Bonaventure

Articulus II. De praedestinatione quantum ad necessitatem.

Secundo quantum ad hunc primum articulum quaeritur de necessitate praedestinationis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum inferat necessitatem salutis libero arbitrio. Secundo, utrum inferat certitudinem in eventu.

Quaestio I.

Utrum praedestinatio inferat salutis necessitatem.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Quod autem inferat necessitatem, ostenditur sic.

1. Omnis causa, quae necessaria est in se et necessario ponit effectum, infert simpliciter necessitatem effectui; sed praedestinatio respectu salutis est huiusmodi: ergo etc. Minor patet. Praedestinatio enim, cum sit Deus in se, dicit quid necessarium; et iterum, necessario infert effectum, quia necessario sequitur: si est praedestinatus, salvabitur: ergo etc.

2. Item, omnis causa, quae nullo modo potest cassari, necessitatem ponit circa productionem effectus — nam causa dicitur cassari, cum nullum ponit effectum — sed praedestinatio nullo modo potest cassari: ergo praedestinatio ponit necessitatem.

3. Item, quotiescumque duae causae concurrunt ad aliquem effectum, quas impossibile est discordare, si una est immutabilis, necesse est, alteram esse immutabilem, et effectum per consequens. Haec manifesta est per se: nam si altera est mutabilis, reliqua existente immutabili, possibile est, eas discordare. Sed impossibile est, quod praedestinatio et liberum arbitrium discordent: ergo cum praedestinatio sit causa immutabilis, necesse est, quod liberum arbitrium sit immutabile; et si hoc, cum totum sit immutabile, restat ergo, quod necessitatem imponat praedestinatio libero arbitrio et saluti.

4. Item, videtur, quod praedestinatus nullo modo possit damnari, et si hoc, tunc necessario salvatur; et ostenditur hac ratione: ista duo convertuntur esse praescitum et damnari, esse praedestinatum et salvari; sed praedestinatus non potest esse praescitus: ergo non potest damnari. Probatio mediae. Quando aliqua duo sic se habent quod impossibile est, unum alteri succedere, nec possunt simul inesse, si alterum inest, impossibile est, reliquum inesse; sed esse praedestinatum et esse praescitum sic se habent, quod impossibile est, simul inesse eidem; impossibile est etiam, alterum alteri succedere, scilicet quod homo primo sit praedestinatus et postea praescitus: ergo cum est praedestinatus, nullo modo potest esse praescitus: ergo etc.

5. Item, de omni quod aeternum est, cum non est, impossibile est esse, quia impossibile est, quod non ens sit aeternum; sed praescitus si est, aeternaliter est praescitus: ergo illum qui non est praescitus, impossibile est esse praescitum. Sed praedestinatus non est praescitus: ergo etc.

6. Item, de eo quod non est, idem est dicere, hoc posse esse, et posse[^1] incipere esse; sed praescitum est quid non ens respectu praedestinati: ergo idem est dicere, praedestinatum posse esse praescitum, quod posse incipere praesciri sive damnari. Sed non potest incipere esse praescitus, ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Praedestinatio divina nullum facit indigne salvari: ergo cum dignitas in salvando respiciat meritum, et meritum liberum arbitrium, ergo praedestinatio non tollit arbitrii libertatem, secundum quod liberum arbitrium: ergo nec imponit necessitatem.

2. Item, praedestinatio nihil aufert libero arbitrio, sed tantum ponit in eo gratiam; sed gratia nullam infert libero arbitrio necessitatem, ergo nec praedestinatio: si nullam ei imponit necessitatem², ergo cum salus pendeat ex libero arbitrio, patet etc.

3. Item, si praedestinatio imponit necessitatem, ergo cum, omni casu contingente, necesse sit, eum qui praedestinatus est, salvari, ergo frustra laborat aliquis benefacere; quia, sive faciat bonum sive malum, necesse est, eum salvari.

4. Item, nullus laudatur in eo quod necessitatis est, neque vituperatur³: si ergo necesse est, praedestinatum salvari et praescitum damnari, neque praedestinatus laudandus est, si salvatur, neque praescitus vituperandus, si damnatur; quod est contra statum gloriae et poenae.

Conclusio.

Praedestinatio nec ratione causalitatis nec ratione praescientiae infert necessitatem sive respectu salutis sive respectu liberi arbitrii.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedestinatio nec infert necessitatem saluti, nec infert necessitatem libero arbitrio, quoniam praedestinatio non est causa salutis nisi includendo merita, et ita salvando liberum arbitrium.

Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod praedestinatio duo importat: et rationem praescientiae et rationem causae. In quantum dicit rationem causae, non necessario ponit effectum, quia non est causa per necessitatem, sed per voluntatem: et iterum, non est tota causa, sed cum alia causa contingente, scilicet cum libero arbitrio. Et regula est, quod quotiescumque effectus pendet ex causa necessaria et variabili — a necessaria tanquam ab universali, a variabili tanquam a particulari — denominatur a variabili, quia denominatio est a causa particulari⁴; et effectus, qui dependet a causa contingente, est contingens. — Praeter rationem causae importat⁵ rationem praescientiae; et praescientia quidem totum includit in cognitione, quia liberum arbitrium et eius cooperationem et vertibilitatem, et totum. Et praeterea, non est nisi veri, et etiam de vero contingente est infallibilis, sicut supra monstratum est in quaestione de praescientia⁶. Ideo praedestinatio infert salutem et non potest cassari nec discordare a libero arbitrio. Et quia praescientia nullam imponit necessitatem consequentis, sed solum consequentiae, similiter nec praedestinatio.

Ad 1, 2, 3. Ex hoc patent tria prima obiecta de necessitate inferendi, impossibilitate cassandi, impossibilitate discordandi. Haec enim omnia dicunt necessitatem consequentiae solum, quia insunt praedestinationi non per rationem causalitatis, sed praecognitionis, quae est concors, certa et infallibilis. Concors, quia praescientia sive praecognitio⁷ vera: qui enim cognoscit vere cognoscit, rem praesentem esse, sicut est, et futuram ita evenire, sicut eveniet. Est enim veritas adaequatio rei et intellectus⁸. Est iterum certa, quia independens, quia nullo modo pendet ex praecognito. Non enim secundum eius exigentiam cognoscit, sed secundum exigentiam luminis et claritatis aeternae, in qua nulla cadit dubietas, sed certitudo summa; et ideo de omnibus aequaliter certa est. Est iterum infallibilis, quoniam est totum posse praesciti circumplectens; et ideo in nullo potest falli nec circumveniri. — Et est exemplum Boethii in libro de Consolatione quinto⁹, quodsi aliquis aspiceret de loco p. 708eminenti circumiacentem regionem, ubi est multitudo viarum, omnes simul et uno aspectu videret, ambulans per locum illum¹⁰, quamvis possit per diversas vias ire, non tamen posset visum eius latere, pro eo quod per nullam viam posset ire, quam ille non videret. Si ergo intelligatur unus esse visus¹¹, qui posset omnes vias praevidere et totum posse euntis, nullo modo quis eum praevenientem circumvenire posset. Et talis est aspectus divinae praescientiae, quia ab aeterno cognovit omne quod poteramus cogitare vel velle; et simul cum hoc vidit, in quam partem nostra voluntas et operatio inclinaretur. Et quia totum posse et velle et agere complectitur, ideo non potest falli. Et quia praedestinatio claudit praescientiam, hinc est, quod concordat cum libero arbitrio, et non potest discordare et non potest cassari; et necessario infert salutem, sed non necessario efficit¹².

Ad 4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum praedestinatus possit damnari; dicendum, quod sic, sine distinctione, quia quamvis haec possit distingui de re, vel dicto¹³: praedestinatum damnari est possibile, sicut haec: album possibile est esse nigrum; haec tamen non est distinguenda secundum artem: praedestinatus potest damnari, sicut nec haec: homo albus potest esse niger. Non enim potest esse de dicto, cum non sit dictum.

Propter quod intelligendum, quod ista habet¹⁴ tres causas veritatis: praedestinatus potest damnari, sicut haec: praedestinatus potest esse praescitus: aut quia forma praedicati potest inesse subiecto cum forma implicata, vel post formam implicatam, vel sine forma implicata. Quocumque enim modo praedicatum possit inesse, iudicanda est locutio simpliciter vera; et dico, quod in tertio sensu locutio est vera¹⁵: praedestinatus potest esse praescitus. Praedestinatus enim potest non esse praedestinatus, et necesse est, omnem hominem esse praedestinatum, vel praescitum; et ideo sequitur, quod possit esse praescitus. Et hoc quidem necessarium est poni. Nam fides dicit et ratio, quod sequitur: si est praedestinatus, salvabitur. Rursus, fides dicit et ratio, quod illum salvari est contingens; et qui diceret contrarium et assereret, respuendus esset, secundum omnium iudicium certum. Et iterum, ars dicit, quod si consequens est contingens, impossibile est, antecedens esse necessarium, et hoc supra probatum est per tres regulas¹⁶; et qui diceret huius contrarium, totam artem syllogisticam destrueret, cuius virtus illationis est, ut oppositum consequentis non possit stare cum antecedente. Certum est autem, quod oppositum contingentis stat cum necessario¹⁷. Istum ergo esse praedestinatum non est necessarium. Et est necessarium, vel contingens, vel impossibile; et non est impossibile nec necessarium: ergo est contingens; et contingens potest non esse: ergo iste qui est praedestinatus potest non esse praedestinatus.

Et hoc quidem credo quod necesse sit poni, hoc tamen difficile est intelligi. Potest tamen sic capi, si praesupponamus quatuor vera. Primum est, quod praesens divinae aeternitatis circumplectitur omne tempus, idem et uniforme; et hoc dicit Anselmus in libro de Concordia praescientiae et liberi arbitrii¹⁸, quod « sicut praesens tempus circumplectitur omnem locum, et omne quod in loco est, ita praesens aeternitatis omne tempus ». Et hoc necessarium est poni, quamvis non possimus hoc plene intelligere. Videmus enim eius oppositum esse falsum et impossibile: quia si hoc non esset, tunc mutaretur praesens divinae aeternitatis. — Secundum est illud, quod Deus uno et eodem cognoscit omnia, ita quod est unica Dei cognitio, qua cognoscit hoc et qua cognoscit eius oppositum. Et hoc supra¹⁹ probatum est auctoritate et ratione, non solum quantum ad illud per quod cognoscitur, sed etiam quantum ad actum divinae cognitionis. — Tertium est, quod cum dicimus, divinam cognitionem vel voluntatem ordinari ad hoc cognoscibile et ad aliud, non ponitur ordo vel respectus in Deo actu, sed solum ex parte rei creatae vel cognitae; et ille quidem, sicut praevisum est²⁰, non ponitur in actu, sed in habitu, nec de praesenti sed de futuro. — Quartum est, quod futurum sub p. 709ratione futuri, quod ponitur semel esse verum, ponitur semper fuisse verum, et quod ponitur semel esse falsum, ponitur semper fuisse falsum; et ideo cum ponitur posse esse, non ponitur nec mutari nec incipere²¹.

His praesuppositis facile est intelligere, quod praedestinatus potest esse praescitus, et quod Deus quem praescivit potuit praedestinasse. Constans enim est, quod salus istius qui praescitus est, potuit ab aeterno praevideri, cum possit esse sive fieri in tempore; et si potuit ab aeterno ordinari ad divinam cognitionem et voluntatem, potest et nunc. Etenim quia praesens totum est, et nihil transiit in praeteritum, et nihil factum est, quod sit necessarium esse factum; hinc est, quod sicut potest cogitari, vere posse²² et non praedestinasse ab aeterno, ita etiam, quod possit nunc, in suo scilicet nunc aeternitatis, non praedestinasse. Et hoc dicit Magister in littera. Actus tamen aeternus divinae cognitionis non potest cogitari non fuisse, sed ad hoc futurum contingens ordinatum non esse²³; et si hoc ponitur, non ponitur aliqua mutatio in aeterno praesenti, quia nulla ponitur successio; nec ponitur mutatio in cognitione, quia non ponitur in Deo alia cognitio nec in ordine ex parte cognoscentis, quia non ponitur in Deo alius ordo, nec in ordine ex parte cogniti, quia ex parte illa non ponitur nisi futurum: et illud, cum non est, potest intelligi esse, et potest esse futurum sine mutatione²⁴.

Et hoc totum clarius aperitur, si veniamus ad significationem horum vocabulorum praescitus et praedestinatus. Praedestinatus enim et praescitus duo sunt vocabula, et quantum ad principale significatum important divinam essentiam, quantum ad connotatum important futura contingentia. Quantum ergo ad principale significatum idem sunt; quantum vero ad connotatum, quia sunt contingentia, quae non de necessitate insunt, potest unum esse alterum²⁵. Quia vero connotata non tantum sunt contingentia, sed etiam de futuro, quae nihil ponunt actu, possunt non inesse et inesse sine mutatione. Cum enim ponuntur inesse vera de futuro, ponuntur semper fuisse, et cum ponuntur non esse ponuntur nunquam fuisse, sicut patet; et Anselmus²⁶ dicit, si dicatur, aliquid esse futurum de contingenti, constat quod possibile est, non esse futurum; et si futurum est, semper verum fuit, ipsum esse futurum. Et ideo haec est vera sine mutatione et sine inceptione: praedestinatus potest esse praescitus. Nulla enim repugnantia est nec ex parte significati nec ex parte connotati, et hoc patet, si resolvantur²⁷. Sensus enim est: iste est praedestinatus, id est, iste est a Deo praecognitus et salvabitur per Dei gratiam. Similiter: iste est praescitus, sensus est: iste est praecognitus et damnabitur per suam culpam. Constat enim, quod in divina cognitione non est differentia in se, sed solum in connotato. Cum ergo salvandus possit damnari, praedestinatus potest esse praescitus sine aliqua mutatione.

Ad 5, 6. Ex hoc patent alia tria obiecta: nam primum et ultimum intelligitur in formis, quae aliquid ponunt actu circa subiectum; secundum vero de eo quod est ita aeternum, quod nihil temporale connotat. Talia autem non sunt esse praescitum et esse praedestinatum²⁸. Et sic patent omnia.

Article II. On predestination as regards necessity.

Secondly, with respect to this first article, inquiry is made concerning the necessity of predestination. And about this two things are asked. First it is asked whether it imposes the necessity of salvation on free choice. Secondly, whether it imposes certainty in the outcome.

Question I.

Whether predestination imposes the necessity of salvation.

That it does impose necessity is shown thus.

1. Every cause which is necessary in itself and necessarily posits its effect imposes necessity simply on the effect; but predestination with respect to salvation is of this kind: therefore etc. The minor is plain. For predestination, since it is God in himself, denotes something necessary; and again, it necessarily imposes its effect, since it necessarily follows: if he is predestined, he will be saved: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every cause which can in no way be voided posits necessity in the production of its effect — for a cause is said to be voided when it posits no effect — but predestination can in no way be voided: therefore predestination posits necessity.

3. Likewise, whenever two causes concur to some effect, which it is impossible for them to be at variance, if one is immutable, it is necessary that the other be immutable, and the effect consequently. This is plain in itself: for if the other be mutable, while the remaining one is immutable, it is possible for them to be at variance. But it is impossible that predestination and free choice be at variance: therefore since predestination is an immutable cause, it is necessary that free choice be immutable; and if this, since the whole is immutable, it remains then that predestination imposes necessity on free choice and on salvation.

4. Likewise, it appears that the predestined can in no way be damned, and if this, then he is necessarily saved; and it is shown by this reasoning: these two are convertible, to be foreknown and to be damned, to be predestined and to be saved; but the predestined cannot be foreknown: therefore he cannot be damned. Proof of the middle. When any two are so related that it is impossible for one to succeed the other, nor can they inhere together, if one inheres, it is impossible for the remaining one to inhere; but to be predestined and to be foreknown are so related, that it is impossible for them to inhere together in the same; it is impossible also for one to succeed the other, namely that a man should first be predestined and afterwards foreknown: therefore since he is predestined, he can in no way be foreknown: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, of every thing which is eternal, when it is not, it is impossible that it be, since it is impossible that what is not be eternal; but if a man is foreknown, he is eternally foreknown: therefore him who is not foreknown, it is impossible to be foreknown. But the predestined is not foreknown: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, of that which is not, it is the same to say, that this can be, and that it can[^1] begin to be; but foreknown is something not-being with respect to the predestined: therefore it is the same to say, the predestined can be foreknown, as he can begin to be foreknown or damned. But he cannot begin to be foreknown, therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. The divine predestination causes no one to be saved unworthily: therefore since dignity in being saved looks to merit, and merit to free choice, therefore predestination does not take away the freedom of choice, in respect of which it is free choice: therefore neither does it impose necessity.

2. Likewise, predestination takes nothing away from free choice, but only places grace in it; but grace imposes no necessity on free choice, neither therefore does predestination: if it imposes no necessity on it², then since salvation depends on free choice, it is plain etc.

3. Likewise, if predestination imposes necessity, then since, every contingent case being granted, it is necessary that he who is predestined be saved, therefore in vain does anyone labour to do well; since, whether he do good or ill, it is necessary that he be saved.

4. Likewise, no one is praised for that which is of necessity, nor blamed³: if therefore it is necessary that the predestined be saved and the foreknown be damned, then neither is the predestined to be praised, if he is saved, nor the foreknown to be blamed, if he is damned; which is contrary to the state of glory and of punishment.

Conclusion.

Predestination, neither by reason of causality nor by reason of foreknowledge, imposes necessity, whether with respect to salvation or with respect to free choice.

I respond: It must be said that predestination neither imposes necessity on salvation, nor imposes necessity on free choice, since predestination is not the cause of salvation save by including merits, and so by saving free choice.

For the understanding of the objections it is to be noted that predestination implies two things: both the character of foreknowledge and the character of cause. Insofar as it denotes the character of cause, it does not necessarily posit its effect, since it is not a cause by necessity, but by will: and again, it is not the whole cause, but together with another contingent cause, namely with free choice. And the rule is, that whenever an effect depends on a necessary and a variable cause — on the necessary as on a universal, on the variable as on a particular — it is denominated from the variable, since denomination is from the particular cause⁴; and the effect, which depends on a contingent cause, is contingent. — Besides the character of cause, it implies⁵ the character of foreknowledge; and foreknowledge indeed includes the whole within cognition, since it includes free choice and its cooperation and changeability, and the whole. And besides, it is not save of the true, and even of the contingent true it is infallible, as has been shown above in the question on foreknowledge⁶. Therefore predestination imposes salvation, and cannot be voided nor be at variance with free choice. And since foreknowledge imposes no necessity of the consequent, but only of the consequence, neither does predestination.

To 1, 2, 3. From this are plain the first three objections concerning the necessity of imposing, the impossibility of being voided, and the impossibility of being at variance. For all these speak of necessity of consequence only, since they belong to predestination not by reason of causality, but of pre-cognition, which is concordant, certain, and infallible. Concordant, because foreknowledge, or pre-cognition⁷, is true: for he who knows truly knows that the present thing is, just as it is, and that the future will so come about, just as it will come about. For truth is the adequation of thing and intellect⁸. It is again certain, because independent, since it depends in no way on the foreknown. For it does not know according to its requirement, but according to the requirement of the eternal light and clarity, in which there falls no doubt, but the highest certitude; and therefore it is equally certain about all things. It is again infallible, since it is wholly encompassing the posse of the foreknown; and therefore in nothing can it be deceived nor circumvented. — And there is the example of Boethius in book five of the Consolation⁹, that if someone should look from a p. 708lofty place at the surrounding region, where there is a multitude of paths, he would see them all together at one glance; one walking through that place¹⁰, although he can go by diverse paths, could nevertheless not escape his sight, for the reason that he could go by no path which that one would not see. If therefore one sight be understood¹¹, which could foresee all the paths and the whole posse of the goer, in no way could anyone forestalling him escape him. And such is the gaze of divine foreknowledge, since from eternity it knew everything that we could think or will; and at the same time with this it saw to which side our will and operation would be inclined. And since it embraces the whole posse and willing and acting, therefore it cannot be deceived. And since predestination encloses foreknowledge, hence it is, that it is concordant with free choice, and cannot be at variance and cannot be voided; and it necessarily imposes salvation, but does not necessarily effect it¹².

To 4. To that which is asked, whether the predestined can be damned; it must be said that he can, without distinction, since although this can be distinguished as to the thing or the dictum¹³: the predestined to be damned is possible, just as this: the white is possibly to be black; this however is not to be distinguished by the rules of art: the predestined can be damned, just as neither this: the white man can be black. For it cannot be of the dictum, since it is not a dictum.

On account of which it must be understood, that this proposition has¹⁴ three causes of truth: the predestined can be damned, just as this: the predestined can be foreknown: either because the form of the predicate can inhere in the subject with the form implied, or after the form implied, or without the form implied. For in whatever way the predicate can inhere, the locution is to be judged simply true; and I say, that in the third sense the locution is true¹⁵: the predestined can be foreknown. For the predestined can not be predestined, and it is necessary that every man be either predestined, or foreknown; and therefore it follows, that he can be foreknown. And this indeed is necessary to be posited. For faith says and reason that it follows: if he is predestined, he will be saved. Again, faith says and reason, that for him to be saved is contingent; and he who would say and assert the contrary, would have to be rejected, by the certain judgment of all. And again, art says, that if the consequent is contingent, it is impossible that the antecedent be necessary, and this has been proved above by three rules¹⁶; and he who would say the contrary of this, would destroy the whole syllogistic art, whose force of inference is, that the opposite of the consequent cannot stand with the antecedent. But it is certain, that the opposite of a contingent stands with the necessary¹⁷. Therefore that this man be predestined is not necessary. And it is necessary, or contingent, or impossible; and it is not impossible nor necessary: therefore it is contingent; and a contingent can not be: therefore this man who is predestined can not be predestined.

And this indeed I believe must be posited, this however is difficult to understand. It can however be grasped thus, if we presuppose four true things. The first is, that the present of the divine eternity embraces all time, the same and uniform; and this Anselm says in his book On the Concordance of foreknowledge and of free choice¹⁸, that « just as the present time embraces every place, and everything that is in place, so the present of eternity embraces all time ». And this is necessary to be posited, although we cannot fully understand this. For we see its opposite to be false and impossible: since if this were not so, then the present of the divine eternity would be changed. — The second is that, that God by one and the same knows all things, so that there is one cognition of God, by which he knows this and by which he knows its opposite. And this has been proved above¹⁹ by authority and by reason, not only as to that by which it is known, but also as to the act of divine cognition. — The third is, that when we say, that the divine cognition or will is ordered to this knowable and to that, no order or relation is posited in God in act, but only on the side of the created or known thing; and this indeed, as has been foreseen²⁰, is not posited in act, but in habit, nor as of the present but as of the future. — The fourth is, that the future under p. 709the character of the future, which is once posited as being true, is posited as having always been true, and that which is once posited as being false, is posited as having always been false; and therefore when it is posited as being able to be, it is posited neither to be changed nor to begin²¹.

These things being presupposed it is easy to understand, that the predestined can be foreknown, and that God could have predestined him whom he foreknew. For it is constant, that the salvation of him who is foreknown could from eternity have been foreseen, since it can be or come about in time; and if it could from eternity have been ordered to the divine cognition and will, it can also now. For since the present is whole, and nothing has passed into the past, and nothing has been done, that it is necessary to have been done; hence it is, that just as it can be thought, that he could truly²² also have not predestined from eternity, so also, that he could now, that is, in his now of eternity, not have predestined. And this the Master says in the letter. Yet the eternal act of the divine cognition cannot be thought not to have been, but rather that this contingent future was not ordered to it²³; and if this is posited, no change is posited in the eternal present, since no succession is posited; nor is a change posited in the cognition, since no other cognition is posited in God, nor in the order on the side of the knower, since no other order is posited in God, nor in the order on the side of the known, since on that side nothing is posited save the future: and that, when it is not, can be thought to be, and can be future without change²⁴.

And this whole is more clearly opened up, if we come to the signification of these words foreknown and predestined. For predestined and foreknown are two words, and as to the principal signification they import the divine essence, as to the connotation they import future contingents. As to the principal signification therefore they are the same; but as to the connotation, since they are contingents, which do not inhere of necessity, one can be the other²⁵. But since the connoted are not only contingents, but also of the future, which posit nothing in act, they can not inhere and can inhere without change. For when they are posited as inhering truly of the future, they are posited as having always been so, and when they are posited as not being, they are posited as never having been so, as is plain; and Anselm²⁶ says, if it be said that something is future contingently, it is established that it is possible that it be not future; and if it is future, it has always been true, that itself is future. And therefore this is true without change and without beginning: the predestined can be foreknown. For there is no repugnance either on the side of the signified or on the side of the connoted, and this is plain, if they be resolved²⁷. For the sense is: this man is predestined, that is, this man is foreknown by God and will be saved by God's grace. Likewise: this man is foreknown, the sense is: this man is foreknown and will be damned through his own fault. For it is established, that in the divine cognition there is no difference in itself, but only in what is connoted. Since therefore one to be saved can be damned, the predestined can be foreknown without any change.

To 5, 6. From this are plain the other three objections: for the first and the last are understood in forms which posit something in act around the subject; the second on the other hand of that which is so eternal, that it connotes nothing temporal. But such are not to be foreknown and to be predestined²⁸. And so all are plain.