid melius est, tanto magis distat a malo; sed Deus est optimus, quo nihil melius potest cogitari: ergo tanta distantia differt³, quanta nulla maior potest cogitari. Sed magis distat a malo quod nec habet veritatem malitiae nec similitudinem, quam quod habet saltem similitudinem, et in quo nullo modo est malum, quam in quo aliquo modo est: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Omne quod cognoscitur ab aliquo, qui est sua cognitio, est in illo tanquam in cognoscente; sed Deus cognoscit mala, quia ea punit et reprobat, et Deus est sua cognitio: ergo mala sunt in Deo. Minor patet, maior similiter, quia omne cognitum est in cognitione⁴: si ergo idem est cognitio et cognoscens, ergo si est in cognitione, et in cognoscente.

2. Item, omne quod cognoscitur in aliquo, est in illo in quo cognoscitur; sed mala cognoscuntur in Deo: ergo sunt in Deo. Probatio minoris: mala cognoscuntur a Deo — constat — aut intra se, aut extra: non extra, hoc constat, quia divinus aspectus non exit extra, tunc enim indigeret alio ad cognoscendum⁵. Et iterum, Angeli cognoscunt mala in Deo. Unde Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram⁶: Angeli vident in illo bona nostra, quae eis placent, et mala nostra, quae eis displicent.

3. Item, omne quod cognoscitur in aliquo, et non per accidens, est aliquo modo in illo sicut in exemplari; sed mala cognoscuntur a Deo, sed non per accidens, quia nihil per accidens cognoscit, sed omnia per se: ergo mala sunt in Deo.

4. Item, omne quod cognoscitur ab aliquo non per privationem, cognoscitur per similitudinem et ideam; sed in Deo non cadit cognitio per privationem, quia nulla potest in illo exemplari esse privatio, cum sit purus actus⁷: ergo si cognoscit mala non cognoscit per privationem, sed per similitudinem. Sed similitudo est idea in Deo: ergo mala habent ideam in Deo.

Conclusio.

Deus mala cognoscit, ipsa tamen non sunt in Deo nec habent ideam in eo, sed cognoscuntur per ideam bonorum, quorum sunt privationes.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod mala a Deo cognoscuntur, non tamen in Deo existunt secundum quod mala, quia sic loquimur in proposito. — Ideo, inquam, cognoscuntur, quia sicut «rectum est iudex sui et obliqui⁸», sic summa veritas et lux et actus est ratio cognoscendi non tantum veritatem et lucem et actum, sed etiam obliquitatem, tenebram, et privationem. Unde lux se ipsa tenebram cognoscit⁹.

Non sunt autem mala in Deo, quoniam illa dicuntur esse in Deo, ad quae cooperatur Deus secundum aliquod genus causae, et maxime secundum genus causae formalis et exemplaris; malum autem non habet Deum pro causa¹⁰, nec pro

exemplari, quia malum ratione malitiae dicit solum privationem, exemplar autem, secundum quod huiusmodi, dicit assimilationem. Quoniam igitur privatio, secundum quod huiusmodi, nulli est assimilabilis, hinc est, quod nec malum nec falsitas habet ideam in Deo; suum autem oppositum est assimilabile. Unde cum uno et eodem cognoscat Deus bonum et malum sibi oppositum, bonum cognoscit secundum rationem assimilationis; et ideo bonum est in Deo ut in exemplari et ut cognitum per se et per modum positionis. Malum autem cum cognoscatur a Deo, non habet in ipso ideam, ideo non est in Deo, quamvis sit in Dei cognitione: quia, quamvis cognoscatur a Deo, non cognoscitur per ideam sui, sed boni, cuius est privatio. Et ideo dicitur cognosci per accidens et per privationem.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod malum est in Dei cognitione, et cognitio est Deus: ergo etc.; dicendum, quod hic est fallacia secundum accidens¹¹. Quamvis enim idem sit cognitio Dei quod Deus, tamen aliud connotat, sicut potentia et sapientia. Unde sicut non sequitur: est in Dei notitia, ergo et in potentia, immo est ibi accidens et consequens; sic et in proposito.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malum cognoscitur in Deo, ergo est in Deo; dicendum, quod nec illud sequitur: plus enim dicit esse in Deo quam cognosci a Deo vel in Deo. Cum enim dicitur aliquid cognosci a Deo, per hoc intelligitur, quod Deus sit ratio cognoscendi illud; sed cum additur, quod hoc sit in Deo, significatur, quod Deus sit ratio cognoscendi ut exemplar et per assimilationem; et ideo est ibi consequens.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod cognoscit non per accidens mala etc.; dicendum, quod cognosci per accidens hoc est dupliciter¹²: aut a parte cognoscentis, aut cogniti. In Deo nulla cadit cognitio per accidens a parte cognoscentis, quia omnia cognoscit se ipso; tamen cadit a parte cogniti, quoniam aliquid cognoscit per similitudinem suam, ut bonum, aliquid per similitudinem sui oppositi; et ita est ibi per accidens, non in decurrendo, sed in assimilando. Cum enim Deus cognoscit malum, non intelligitur assimilari ei, sed suo opposito.

4. Similiter solvendum est de privatione: quia cognoscere per privationem est dupliciter: aut ita, quod sit privatio in virtute cognoscente, sicut cognoscit aliquis silentium et tenebram per aurem et oculum¹³, et sic ponit imperfectionem; aut ita, quod sit privatio in cognito, non in cognoscente, sicut lux cognosceret tenebram, si haberet vim cognitivam, et sonus silentium: et sic cognoscit Deus, quoniam est actus purus et lux et veritas.

Article III. On the number, that is, the generality, of the existence which things have in God.

In the third place there is the question concerning the third article, namely concerning the generality of the existence of things in God; and concerning this two [questions] are asked. First it is asked, whether evils are in God. Secondly, whether imperfect [things] are in God, insofar as they are such.

Question I.

Whether evils are [in God].

That, however, evils are not in God, appears [thus].

1. Augustine, On Free Choice [of the Will]: "To the extent that things are rightly censured, the censurer of them sees the art in which they are made, so as to censure in them that which he does not see in the art." If therefore they are censured as to malice, that is, insofar as they are evil; and in this mode they are not seen in God: therefore in this mode they are not in God.

2. Likewise, "everything which is in God is from him and through him," as Augustine and the Master in the Lombard text say¹; but evils never are from God, nor through God: therefore neither in God.

3. Likewise, everything which is in God is either as in a producing principle, or as in an expressing exemplar, or as in a conserving end²; but it is settled that God is not a principle producing evils, nor even conserving [them]. Likewise, [he] is not an exemplar expressing [them], since the account of an exemplar is taken according to assimilation; but of God to evil there is no assimilation: therefore evils are in no way in God.

4. Likewise, by however much something is better, by so much the more does it stand at a distance from evil; but God is the best, than whom nothing better can be thought: therefore [God] differs by so great a distance³ as none greater can be thought. But that which has neither the truth of malice nor a likeness of it stands more distant from evil than that which has at least a likeness; and that in which evil is in no way [stands more distant] than that in which it is in some way: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. Everything which is known by someone who is his own knowing is in him as in a knower; but God knows evils, since he punishes them and reprobates [them], and God is his own knowing: therefore evils are in God. The minor is clear; the major likewise, since everything known is in the knowing⁴: if therefore the knowing and the knower are the same, therefore if [something] is in the knowing, [it is] also in the knower.

2. Likewise, everything which is known in something is in that in which it is known; but evils are known in God: therefore they are in God. Proof of the minor: evils are known by God — this is settled — either inside himself or outside: not outside, this is settled, since the divine glance does not go outside, for then he would need another for knowing⁵. And again, the angels know evils in God. Hence Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter⁶: The angels see in him our goods, which please them, and our evils, which displease them.

3. Likewise, everything which is known in something, and not by accident, is in some way in it as in an exemplar; but evils are known by God, and not by accident, since [God] knows nothing by accident, but all things by themselves: therefore evils are in God.

4. Likewise, everything which is known by someone not by privation is known by likeness and idea; but in God knowing through privation does not fall, since no privation can be in that exemplar, since it is pure act⁷: therefore if he knows evils, he does not know [them] by privation, but by likeness. But likeness is the idea in God: therefore evils have an idea in God.

Conclusion.

God knows evils; nevertheless they are not in God, nor have they an idea in him, but are known through the idea of the goods of which they are privations.

I respond: It must be said that evils are known by God, yet they do not exist in God insofar as they are evils, since thus we are speaking in the proposition. — They are known, I say, because just as "a straight thing is the judge of itself and of what is oblique⁸," so the supreme truth and light and act is the ground of knowing not only truth and light and act, but also obliquity, darkness, and privation. Hence light by itself knows darkness⁹.

Evils, however, are not in God, since those things are said to be in God toward which God cooperates according to some kind of cause, and most of all according to the kind of formal and exemplar cause; but evil does not have God as a cause¹⁰, nor as

an exemplar, since evil by reason of malice states only privation, but an exemplar, insofar as such, states assimilation. Therefore since privation, insofar as such, is assimilable to nothing, hence it is that neither evil nor falsity has an idea in God; but its opposite is assimilable. Hence, since by one and the same [thing] God knows the good and the evil opposed to it, he knows the good according to the account of assimilation; and therefore the good is in God as in an exemplar and as known by itself and after the manner of position. But evil, since it is known by God, does not have in him an idea, and therefore is not in God, although it is in God's knowing: since, although it is known by God, it is not known through an idea of itself, but of the good of which it is the privation. And therefore it is said to be known by accident and by privation.

1. Therefore to that which is objected, that evil is in God's knowing, and the knowing is God: therefore etc.; it must be said that here there is a fallacy according to accident¹¹. For although the knowing of God is the same thing as God, yet it connotes something else, like power and wisdom. Hence just as it does not follow: it is in God's notice, therefore also in [his] power, but rather it is there as accidental and consequent; so also in the proposition.

2. To that which is objected, that evil is known in God, therefore it is in God; it must be said that this also does not follow: for to be in God states more than to be known by God or in God. For when something is said to be known by God, by this is understood that God is the ground of knowing it; but when it is added that this is in God, it is signified that God is the ground of knowing as exemplar and through assimilation; and therefore it is there as consequent.

3. To that which is objected, that he knows evils not by accident etc.; it must be said that to be known by accident is twofold¹²: either on the part of the knower, or of the known. In God no knowing by accident falls on the part of the knower, since he knows all things by himself; nevertheless it does fall on the part of the known, since [he] knows something by its likeness, as the good, [and] something by the likeness of its opposite; and thus it is there by accident, not in running through, but in assimilating. For when God knows evil, he is not understood to be assimilated to it, but to its opposite.

4. Similarly the [reply] concerning privation must be solved: since to know by privation is twofold: either thus, that there be privation in the knowing power, as someone knows silence and darkness through the ear and the eye¹³, and thus it posits imperfection; or thus, that there be privation in the known, not in the knower, as light would know darkness, if it had a cognitive power, and sound silence: and thus God knows, since he is pure act and light and truth.