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Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 37

Textus Latinus
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QUAESTIO III.

Utrum omnis compositio sit a Deo.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum omnis compositio sit a Deo. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Ubicumque est aliqua compositio, ibi est aliqua componentis actio1; sed omnis actio est a Deo: ergo omnis compositio est a Deo.

2. Item, sicut potentiae et virtutis est distinguere et separare, sic potentiae et virtutis est res unire et componere; sed omne quod est potentiae, est ab omnipotentia Creatoris: ergo etc.

3. Item, ubicumque est compositio, ibi est aliqua unio; et ubicumque est unio, ibi est aliqua unitas; sed omnis unitas est a prima unitate2; prima autem et summa unitas Deus est: ergo omnis compositio est a Deo.

4. Item, Augustinus de Vera Religione3: « Omnis res habet haec tria, scilicet quod unum aliquid sit, et specie propria discernatur, et rerum ordinem non excedat »; sed, sicut dicit Augustinus undecimo de Civitate Dei, « ab eo est omnis modus, et omnis species, et omnis ordo, sine quibus nihil esse nec cogitari potest »: ergo si omne compositum et omnis compositio aliquo modo est, videtur igitur omnis compositio a Deo esse.

Sed contra:

1. Super illud primae ad Corinthios octavo4: Scimus, quia idolum nihil est; Glossa: « Materiam idoli Deus formavit, sed stultitia hominum formam dedit ». Et post: « Quaecumque sunt in creaturis, facta sunt per Verbum; sed forma hominis in idolo non est facta per Verbum, sicut peccatum non est factum per Verbum »: videtur ergo, quod compositio talis formae cum tali materia non sit a Deo.

2. Item, quaedam sunt, quae impossibilia sunt coniungi, non tantum a natura, sed etiam a Deo, utpote quod aliquid sit simul et semel album et nigrum, sed intellectus noster phantasticus frequenter componit talia; nullorum autem compositio est a Deo, nisi eorum quae sunt a Deo componibilia: si ergo opposita non sunt a Deo componibilia et componuntur ab intellectu; videtur, quod non omnis compositio sit a Deo.

3. Item, quaedam sunt, quae non possunt coniungi in eodem sine monstruositate, sicut duo capita in eodem corpore; et talis compositio non potest esse a natura nisi cum errore et praeter intentionem5: si ergo Deus in nulla compositione errat nec facit errare, videtur, quod talium compositio nullo modo sit a Deo.

4. Item, aliqua sunt, quae impossibile est coniungi sine deordinatione, utpote si homo commisceatur6 bruto, vel e converso: si ergo talis compositio non est aliud quam componibilium deordinatio — hoc ipso enim deordinantur, quod sic componuntur — et deordinatio non sit a Deo; videtur, quod aliqua compositio non sit a Deo.

Conclusio.

Omnis compositio, secundum quod compositio, est a Deo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum compositionis nomen tripliciter accipiatur, in qualibet suarum acceptionum aliquid dicit. Dicitur enim compositio componentis actio; dicitur etiam compositio componibilis passio; dicitur tertio modo compositio rei compositae dispositio7. Et quoniam tam actio quam passio quam etiam dispositio rei compositae, secundum quod composita est, aliquid dicit; et omne quod dicit aliquam positionem, a Deo est: concedendum est simpliciter, quod omnis compositio sit a Deo, secundum quod compositio, sicut et omnis actio et conservatio.

Attendendum est tamen, quod quemadmodum quaedam actiones sunt, « quae mox nominatae coniunctae sunt malo8 », sicut mendacium et adulterium; sic quaedam quarundam rerum compositiones sunt, quas inseparabiliter concomitatur aliqua deformitas et inordinatio. Unde quemadmodum actio, quae coniuncta est defectui malitiae inseparabiliter, dicitur a Deo esse, ita tamen, quod defectus malitiae non est a Deo, sed a defectu creaturae, utpote liberae

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voluntatis; sic compositio, cui iuncta est deformitas et inordinatio, sic est a Deo, quod illa deformitas sive deordinatio, quae vere defectus est, est a defectu alicuius causae componentis creatae, vel a defectu ipsorum componibilium. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes ostendentes, quod omnis compositio est a Deo.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de compositione, quae est in idolo; dicendum, quod idolum, secundum quod huiusmodi, nominat aliquod artificiatum, continens in se aliquid numinis vel divinitatis: et secundum hoc dupliciter intelligitur ibi compositio, videlicet formae artis ad materiam, et divinitatis ad artificium; et prima quidem compositio est ex parte rei, secunda vero est solummodo secundum aestimationem idololatrae. Quantum ad primam compositionem idolum aliquid est, quantum vero ad secundam nihil est in mundo in re, quamvis aliquid aestimetur. — Concedo ergo, quod coniunctio talis formae cum hac materia, cum sit realiter ens, quod9 a Deo est. Concedendum est nihilominus, quod illa aestimatio, in quantum animae actus est, a Deo est; sed compositio divinitatis ad illud artificium, quae aestimatur esse, omnino nihil est; et haec a Deo non est, quia non est talis compositio secundum rem. Similiter ordinatio illius formae artificialis ad continentiam divinitatis, illa quidem potius est deordinatio quam aliqua positio; et haec quidem a Deo non est, sed a defectu cognitionis et fidei. Cum ergo dicitur, quod forma idoli in tali materia non sit a Deo, non negatur compositio huius formae cum hac materia absolute esse a Deo; sed hoc negatur, quod non est a Deo ad id, propter quod homo illam effigiem efficit. — Et sic patet, pro quanto dicitur idolum nihil esse, scilicet pro eo, quod est nomen impositum a fictione, cui subest falsitas. Patet etiam, quod idolum quantum ad aliquid, quod nominat, sit a Deo, et quantum ad aliquid, non, quoniam10 quidquid est positionis ibi, a Deo est; illud autem quod est privationis vel defectionis non est a Deo, sed a defectu nostro.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus componit aliqua, quae sunt incompossibilia11 componi; dicendum, quod talia impossibilia sunt componi propter inseparabilitatem deordinationis. Nunquam enim potest nec esse nec intelligi aliquid simul et semel sub duobus oppositis, quin intelligatur confusio et inordinatio. Et quoniam in actione Dei, quam Deus per se agit ut tota causa, non potest esse defectus ordinis, quia si esset, iam potentia eius in operando deficeret; hinc est, quod talia a Deo non possunt componi. Sed cum Deus cooperatur intellectui potenti deficere, sic potest esse, quod illud quod est ibi positionis, sit a virtute Dei; quod vero est privationis, sit a defectu intellectus creati. Ideo ratio illa non valet, quodsi non potest Deus per se illam compositionem facere, quod non possit in faciendo alii cooperari12.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de his quae non possunt componi sine monstruositate; iam patet responsio; quoniam, cum dico compositionem monstruosam, duo dico: et dico compositionem, et dico ulterius annexam deformitatem13. Et compositio quidem est a Deo, deformitas autem monstruositatis est a defectu et errore naturae, quae venit ex improportione virtutis ad materiam, supra quam agit, sive pro eo, quod materia superabundat, sive pro eo, quod deficit; et utrobique est defectus debitae proportionis.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaedam est compositio, quae non potest esse nec intelligi praeter inordinationem, utpote si pes poneretur in pectore, si homo coiret cum iumento; dicendum est, quod etsi unum necessario consequatur ad aliud, et intellectus unius inseparabiliter consequatur ex intellectu alterius; nihilominus tamen diversitatem habent, quia unum dicit privationem, et aliud dicit positionem; et ideo potest unum Deo attribui, quamvis alterum non attribuatur14.

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English Translation
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QUESTION III.

Whether every composition is from God.

Thirdly it is asked, whether every composition is from God. And that it is, it seems.

1. Wherever there is any composition, there is some action of a composer1; but every action is from God: therefore every composition is from God.

2. Likewise, just as it belongs to potency and power to distinguish and separate, so it belongs to potency and power to unite and compose things; but everything that belongs to potency is from the omnipotence of the Creator: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, wherever there is composition, there is some union; and wherever there is union, there is some unity; but every unity is from the first unity2; but the first and highest unity is God: therefore every composition is from God.

4. Likewise, Augustine On True Religion3: « Every thing has these three, namely that it be some one thing, and be discerned by its proper species, and not exceed the order of things »; but, as Augustine says in the eleventh [book] On the City of God, « from him is every mode, and every species, and every order, without which nothing can exist or be conceived »: therefore if every composite and every composition in some manner exists, it seems therefore that every composition is from God.

On the contrary:

1. Upon that text of the first [letter] to the Corinthians, eighth [chapter]4: We know that an idol is nothing; the Gloss: « The matter of the idol God formed, but the foolishness of men gave it form ». And after: « Whatever things are in creatures, were made through the Word; but the form of the man in the idol was not made through the Word, just as sin was not made through the Word »: it seems therefore that the composition of such a form with such matter is not from God.

2. Likewise, there are certain things which are impossible to be conjoined, not only by nature, but even by God, such as that something be at once and at the same time white and black, but our imaginative intellect frequently composes such things; but the composition of none of them is from God, except of those which are composable by God: if therefore opposites are not composable by God and are composed by the intellect; it seems that not every composition is from God.

3. Likewise, there are certain things which cannot be conjoined in the same [subject] without monstrousness, such as two heads in the same body; and such a composition cannot be from nature except with error and beside intention5: if therefore God errs in no composition nor makes [anything] to err, it seems that the composition of such things is in no way from God.

4. Likewise, there are some things which it is impossible to conjoin without disordering, as for instance if a human were mingled6 with a brute, or conversely: if therefore such a composition is nothing other than a disordering of the composables — for by this very fact they are disordered, that they are thus composed — and disordering is not from God; it seems that some composition is not from God.

Conclusion.

Every composition, insofar as it is composition, is from God.

I respond: It must be said that, since the name of composition is taken in three ways, in each of its acceptations it states something. For composition is called the action of a composer; composition is also called the passion of the composable; in a third way composition is called the disposition of the composed thing7. And since action as well as passion as well as also the disposition of the composed thing, insofar as it is composed, states something; and everything that states some positing is from God: it must be granted simply that every composition is from God, insofar as it is composition, just as also is every action and conservation.

Yet it must be attended to that, just as there are certain actions « which, the moment they are named, are conjoined with evil8 », such as lying and adultery; so there are certain compositions of certain things which some deformity and disorder inseparably accompanies. Whence just as an action which is inseparably conjoined to a defect of malice is said to be from God, yet in such a way that the defect of malice is not from God, but from a defect of the creature, namely of free

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will; so a composition, to which deformity and disorder is joined, is from God in such a way that that deformity or disordering, which is truly a defect, is from a defect of some created composing cause, or from a defect of the composables themselves. — The reasons therefore are to be granted which show that every composition is from God.

1. To that therefore which is first objected concerning the composition which is in an idol; it must be said that the idol, insofar as it is of this kind, names some artifact, containing in itself something of deity or divinity: and according to this, composition is there understood in two ways, namely [the composition] of the form of art to the matter, and of divinity to the artifact; and the first composition indeed is on the part of the thing, but the second is only according to the estimation of the idolater. As to the first composition the idol is something, but as to the second there is nothing in the world in reality, although something is estimated [to be there]. — I grant therefore that the conjunction of such a form with this matter, since it is really a being, is9 from God. It must nevertheless be granted that that estimation, insofar as it is an act of the soul, is from God; but the composition of divinity to that artifact, which is estimated to exist, is altogether nothing; and this is not from God, because there is no such composition in reality. Likewise the ordering of that artificial form to the containment of divinity, that indeed is rather a disordering than any positing; and this indeed is not from God, but from a defect of cognition and of faith. When therefore it is said that the form of the idol in such matter is not from God, it is not denied that the composition of this form with this matter is absolutely from God; but this is denied, that it is not from God with respect to that for which the human makes that effigy. — And thus it is plain in what sense the idol is said to be nothing, namely for the reason that it is a name imposed by a fiction, beneath which lies falsity. It is also plain that the idol, as to something which it names, is from God, and as to something, is not, since10 whatever is of positing there, is from God; but that which is of privation or of defection is not from God, but from our defect.

2. To that which is objected, that the intellect composes some things which are incomposable11 to be composed; it must be said that such things are impossible to be composed on account of the inseparability of the disordering. For never can anything be, nor be understood, at once and at the same time under two opposites, without confusion and disorder being understood. And since in the action of God, which God does of himself as the whole cause, there cannot be a defect of order — because if there were, his power in operating would now be deficient — hence it is that such things cannot be composed by God. But since God cooperates with an intellect able to fail, it can be so, that that which is there of positing, is from the power of God; but that which is of privation, is from a defect of the created intellect. Therefore that reasoning does not hold, [that] if God cannot of himself make that composition, [it follows] that he cannot cooperate with another in making it12.

3. To that which is objected concerning those things which cannot be composed without monstrousness; the response is already plain; since, when I say a monstrous composition, I say two things: I both say a composition, and I further say an attached deformity13. And the composition indeed is from God, but the deformity of the monstrousness is from a defect and error of nature, which comes from the disproportion of the power to the matter upon which it acts, either for the reason that the matter superabounds, or for the reason that it is deficient; and in both cases there is a defect of due proportion.

4. To that which is objected, that there is a certain composition which cannot exist nor be understood apart from disorder, as for instance if a foot were placed in the chest, [or] if a human were to couple with a beast; it must be said that, even if one necessarily follows upon the other, and the understanding of the one inseparably follows from the understanding of the other; nevertheless they have a diversity, because the one states a privation, and the other states a positing; and therefore the one can be attributed to God, although the other be not attributed14.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Richard. a S. Vict., V. de Trin. c. 4: Omnis compositio compositore eget et sine beneficio compositoris esse non valet. Cfr. Alanus ab Insulis, I. de Arte seu articulis cathol. fidei, n. 3. — Minor probata est supra q. I.
    Richard of St. Victor, V. On the Trinity c. 4: Every composition needs a composer and cannot exist without the benefit of a composer. Cfr. Alan of Lille, I. On the Art or the Articles of the Catholic Faith, n. 3. — The minor was proved above in q. I.
  2. Boeth., de Unitate et uno: Unitas est descendens a prima Unitate, quae creavit eam. Prima enim et una Unitas, quae est unitas sibi ipsi, creavit aliam unitatem, quae est infra eam. Cfr. August., de Vera Relig. c. 36. n. 66. et 11. de Morib. Manich. c. 6. n. 8., et Dionys. de Div. Nom. c. 1. § 1. et c. 13. § 2.
    Boethius, On Unity and the One: Unity is something descending from the first Unity, which created it. For the first and one Unity, which is unity to itself, created another unity, which is below it. Cfr. Augustine, On True Religion c. 36. n. 66. and 11. On the Morals of the Manichees c. 6. n. 8., and Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 1. § 1. and c. 13. § 2.
  3. Cap. 7. n. 13. Vide supra pag. 829, nota 4. — Seq. textus est loc. cit. c. 1-5, ubi textus originalis sic: sine quibus nihil rerum inveniri vel cogitari potest.
    Chapter 7. n. 13. See above p. 829, note 4. — The following text is from the cited place, c. 1-5, where the original text [reads] thus: without which nothing of things can be found or conceived.
  4. Vers. 4. — Glossa, quae est ordinaria et secundum August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 1. n. 13, habetur apud Strabum et Lyranum. In secunda propositione Glossae post creaturis Vat. nec non codd. F T et alii adiiciunt facta.
    Verse 4. — The Gloss, which is the ordinary [Gloss] and is according to Augustine, in [his commentary] on the Gospel of John, tractate 1. n. 13, is found in Strabus and in Lyranus. In the second clause of the Gloss, after creaturis ("in creatures") the Vatican [edition] as well as codd. F T and others add facta ("made").
  5. Vide supra pag. 808, nota 4. — In fine arg. pro sit edd., excepta 1, substituunt possit esse.
    See above p. 808, note 4. — At the end of the argument, for sit ("be") the editions, except 1, substitute possit esse ("can be").
  6. Edd. praeter 1 cum nonnullis codd. commisceretur.
    The editions besides 1, with several codices, [read] commisceretur.
  7. Ut cum dicitur: haec res est facilis, vel difficilis ad dissolvendum etc.
    As when it is said: this thing is easy, or difficult, to dissolve etc.
  8. Secundum Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 6. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 32, nota 6. — In propos. seq. post quemadmodum actio non pauci codd., ut C F H L S (T a prima manu) etc., cum edd. 1, 2 omittunt quae; mendose, nisi etiam pariter omittitur est post coniuncta, quae lectio sic moderata habetur in codd. bb et T (a secunda manu). Subinde codd. V X sive inordinatio pro et inordinatio.
    According to Aristotle, II. Ethics c. 6. Cfr. tom. I. p. 32, note 6. — In the following clause, after quemadmodum actio not a few codices, such as C F H L S (T by a first hand) etc., with edd. 1, 2 omit quae; mistakenly, unless est after coniuncta is likewise omitted, which reading thus moderated is found in codd. bb and T (by a second hand). Then codd. V X [read] sive inordinatio ("or disorder") for et inordinatio ("and disorder").
  9. Vat. expunxit hoc secundum quod.
    The Vatican [edition] struck out this secundum quod ("insofar as").
  10. Edd., excepta 1, cum nonnullis codd. Unde.
    The editions, except 1, with several codices, [read] Unde ("Whence").
  11. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 nec non codd. F ee et pauci alii impossibilia; econtra cod. bb etiam infra incompossibilia.
    The Vatican [edition] with edd. 3, 4 as well as codd. F ee and a few others [read] impossibilia; on the contrary cod. bb [reads] also below incompossibilia.
  12. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 41. a. 2. q. 1.
    Cfr. I. Sent. d. 41. a. 2. q. 1.
  13. Pro annexam deformitatem, quam lectionem in codd. A E K L M Q W X Y bb et aliis invenimus, codd. H U monstruositatis deformitatem, cod. D luxuriam et deformitatem, codd. C S T luxuriam deformitatem (!), cod. ee luxuriam deformantem, edd. praeter 1 luxuriam deordinantem, ed. 1 deformitatem tantum. Paulo inferius pro quae venit (scil. deformitas) Vat. qui venit. Cfr. Aristot., IV. de Generat. animal. c. 4.
    For annexam deformitatem ("attached deformity"), which reading we find in codd. A E K L M Q W X Y bb and others, codd. H U [read] monstruositatis deformitatem, cod. D luxuriam et deformitatem, codd. C S T luxuriam deformitatem (!), cod. ee luxuriam deformantem, the editions besides 1 luxuriam deordinantem, ed. 1 deformitatem only. A little below, for quae venit (namely the deformity) the Vatican [edition reads] qui venit. Cfr. Aristotle, IV. On the Generation of Animals c. 4.
  14. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion to the preceding question.
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