Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`La.`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`En.`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., Cod. T, Vat., ed. 1).

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit Augustinus: Nec aliter scilicet creata quam creanda. Videtur enim male dicere, quia res, si vere cognoscatur, cognoscitur sicut est; sed aliter fuerunt, cum fuerunt creanda, quam cum erant creata — primo enim res fuerunt in causa et secundum quid, postea in proprio genere et simpliciter — ergo aut Deus non vere cognoscit, aut aliter cognovit.

Item, Angelus cognoscit res in Verbo, cognoscit etiam eas in proprio genere, et alius et alius modus cognoscendi est hic ab illo¹: ergo cum non possit latere Deum quod novit Angelus, videtur, quod Deus utroque modo cognoscat, et ita aliter et aliter.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dico, aliter cognosci, dupliciter potest intelligi: aut ita quod adverbium dicat alietatem quantum ad cognitionem, aut quantum ad esse rei cognitae. Si quantum ad esse rei cognitae, sic est verum², et est sensus: Deus cognoscit rem istam aliter se vel se habere, quam se prius habuit; et sic non intelligit Augustinus. Si autem dicat alietatem quantum ad cognitionem, sic est falsa; et est sensus: Deus cognoscit aliter rem factam, quam prius faciendam cognoverit; et ita est falsum, quia sic significatur divina cognitio alterata, et quod aliquid receperit a re extra. Et per hoc patet obiectum primum.

Quod obiicitur, quod Deus cognoscit res in proprio genere, sicut Angelus; dicendum, quod cognoscere res in proprio genere dupliciter intelligitur: aut ita quod hoc dicat, quod habet in proprio genere, cognoscatur, et hoc perfectionis est, et non latet Deum, et sic non dicit novum modum cognoscendi a cognitione in Verbo; aut ita quod aspectus intelligentiae sive vis cognitivae deflectatur³ supra

rem ut est in proprio genere, et hoc est imperfectionis, quia scilicet tunc⁴ cognoscens egreditur extra se; et hoc nullo modo potest poni in Deo, et ita facit in Angelo alium modum cognoscendi. Et sic patet illud.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Tunc eius quod aeternum est, aliqua existeret causa etc. Vult enim dicere, quod praescientia dicat quid aeternum; sed hoc videtur falsum, quia praescientia dicit respectum ad creaturam futuram; sed nihil est futurum secundum esse, quod habet in Deo, sed in proprio genere: ergo connotat aliquod temporale, ergo videtur, quod cognoscatur⁵ ex tempore. — Praeterea, respectus ille nihil dicit a parte Dei nisi solum modum intelligendi nostrum: ergo tunc coepit ille respectus, quando coepit noster intellectus, non ergo fuit ab aeterno.

Respondeo: Sicut dicit Magister⁶, praescientia dicit quid aeternum et ab aeterno. Cum enim non importet nisi duo, scilicet antecessionem et scientiam, et antecessio omnis creaturae sit ante omnem creaturam, et scientia naturaliter, patet quod praescientia quid aeternum dicit⁷. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod importat rei futuritionem; dicendum, quod futuritio uno modo importat successionem temporis, et ita non est de ratione praescientiae; hoc enim modo futurum coepit cum tempore. Alio modo futurum importat ordinem temporalis ad aeternum secundum consecutionem, sicut praescientia antecessionem; et quoniam iste ordo solum exigit primum extremum in actu, et illud fuit ab aeterno, ideo et futuritio et praescientia.

Quod obiicitur, quod respectus ille a parte Dei nihil dicit secundum rem; dicendum, quod falsum est, quia respectus ille est divina essentia; sed verum est, quod nihil dicit respectivum sive dependens, nisi solum secundum modum intelligendi; et ideo non coepit secundum rem, sed solum modus significandi coepit. Et quando Magister dicit, quod praescientia dicit aeternum, non loquitur de ratione nominandi, sed de eo quod significatur per nomen⁸.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Scientiam vel praescientiam non esse causam etc., si scientiam ad notitiam tantum referamus. Si vero nomine scientiae includitur beneplacitum atque dispositio, recte potest dici. Videtur enim male dicere, quia aut scientia, hoc modo et illo dicta, dicit eundem modum sciendi, aut alium; si eundem, ergo si uno modo est causa, et alio; si alium modum, ergo in Deo est multiplex modus sciendi, non ergo uniformis per omnia. — Item, scientia simplicis notitiae est Deus; et Deus est causa omnium: ergo scientia illa est causa omnium.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in nobis notitia simplex et notitia beneplaciti dicunt diversas cognitiones et diversos modos cognoscendi, et per consequens connotant diversa: in Deo autem una tantum cognitio est, sed illa una facit Deus, quod nos multis; et ideo illa una dupliciter potest significari⁹. Et cum significatur per modum approbationis, connotat effectum et bonitatem; quando vero per modum simplicis notitiae, solum eventum. Et quoniam esse causam alicuius connotat effectum sive respectum — quamvis eadem sit scientia sive sapientia a parte principalis significati¹⁰ — ideo dicitur, quod haec¹¹ est causa illorum quae praescit, et illa non. Et hoc dicitur, non quia res significata non sit causa, sed quia, ut sic significata est, non significatur per modum causae, quoniam comparatur ad ea quae nullo modo sunt a Deo. Et sic patet illud.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc verbo Augustini: Deus per Prophetam praedixit infidelitatem Iudaeorum; quia, cum dictum Prophetae fuerit verum certitudinaliter¹², videtur, quod Deus revelaverit Iudaeis suum casum sive damnationem; quod est contra ipsum super Genesim ad litteram¹³, qui dicit, quod nulli debet revelari, ne cogatur desperare.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod casus potest prae-

dici; sed non propter hoc revelatur, sive quia dicenti non creditur, sive quia dictum de conditione intelligitur, sive intelligens intelligit de alio, non de se ipso. Et quia verbum Isaiae prophetae comminatorie et generaliter erat dictum, et hominibus iam in parte incredulis non advertentibus, omnibus his modis potuit intelligi, ut esset praedictio, non revelatio.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what Augustine says: Not otherwise [did He know things] as already created than as about to be created. For he seems to speak ill, because a thing, if it is truly known, is known as it is; but [things] were otherwise when they were about to be created than when they were created — for first the things were in [their] cause and secundum quid, [and] afterwards in [their] proper genus and simply — therefore either God does not truly know, or He has known otherwise.

Likewise, an Angel knows things in the Word, and also knows them in [their] proper genus, and there is one mode of knowing here, [and] another there¹: therefore since what an Angel knows cannot lie hidden from God, it seems that God [too] knows in both modes, and so [knows things] otherwise and otherwise.

I respond: It must be said that when I say to be otherwise known, it can be understood in two ways: either so that the adverb states an otherness with respect to the cognition, or [an otherness] with respect to the being of the thing known. If [it is taken] with respect to the being of the thing known, thus it is true², and the sense is: God knows that this thing is otherwise, or holds itself otherwise, than it has held itself before; and thus Augustine does not [intend it]. But if it states an otherness with respect to the cognition, thus it is false; and the sense is: God knows a thing once made otherwise than as He had previously known it as needing to be made; and this is false, because thus the divine cognition is signified as altered, and as having received something from a thing outside. And by this the first objection is plain.

What is objected, that God knows things in their proper genus, as the Angel does; it must be said that to know things in their proper genus is understood in two ways: either so that this says that what is in the proper genus, is known [in that genus], and this is of perfection, and does not lie hidden from God, and thus [it] does not state a new mode of knowing [different] from the cognition in the Word; or so that the gaze of the intelligence or cognitive power is bent³ over

a thing as it is in its proper genus, and this is of imperfection, namely because then⁴ the knower goes outside himself; and this can in no way be put in God, and so it makes another mode of knowing in the Angel. And so that is plain.

DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: Then of that which is eternal, some cause would have to exist etc. For he wishes to say that praescientia (foreknowledge) says something eternal; but this seems false, because foreknowledge says a respect to a future creature; but nothing is future according to the being which it has in God, but [only] in its proper genus: therefore it connotes something temporal, therefore it seems that it is known⁵ from time. — Furthermore, that respect says nothing on the side of God except only our mode of understanding: therefore that respect began when our intellect began, therefore it was not from eternity.

I respond: As the Master says⁶, praescientia says something eternal and from eternity. For since it imports nothing but two things, namely antecession and knowledge, and the antecession of every creature is before every creature, and knowledge naturally [is so], it is plain that praescientia says something eternal⁷. — As to what is objected, that it imports the futurition of a thing; it must be said that futurition in one way imports a succession of time, and so it is not of the account of foreknowledge; for in this way the future began with time. In another way the future imports an order of the temporal to the eternal according to consecution, just as foreknowledge [imports] antecession; and since this order requires only the first extreme in act, and that was from eternity, therefore both futurition and praescientia [are from eternity].

As to what is objected, that that respect on the side of God says nothing according to the thing; it must be said that this is false, because that respect is the divine essence; but it is true that it says nothing relative or dependent except only according to the mode of understanding; and therefore it did not begin according to the thing, but only the mode of signifying began. And when the Master says that praescientia says something eternal, he is not speaking of the account of naming, but of that which is signified through the name⁸.

DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: That science or foreknowledge is not a cause etc., if we refer science to bare cognition. But if under the name of science there is included [divine] good-pleasure and disposition, it can rightly be said. For he seems to speak ill, because either science, said in this way and in that, says the same mode of knowing, or another; if the same, then if [it is a cause] in one way, [it is so] in the other; if another mode, then in God there is a manifold mode of knowing, therefore not uniform through all things. — Likewise, the science of simplex notitia (simple cognition) is God; and God is the cause of all things: therefore that science is the cause of all things.

I respond: It must be said that in us simple cognition and the cognition of [divine] good-pleasure say diverse cognitions and diverse modes of knowing, and consequently they connote diverse things: but in God there is one cognition only, but that one God makes [to do] what we [do] with many; and therefore that one [cognition] can be signified in two ways⁹. And when it is signified by way of approbation, it connotes the effect and the goodness; but when by way of simplex notitia, only the event. And since to be the cause of something connotes an effect or respect — although on the side of the principal signified¹⁰ the science or wisdom is the same — therefore it is said that this one¹¹ is the cause of those things which it foreknows, and that [other] is not. And this is said, not because the thing signified is not the cause, but because, as so signified, it is not signified by way of cause, since it is compared to those things which are in no way from God. And so that is plain.

DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning this saying of Augustine: God through the Prophet foretold the unbelief of the Jews; because, since the saying of the Prophet was certainly¹² true, it seems that God revealed to the Jews their fall or damnation; which is against [Augustine] himself in On Genesis to the Letter¹³, who says that [it] ought to be revealed to no one, lest he be driven to despair.

I respond: It must be said that a fall can be fore-

told; but not on this account is it revealed, either because the speaker is not believed, or because the saying is understood of a [conditional] condition, or [because] the one understanding understands [it] of another, not of himself. And since the word of Isaiah the Prophet was uttered minatorily and generally, and to men in part already unbelieving and not heeding, it could be understood in all these ways, so as to be a prediction, not a revelation.

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