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Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 9

Textus Latinus
p. 184

Quaestio III

Utrum in divinis generatio sit aeterna.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum divina generatio sit aeterna. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. In creaturis operans naturaliter operatur quam citissime potest, et de perfectione agentis est, quod citissime possit operari1: ergo cum productio Filii a Patre sit per naturam et summam potentiam, quam cito fuit, Pater genuit; sed fuit ab aeterno: ergo etc.

2. Item, de perfectione generationis est, ut quod generatur aequetur generanti2: ergo cum divina generatio sit perfectissima, Filius erit Patri per omnia aequalis; sed Pater est infinitus duratione: ergo et Filius.

3. Item, intelligere se coaeternum est menti divinae; nunquam enim est ponere, quod de non intelligente sit Deus factus intelligens; sed verbum est coaeternum menti intelligenti; ex hoc enim, quod mens se intelligit, verbum gignit. Si ergo propriissime Filius est verbum, est coaeternum Patri; et hoc est quod dicit beatus Ioannes3: In principio erat Verbum.

4. Item, hoc4 idem ostenditur per impossibile. Omne quod coepit esse, est mutatum secundum substantiam; sed omne quod incipit generari, incipit esse: ergo omne quod incipit generari, est mutatum secundum substantiam; sed generatio5 est de substantia generantis: ergo ubi incipit esse generatio, substantia generantis mutatur; sed substantia Dei Patris secundum esse est immutabilis: ergo generatio non incipit in divinis.

Contra:

1. Sicut se habet corruptio ad non6 esse ex parte finis, sic generatio ex parte principii; sed omne quod corrumpitur, desinit esse: ergo omne quod generatur, incipit esse; sed nullum tale est aeternum: ergo etc.

2. Item, quidquid producit divina essentia est ipsa7 posterius tempore, sive duratione: ergo pari ratione quidquid producit divina persona, cum essentia et persona sint idem.

3. Item, in Deo idem est suum esse et sua duratio; sed Filius habet principium essendi: ergo habet principium durationis: sed quod habet principium durandi8 incipit esse: ergo etc.

p. 185

4. Item, Pater caret principio et caret initio: ergo qua ratione communicat Filio non habere initium, eadem ratione communicat ei non habere principium; aut si non hoc, nec illud.

Conclusio. Generatio in divinis est aeterna propter summam generantis fecunditatem et summam geniti aequalitatem et utriusque summam actualitatem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod generatio Filii est aeterna tum ratione generantis, tum ratione geniti: ratione generantis propter summam et perfectam fecunditatem, ratione geniti propter summam et perfectam aequalitatem; quarum utraque conditio tollit, ne Filius sit posterius9 Patre, sicut visum est in opponendo. Alia ratio est propter summam in utroque actualitatem, in qua non distat actus a potentia, nec posse antecedit esse.

Ad argumenta pro parte contra:

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corruptio ponit terminum finalem; dicendum, quod corruptio semper dicit variationem et mutationem, et ita conversionem entis in non esse; et ideo ponit terminum finalem. Sed generatio aliquando dicit mutationem10, ut in creaturis, et sic ponit terminum initialem; sed in divinis non dicit mutationem ex non ente, sed emanationem ab ente.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod essentia nihil producit nisi ex tempore; dicendum, quod sicut persona producit aliam personam, sic essentia aliam essentiam. Aliam autem essentiam11 ex se ipsa non producit, cum ipsa sit immultiplicabilis, nec ex alia, quia similiter esset quaerere, unde producit illam aliam; et sic necesse est in productione prima creaturae, quod producat ex nihilo; et omne sic productum habet esse post non esse, et ita initium. Persona autem non de nihilo producit personam; et ideo non facit de non ente ens, et ideo nullum ponit initium talis productio.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filius habet principium essendi; dicendum, quod principium dicitur dupliciter, scilicet originale et initiale. Secundum quod principium dicitur originaliter, sic Filius tam quantum ad esse, quam quantum ad durationem habet principium, quia utrumque habet ab alio. Si autem principium dicatur initium, sic dico, quod nec habet principium essendi nec durandi. Primum principium non aufert rationem aeterni, secundum vero sic.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, quare Pater communicat Filio carentiam initii, non principii; patet iam responsio: quia temporale et aeternum de necessitate differunt per essentiam, principium et principiatum non sic; ideo non est simile de hoc et illo. Quia ergo quod habet initium est temporale, quod caret est aeternum; ideo cum Pater et Filius sint unius essentiae, patet etc. Rursum, cum habere principium et non habere dicant differentiam personae, et haec est inter Patrem et Filium; ideo sicut Pater non communicat Filio personam, sed tantum naturam sive essentiam, sic communicavit ei non habere initium, sed non communicavit non habere principium.

Scholion

I. Conclusio est de fide, definita in Nicaeno contra Arianos. — Rationes pro conclusione in responsione breviter allatae explicantur argumento 1. et 2. in fundam. — Quoad aeternitatem cfr. infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 3. et IV. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 1. ad 1; I. Sent. d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4; d. 41. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4.

II. Quoad conclusionem: Scot., hic et Report. q. unic. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. q. 42. a. 2; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 11. — B. Albert., hic a. 5. 6. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 58. q. 1. n. 22. 23. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. hic q. unic. — Biel, hic q. 3.

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English Translation

Question III

Whether generation in God is eternal.

Thirdly it is asked, whether divine generation is eternal. And that it is so, is shown in this way.

1. In creatures, what acts naturally acts as quickly as it can, and it pertains to the perfection of the agent that it can act as quickly as possible1: therefore, since the production of the Son from the Father is by nature and by the highest power, the Father generated [him] as soon as he was; but he was from eternity: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it pertains to the perfection of generation that what is generated be equal to the generator2: therefore, since divine generation is most perfect, the Son will be in all things equal to the Father; but the Father is infinite in duration: therefore [so is] the Son also.

3. Likewise, to understand itself is co-eternal to the divine mind; for it is never to be posited that God was made, from a non-understanding [being], to be understanding; but the word is co-eternal to the understanding mind; for from this, that the mind understands itself, it generates a word. If therefore the Son is most properly the Word, he is co-eternal to the Father; and this is what blessed John says3: In the beginning was the Word.

4. Likewise, this4 same [thing] is shown by [reduction to] the impossible. Everything which began to be has been changed according to substance; but everything which begins to be generated, begins to be: therefore everything which begins to be generated has been changed according to substance; but generation5 is from the substance of the generator: therefore where generation begins to be, the substance of the generator is changed; but the substance of God the Father is, according to its being, immutable: therefore generation does not begin in divine matters.

On the contrary:

1. Just as corruption is related to non6-being on the side of the end, so generation [is related] on the side of the principle; but everything which is corrupted ceases to be: therefore everything which is generated begins to be; but no such thing is eternal: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, whatever the divine essence produces is posterior to it7 in time, or in duration: therefore by parity of reasoning, [so is] whatever a divine person produces, since essence and person are the same.

3. Likewise, in God his being and his duration are the same; but the Son has a beginning of being: therefore he has a beginning of duration; but what has a beginning of enduring8 begins to be: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the Father lacks principle (principium) and lacks beginning (initium): therefore by the [same] account by which he communicates to the Son not having a beginning, by the same account he communicates to him not having a principle; or, if not this, neither that.

Conclusion. Generation in divine matters is eternal on account of the highest fecundity of the generator and the highest equality of the begotten, and the highest actuality of each.

I respond: It must be said that the generation of the Son is eternal both by reason of the generator and by reason of the begotten: by reason of the generator on account of the highest and perfect fecundity, by reason of the begotten on account of the highest and perfect equality; each of which conditions removes [the possibility] that the Son be posterior9 to the Father, as has been seen in the opposing [arguments]. Another reason is on account of the highest actuality in each, in which act does not stand apart from potency, nor does being-able antecede being.

To the arguments for the contrary part:

To 1. To that which is objected, that corruption posits a final term; it must be said that corruption always says variation and change, and thus the conversion of being into non-being; and therefore it posits a final term. But generation sometimes says change10, as in creatures, and so posits an initial term; but in divine matters it does not say change from non-being, but emanation from being.

To 2. To that which is objected, that the essence produces nothing except in time; it must be said that, just as a person produces another person, so an essence [produces] another essence. But it does not produce another essence11 from itself, since it is itself unmultipliable, nor from another, because [otherwise] it would similarly be necessary to ask whence it produced that other; and so it is necessary in the first production of a creature that it produce from nothing; and everything thus produced has being after non-being, and so [has] a beginning. But the person does not produce a person from nothing; and therefore it does not make a being from a non-being, and therefore such production posits no beginning.

To 3. To that which is objected, that the Son has a principle of being; it must be said that principle is said in two ways, namely [as] originative and [as] initial. According as principle is said originatively, thus the Son has a principle both as to being and as to duration, since he has each from another. But if principle be said [as] beginning, then I say that he has neither a principle of being nor of enduring. The first principle does not take away the account of the eternal, but the second does so.

To 4. To that which is objected last, why the Father communicates to the Son lacking-a-beginning, [but] not [lacking]-a-principle; the response is now plain: because the temporal and the eternal differ of necessity by essence, [whereas] principle and that-from-a-principle [differ] not so; therefore it is not similar in this and in that. Since therefore what has a beginning is temporal, [and] what lacks [a beginning] is eternal; therefore since the Father and the Son are of one essence, it is plain etc. Again, since to have a principle and not to have [one] say a difference of person, and this [difference] is between Father and Son; therefore just as the Father does not communicate to the Son [his] person, but only [his] nature or essence, so he has communicated to him not having a beginning, but he has not communicated [his] not having a principle.

Scholion

I. The conclusion is of the faith, defined at Nicaea against the Arians. — The reasons for the conclusion briefly adduced in the response are explained in arguments 1 and 2 in the fundamenta. — As to eternity, cf. below d. 31, a. 1, q. 3, and IV Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 1, ad 1; I Sent. d. 40, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4; d. 41, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4.

II. As to the conclusion: Scotus, here and Reportata q. unic. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1; S. I, q. 42, a. 2; S. c. Gent. IV, c. 11. — Bl. Albert, here a. 5, 6, 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. — Aegid. R. (Giles of Rome), here 2 princ., q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 58, q. 1, n. 22, 23. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionys. the Carthusian, on this and the following [question], here q. unic. — Biel, here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vide Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 10. (VIII. c. 3.). — Paulo infra ed. 1 post et repetit per et cod. T post genuit addit Filium.
    See Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 10 (VIII, c. 3). — A little below, ed. 1 after et repeats per, and codex T after genuit adds Filium.
  2. Aristot., IV. Meteor. text. 19. (c. 3.) ait: Perfectum esse id quod tale producere potest, quale ipsum est. Vide et II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4.).
    Aristotle, Meteorologica IV, text 19 (c. 3) says: That is perfect which can produce something such as it is itself. See also De Anima II, text 34 (c. 4).
  3. Cap. 1, 1.
    John 1:1.
  4. Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus hoc. — Vide pro hoc et sequenti argumento Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7; I. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 11–23. (c. 3.), et II. de Anima, text. 34. seqq. (c. 4.).
    From the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have supplied hoc. — For this and the following argument, see Aristotle, Physics V, text 7; De Generatione et Corruptione I, text 11–23 (c. 3), and De Anima II, text 34 ff. (c. 4).
  5. Cod. T generatus pro generatio et mox si loco ubi.
    Codex T reads generatus for generatio and shortly after si for ubi.
  6. Cod. O omittit non, salvo eodem sensu, qui est in generationis et corruptionis contrarietate, de qua V. Phys. text. 14, et quae sub alio respectu exprimitur hac formula: Corruptio unius est generatio alterius.
    Codex O omits non, the same sense being preserved, which consists in the contrariety of generation and corruption, on which see Physics V, text 14, and which under another aspect is expressed by the formula: The corruption of one thing is the generation of another.
  7. Fide plurium mss. ut HKY bb et ed. 1 posuimus ablativum ipsa pro ipsi.
    On the authority of several manuscripts, like HKY bb, and ed. 1, we have used the ablative ipsa for ipsi.
  8. Praeferimus lectionem nonnullorum mss. ut M P Q pro essendi ponentium durandi, quia in ipsa et processus et vis argumenti distinctior redditur. Cod. H et ed. 1 ponunt durationis; cod. O vero essendi et durationis.
    We prefer the reading of some manuscripts, like M P Q, which have durandi for essendi, because in it both the process and the force of the argument are made more distinct. Codex H and ed. 1 read durationis; codex O reads essendi et durationis.
  9. Ed. 1 posterior.
    Ed. 1 reads posterior.
  10. Cod. bb addit ex non ente, quod subnexis correspondet.
    Codex bb adds ex non ente, which corresponds to what follows.
  11. Praestantiorem lectionem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1, quae concinnior est lectione Vat. Aliam autem naturam essentia. Vat. et paulo infra minus distincte exhibet immutabilis loco immultiplicabilis; cum Vat. consentit cod. cc, eo excepto, quod pro naturam ponat creaturam. Mox cod. R produceret loco producit.
    We prefer the reading of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, which is more polished than the Vatican edition's Aliam autem naturam essentia. The Vatican edition also, a little below, less precisely reads immutabilis for immultiplicabilis; codex cc agrees with the Vatican edition, except that it reads creaturam for naturam. Shortly after, codex R reads produceret for producit. ---
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