Bonaventure

Quaestio II.

Utrum res verius esse habeant in Deo quam in proprio genere.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum res sint in Deo verius quam in universo sive in proprio genere. Et quod verius sint in Deo, videtur:

1. Per Augustinum quinto super Genesim ad litteram¹: «Omnia, priusquam fierent, erant in notitia facientis et utique ibi meliora, ubi aeterna, ubi veriora et incommutabilia».

2. Item, «unumquodque sicut se habet ad esse, ita ad cognitionem»²; sed creaturae verius cognoscuntur in Deo quam in proprio genere: ergo et verius sunt in Deo.

3. Item, «omne quod est in aliquo est in eo per modum eius in quo est»³; sed Deus est in infinitum nobilior mundo: ergo in infinitum nobiliori et veriori modo sunt res in Deo quam in universo.

4. Item, nobilius et verius est esse vitae quam non viventis; sed omnia vivunt in Deo, ut supra monstratum est⁴, non autem in genere proprio: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Verius est res, ubi est simpliciter, quam ubi est solum secundum quid; sed in Deo solum dicitur esse secundum quid — quia non sequitur: asinus est in Deo, ergo asinus est — sed in proprio genere simpliciter: ergo ibi verius.

2. Item, verius est res, ubi est secundum principia intrinseca et proxima, quam ubi est⁵ in principio extrinseco et remoto; sed res in mundo sunt secundum principia intrinseca, in Deo autem ut in principio extrinseco: ergo etc.

3. Item, verius est res, ubi est secundum propriam entitatem, quam ubi solum secundum similitudinem; sed in Deo est homo et lapis et alia secundum similitudinem: ergo⁶ etc.

Conclusio.

Res, si comparantur ad se ipsas secundum diversum modum existendi, habent verius esse in proprio genere quam in cognoscente; si vero comparantur cum sua similitudine, quae in Deo est, tunc similitudo verius habet esse quam ipsa res in mundo.

Respondeo: Dicendum quod triplex est existentia rerum, scilicet in exemplari aeterno, et in intellectu creato, et in ipso mundo⁷. In exemplari aeterno et in intellectu creato sunt res secundum similitudinem; in ipso mundo secundum entitatem propriam. — Quando ergo quaeritur, in quo sint verius, hoc dupliciter potest quaeri: aut ita quod fiat comparatio eiusdem rei ad se secundum diversum modum existendi, ut sit sensus: ubi lapis verius habet esse, vel cum est in cognoscente vel⁸ producente, vel cum est in se; et hoc modo concedendum est, quod verius est unaquaeque res in proprio genere quam in Deo, sicut probant rationes ad hoc inductae. Alio modo potest fieri comparatio rei ad suam similitudinem, ut sit sensus quaestionis: quid habet esse verius et nobilius, utrum ipsa res, vel eius similitudo? Et hoc modo simpli-

citer concedendum, quod similitudo rei verius et nobilius esse habet in Deo, quam ipsa res in mundo ratione eius quod est; quia est ipse Deus. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

Adhuc similitudines rerum in intellectu creato verius et nobilius habent esse quam res in universo, ut dicit Augustinus de Trinitate¹, non ratione eius quod sunt, sed ratione eius in quo, quia sunt nobiliori et spirituali modo similitudines in intellectu cognoscente, quam sint ipsae res in mundo contentae. Et sic patent rationes ad utramque partem.

2. Tamen ad illud argumentum, quod fit de comparatione esse ad cognoscere; dicendum, quod illud generaliter intellectum, quod res ibi est verius, ubi verius cognoscitur, non habet veritatem. Contingit enim cognoscere quod non est: et ideo sicut ad cognosci non sequitur esse, ita nec ad vere cognosci vere esse, nec ad verius cognosci verius esse. Quando ergo dicitur, quod unumquodque sicut se habet ad esse, ita ad cognitionem, hoc intelligitur, quia eadem principia, quae sunt principia essendi, sunt principia cognoscendi; sed tamen principia essendi conferunt esse per se ipsa, sed cognitionem non conferunt per se, sed per suas similitudines.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod res in illo exemplari repraesentantur ut sunt; dicendum, quod verum est; tamen non oportet, quod ratio repraesentationis sit talis omnino, quale est repraesentatum, sicut supra ostensum est: et ideo sicut corporalium est idea spiritualis, ita non viventium vivens.

4. Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, quare magis dicuntur res esse in Deo vita quam alia; dicendum, quod quamvis praedictum verbum multas habeat expositiones, quo dicitur: Quod factum est in ipso vita erat; tamen specialiter circa hoc verbum consideranda est veritas dicti, et ratio dicendi. Veritas dicti, ut dicit Augustinus, est, quod omnes res, factae a Deo vel etiam possibiles fieri, habent rationes in Deo, per quas intelliguntur; quae quidem rationes vivere dicuntur, quia sunt in substantia vivente, secundum quod vivens, et sunt etiam ratio intelligendi, qui est actus vitae.

Question II.

Whether things have truer being in God than in their proper genus.

Secondly it is asked, whether things are in God more truly than in the universe, that is, in their proper genus. And that they are more truly in God, appears thus:

1. Through Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter, book five¹: "All things, before they came to be, were in the knowledge of the Maker, and surely there better, where eternal, where truer and unchangeable."

2. Likewise, "each thing as it stands toward being, so [it stands] toward knowing"²; but creatures are known more truly in God than in their proper genus: therefore they also are more truly in God.

3. Likewise, "everything which is in something is in it after the manner of that in which it is"³; but God is infinitely nobler than the world: therefore in an infinitely nobler and truer manner are things in God than in the universe.

4. Likewise, the being of a living thing is nobler and truer than [that] of a non-living thing; but all things live in God, as has been shown above⁴, yet not in their proper genus: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. A thing is more truly where it is simply, than where it is only in a certain respect; but in God it is said to be only in a certain respect — for it does not follow: the ass is in God, therefore the ass is — but in its proper genus simply: therefore there [it is] more truly.

2. Likewise, a thing is more truly where it is according to its intrinsic and proximate principles, than where it is⁵ in an extrinsic and remote principle; but things in the world are according to intrinsic principles, in God however as in an extrinsic principle: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a thing is more truly where it is according to its proper entity, than where [it is] only according to a likeness; but in God a man and a stone and other things are according to a likeness: therefore⁶ etc.

Conclusion.

Things, if they are compared to themselves according to a diverse mode of existing, have truer being in their proper genus than in the knower; but if they are compared with their likeness, which is in God, then the likeness has truer being than the thing itself in the world.

I respond: It must be said that there is a threefold existence of things, namely in the eternal exemplar, and in the created intellect, and in the world itself⁷. In the eternal exemplar and in the created intellect things are according to a likeness; in the world itself, according to their proper entity. — When therefore it is asked in which they are more truly, this can be asked in two ways: either in such a way that a comparison is made of the same thing to itself according to a diverse mode of existing, that the sense be: where does a stone have truer being, whether when it is in the knower or⁸ producer, or when it is in itself; and in this mode it must be conceded that any thing is more truly in its proper genus than in God, as the reasons brought forward for this prove. In another mode the comparison can be made of a thing to its likeness, that the sense of the question be: which has truer and nobler being, whether the thing itself, or its likeness? And in this mode simply

it must be conceded that the likeness of a thing has truer and nobler being in God than the thing itself in the world, by reason of that which it is; since it is God himself. And the reasons brought forward for this are to be conceded.

Furthermore the likenesses of things in the created intellect have truer and nobler being than things in the universe, as Augustine says On the Trinity¹, not by reason of that which they are, but by reason of that in which [they are], since the likenesses are in a nobler and spiritual manner in the knowing intellect, than are the things themselves contained in the world. And thus the reasons on each side stand.

2. Yet to that argument which is made about the comparison of being to knowing; it must be said that what is generally understood [in the dictum], that a thing is more truly there where it is more truly known, does not have [the] truth. For it happens that one knows what is not: and therefore just as upon being-known being does not follow, so neither upon being-known-truly being-truly, nor upon being-known-more-truly being-more-truly. When therefore it is said that each thing as it stands toward being, so [it stands] toward knowing, this is understood [thus], because the same principles which are principles of being are principles of knowing; yet however the principles of being confer being through themselves, but they do not confer knowing through themselves, but through their likenesses.

3. To that which is objected, that things are represented in that exemplar as they are; it must be said that this is true; yet it is not necessary that the account of representation be wholly such as that which is represented is, as has been shown above: and therefore just as the idea of bodily things is spiritual, so [the idea] of non-living things [is] living.

4. To that which is asked lastly, why things are said to be in God life more than [under] other [titles]; it must be said that, although the foresaid word — by which it is said: That which was made, in him was life — has many expositions, nevertheless specially concerning this word the truth of the saying and the ground of the saying must be considered. The truth of the saying, as Augustine says, is that all things made by God or even possible to be made have grounds in God through which they are understood; which grounds indeed are said to live, since they are in a living substance, according to that it is living, and they are also a ground of understanding, which is an act of life.