Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 37
Quaestio II.
Quibus modis Deus in rebus esse dicatur.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Secundo quaeritur, quibus modis, et qualiter, sit Deus in rebus. Et assignat Magister dupliciter1 modos existendi Deum in rebus. Et unum modum2 accipit ab Augustino de praesentia Dei ad Dardanum3, qui dicit, quod « aliter est Deus in omnibus creaturis, aliter in Sanctis, aliter in Christo. In creaturis singulis per naturam, in Sanctis per inhabitantem gratiam, in Christo per unionem ». Alium modum accipit a Gregorio, qui dicit super quintum Canticorum4, « quod Deus est in rebus tripliciter, scilicet potentialiter, praesentialiter et essentialiter ». Quaeritur ergo de distinctione, sufficientia et ordine istorum modorum.
1. Et obiicitur contra assignationem Augustini: aut enim accipiuntur modi illi quantum ad divinam substantiam, aut quantum ad creaturam, aut quantum ad effectus. Si quantum ad effectus, cum innumerabiles sint, innumerabiles sunt modi essendi. Si quantum ad creaturam suscipientem, cum solum duplex sit suscipiens, scilicet natura et voluntas, videtur quod tantum duo sint modi, scilicet per naturam, et per gratiam. Si quantum ad Dei substantiam, cum in ea non cadat diversitas, erit tantum unus modus.
2. Item, sicut gratia est effectus superadditus naturae, ita operatio miraculosa: ergo sicut in habentibus gratiam est aliter Deus quam in non habentibus, ita et in re, in qua operatur miraculose, ut in asina Balaam5, erit alio modo essendi.
3. Item, sicut gratia gratum faciens est supra naturam, ita gratia gratis data, ut prophetia, ita etiam poena et gloria: ergo cum ista differant genere et specie, debent secundum hoc diversi modi essendi distingui: ergo non distinguit Magister sufficienter.
4. Item, obiicitur contra assignationem Gregorii: aut enim illa assignatio est secundum effectus, aut conditiones et proprietates Dei. Si secundum effectus, tunc cum essentia nullum connotet effectum, non deberet poni. Si secundum conditiones Dei; sed non tantum est Dei potentia, sed etiam sapientia et voluntas: ergo videtur, quod insufficienter assignet.
5. Item, videtur esse praeposteratio in ordine. Nam secundum rem et rationem intelligendi essentia praecedit potentiam, et potentia praesentiam: ergo male ordinat.
6. Item, verborum inculcatio videtur, quia in Deo idem est potentia, essentia et praesentia: quaeritur6 ergo distinctio.
Conclusio.
Utraque assignatio modorum essendi Deum in rebus conveniens est, tam illa quae est Augustini, quam quae Gregorii: illa enim respicit diversitatem modorum essendi in rebus, haec conditiones eorundem modorum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod assignatio Augustini respicit diversitatem modorum essendi Deum in rebus, sed assignatio Gregorii respicit conditiones modorum essendi. Ubicumque enim est Deus, sive per naturam sive per gratiam, est essentialiter, potentialiter, praesentialiter.
Diversitas autem modorum essendi accipitur penes diversitatem effectuum, et non qualemcumque, sed solum trimembrem. Quidam enim est effectus, secundum quem comparatur res7 ad Deum per modum exeuntis; et hi omnes continentur sub modo naturae, extenso nomine. Quidam per modum redeuntis; et hic est effectus gratiae inchoatae, vel consummatae, vel gloriae, et quantum ad hunc est secundus modus essendi. Quidam est effectus, secundum quem comparatur creatura ad Deum ut perveniens8, et hic est effectus unionis, in qua uniuntur in unitate personae creatura et Creator, ut homo-Deus. Quoniam igitur tres sunt modi effectuum, secundum quos creatura diversimode comparatur ad Deum; ideo tantum tribus modis dicitur esse in rebus.
Et primus — qui attenditur quantum ad exitum, assimilatur lineae rectae; secundus, quantum ad reditum, lineae reflexae; tertius, quantum ad perfectionem, assimilatur circulo. Et primus quidem modus similis est lineae; secundus, quia includit primum, similis est superficiei; tertius, quia utrumque, similis est soliditati. Et ideo optime dicit Apostolus ad Colossenses secundo9, quod in Christo tota divinitas habitat corporaliter: est enim perfectissime, quia est ad modum circuli, quae est natura perfecta, et per modum altitudinis, quae est quantitas perfecta. Ex his patet sufficientia et distinctio, et solutio obiectorum.
Assignatio autem beati Gregorii accipitur quantum ad conditiones modorum essendi. In his enim tribus circumloquitur beatus Gregorius perfectionem modorum existendi Deum in omnibus, in quibus est, hoc modo. Aliquid enim est in aliquo secundum praesentialitatis indistantiam, ut contentum in continente, ut aqua in vase; aliquid secundum virtutis influentiam, ut motor in mobili; aliquid secundum intimitatis existentiam, ut illud quod est continens intra, ut anima in corpore10. Et omne quod perfecte est in re, necesse est esse quantum ad hanc triplicem conditionem; et hoc modo est Deus. Et ideo dicitur esse potentialiter, praesentialiter et essentialiter, quia secundum praesentialitatis indistantiam, secundum virtutis influentiam, secundum intimitatis existentiam.
Et sic patet distinctio, sufficientia et ordo, quoniam secundum rationem intelligendi conditiones istae se habent per additionem, et ideo bene ordinat beatus Gregorius, primo praesentialiter etc.
Aliqui tamen huiusmodi conditiones voluerunt distinguere penes substantiam, virtutem et operationem. Sed licet modus existendi essentialiter respondeat substantiae, et potentialiter virtuti, tamen praesentialiter non respondet operationi; nam praesens est aliquis alicui, etiamsi non operetur.
Aliqui accipiunt penes genera causarum. Sed nec illud videtur conveniens, quia essentialiter consistere non connotat genus causalitatis.
Aliqui penes trinitatem vestigii, scilicet modum, speciem et ordinem; sed omnia haec praecedit essentia secundum rationem intelligendi.
I. In assignatione S. Augustini connotantur diversi effectus praesentiae divinae, et secundum hos distinguuntur tres gradus; unde sic Deus non est uniformiter in rebus creatis (cfr. q. praeced.). — Triplex comparatio creaturae per modum exeuntis, redeuntis, pervenientis, sub variis formulis familiaris est Seraphico, et sumta est ex Dionysio Areop. (de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 4. 10. 14; de Caelest. Hier. c. 1.). — Verba in primo membro divisionis posita: « hi (effectus) continentur sub modo naturae, extenso nomine », insinuant, quod natura hic in sensu largiore intelligitur, ut comprehendat simul etiam gratias gratis datas v. g. operationem miraculorum. — Exemplum triplicis lineae sumtum est ex Dionys. (de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 8.). — De circulo, qui est « figura simplicissima, capacissima, pulcherrima » (IV. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. I. q. 1.), quatenus repraesentat Christum, cfr. III. Sent. d. 1. a. 2. q. 1. — De altero exemplo, sumto ex triplici quantitate, cfr. supra d. 2. q. 4.
II. In explicanda secunda assignatione, quae fundatur in verbis per errorem a Scholasticis S. Gregorio attributis (vide pag. 632 col. II, nota 2.), antiqui magistri in diversas vias abeunt; quae, quia vera in se dicunt, plus minusve probabilitatis habent. Positio S. Bonaventurae profunda et plana est; ipsa distinctionem horum modorum, ordinem eorum (quia sequens modus per additionem quandam gradationem exprimit) et sufficientiam praeclare explicat. Modus distinguendi, secundo loco positus, est Alexandri Hal. (S. p. I. q. 10. m. 4.), qui dicit: « In Deo sunt tria: essentia, virtus, operatio... per essentiam est in rebus essentialiter, per virtutem est in rebus potentialiter, per operationem praesentialiter ». Hic modus distinguendi placet etiam Durando et Ægidio R., sed non S. Bonaventurae. — Tertius modus est « penes genera causarum », id est secundum causam efficientem, exemplarem et finalem. Contra hanc arguit Seraphicus, quod essentialiter non connotat genus aliquod causalitatis. — Quartus modus est secundum distinctionem modi (mensurae), speciei et ordinis (cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. q. 2, et dub. 3.), quae tria secundum Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 18. m. 2.) in hoc sensu sunt essentialia, quia referunt rem ad suas causas essentiales. « Modus enim dicit relationem ad Deum ut ad efficientem, species ut ad formam [scil. exemplarem], ordo ut ad finem ». Unde in hac sententia essentialiter responderet modo, praesentialiter speciei, potentialiter ordini. Sed S. Doctor hoc improbat his verbis ob brevitatem obscuris: « Sed omnia haec praecedit essentia secundum rationem intelligendi ». Sensus est: cum essentia rerum praecedat illas tres relationes, sequeretur, quod respectu essentiae rerum non esset praesentia Dei; quod est falsissimum. — S. Thom. (S. I. q. 8. a. 3.) cum multis sic distinguit: « In omnibus est per potentiam, in quantum omnia eius potestati subduntur; est per praesentiam in omnibus, in quantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta oculis eius; est in omnibus per essentiam, in quantum adest omnibus ut causa essendi ».
III. Praeter locos citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 10. m. 2. 3. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. 10. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
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Question II.
In what modes God is said to be in things.
Secondly it is asked, in what modes, and in what manner, God is in things. And the Master assigns in two ways1 the modes of God's existing in things. And one mode2 he takes from Augustine on the presence of God to Dardanus3, who says that "God is in all creatures in one way, in the saints in another way, in Christ in another way. In individual creatures by nature, in the saints by indwelling grace, in Christ by union." Another mode he takes from Gregory, who says on the fifth [chapter] of Canticles4, that "God is in things in three ways, namely potentially, presentially, and essentially." Therefore it is asked concerning the distinction, sufficiency, and order of these modes.
1. And it is objected against the assignation of Augustine: for either those modes are taken with respect to the divine substance, or with respect to the creature, or with respect to the effects. If with respect to the effects, since they are innumerable, the modes of being are innumerable. If with respect to the creature receiving, since the receiver is only twofold, namely nature and will, it seems that there are only two modes, namely by nature, and by grace. If with respect to the substance of God, since no diversity falls in it, there will be only one mode.
2. Likewise, just as grace is an effect superadded to nature, so [is] miraculous operation: therefore just as in those having grace God is otherwise than in those not having [it], so also in a thing in which he works miraculously, as in the ass of Balaam5, he will be in another mode of being.
3. Likewise, just as gratum-faciens grace is above nature, so [also] gratuitously-given grace, such as prophecy, and likewise also punishment and glory: therefore since these differ in genus and species, diverse modes of being ought to be distinguished accordingly: therefore the Master does not distinguish sufficiently.
4. Likewise, it is objected against the assignation of Gregory: for either that assignation is according to effects, or [according to] the conditions and properties of God. If according to effects, then since the essence connotes no effect, it ought not to be posited. If according to the conditions of God; but there is not only the potency of God, but also wisdom and will: therefore it seems that he assigns insufficiently.
5. Likewise, there seems to be a reversal in the order. For according to the thing and the account of understanding, essence precedes potency, and potency [precedes] presence: therefore he orders badly.
6. Likewise, there seems to be a heaping-up of words, since in God potency, essence, and presence are the same: therefore the distinction is asked for6.
Conclusion.
Each assignation of the modes of God's being in things is fitting, both that of Augustine and that of Gregory: for the former regards the diversity of the modes of being in things, the latter the conditions of the same modes.
I respond: It must be said that the assignation of Augustine regards the diversity of the modes of God's being in things, but the assignation of Gregory regards the conditions of the modes of being. For wherever God is, whether by nature or by grace, he is essentially, potentially, presentially.
But the diversity of the modes of being is taken according to the diversity of effects, and not just any [diversity], but only a three-membered one. For there is a certain effect according to which a thing7 is compared to God by way of going-out (exeuntis); and all these are contained under the mode of nature, in an extended sense of the name. There is another by way of returning (redeuntis); and this is the effect of grace inchoate, or consummated, or of glory, and as to this is the second mode of being. There is another effect, according to which the creature is compared to God as arriving (perveniens)8, and this is the effect of union, in which creature and Creator are united in unity of person, as the God-man. Therefore since there are three modes of effects, according to which the creature is compared to God in diverse ways, therefore he is said to be in things in only three modes.
And the first — which is attended to with respect to going-out — is likened to a straight line; the second, with respect to return, to a reflected line; the third, with respect to perfection, is likened to a circle. And the first mode indeed is similar to a line; the second, because it includes the first, is similar to a surface; the third, because [it includes] both, is similar to solidity. And therefore the Apostle most aptly says to the Colossians, second [chapter]9, that in Christ the whole divinity dwells corporeally: for he is [there] most perfectly, since he is after the manner of a circle, which is a perfect nature, and after the manner of altitude, which is a perfect quantity. From these the sufficiency and the distinction, and the solution of the objections, is clear.
But the assignation of blessed Gregory is taken with respect to the conditions of the modes of being. For in these three [terms] blessed Gregory circumlocutes the perfection of the modes of God's existing in all [things] in which he is, in this way. For something is in something according to the indistance of presentiality, as the contained in the container, as water in a vessel; something according to the influence of power, as the mover in the mobile; something according to the existence of intimacy, as that which is containing within, as the soul in the body10. And everything that is perfectly in a thing must necessarily be [there] as to this threefold condition; and in this mode is God. And therefore he is said to be potentially, presentially, and essentially, since [he is] according to the indistance of presentiality, according to the influence of power, according to the existence of intimacy.
And thus the distinction, sufficiency, and order are clear, since according to the account of understanding these conditions are related by addition, and therefore blessed Gregory orders well, first presentially etc.
Some however have wished to distinguish such conditions according to substance, power, and operation. But although the mode of existing essentially answers to substance, and potentially to power, nevertheless presentially does not answer to operation; for someone is present to someone, even if he does not operate.
Some take [them] according to the genera of causes. But neither does that seem fitting, since to subsist essentially does not connote a genus of causality.
Some [take them] according to the trinity of the vestige, namely mode, species, and order; but essence precedes all these according to the account of understanding.
I. In the assignation of St. Augustine diverse effects of the divine presence are connoted, and according to these three grades are distinguished; whence in this way God is not uniformly in created things (cf. the preceding question). — The threefold comparison of the creature by way of going-out, returning, and arriving, under various formulae, is familiar to the Seraphic [Doctor], and is taken from Dionysius the Areopagite (On the Divine Names c. 4, §§ 4, 10, 14; On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 1). — The words placed in the first member of the division: "these (effects) are contained under the mode of nature, in an extended sense of the name," insinuate that nature here is understood in a broader sense, so that it includes also the gratuitously-given graces, e.g. the working of miracles. — The example of the threefold line is taken from Dionysius (On the Divine Names c. 4, § 8). — On the circle, which is "the simplest, most capacious, most beautiful figure" (IV Sent., d. 24, p. I, a. I, q. 1), insofar as it represents Christ, cf. III Sent., d. 1, a. 2, q. 1. — On the other example, taken from threefold quantity, cf. above d. 2, q. 4.
II. In explaining the second assignation, which is founded on words attributed by error by the Scholastics to St. Gregory (see p. 632, col. II, note 2), the ancient masters depart into different ways; which, since they say things true in themselves, have more or less of probability. The position of St. Bonaventure is profound and plain; it itself explains in distinguished fashion the distinction of these modes, their order (since the following mode by addition expresses a certain gradation), and the sufficiency. The mode of distinguishing, placed in the second position, is that of Alexander of Hales (S. p. I, q. 10, m. 4), who says: "In God there are three: essence, power, operation... by essence he is in things essentially, by power he is in things potentially, by operation presentially." This mode of distinguishing pleases also Durandus and Ægidius R., but not St. Bonaventure. — The third mode is "according to the genera of causes," that is, according to the efficient, exemplary, and final cause. Against this the Seraphic [Doctor] argues that essentially does not connote any genus of causality. — The fourth mode is according to the distinction of mode (measure), species, and order (cf. above d. 3, p. I, q. 2, and dubium 3), which three according to Alex. Hal. (S. p. I, q. 18, m. 2) in this sense are essential, since they refer the thing to its essential causes. "For mode indicates a relation to God as to the efficient [cause], species as to the form [namely, the exemplary], order as to the end." Whence in this opinion essentially would correspond to mode, presentially to species, potentially to order. But the holy Doctor disapproves this in these words, obscure on account of brevity: "But essence precedes all these according to the account of understanding." The sense is: since the essence of things precedes those three relations, it would follow that with respect to the essence of things there would be no presence of God; which is most false. — St. Thomas (S. I, q. 8, a. 3), with many [others], distinguishes thus: "He is in all by power, inasmuch as all are subject to his power; he is by presence in all, inasmuch as all are bare and open to his eyes; he is in all by essence, inasmuch as he is present to all as the cause of being."
III. Besides the places cited: Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 10, m. 2, 3, 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 5, 10. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 3. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 1. — Ægid. R., here 1, princ. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2.
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- Vat. cum multis codd. perperam dupliciter.The Vatican [edition], with many codices, wrongly [reads] dupliciter.
- Supple cum cod. H plus.Supply with codex H plus ("more").
- Epist. 187. c. 12. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et 3. — Verba textus citati In creaturis singulis per naturam, in Sanctis per inhabitantem gratiam, in Christo in Vat. desunt.Letter 187, c. 12. See here the Master's text, c. 1 and 3. — The words of the cited text In individual creatures by nature, in the saints by indwelling grace, in Christ are missing in the Vatican [edition].
- De hoc textu, qui falso attribuitur Gregorio, cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. Triplex hic essendi modus insinuatur ab Anselmo, de Fide Trin. c. 1, et a Richardo de S. Vict., II de Trin. c. 23.On this text, which is falsely attributed to Gregory, cf. here the Master's text, c. 1. This threefold mode of being is insinuated by Anselm, On the Faith of the Trinity c. 1, and by Richard of St. Victor, II On the Trinity c. 23.
- Num. 22, 23 seqq. — Ita Vat., omnes codd. pro erit habent erat, quod minus congruum nobis videtur. Post miraculose supple cum codd. K V X quam in re, in qua non operatur miraculose.Numbers 22, 23 ff. — Thus the Vatican [edition]; all codices for erit have erat, which seems to us less fitting. After miraculose supply with codices K V X quam in re, in qua non operatur miraculose ("than in a thing in which he does not work miraculously").
- Pro quaeritur aliqui codd. ut C I aa bb quare.In place of quaeritur, some codices, such as C I aa bb, [read] quare.
- Codd. F R (T in marg.) creatura.Codices F R (T in margin) [read] creatura ("creature").
- Vat. absque auctoritate codd. addit vel perficiens; deinde post effectus codd. D W adiiciunt gratiae. Paulo inferius lectionem cod. T Homo-Deus in textum recepimus pro homo et Deus, ut in Vat. legitur.The Vatican [edition], without the authority of the codices, adds vel perficiens ("or perfecting"); then after effectus codices D W add gratiae ("of grace"). A little below we have received into the text the reading of codex T, Homo-Deus, for homo et Deus, as is read in the Vatican [edition].
- Vers. 9: Quia in ipso inhabitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter. — Mox post perfectissime supple cum Vat. et cod. cc in eo. Dein pro natura Vat. cum aliquibus mss. figura. — Cfr. August., de Quant. animae, c. 12. n. 19, et c. 16. n. 27, ubi de praestantia circuli agitur.Verse 9: For in him dwells all the fullness of divinity corporeally. — Soon after perfectissime supply with the Vatican [edition] and codex cc in eo ("in him"). Then in place of natura the Vatican [edition], with some manuscripts, [reads] figura ("figure"). — Cf. Augustine, On the Greatness of the Soul c. 12, n. 19, and c. 16, n. 27, where the excellence of the circle is treated.
- Cod. T in margine soliditatis, qui terminus magis conveniens esse videtur.Codex T in the margin [reads] soliditatis, which term seems to be more fitting.