Bonaventure

Articulus III. De ipsa productione sive creatione.

Viso de entitate et quidditate principii producentis, quaeritur hic tertio de ipsa productione, quae creatio appellatur. Circa quam quaeruntur duo. Primum est, utrum dicat mutationem aliquam. Secundum est, utrum dicat aliquid¹ medium inter Creatorem et creaturam.

Quaestio I. Utrum creatio mutationem dicat.

Quod autem dicat mutationem, videtur:

1. Primo per auctoritatem Augustini, duodecimo de Civitate Dei²: «Omnia quae creata sunt, mutabilia sunt, quia de nihilo facta sunt»; si ergo creabile est mutabile, ergo creatum est mutatum, et creatio est mutatio. Si tu dicas, quod est mutabile, quia potest in nihil cedere, et non, quia productum est;

contra: sicut destrui dicit viam deveniendi in non-esse, ita creari in esse: si ergo destructio ponit mutationem, ergo pari ratione et productio.

2. Item, creatio est actio; sed «omnis actio est in motu, et omnis motus in actione³»: ergo qui creat, vere agit: ergo vere movet. Si tu dicas, quod actio divina magis est substantia quam actio, et talis est creatio; obiicitur de passione, quia creari est ipsius creaturae. Si ergo creatura susceptibilis est vere passionis et mutationis, ergo creatio-passio est mutatio.

3. Item, per Damascenum⁴, qui philosophus et theologus est: «Omne quod a versione incipit, in versionem tendit» — loquitur de creatione — ergo secundum ipsum creatio est versio; sed omnis versio est mutatio, sicut ipse idem dicit, quod creata sunt mutabilia, quia vertibilia: ergo creatio est mutatio.

4. Item, quanto aliqua sunt magis distantia, tanto in perveniendo ab uno ad alterum maior est mutatio et variatio; sed ens et non-ens summe distant: ergo cum creatione de non-ente fiat ens, creatio verissime est mutatio.

5. Item, magis mutatur res, quando suscipit formam novam, quam quando acquirit novum situm; et rursus adhuc magis, quando acquirit formam substantialem, quam quando acquirit dispositionem accidentalem: ergo quando totum de novo recipit et accipit, tunc mutatur maxime. Sed hoc est in creatione: ergo ibi vere est mutatio.

6. Item, si creatio dicit actionem absque omni mutatione, ergo absque omni tempore; et talia possunt inesse et insunt Deo ab aeterno: ergo videtur, quod Deus res produxerit ab aeterno.

Ad oppositum:

1. Magister dicit, et habetur in littera⁵: «Cum dicimus Deum facere aliquid, non aliquem in operando motum intelligimus inesse». Si dicas, quod creatio-actio non dicit motum, sed creatio-passio tantum; contra: idem manet significatum in activo et passivo, sicut dicit grammaticus, sicut recti et obliqui: si ergo in actione non dicit motum, ergo nec in passione.

2. Item, mutari est aliter se habere nunc quam prius⁶; sed quod creatur non se habet aliter nunc et prius, quia nunquam se habuit aliter, quam sicut se habet in creatione — nunquam enim fuit aliquo modo nec se habuit aliqualiter, nec ergo aliter quam nunc — ergo non mutatur, dum creatur: ergo creatio non est mutatio.

3. Item, immutabile est quod se habet eodem modo nunc et prius: ergo mutabile, quod se habet aliter, cum sit eius oppositum; sed creatum non se habet aliter nunc quam prius, quia nullo modo se habuit prius: ergo non est mutatum: ergo creatio non est mutatio⁷.

4. Item, «omnis motus et mutatio est perfectio entis in potentia»; creatio autem est nullo modo entis: ergo creatio non est motus nec mutatio. Prima patet per Philosophum⁸, secunda vero per Magistrum.

5. Item, omnis mutatio fundatur super aliquod mobile⁹; sed creatio non praeexigit aliquod mobile, quia omne mobile per creationem inducitur in esse: ergo creatio non est mutatio.

6. Item, si creatio est mutatio, aut ergo secundum accidens, aut secundum substantiam¹⁰. Non secundum accidens, quia tunc sola accidentia crearentur; sed nec secundum substantiam, quia tunc esset generatio, vel corruptio. Si dicas, quod sub nulla harum specierum continetur: obiicitur, quod non solum secundum Philosophum, sed secundum Augustinum¹¹ «omnis motus aut est ad situm, aut ad formam»; sed creatio est ad materiam recte ac proprie: ergo videtur, quod non sit mutatio.

7. Item, ex tanta potentia creat Deus, ex quanta generat, quia utrumque facit per potentiam infinitam¹²; sed Deus potest generare sine mutatione sui et etiam personae genitae: ergo pari ratione potest creare sine mutatione sui et creaturae; aut si non, quaero, quare non?

Conclusio.

Creatio est mutatio, sed distincta a mutatione naturali.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quaedam est productio, in qua productum se habet aliter nunc et prius, quia secundum aliquid sui fuit prius sub una dispositione, et nunc est sub alia; et talis est productio, quae est ex materiali principio, ut naturalis generatio.

Quaedam est productio, in qua productum omni modo se habet nunc et nullo modo prius; et talis est productio, quae est ex nihilo. Tertia est productio, in qua productum aeque omnino se habet nunc et prius, si tamen est ibi dicere prius; et talis est Filii generatio ab aeterno. Ab aeterno enim sic processit ut nunc¹³.

— Prima habet rationem motus et mutationis et productionis: motus, ratione praeparationis materiae, quae fit per dispositiones accidentales, et haec indiget successione et tempore; mutationis, ratione exitus in esse sive receptionis substantialis formae, quae fit in instanti; productionis vero, ratione eius, quod illam formam non a se habet, sed ab alio effectivo¹⁴. — Secunda caret ratione motus, habet tamen rationem mutationis et productionis. Ratione motus caret, quia cum non habeat materiam, nulla potest praeire dispositio; habet tamen rationem mutationis, quia ibi est subita et nova formae inductio; habet rationem productionis, quoniam hoc¹⁵ habet ab alio effectivo principio. — Tertia caret ratione motus et mutationis, habet tamen rationem productionis. Ratione motus et mutationis caret, quia nec est ex materiali principio, nec ex nihilo; sed tamen est ab aliquo¹⁶, et sempiternaliter est ab ipso.

Concedendum est igitur, quod productio creaturae est mutatio; et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc, licet aliquae videantur sophisticae.

Ad argumenta.

Ad 1. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod est sine motu; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur sine motu agentis, non tamen quod sine mutatione producti. Si enim, ut dicit Philosophus¹⁷, anima, dum movet corpus, immobilis perseverat, quanto magis Deus, dum creat et mutat omnia, «ipse stabilis manens dat cuncta mutari». — Si ergo obiiciat, quod verbum activum et passivum idem significant; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia actio et passio dicunt diversa genera¹⁸; tamen in coniugatione unum ponitur iuxta alterum, quia secundum vocis formationem unum venit ab alio.

Ad 2. Quod obiicitur, quod mutari est aliter se habere nunc et prius; dicendum, quod ista non est generalis ratio eius quod est mutari sive mutationis, sed solius mutationis naturalis.

Ad 3. Quod ergo obiicitur: immutabile est quod se habet eodem modo, et mutabile quod se habet aliter; dicendum, quod hic est consequens¹⁹, quia si mutabile et immutabile opponuntur ut privatio et habitus, et immutabile est quod se habet eodem modo, tunc mutabile est sive mutatum quod non se habet eodem modo. Sed hoc habet tres causas veritatis: aut quia nullo modo se habet prius et posterius; aut²⁰ nullo modo prius, et aliquo modo posterius, et ita non eodem modo; aut quia simpliciter aliter se habet prius, et aliter posterius: et ideo, cum procedit a pluribus causis veritatis ad unam, peccat secundum consequens.

Ad 4, 5, 6. Ad tres rationes sequentes patet responsio, quia omnes procedunt de mutatione naturali, quae praeexigit materiam et ens in potentia, et quae est generatio; tali autem modo creatio non est mutatio, sed supra hanc mutationem; unde potest dici supernaturalis mutatio. Et si quaeras, utrum sit mutatio ad formam aut ad situm; dico,

quod est ad totam rei substantiam, et ita ad formam, ac per hoc sub mutatione ad formam potest comprehendi.

Ad 7. Quod quaeritur de generatione Filii; dicendum, quod non est simile: quamvis enim utraque sit ab aequali potentia, tamen creatio est ex nihilo. Sed ex non potest dicere identitatem nec causalitatem, ergo ordinem: ergo fieri ex nihilo habet esse post nihil, et ita post non-esse: ergo aliquo modo se habet nunc, quo non se habebat prius; et ideo necessario mutatio ponitur per productionem de nihilo, vel²¹ inceptio. Filius autem est de Patris substantia per identitatem, nec oportet, quod habeat ordinem ad nihil sive ad non-esse: ergo potest semper esse, et ita produci sine initio et mutatione. Unde productio rei non ponit inchoationem rei necessario, sed productio ex nihilo necessario ponit; et ideo creatio includit mutationem, generatio vero Filii minime.

Article III. On the production or creation itself.

Having seen [these things] about the entity and quiddity of the producing principle, the question is asked here, thirdly, concerning the production itself, which is called creation. Concerning which two things are asked. The first is whether it implies any mutation. The second is whether it implies anything¹ as a medium between Creator and creature.

Question I. Whether creation implies a mutation.

That it does imply a mutation, it seems:

1. First, by the authority of Augustine, On the City of God XII²: «All things that have been created are mutable, because they have been made from nothing»; if therefore what is creatable is mutable, then what is created has been changed, and creation is a mutation. If you say that it is mutable because it can return into nothing, and not because it has been produced, the contrary: as to be destroyed implies the way of coming-to-be into non-being, so to be created implies it into being: therefore if destruction posits a mutation, so equally does production.

2. Likewise, creation is an action; but «every action is in motion, and every motion in action³»: therefore he who creates truly acts: therefore truly moves. If you say that divine action is more a substance than an action, and such is creation, the objection is from the passive side: for to be created belongs to the creature itself. If therefore the creature is truly susceptible of a passion and a mutation, then creation-as-passion is a mutation.

3. Likewise, by Damascene⁴, who is both philosopher and theologian: «Everything that begins from a turning, tends toward a turning» — he is speaking of creation — therefore according to him creation is a turning; but every turning is a mutation, as the same one himself says that created things are mutable because they are turnable: therefore creation is a mutation.

4. Likewise, the more distant things are, the greater the mutation and variation in coming from one to the other; but being and non-being are most distant: therefore since by creation a being comes from non-being, creation is most truly a mutation.

5. Likewise, a thing is changed more when it takes on a new form than when it acquires a new place; and still more when it acquires a substantial form than when it acquires an accidental disposition: therefore when [a thing] receives and takes on the whole anew, then it is changed most. But this is what happens in creation: therefore there truly is mutation there.

6. Likewise, if creation implies an action without any mutation, then [it implies an action] without any time; and such things can belong to God, and do belong to him, from eternity: therefore it seems that God produced things from eternity.

On the contrary:

1. The Master says, and it is contained in the littera⁵: «When we say that God makes something, we do not understand any motion to be present in him as he operates». If you say that creation-as-action does not imply motion, but only creation-as-passion, the contrary: the same significate remains in active and passive, as the grammarian says, like nominative and oblique [cases]: therefore if it does not imply motion in the action, then neither in the passion.

2. Likewise, to be changed is to be otherwise now than before⁶; but what is created is not otherwise now and before, because it never was otherwise than as it is in creation — for it never in any way was nor was it in any state, nor therefore otherwise than now — therefore it is not changed in being created: therefore creation is not a mutation.

3. Likewise, the immutable is what remains in the same way now and before: therefore the mutable is what is otherwise, since it is its opposite; but what is created is not otherwise now than before, because in no way was it before: therefore it has not been changed: therefore creation is not a mutation⁷.

4. Likewise, «every motion and mutation is the perfection of what is in potency»; but creation is in no way of what is [already in potency]: therefore creation is neither motion nor mutation. The first is plain from the Philosopher⁸; the second from the Master.

5. Likewise, every mutation is founded upon some movable⁹; but creation does not presuppose any movable, because every movable is brought into being by creation: therefore creation is not a mutation.

6. Likewise, if creation is a mutation, then either according to an accident or according to substance¹⁰. Not according to an accident, because then only accidents would be created; but neither according to substance, because then it would be generation or corruption. If you say that it is contained under none of these species, the objection is that not only according to the Philosopher but also according to Augustine¹¹ «every motion is either toward place or toward form»; but creation is toward matter properly and strictly: therefore it seems that it is not a mutation.

7. Likewise, God creates from as great a power as he generates, since he does both by an infinite power¹²; but God can generate without a mutation either of himself or of the begotten Person: therefore by equal reason he can create without a mutation either of himself or of the creature; and if not, I ask why not?

Conclusion.

Creation is a mutation, but a mutation distinct from natural mutation.

I respond: It must be said that one kind of production is that in which the product is otherwise now than before, because according to something of itself it was earlier under one disposition and now is under another; and such is the production which is from a material principle, namely natural generation. Another kind of production is that in which the product in every way is now and in no way was before; and such is the production which is from nothing. The third kind is the production in which the product is equally entirely [the same] now and before, if indeed it is meaningful to speak of before there; and such is the generation of the Son from eternity. For from eternity he so proceeded as now¹³.

— The first has the account of motion, of mutation, and of production: of motion, by reason of the preparation of matter, which happens through accidental dispositions, and this needs succession and time; of mutation, by reason of the going-out into being or the reception of the substantial form, which happens in an instant; of production, by reason of the fact that it does not have that form from itself but from another effective [cause]¹⁴. — The second lacks the account of motion, but has the account of mutation and of production. It lacks the account of motion, because since it has no matter, no disposition can precede it; but it has the account of mutation, because there is a sudden and new bringing-in of form; it has the account of production, because it has this¹⁵ from another effective principle. — The third lacks the account of motion and of mutation, but has the account of production. It lacks the account of motion and of mutation because it is neither from a material principle nor from nothing; yet it is from someone¹⁶, and is so from him from all eternity.

Therefore it must be granted that the production of the creature is a mutation; and the reasons for this are to be granted, although some seem sophistical.

To the arguments.

To 1. What is then objected, that it is without motion; it must be said that this is understood as without a motion of the agent, not however that it is without a mutation of the product. For if, as the Philosopher says¹⁷, the soul, while it moves the body, remains immovable, how much more God, while he creates and changes all things, «himself remaining stable, gives all things to be changed». — If then it be objected that the verb in active and passive signify the same; it must be said that this is false, because action and passion belong to different categories¹⁸; nevertheless in the conjugation [of the verb] the one is placed alongside the other, because according to the formation of the word one comes from the other.

To 2. What is objected, that to be changed is to be otherwise now and before; it must be said that this is not the general account of to be changed or of mutation, but only of natural mutation.

To 3. What is then objected: the immutable is what remains in the same way, and the mutable is what is otherwise; it must be said that here the fallacy of the consequent¹⁹ occurs, because if mutable and immutable are opposed as privation and habit, and the immutable is what remains in the same way, then the mutable or the changed is what does not remain in the same way. But this may be true for three reasons: either because it is in no way before and after; or²⁰ in no way before and in some way after — and so not in the same way; or because it is simply otherwise before and otherwise after; and so, when one proceeds from many causes-of-truth to one, one commits the fallacy of the consequent.

To 4, 5, 6. To the three following reasons the answer is plain, because all of them proceed concerning natural mutation — which presupposes matter and a being in potency, and which is generation; but in that way creation is not a mutation, but [is] above this kind of mutation; whence it can be called a supernatural mutation. And if you ask whether it is a mutation toward form or toward place, I say that it is toward the whole substance of the thing and so toward form, and through this it can be included under mutation-toward-form.

To 7. What is asked about the generation of the Son, it must be said that the cases are not alike: for although each is from an equal power, nevertheless creation is from nothing. But from cannot imply identity nor causality, therefore [implies] order: therefore to come-to-be from nothing has being after nothing, and so after non-being: therefore in some way it is now in a way it was not before; and therefore a mutation is necessarily posited by production from nothing, or²¹ a beginning. But the Son is from the substance of the Father by identity, nor need it be that he have an ordering toward nothing or toward non-being: therefore he can always be, and so be produced without a beginning or a mutation. Whence the production of a thing does not necessarily posit the inchoation of the thing, but production from nothing necessarily does; and therefore creation includes a mutation, but the generation of the Son does not at all.