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Dist. 9, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 9

Textus Latinus
p. 182

Quaestio II. Utrum in divinis generatio distinguat inter gignentem et genitum.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum generatio in divinis sit personarum distinctiva. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Augustinus circa principium de Trinitate1: «Nulla res est, quae se ipsam gignat, ut sit»: si ergo gignit, aliam gignit; sed inter aliam et aliam est distinctio: ergo etc.

2. Item, generatio est emanatio; sed ubi est emanatio, ibi est multiplicatio sive plurificatio; ubi autem multiplicatio, ibi2 distinctio: ergo ubi generatio, ibi necessario est distinctio.

3. Item, generatio in divinis est relatio3; sed relatio importat respectum et ordinem; sed ubi respectus et ordo, ibi suppositorum et relatorum sive ordinatorum distinctio: et sic etc.

4. Item, maior4 diversitas sustinetur a supposito vel in supposito composito et multiplici quam in subiecto simplici et uniformi; sed relative opposita non stant insimul in eodem individuo creato: ergo nec in simplici hypostasi. Probatio mediae. Bene sequitur: Socrates est pater Platonis: ergo non est filius eius, vel est distinctus ab eo: ergo multo fortius in divinis.

Contra:

1. Pater generando Filium dat ei totum quod habet; sed habet essentiam et personam: ergo dat ei essentiam et personam: ergo sicut Filius non distinguitur a Patre essentialiter, ita nec personaliter, ut videtur.

2. Item, Pater communicat Filio essentiam suam propter summam5 simplicitatem; sed aeque simplex est persona ut essentia: ergo qua ratione communicat essentiam, communicat et personam.

3. Item, in Patre idem est natura et persona: ergo impossibile est, quod communicet unum, quod non6 communicet aliud, ergo si dat naturam, et personam.

4. Item, videtur quod relatio non distinguat aliqua7 ratione, quia unus et idem punctus est principium et finis respectu diversarum linearum: ergo si istae relationes non sunt distinctivae, videtur similiter, quod nec paternitas et filiatio. Si dicas, quod non omnes relationes distinguunt, sed solum mutuae, ut principium et principiatum, finis et finitum; contra8: Pater et Filius se habent, sicut intelligens et intellectum, ut dicit Anselmus9; sed idem potest esse intelligens et intellectum: ergo etc.

5. Item, maior est repugnantia in contrariis quam in relativis10; sed albedo et nigredo, quae sunt contraria, non faciunt distinctionem circa Petrum, quia idem potest modo esse albus, modo niger: ergo multo fortius unus in divinis modo erit Pater modo Filius.

6. Item, quaeritur, quare potius relationes faciunt distinctionem personae quam essentiae, cum aeque bene possint esse plures essentiae vel naturae in una persona, sicut e converso.

p. 183
Conclusio. Contra Sabellium probatur, quod generatio in divinis facit realem distinctionem inter generantem et genitum; contra Arium vero, quod haec distinctio sit quantum ad personam, non quantum ad essentiam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod generatio in divinis, sicut ostensum est11, facit realem distinctionem inter generantem et generatum, non rationalem vel intellectualem solum, sicut dixit Sabellius; et12 realem quantum ad personam, non quantum ad essentiam, sicut dixit Arius.

Quod sic patet. Generatio in creaturis dicit emanationem per modum actionis sive mutationis, in Deo13 emanationem per modum relationis.

In quantum emanatio, dicit aliquam distinctionem; in quantum talis emanatio, dicit distinctionem in persona14. Ratione emanationis est distinctio; quia, sicut dicit Anselmus15, «nec intellectus capit, nec natura permittit, illum, qui est ab alio, esse illum, a quo est», secundum quod positive dicitur aliquis esse ab alio — nam Pater privative dicitur esse a se, id est non ab alio. In quantum talis emanatio, ponit distinctionem in persona. Generatio enim est productio convenientis in natura; ratione16 naturae non potest esse distinctio: ergo vel erit ratione suppositi, vel proprietatis. Si proprietatis, aut absolute, aut respective; non absolute, quia tunc esset distinctio in natura; nec17 respective, ut puta relationis, quia in relatione secundum se non est motus in creaturis18 nec origo in divinis; unde filiatio non generatur nisi in alio. Ergo necesse est, quod sit distinctio in supposito.

Similiter ratione relationis est distinctio, quia nihil ad se refertur nec ordinatur. Ratione vero talis relationis est distinctio personalis; quia generare et generari, cum dicant relationem per modum actionis et passionis19, dicunt eam in supposito et respectu suppositi. Et ideo, quia relatio inter extrema notat distinctionem, patet quod distinctio est ibi suppositorum. His visis20, facile est solvere ad obiecta.

Ad argumenta:

1. Quod ergo obiicitur: Pater communicat Filio totum quod habet; verum est, praeter generationem et generationis distinctionem; ipsa enim ratio communicandi dat intelligere distinctionem, quia nullus communicat sibi, sed alii: et ideo21 id in quo distinguit, non communicat.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aeque simplex est persona, ut essentia; dicendum, quod simplicitas essentiae est, quod sit in pluribus; sed simplicitas suppositi est, quod non sit in22 pluribus. Nam suppositum sive individuum, quantum est de se, dicitur quod est in uno solo; ideo non est simile.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem23 est essentia et persona; dicendum, quod quamvis sint idem, non tamen sunt ad idem: quia persona est ad alium, ideo generatur et refertur; essentia vero non, ideo essentia communicatur et persona distinguitur. Sicut ergo, quamvis idem sit in Patre essentia et persona, tamen persona generat, essentia non; sic e converso essentia communicatur et persona non.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de principio et fine in puncto, patet responsio, quia illae non sunt mutuae relationes, quod proprie requiritur ad distinctionem; unde non valet. Quod obiicit24 de intelligente et intellecto, dico quod non est ibi relatio secundum esse, sed secundum dici. Ad hoc autem quod relatio distinguat, oportet quod sint relationes mutuae, quia aliter non distinguunt; oportet etiam, quod dicant relationem secundum esse.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de albedine et nigredine, dicendum, quod nulla est oppositio formarum, nisi considerentur25 respectu eiusdem temporis; et impossibile est, quod idem subiectum eodem tempore sit album et nigrum; relationes autem in divinis simul sunt.

6. Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, quare magis relationes faciunt26 distinctionem in personis quam in essentia; patet ex iam dictis responsio. Potest etiam alia ratio reddi, quia pluralitas naturarum impedit simplicitatem personae, sed non sic e converso. Quod patet sic: si27 plures naturae sunt in una persona, aut ergo per gratiam, aut per naturam. Si per gratiam unimus, sic — quia natura unita consequitur unitatem personae — non impedit28; sed si naturaliter, ut in Petro, est pluralitas essentiarum sive naturarum, tunc — cum intellectus naturae praecedat personam, et non natura ex personis, sed persona ex naturis sit29 — necesse est, personam esse compositam; et inde est, quod in divinis magis est unitas naturae cum pluralitate personarum, quam e converso.

Scholion

I. Duae haereses Sabellii et Arii, Symbolo Nicaeno aliisque Ecclesiae decretis reprobatae, duplici conclusionis propositione refelluntur.

Quoad distinctiones relationis in solut. ad 4. notandum, quod relativa secundum dici ea sunt, quae in principali significato non important relationem, sed aliquid absolutum, quod tamen secundario involvit relationem ad aliud, ut scientia ad obiectum, i. e. scibile; ita Brulifer ad hunc locum. Vel clarius cum Goudin (Philos. Logica Maior. p. I. disp. 2. q. 4.): «Relatio secundum dici non est aliquid pure relativum, sed res quaedam absoluta, quam consequitur habitudo ad aliam, adeo ut exprimi non possit, quin et illa habitudo exprimatur... sic pars, etsi sit aliquid absolutum, includit tamen habitudinem ad totum, scientia ad obiectum». Quid sit relatio mutua, non eget explicatione. Plura vide infra d. 30. q. 3. Scholion.

II. Cfr. supra d. 5. per totam. — Scot., d. 11. q. 2; d. 26. q. unic. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 28. a. 1. 3; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 14. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 26. a. 7; d. 9. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. et 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. unic.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether generation in God distinguishes between the one begetting and the one begotten.

Secondly it is asked, whether generation in God is distinctive of the persons. And that it is so, is shown in this way.

1. Augustine, near the beginning of On the Trinity1: «There is no thing which begets itself, that it may exist»: if therefore it begets, it begets another; but between one and another there is distinction: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, generation is an emanation; but where there is emanation, there is multiplication or plurification; and where multiplication, there2 distinction: therefore where generation, there necessarily is distinction.

3. Likewise, generation in God is a relation3; but relation imports respect and order; but where respect and order, there is distinction of the supposits and of the things related or ordered: and so etc.

4. Likewise, greater4 diversity is sustained by a supposit, or in a composite and manifold supposit, than in a simple and uniform subject; but relatively opposed things do not stand together in the same created individual: therefore neither in a simple hypostasis. Proof of the middle [premise]. It well follows: Socrates is the father of Plato: therefore he is not his son, or he is distinct from him: therefore much more strongly in God.

On the contrary:

1. The Father, in begetting the Son, gives him everything that he has; but he has the essence and the person: therefore he gives him the essence and the person: therefore just as the Son is not distinguished from the Father essentially, so neither personally, as it seems.

2. Likewise, the Father communicates his essence to the Son on account of [his] supreme5 simplicity; but the person is just as simple as the essence: therefore by the same reason by which he communicates the essence, he also communicates the person.

3. Likewise, in the Father the nature and the person are the same: therefore it is impossible that he should communicate the one and not6 communicate the other; therefore if he gives the nature, [he gives] also the person.

4. Likewise, it seems that relation does not distinguish by any7 account, because one and the same point is the beginning and the end with respect to diverse lines: therefore if these relations are not distinctive, it seems likewise that neither are paternity and filiation. If you say that not all relations distinguish, but only mutual ones, as principle and that which is from a principle, end and that which is ended; on the contrary8: the Father and the Son are related as the one understanding and the thing understood, as Anselm says9; but the same can be understanding and understood: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, there is greater repugnance in contraries than in relatives10; but whiteness and blackness, which are contraries, do not make a distinction in Peter, because the same [subject] can now be white, now black: therefore much more strongly will one in God be now Father, now Son.

6. Likewise, it is asked, why rather do the relations make the distinction of the person than of the essence, since equally well there could be several essences or natures in one person, as conversely.

Conclusion. Against Sabellius it is proved, that generation in God makes a real distinction between the one generating and the one generated; against Arius, however, [it is proved] that this distinction is with regard to the person, not with regard to the essence.

I respond: It must be said that generation in God, as has been shown11, makes a real distinction between the one generating and the one generated, not a rational or intellectual one only, as Sabellius said; and12 [makes] a real [distinction] with regard to the person, not with regard to the essence, as Arius said.

That it is so appears thus. Generation in creatures bespeaks an emanation by way of action or change; in God13, an emanation by way of relation.

Insofar as [it is] emanation, it bespeaks some distinction; insofar as [it is] such an emanation, it bespeaks distinction in the person14. By reason of emanation there is distinction; because, as Anselm says15, «neither does the intellect grasp, nor does nature permit, that he who is from another should be the one from whom he is», according as one is said positively to be from another — for the Father is said privatively to be from himself, that is, not from another. Insofar as [it is] such an emanation, it places distinction in the person. For generation is the production of one agreeing in nature; by reason16 of nature there cannot be distinction: therefore either it will be by reason of the supposit, or of a property. If of a property, either absolutely or relatively; not absolutely, because then there would be distinction in nature; nor17 relatively, as for example of a relation, because in a relation taken in itself there is no motion in creatures18 nor origin in God; whence filiation is not generated except in another. Therefore it is necessary that there be distinction in the supposit.

Likewise by reason of the relation there is distinction, because nothing is referred to itself nor ordered [to itself]. But by reason of such a relation there is personal distinction; because to generate and to be generated, since they bespeak a relation by way of action and passion19, bespeak it in a supposit and with respect to a supposit. And therefore, since the relation between the extremes notes a distinction, it is clear that the distinction is there a distinction of supposits. These things being seen20, it is easy to answer the objections.

To the arguments:

1. To what is therefore objected: the Father communicates to the Son everything that he has; it is true, except for the generation and the distinction of generation; for the very account of communicating gives [us] to understand a distinction, because no one communicates to himself, but to another: and therefore21 that in which he distinguishes [himself], he does not communicate.

2. To that which is objected, that the person is just as simple as the essence; it must be said that the simplicity of the essence is that it be in many; but the simplicity of the supposit is that it not be in22 many. For a supposit or individual, insofar as it is in itself, is said [to be] that which is in one alone; therefore it is not the same.

3. To that which is objected, that the essence and the person are the same23; it must be said that, although they are the same, yet they are not toward the same: because the person is toward another, therefore it is generated and is referred; but the essence is not, therefore the essence is communicated and the person is distinguished. As therefore, although in the Father the essence and the person are the same, yet the person generates, the essence does not; so conversely the essence is communicated, the person is not.

4. To that which is objected concerning beginning and end in a point, the answer is clear, because those are not mutual relations, which is properly required for distinction; whence it does not hold. As to what is objected24 concerning the one understanding and the thing understood, I say that there is not there a relation according to being, but according to predication. For the relation to distinguish, it is required that the relations be mutual, because otherwise they do not distinguish; it is required also that they bespeak a relation according to being.

5. To that which is objected concerning whiteness and blackness, it must be said that there is no opposition of forms unless they be considered25 with respect to the same time; and it is impossible that the same subject at the same time be white and black; but the relations in God are simultaneous.

6. To that which is finally asked, why rather do the relations make26 the distinction in persons than in essence; the answer is clear from what has already been said. Another reason can also be given, namely that the plurality of natures impedes the simplicity of the person, but not so conversely. Which appears thus: if27 several natures are in one person, then either through grace or through nature. If we are united through grace, in that case — because the united nature follows the unity of the person — it does not impede28; but if naturally, as in Peter, there is a plurality of essences or natures, then — since the understanding of nature precedes the person, and the nature is not from the persons, but the person from the natures29 — it is necessary that the person be composite; and from this it is that in God there is rather a unity of nature with a plurality of persons than conversely.

Scholion

I. The two heresies of Sabellius and Arius, reproved by the Nicene Creed and other decrees of the Church, are refuted by the twofold proposition of the conclusion.

As to the distinctions of relation in the solution to argument 4, it should be noted that relatives "according to predication" (secundum dici) are those which in their principal signification do not import a relation, but something absolute, which however secondarily involves a relation to another, as knowledge to its object, i.e. the knowable; thus Brulifer at this place. Or more clearly with Goudin (Philos. Logica Maior. p. I. disp. 2. q. 4.): «A relation secundum dici is not something purely relative, but a certain absolute thing, upon which there follows a habitude to another, so that it cannot be expressed without that habitude also being expressed... thus a part, even if it is something absolute, yet includes a habitude to the whole, knowledge to the object». What a mutual relation is, needs no explanation. See further below at d. 30. q. 3. Scholion.

II. Cf. above d. 5. throughout. — Scotus, d. 11. q. 2; d. 26. q. unic. — St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 28. a. 1. 3; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 14. — Bl. Albert, I. Sent. d. 26. a. 7; d. 9. a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1. q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1. princ. q. 1. and 2. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. unic.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. I. c. I. n. 1. — Circa finem argumenti fide multorum mss. et ed. 1 post inter aliam expunximus rem.
    Book I, c. 1, n. 1. — Near the end of the argument, on the authority of many manuscripts and the first edition, we have expunged rem after inter aliam.
  2. Vat. adiungit et.
    The Vatican edition adds et.
  3. Cod. Y addit in creaturis vero actio vel mutatio.
    Codex Y adds in creaturis vero actio vel mutatio ("but in creatures [it is] action or change").
  4. Multi codd. ut ACGKORSUVY etc. cum sex primis edd. minor, sed mendose. Paulo infra ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus subiecto pro substantia et relative pro relativa. — Sensus argumenti est: Suppositum creatum et compositum est capax ad maiorem diversitatem sustinendam, quam increatum et simplex; sed in creato supposito non est capacitas ad simul sustinenda relative opposita; ergo multo minus in simplici supposito etc.
    Many codices, such as ACGKORSUVY etc., with the first six editions [read] minor, but mistakenly. A little below, on the authority of older manuscripts and the first edition, we have substituted subiecto for substantia and relative for relativa. — The sense of the argument is: A created and composite supposit is capable of sustaining greater diversity than an uncreated and simple one; but in a created supposit there is no capacity for sustaining relatively opposed things simultaneously; therefore much less in a simple supposit, etc.
  5. In mss. et ed. 1 deest suam, quod Vat. hic addit. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc contra alios codd. et ed. 1 et pro ut.
    In the manuscripts and the first edition, suam is lacking, which the Vatican edition adds here. Shortly after, the Vatican edition, with codex cc against the other codices and the first edition, [reads] et in place of ut.
  6. Sequimur vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1 ponendo quod non loco quin. Cod. Z brevius unum sine altero.
    We follow the older codices with the first edition in placing quod non in place of quin. Codex Z [reads] more briefly unum sine altero.
  7. Multi codd. ut ACLOPQRSTUVY etc. cum ed. 1 alia loco aliqua, sed, ut videtur, minus bene, etiamsi sub alia ratione intelligas modum distinguendi relativis proprium, quia, uti ex subnexis patet, agitur de eo, quod relatio simpliciter non distinguat. Cod. Z nisi pro aliqua.
    Many codices, such as ACLOPQRSTUVY etc., with the first edition [read] alia in place of aliqua, but, as it seems, less well, even if under alia ratione one should understand the mode of distinguishing proper to relatives, because, as appears from what follows, the discussion is about [the claim] that relation, simply speaking, does not distinguish. Codex Z [reads] nisi in place of aliqua.
  8. Cod. Y addit videtur quod nec mutuae quia. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. renitentibus, ut pro sicut.
    Codex Y adds videtur quod nec mutuae quia ("it seems that not even mutual [relations distinguish] because"). Shortly after, the Vatican edition, with codex cc, the other codices nonetheless resisting, [reads] ut in place of sicut.
  9. Monolog. c. 32, ubi hoc quoad sensum invenitur.
    Monologion, c. 32, where this is found as to the sense.
  10. Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis.
    Cf. Aristotle, Categories, the chapter on Opposites.
  11. Hic in fundam.
    Here in the fundamenta [of the question].
  12. Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. sed loco et, ac paulo post dicit pro dixit. Cod. M accidentalem loco intellectualem.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] sed in place of et, and a little after dicit in place of dixit. Codex M [reads] accidentalem in place of intellectualem.
  13. Cod. bb addit autem.
    Codex bb adds autem.
  14. Praeclaram hanc emendationem debemus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, dum Vat. verba in quantum usque Ratione omittit, mutata insuper interpunctione. Nonnulli codd. autem praemittunt voci talis.
    This excellent emendation we owe to the older manuscripts and the first edition, while the Vatican edition omits the words from in quantum down to Ratione, with the punctuation moreover changed. Some codices, however, prefix [autem?] to the word talis.
  15. De Process. Spir. S. c. 3: Quippe nec natura permittit nec intellectus capit, existentem de aliquo esse de quo existit, aut de quo existit esse existentem de se. — Cfr. etiam Monolog. c. 38.
    On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, c. 3: "Indeed neither does nature permit, nor does the intellect grasp, that one who exists from something should be that from which he exists, or that from which he exists should be the one who exists from himself." — Cf. also Monologion, c. 38.
  16. Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. addit igitur, pro quo codd. aa bb incongrue ponunt enim.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, adds igitur, in place of which codices aa and bb incongruously place enim.
  17. Ed. 1 non.
    The first edition [reads] non.
  18. Vide Aristot., V. Phys. text. 10. (c. 2.).
    See Aristotle, Physics V, text 10 (c. 2).
  19. Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt et passionis, qui et bis pro plurali ponunt singularem numerum dicat et dicit. — Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 20. (IV. c. 15.), ubi tres species relationis, inter quas est actio et passio, afferuntur.
    Very many codices with the first edition omit et passionis, and twice place the singular dicat and dicit in place of the plural. — Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 20 (IV, c. 15), where three species of relation are presented, among which is action and passion.
  20. Vat. cum paucis codd. incongrue et contra alios codd. et ed. 1 hic addit patet, moxque omittit est. Nonnulli codd. respondere pro solvere.
    The Vatican edition, with a few codices, incongruously and against the other codices and the first edition, adds patet here, and shortly omits est. Some codices [read] respondere in place of solvere.
  21. Supple: Pater. — Cod. R et ed. 1 clarius distinguitur loco distinguit. Paulo ante cod. N post sibi addit ipsi.
    Supply: Pater ("the Father"). — Codex R and the first edition [read] more clearly distinguitur in place of distinguit. A little before, codex N adds ipsi after sibi.
  22. Multi codd. ut BDESVXYZ aa bb cum ed. 1 ex loco in, sed falso, ut patet ex contextu. Mox post dicitur fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus esse.
    Many codices, such as BDESVXYZ aa bb, with the first edition [read] ex in place of in, but falsely, as is clear from the context. Shortly after dicitur, on the authority of the older manuscripts and the first edition, we have expunged esse.
  23. Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. generat.
    The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] generat.
  24. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 obiicitur. Cod. V particulam Et praemittit relativo quod.
    The Vatican edition, against the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, [reads] obiicitur. Codex V prefixes the particle Et to the relative quod.
  25. Cod. R adiungit secundum idem.
    Codex R adds secundum idem.
  26. Cod. Y faciant.
    Codex Y [reads] faciant.
  27. Vat. omittit si, quod pauci codd. ut EXZ bene addunt, cum sermo sit ex suppositione. Mox cod. E eadem pro una.
    The Vatican edition omits si, which a few codices, such as EXZ, rightly add, since the discourse is from a supposition. Shortly after, codex E [reads] eadem in place of una.
  28. Cod. X addit simplicitatem.
    Codex X adds simplicitatem.
  29. Plurimi codd., mutata interpunctione, cum ed. 1 sic pro sit, cod. Y est; paulo supra plurimi codd. praecedit pro praecedat. Lectionem tamen cod. I et ed. 1 praeferimus propter congruitatem grammaticalis constructionis. Cod. I post personis addit constet. Vat. contra vetustiores codd. et ed. 1 perperam natura loco naturis.
    Very many codices, with the punctuation changed, with the first edition [read] sic in place of sit; codex Y [reads] est; a little above, very many codices [read] praecedit in place of praecedat. We nevertheless prefer the reading of codex I and the first edition on account of the congruity of the grammatical construction. Codex I adds constet after personis. The Vatican edition, against the older codices and the first edition, wrongly [reads] natura in place of naturis.
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