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Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 3, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 37

Textus Latinus
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Articulus III.

Qualiter Deus sit in rebus.

Tertio loco principaliter quaeritur de tertio articulo, scilicet qualiter Deus sit in rebus. Et circa hoc duo quaeruntur.

Primo quaeritur, utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus aequaliter sive uniformiter.

Secundo quaeritur, quibus modis, et qualiter Deus sit in rebus.

Quaestio I.

Utrum Deus aequaliter sit in omnibus rebus.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Quod autem sit uniformiter, videtur:

1. Quia, sicut dicit Philosophus1, « prima causa uno modo se habet ad omnia, licet omnia non habeant se uno modo ad ipsam »; sed omnia in Deo sunt uniformiter, quia sunt vita et creatrix essentia: ergo multo fortius Deus in omnibus rebus est aequaliter et uniformiter.

2. Item, quod est ubique totum est aequaliter et uniformiter2; sed cum Deus sit simplicissimus, est ubique totus: ergo aequaliter et uniformiter est in omnibus rebus.

3. Item, unicuique rei intima est materia et forma; sed forma non unitur materiae nisi mediante appetitu, appetitus autem ortum habet ab essentia3; sed hoc non posset nisi per Dei praesentiam: ergo Deus magis est intimus omni rei quam sua forma. Sed forma unicuique rei est summe intima: ergo Deus in termino intimus est cuilibet. Sed quod habet esse in termino est uniformiter: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc ostenditur per impossibile: quia, si Deus non est aequaliter in rebus, ergo cum4 magis intime est in una quam in alia, ergo in aliqua non est summe intime: ergo aliquid est in re intrinsecum, in quo non est Deus: ergo Deus non est intimum quod est. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo et primum.

Sed contra:

1. « Omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est ibi per modum recipientis, et non recepti »5; sed creaturae non sunt aequaliter capaces Dei: ergo non est aequaliter in eis Deus.

2. Item, sicut se habet intellectus ad primam lucem, sic ens ad primam essentiam, et vivens ad primam vitam6; sed maior intellectus magis participat divinam lucem: ergo perfectius ens, et perfectius vivens divinam essentiam et vitam: ergo Deus perfectius est in uno quam in alio.

3. Item, existentia Dei in rebus est conservatio rerum7; sed non omnes res aequaliter conservantur: ergo non est aequaliter in omnibus.

4. Item, cum Deus sit ubique, solum dicitur habitare in iustis; sed hoc non esset, si aequaliter et uniformiter esset in omnibus: ergo etc.

Conclusio.

Deus uniformiter est in rebus, quatenus non connotantur effectus; sed quatenus uni creaturae Deus dat plus quam alii, magis dicitur esse in una quam in alia.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod Deum esse in rebus dupliciter

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potest intelligi: uno modo, ut idem sit quod esse praesentem cuilibet rei, non connotando effectum; et sic uniformiter est in omnibus rebus, eo quod intimus est cuilibet rei et summe praesens et totus in qualibet re. Alio modo potest connotare effectum, sicut artifex dicitur in artificio esse per connotationem effectus et per impressionem suae similitudinis; et sic, cum uni creaturae plus det quam alii, magis est in una quam in alia. — Et hoc potest esse tripliciter8: vel extensive, quantum ad ea quae habent esse diuturnius, ut in corpore incorruptibili plus quam in anima sensibili; vel intensive, quantum ad ea quae habent esse nobilius, ut in anima sensibili9 quam in corpore incorruptibili; vel utroque modo, ut in anima rationali quam in corpore corruptibili.

His visis patent obiecta ad utramque partem. Procedunt enim his duabus viis, ut patet, exceptis duobus primis ad utramque partem.

Quod enim obiicitur, quod Deus uniformiter se habet ad omnes res; si intelligatur uniformitas ex parte divini esse, verum est; si autem intelligatur ex parte effectus, falsum est. Quoniam Deus uniformiter et stabiliter existens, cetera movet10 et multos et varios effectus producit, et efficiendo diversa in rebus facit, quod res non se habeant uniformiter ad ipsum. Quoniam igitur, cum dicitur Deus esse in rebus, uno modo connotatur effectus, alio modo non; ideo uno modo conceditur, quod sit uniformiter, alio modo quod non. Similiter e converso, cum dicitur, quod omnia sunt in Deo, uno modo potest connotari effectus, sicut patet in praedestinatione et reprobatione, et sic non est uniformiter; alio modo non connotatur effectus, et sic uniformiter.

Quod obiicitur iterum ad oppositum, quod omne quod recipitur, est per modum recipientis; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi receptum dependet a recipiente, ut species11 a virtute cognoscente; in proposito autem non sic est. Unde divina essentia, existens in re, non accipit modum rei; et sic patet illud.

Scholion

I. Haec quaestio, a paucis antiquis explicite tractata, viam sternit ad sequentem quaest. enodandam. — In arg. 3. inter fundam. difficilis locus: « forma non unitur materiae nisi mediante appetitu; appetitus autem ortum habet ab essentia », profunde ab Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 86. m. 2. a. 2. § I. explicatur: « In omni motu sive ad formam sive ad situm primum principium motus intrinsecum est appetitus. Hic etenim est vis a Creatore omnibus indita creaturis, per quam ad sui complementum ordinantur et in suo complemento stant et radicantur. Nec solum sic est in creaturis, sed etiam in creaturarum essentialibus principiis, quae sunt materia et forma, actus et potentia. Neque enim materia se ipsa movetur ad formam, quia cum nullam determinet, non magis moveretur ad hanc quam ad illam; neque forma se ipsam facit in materia; sed per appetitum insitum utraque ad invicem ordinantur et per appetitum huiusmodi inseparabiliter coniunguntur. Nec solum appetitus rem completam in esse sequitur, sed in ipsis rerum principiis essentialibus radicatur et fundatur. Et sicut est in motu ad formam, sic est in omni motu non violento; in omni enim motu appetitus excitat motorem ad motum. Ex quo patet, ipsum esse principium motus intrinsecum universale ». Pergit explicans differentias appetituum et eorum in quibus est appetitus, secundum quod magis vel minus habent vel de forma vel de materia. Illud autem principium intrinsecum motus et vitae minime excludit influxum primae causae, immo eum postulat, ut ibid. a. 1. § 1. probatur. — Ex hoc Alexandri loco patet, errare Trigosum (Sum. q. 6. a. 5.), qui, nullo codice vel editione suffragante, textum mutavit ponendo ortum habet ab esse pro ortum habet ab essentia, hac innixus ratione, quod scil. antiqua lectio nullum sensum haberet.

Quod anima sensibilis perfectius habeat esse quam corpus incorruptibile, magis explanatur III. Sent. d. 21. a. 2. q. 2. ad 3. (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 70. a. 3. ad 2.).

II. Quoad ipsam quaestionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 10. m. 5. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. Report. hic q. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic p. I. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. circa med.

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English Translation
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Article III.

In what manner God is in things.

In the third place, principally, inquiry is made concerning the third article, namely in what manner God is in things. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked, whether God is in all things equally or uniformly.

Second it is asked, in what modes, and in what manner God is in things.

Question I.

Whether God is equally in all things.

That, however, he is [in them] uniformly, appears thus:

1. Because, as the Philosopher says1, "the first cause stands in one mode toward all things, although all things do not stand in one mode toward it"; but all things are in God uniformly, since they are life and creative essence: therefore much more strongly is God in all things equally and uniformly.

2. Likewise, what is whole everywhere is [there] equally and uniformly2; but since God is most simple, he is whole everywhere: therefore he is equally and uniformly in all things.

3. Likewise, to each thing, matter and form are inmost; but form is not united to matter except by mediation of appetite, and appetite has its origin from essence3; but this could not be except through God's presence: therefore God is more inmost to every thing than its form. But form is in the highest degree inmost to each thing: therefore God is, at the limit, inmost to anything whatever. But what has being at the limit is [there] uniformly: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this is shown through the impossible: for, if God is not equally in things, then since4 he is more inmostly in one than in another, therefore in some he is not in the highest degree inmostly: therefore there is something intrinsic in the thing in which God is not: therefore God is not the inmost which is. But this is impossible: therefore so is the first [thesis].

On the contrary:

1. "Everything which is received in something is there according to the mode of the receiver, and not of the received"5; but creatures are not equally capable of God: therefore God is not equally in them.

2. Likewise, as intellect stands toward the first light, so being toward the first essence, and the living toward the first life6; but a greater intellect more participates the divine light: therefore a more perfect being, and a more perfect living, [more participates] the divine essence and life: therefore God is more perfectly in one than in another.

3. Likewise, the existence of God in things is the conservation of things7; but not all things are equally conserved: therefore he is not equally in all.

4. Likewise, since God is everywhere, he is said to dwell only in the just; but this would not be so, if he were equally and uniformly in all: therefore etc.

Conclusion.

God is uniformly in things, insofar as effects are not connoted; but insofar as God gives more to one creature than to another, he is more said to be in one than in another.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that "to be in things" can be understood of God in two ways:

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in one way, so that it is the same as to be present to each thing, not connoting an effect; and thus he is uniformly in all things, since he is inmost to each thing and most highly present and whole in any thing whatever. In another way, it can connote an effect, just as the artificer is said to be in the artifact through the connotation of the effect and through the impression of his likeness; and thus, since he gives more to one creature than to another, he is more in one than in another. — And this can be in three ways8: either extensively, with respect to those which have a more lasting being, as more in an incorruptible body than in a sensible soul; or intensively, with respect to those which have a more noble being, as in a sensible soul9 [more] than in an incorruptible body; or in both ways, as in the rational soul [more] than in a corruptible body.

With these things seen, the objections to either side are clear. For they proceed by these two ways, as appears, except the first two on each side.

For what is objected, that God stands uniformly toward all things; if uniformity is understood on the side of the divine being, it is true; if, however, it is understood on the side of the effect, it is false. For God, existing uniformly and stably, moves10 other things and produces many and varied effects, and by effecting diverse [things] in things brings it about that things do not stand uniformly toward him. Therefore since, when God is said to be in things, in one mode an effect is connoted, in another not; therefore in one mode it is conceded that he is [there] uniformly, in another that he is not. Similarly conversely, when it is said that all things are in God, in one mode an effect can be connoted, as appears in predestination and reprobation, and so it is not uniformly; in another mode an effect is not connoted, and so [it is] uniformly.

What is objected again on the opposite side, that everything which is received is [received] according to the mode of the receiver; it must be said that this is true where the received depends on the receiver, as a species11 [depends] on the cognitive power; in the case under consideration, however, it is not so. Hence the divine essence, existing in a thing, does not take on the mode of the thing; and so that [point] is plain.

Scholion

I. This question, treated explicitly by few of the ancients, prepares the way for unfolding the next question. — In argument 3, among the fundamenta, [there is] a difficult passage: "form is not united to matter except by mediation of appetite; and appetite has its origin from essence," profoundly explained by Alex. Hal., S. p. II, q. 86, m. 2, a. 2, § I: "In every motion, whether toward form or toward place, the first intrinsic principle of motion is appetite. For this is a force implanted by the Creator in all creatures, by which they are ordered toward their completion, and stand and are rooted in their completion. Nor is this so only in creatures, but also in the essential principles of creatures, which are matter and form, act and potency. For neither does matter move itself toward form, since, as it determines no [form], it would be no more moved to this than to that; nor does form make itself in matter; but through implanted appetite the two are ordered to each other, and through this appetite are inseparably joined. Nor does appetite follow only the thing complete in being, but is rooted and grounded in the very essential principles of things. And as it is in motion toward form, so it is in every non-violent motion; for in every motion appetite stirs the mover to motion. From which it appears that this is the universal intrinsic principle of motion." He goes on, explaining the differences of appetites and of those in which appetite is, according to which they have more or less either of form or of matter. But that intrinsic principle of motion and life by no means excludes the influx of the first cause, but rather requires it, as is proved at the same place, a. 1, § 1. — From this passage of Alexander it appears that Trigosus (Sum. q. 6, a. 5) errs, who, with no codex or edition supporting him, altered the text by putting ortum habet ab esse for ortum habet ab essentia, relying on this reasoning, namely that the ancient reading would have no sense.

That a sensible soul has being more perfectly than an incorruptible body is more fully explained III. Sent. d. 21, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3 (cf. St. Thomas, S. I, q. 70, a. 3, ad 2).

II. As for the question itself: Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 10, m. 5. — Scotus, on this and the following q., Report. here q. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 6. — Petr. a Tar., here q. I, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 2. — Durand., on this and the following q., here p. I, q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2, near the middle.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Philosophus hic intelligitur auctor libri de Causis, qui prop. 24. ait: Causa prima existit in omnibus rebus secundum unam dispositionem, sed res omnes non existunt in causa prima secundum unam dispositionem. — De minori huius argumenti vide supra d. 36. a. 2. q. I.
    "The Philosopher" here is understood [to be] the author of the book On Causes, who at prop. 24 says: "The first cause exists in all things according to one disposition, but all things do not exist in the first cause according to one disposition." — On the minor of this argument see above d. 36, a. 2, q. I.
  2. Cod. T in marg. non incongrue addit in omnibus.
    Codex T in the margin not unfittingly adds in omnibus ("in all").
  3. Quid sibi velit haec sententia, explicat Alexander Hal., ut invenies infra in Scholio huic quaestioni adiuncto. — Mox post posset codd. P V inserunt esse. In fine argumenti auctoritate plurimorum codd. posuimus in termino intimus est, et deinde in termino i. e. summe sive quantum possibile est, pro quo Vat. intimior intimo est intimus, et deinde in intimo pro in termino. Cod. T primo loco intimior est intimo, et cod. W summe et in termino est intimus.
    What this sentence intends, Alexander Hal. explains, as you will find below in the Scholion attached to this question. — Soon after posset, codices P V insert esse. At the end of the argument, on the authority of most of the codices, we have set in termino intimus est, and then in termino i.e. "in the highest [degree]" or "as much as possible," in place of which the Vatican [edition reads] intimior intimo est intimus, and then in intimo for in termino. Codex T in the first place [reads] intimior est intimo, and codex W [reads] summe et in termino est intimus.
  4. In pluribus codd. ut H P Q V desideratur cum. Paulo inferius pro intimum Vat. cum nonnullis mss. in omni, cod. T a secunda manu intimum omni.
    In several codices, such as H P Q V, cum is wanting. A little below, in place of intimum, the Vatican [edition] with some manuscripts [reads] in omni, codex T from a second hand [reads] intimum omni.
  5. Libr. de Causis, prop. 10. 20. seqq. Cfr. etiam Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 4.
    Book On Causes, prop. 10, 20 ff. Cf. also Boethius, On the Consolation [of Philosophy] V, prose 4.
  6. Cfr. liber de Causis, prop. 18. seqq. — Immediate post pro maior intellectus codd. M P Q magis intelligens et cod. T cum aliquibus aliis magis intellectus. In initio argumenti pro sicut se habet intellectus codd. P Q sicut se habet intelligens.
    Cf. the book On Causes, prop. 18 ff. — Immediately after, in place of maior intellectus, codices M P Q [read] magis intelligens, and codex T with some others [reads] magis intellectus. At the beginning of the argument, in place of sicut se habet intellectus, codices P Q [read] sicut se habet intelligens.
  7. Cfr. hic a. I. q. I. seq. — Voci existentia in initio huius propos. codd. A D Z aa ff et plures alii praefigunt ex, qua particula addita propositionis sententia clare apparet.
    Cf. here a. I, q. I, [and] following. — Before the word existentia at the beginning of this proposition, codices A D Z aa ff and several others prefix ex ("from"), with which particle added the sense of the proposition clearly appears.
  8. Vat. cum multis codd. perperam dupliciter.
    The Vatican [edition] with many codices wrongly [reads] dupliciter ("in two ways").
  9. Supple cum cod. H plus.
    Supply with codex H plus ("more").
  10. Respicitur illud Boeth., III. de Consol. metr. 9: Tu numeris elementa ligas, ut frigora flammis, Arida conveniant liquidis, ne purior ignis Evolet, aut mersas deducant pondera terras.
    Reference is made to that [verse of] Boethius, On the Consolation III, metre 9: "Thou bindest the elements by numbers, that cold may agree with flame, the dry with the liquid, lest the purer fire fly off, or weights drag down the submerged lands."
  11. Scilicet intentionales, quae concurrunt ad actum cognitionis.
    Namely intentional [species], which concur in the act of cognition.
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