Bonaventure

Articulus II.

De sempiternitate divinae cognitionis.

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur secundo de interminabilitate divinae cognitionis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, quia dubium habet per comparationem ad complexa¹, quaeritur, utrum Deus cognoscat res per modum complexionis. Secundo quaeritur, utrum enuntiabilia sive complexa, quae Deus semel cognoscit, semper cognoscat.

Quaestio I.

Utrum Deus cognoscat res per modum complexionis.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`). Footnote numbering in the printed Quaracchi text restarts on every page; this chunk re-numbers continuously ¹–¹² across the two printed pages (736–737) where apparatus anchors fall.

Quod autem cognoscat Deus per modum complexionis, ostenditur sic.

1. Eandem rem, quam cognoscit sensus, cognoscit intellectus², sed sensus per modum incomplexionis, intellectus vero per modum complexionis; sed intellectus est potentior in cognoscendo quam sensus; ergo cognoscere per modum complexionis est potentiae. Sed omne tale est Deo attribuendum: ergo etc.

2. Item, differenter significatur res per vocem incomplexam et per complexionem, quia per vocem incomplexam quantum ad esse simpliciter, per p. 737orationem sive complexionem quantum ad esse tale³ vel tale; sed Deus non tantum cognoscit res quantum ad esse simpliciter, sed etiam quantum ad esse tale vel tale: ergo cognoscit secundum complexionem.

3. Item, ordo unius rei ad alteram, cui coniungitur in re, facit compositionem in cognitione vel in sermone complexionem; sed Deus non tantum intelligit in se rem ipsam, sed etiam in ordine ad rem aliam, cui unitur: ergo non solum per modum simplicem⁴, sed compositionis.

4. Item, Deus intelligit nostrum intelligere et nostrum dicere; sed nos dicimus et intelligimus rem per modum complexionis: ergo Deus hoc modo intelligit.

Sed contra:

1. Dionysius de Divinis nominibus⁵: «Cognoscit Deus omnia immaterialiter materialia, impartite partita, uniformiter multa, immutabiliter mutabilia». Si ergo partita cognoscit impartite, ergo composita per modum simplicem; sed modus simplicitatis et complexionis opponuntur: ergo non cognoscit per modum complexionis.

2. Item, cum intellectus cognoscat⁶ per modum complexionis, aut modus ille est in re, aut in intellectu. Non in re, quia cum sensus apprehendat eandem rem, apprehenderet eam per modum complexionis: ergo est in intellectu. Sed omnis talis intellectus, in quo est complexio, realiter est complexus et compositus; sed divinus intellectus non est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

3. Item, si cognoscit res per modum complexionis, cum modus divinae cognitionis sit ei coae⁷ternus, ab aeterno cognovit per modum complexionis: ergo complexio fuit ab aeterno. Sed multa intellexit, ergo multae complexiones sunt ab aeterno; ergo verae, vel falsae; si verae: ergo plura sunt vera ab aeterno; si falsae: ergo plura sunt falsa ab aeterno.

4. Item, si cognoscit per modum complexionis, cum eadem res modo vere significetur sub ratione futuritionis, modo sub ratione praeteritionis, modo sub ratione praesentialitatis: ergo his omnibus modis Deus cognoscit. Sed contra: omnia cognoscit ut praesentia; unde secunda Petri ultimo⁸ dicitur: Unus dies apud Deum sicut mille anni etc.: ergo non cognoscit omnibus his modis.

Conclusio.

Cognitio divina rerum non est per modum complexionis, prout complexio accipitur circa intellectum divinum, sed prout cadit circa res tum in se spectatas tum per nostrum intellectum expressas.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cognoscere res per modum complexionis potest intelligi tripliciter. Aut enim modus complexionis cadit circa rem; et sic est sensus: Deus cognoscit, res existere vel se habere per modum complexionis sive compositionis⁹; et hoc est verum, cognoscit enim res esse, sicut sunt. Alio modo, ut modus complexionis cadat circa rem, ut est expressa per intellectum nostrum; et tunc est sensus, quod Deus cognoscit res non tantum ut sunt, sed etiam ut intellectus exprimit — cognoscit enim res et voces sive intellectus¹⁰ illas significantes — et hoc verum est. Tertio modo potest intelligi, ut modus complexionis cadat circa intellectum divinum; et hoc modo falsum est. Hoc enim conspectat ad intellectum, qui intelligit multa et per multa, quae oportet complecti; Deus autem multa intelligit uno et ita simplici¹¹ modo, nec magis est simplex intellectus eius intelligendo unum quam multa. Unde intelligere multa per modum complexionis nec est omnino virtutis, nec omnino imperfectionis; et ideo non ponitur nec in cognitione infima, ut sensitiva, nec in cognitione suprema, ut in divina, et fortassis non etiam est in cognitione suprema ipsius animae, quae dicitur intellectiva prout est in suo summo: cognoscit enim per modum simplicis aspectus.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

Ad 1. Rationes probantes, quod cognoscit Deus per modum complexionis, procedunt secundum primam et secundam viam; ideo verum concludunt praeter primum, ad quod iam solutum est.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod complexio non venit ab intellectu; dicendum, quod complexio dupliciter potest comparari ad intellectum: aut sicut ad causam, aut sicut ad subiectum. Si sicut ad subiectum, in quo et quod informat et denominat, sic comparatur ad intellectum humanum, a quo est complexio, qui etiam complectitur¹². Si sicut ad causam, sic comparatur ad intellectum divinum. p. 738Nam intellectus divinus cognoscit complexionem non circa se, sed circa nostrum intelligere; quoniam complexio non est ab intellectu nostro, nisi cooperante divino in intelligendo.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si cognoscit res per modum complexionis, quod tunc complexiones sunt aeternae; dicendum, quod ex primo vel secundo sensu non sequitur, quod complexiones sint aeternae, quia non est complexio circa Deum; sed bene sequitur, quod veritas significata per aliquam complexionem est aeterna, sicut veritas huius, mundum esse futurum; tamen propositio et complexio est ab intellectu nostro intelligente illam veritatem aeternam. Unde sicut vox temporalis significat rem aeternam, ut hoc nomen Deus, non tamen sequitur, quod sit aeterna; sic multa enuntiabilia significant veritatem aeternam, nec tamen sunt aeterna.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tunc cognoscit res sub ratione futuritionis et praeteritionis: dicendum, sicut tactum est, quod modus divinae cognitionis potest accipi secundum se, vel a parte cogniti. Si a parte cogniti; sic dicendum, quod omnino cognoscit, rem esse sicut est, et ita mutabiliter esse, et ita composito modo esse, sicut est, et sic de omnibus: et sic cognoscit, rem praeteritam esse praeteritam, et futuram esse futuram, et non praeteritam esse praesentem. Potest iterum accipi a parte sui; et sic, cum cognitio Dei sit omnino simplex, omnino praesens, omnia cognoscit per modum simplicitatis et per modum praesentialitatis. Unde, quod dicit: omnia sunt praesentia apud Deum, hoc dictum est quantum ad cognitionem, in qua nulla cadit successio, ideo nec novum nec vetus, nec praeteritum nec futurum. In arctata autem cognitionis angelicae et humanae cadit successio, et ideo praeteritum et futurum. Et propterea non ita dicuntur omnia praesentia animae cognoscenti, sicut Deo. Et hoc manifestum est, quia nunc aeternitatis, quod est semper praesens, complectitur omnia temporalia; et ideo patet, quomodo sit intelligendum.

Article II.

On the everlastingness of the divine cognition.

Consequently, as to the second article, it is asked secondly concerning the interminability of the divine cognition. And on this two [things] are asked. First, since a doubt arises by comparison with [things] complex¹, it is asked, whether God knows things by the mode of complexion. Secondly it is asked, whether enuntiabilia or complexa, which God once knows, he always knows.

Question I.

Whether God knows things by the mode of complexion.

That God does know by the mode of complexion is shown thus.

1. The same thing which the sense knows, the intellect also knows²; but the sense [knows it] by the mode of incomplexion, the intellect however by the mode of complexion; but the intellect is more powerful in knowing than the sense; therefore to know by the mode of complexion is [a mark] of power. But every such [perfection] is to be attributed to God: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, a thing is differently signified by an incomplex utterance and by a complexion, since by an incomplex utterance [it is signified] as to being simpliciter, but by p. 737a statement or complexion as to such-and-such³ a being; but God knows things not only as to being simpliciter, but also as to such-and-such a being: therefore he knows them according to complexion.

3. Likewise, the order of one thing to another, to which it is joined in reality, produces composition in cognition or complexion in speech; but God not only understands the thing itself in itself, but also in relation to another thing, to which it is united: therefore [he understands it] not only by the simple⁴ mode, but [by the mode] of composition.

4. Likewise, God understands our understanding and our speaking; but we speak and understand the thing by the mode of complexion: therefore God in this mode understands [it].

On the contrary:

1. Dionysius, On the Divine Names⁵: "God knows all things — material things immaterially, divided things undividedly, many things uniformly, mutable things immutably". If, therefore, he knows divided things undividedly, then composite things by the simple mode; but the mode of simplicity and the [mode] of complexion are opposed: therefore he does not know by the mode of complexion.

2. Likewise, since the intellect knows⁶ by the mode of complexion, either that mode is in the thing, or in the intellect. Not in the thing, because, since the sense apprehends the same thing, it would apprehend it by the mode of complexion: therefore [the mode of complexion] is in the intellect. But every such intellect, in which there is complexion, is really complex and composite; but the divine intellect is not of this sort: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if he knows things by the mode of complexion, since the mode of divine cognition is coeternal⁷ with him, from eternity he has known by the mode of complexion: therefore complexion was from eternity. But he has understood many things, therefore many complexions are from eternity; therefore [they are] either true or false; if true: therefore many things are true from eternity; if false: therefore many things are false from eternity.

4. Likewise, if he knows by the mode of complexion, since the same thing now is truly signified under the ratio of future-being, now under the ratio of past-being, now under the ratio of present-being: therefore in all these modes God knows [it]. But on the contrary: he knows all things as present; whence in Second Peter, at the end⁸, it is said: "One day with God [is] as a thousand years" etc.: therefore he does not know in all these modes.

Conclusio.

The divine cognition of things is not by the mode of complexion, insofar as complexion is taken with respect to the divine intellect; but [it is] insofar as it falls with respect to things, both considered in themselves and as expressed by our intellect.

I respond: It must be said that to know things by the mode of complexion can be understood in three ways. For either the mode of complexion falls with respect to the thing; and thus the sense is: God knows that things exist or have themselves by the mode of complexion or composition⁹; and this is true, for he knows the things to be, just as they are. In another way, [it is taken] so that the mode of complexion falls with respect to the thing, as it is expressed by our intellect; and then the sense is, that God knows things not only as they are, but also as the intellect expresses [them] — for he knows both the things and the utterances or intellections¹⁰ signifying them — and this is true. In the third way it can be understood [in such a way] that the mode of complexion falls with respect to the divine intellect; and in this mode it is false. For this regards the intellect, which understands many [things] and [understands them] through many [acts], which it must combine; but God understands many [things] by one and so simple¹¹ a mode, and his intellect is not more simple in understanding one [thing] than [in understanding] many. Hence to understand many [things] by the mode of complexion is neither wholly [a mark] of power, nor wholly [a mark] of imperfection; and therefore it is set neither in the lowest cognition, as the sensitive [is], nor in the highest cognition, as the divine [is], and perhaps it is also not in the supreme cognition of the soul itself, which is called intellective insofar as it is at its summit: for it knows by the mode of simple regard.

To the arguments to the contrary:

To 1. The reasonings proving that God knows by the mode of complexion proceed according to the first and the second way; therefore they truly conclude — except for the first [argument], to which it has now been resolved.

To 2. To that which is objected, that complexion does not come from the intellect; it must be said that complexion can be compared to the intellect in two ways: either as to a cause, or as to a subject. If as to a subject, in which and which it informs and denominates, thus it is compared to the human intellect, from which the complexion [comes], which also combines [things]¹². If as to a cause, thus it is compared to the divine intellect. p. 738For the divine intellect knows the complexion not regarding itself, but regarding our understanding; since complexion is not from our intellect, except with the divine [intellect] cooperating in understanding.

To 3. To that which is objected, that if he knows things by the mode of complexion, then the complexions are eternal; it must be said that from the first or the second sense it does not follow, that the complexions are eternal, since there is no complexion regarding God; but it does well follow, that the truth signified by some complexion is eternal, just as the truth of this [proposition], "the world is going to be"; nevertheless the proposition and complexion is from our intellect understanding that eternal truth. Hence just as a temporal utterance signifies an eternal thing, as this name God, yet it does not follow that it is eternal; so many enuntiabilia signify an eternal truth, yet they are not eternal.

To 4. To that which is objected, that then he knows things under the ratio of future-being and past-being: it must be said, as has been touched upon, that the mode of divine cognition can be taken in itself, or on the side of the [thing] known. If on the side of the [thing] known; then it must be said that he wholly knows the thing to be just as it is, and so [knows it] to be mutably, and so to be in a composite mode, just as it is, and so concerning all [things]: and thus he knows a past thing to be past, and a future [thing] to be future, and a non-past [thing] to be present. It can again be taken on the side of himself; and thus, since the cognition of God is wholly simple [and] wholly present, he knows all things by the mode of simplicity and by the mode of presentiality. Hence, what is said: "all things are present to God", this is said as to the cognition, in which no succession falls, [and] therefore [there is] neither new nor old, neither past nor future. But in the constricted [scope] of the angelic and human cognition succession falls, and therefore [also] past and future. And for this reason all things are not so called present to the cognizing soul, as to God. And this is manifest, since the now of eternity, which is always present, embraces all temporal [things]; and therefore it is clear how [the saying] is to be understood.