Bonaventure

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit in littera: Creatoris voluntas necessitas est. Hoc enim necessario futurum est, quod vult et praescit. Quod si verum est, cum Deus velit omnia bona futura, nullum bonum futurum evenit contingenter: perit ergo libertas arbitrii. — Praeterea, falsum videtur dicere in hoc quod subiungit: Multa secundum inferiores causas futura sunt, sed in praescientia Dei futura non sunt; quod enim est futurum, erit; quod non est futurum in praescientia Dei, non erit: ergo simul idem erit et non erit.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod primum verbum intelligendum est de necessitate non consequentis, sed consequentiae¹, quia necessario ad velle Dei sequitur ipsum volitum esse vel futurum esse. Secundum autem verbum intelligendum est ita, quod per hoc participium futura significetur ordo effectus ad causas, non eventus, ut sit sensus: multa secundum inferiores causas futura sunt, id est ordinata fieri, quae tamen secundum veritatem vel praescientiam non sunt futura, quia non evenient.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod homo extra paradisum est creatus, postmodum in paradiso est positus. Cum enim paradisus esset locus habitationis, debitus homini secundum statum innocentiae, et locus congruus habitationi sit congruus² generationi et productioni; videtur, quod homo debuit produci in paradiso. — Item, cum tota terra tunc esset fructifera et aer tranquillus; videtur, quod tota erat congrua, ut inhabitaretur ab homine: ergo si homo extra paradisum productus est, videtur, quod extra paradisum ad habitandum debuit relinqui. — Item, si tota terra producta est propter hominem, ergo videtur, quod si homo stetisset, alia pars terrae a paradiso superflueret. — Propter hoc Quaestio connexa. est hic quaestio, quid vocetur hic paradisus, in quo homo est positus.

Respondeo: Ad quaest. connexam. Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, sicut dicit Magister³, tres fuerunt de paradiso sententiae.

Opinio 1. Quidam enim dixerunt, quod paradisus ille, in quo erat positus homo, erat locus corporalis, qui propter suam amoenitatem paradisus dicebatur, nec est alius paradisus nisi corporalis⁴.

Opinio 2. Alii vero attendentes, quod beatificatio hominis est in paradiso, quae consistit in Dei fruitione, non in corporali amoenitate, dixerunt, hunc paradisum non esse locum corporalem, sed spiritualem; et omnia illa quae dicuntur de paradiso in Genesi, dicta esse metaphorice. Unde homo in sui formatione dicitur positus fuisse in paradiso, non quia fuerit localiter mutatus, sed quia in spirituali amoenitate et deliciis ex Dei amore et cognitione et fruitione est positus. In huius autem sententiae assertionem adducunt illud quod dicitur de latrone, Lucae vigesimo tertio⁵: Hodie mecum eris in paradiso; p. 427 et illud quod dicitur de lucifero, Ezechielis vigesimo octavo: In deliciis paradisi Dei fuisti.

Opinio 3. cum distinctione. Tertia est positio, quod est paradisus spiritualis, et est paradisus corporalis. Paradisus spiritualis dicit statum quietis et amoenitatem deliciarum spiritualium; et iste potest esse secundum duplicem statum, scilicet Ecclesiae triumphantis et Ecclesiae militantis. Subdistinctio. Unde paradisus spiritualis duplex est sive dupliciter dictus: unus est in Ecclesia militante, et alter in Ecclesia triumphante. Unde illa quae sunt dicta in Genesi de paradiso isto spirituali possunt exponi metaphorice. — Paradisus autem corporalis est locus deliciarum et amoenitatis; et hic Alia subdistinctio. est duplex similiter secundum duplicem statum, scilicet perfectum et imperfectum. Secundum statum perfectum paradisus est empyreum. Secundum statum imperfectum paradisus est locus quidam amoenus in partibus orientis, de quo dicit Damascenus⁶: « Divinus paradisus est Dei manibus in Eden plantatus, gaudii et exultationis universae promptuarium ».

Rationes congruentiae. In hoc autem loco decuit hominem poni, ut esset ei facilitas perveniendi ad patriam, et ut Deus homini ostenderet benevolentiam, cui locum amoenissimum ad inhabitandum praeparaverat, et sic amoenitas exterioris habitaculi corresponderet deliciis interioribus, quales habet anima, quae est templum Dei, et habebat anima primi hominis. — Extra autem hunc locum debuit homo produci, ut melius cognosceret Dei beneficium, dum se videret quasi aliunde adductum; et ut etiam per hoc ostenderet, quod homo non erat ibi factus ad aeternaliter habitandum, sed temporaliter peregrinandum. Et quia Deus praesciebat hominis casum, in paradiso voluit eum collocare, ut per eius eiectionem de loco voluptatis cognosceret sensibiliter, quanta bona spiritualia amisisset per culpam; cognosceret etiam nihilominus, quanta esset differentia inter eum qui Domino humiliter obedit, et eum qui ipsum superbe contemnit⁷.

Ad obiecta. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Locus enim paradisi convenienter fuit factus propter hominem institutum; et alia terra convenienter fuit facta propter hominem, quem Deus praeviderat esse lapsurum; et quia simul etiam viderat hominem et peccatum, de ea terra sumsit eum, in quam erat postmodum rediturus. — Nec tamen, si homo stetisset, alia pars mundi superflueret, quia bestiis servientibus homini habitaculum praeberet, et habitaculum hominis sua inferioritate excellens ostenderet et sua magnitudine decoraret, sicut magna platea decorat palatium, et sicut aula⁸ decorat cameram.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Locum paradisi in alto situm, usque ad lunarem circulum pertingentem. Videtur hoc esse falsum: primo, quia inter lunarem circulum et aerem est sphaera ignis⁹, quae non pateretur, hominem ibi posse vivere. — Item, aer in sua parte superiori est tantae subtilitatis, quod ibi non possunt aves vivere, sicut dicit Augustinus¹⁰: ergo si paradisi locus esset adeo elevatus, non posset ibi vivere homo habens corpus animale. — Praeterea, si adeo esset ille locus elevatus, cum maxime appropinquaret soli: ergo esset calidissimus et intemperatissimus. Sequeretur etiam ex hoc, quod terra esset supra aquam et supra aerem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut doctores¹¹ dicunt, paradisi corporalis situs est valde eminens et altus et iuxta aequinoctialem in oriente, quodam modo vergens ad meridiem. Est autem tantae altitudinis, ut illuc non conscendant vapores in aere elevati, sed sit ibi aer mundus et purus, idoneus statui perpetuitatis; et propter puritatem aeris ibi est contemperantia¹² caloris, et quia secus aequinoctialem est, est ibi magna temperies temporis. — Quod ergo dicitur usque ad lunarem circulum pertingere, hoc non est dictum secundum situm, sed secundum quandam proprietatem, sive quia conformatur in raritate et luminositate et tranquillitate, p. 428 sive quia vapores, quibus dominatur luna, illuc non pertingunt. Et sic patet illud.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: In paradiso erant ligna diversi generis etc., propter quid duo¹³ ex illis lignis nominat, et non plura? — Item, cum lignum illud, de quo facta est prohibitio, non fuerit scientiae boni et mali nisi propter transgressionem Adae, non videtur, quod sic debuerit a sui principio nominari. — Item, cum lignum vitae illum effectum vivificandi non habuerit, videtur, quod aut frustra fuerit, aut ab illo effectu nominari non debuit.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Triplex differentia lignorum. universitas lignorum¹⁴ sub tribus differentiis comprehenditur, secundum quod ad triplicem utilitatem hominis poterant ordinari: aut ex parte corporis, aut ex parte animae, aut ex parte coniuncti. Si ex parte corporis; sic erant ligna fructifera, quae praebebant ei alimenta ad corporis sustentationem. Si ex parte animae; sic fuit lignum scientiae boni et mali, quod ordinabatur ad obedientiae hominis probationem. Si ex parte coniuncti; sic erat lignum vitae, quod faciebat ad humanae vitae perpetuationem. De his autem lignis duo tantum nominata sunt propter speciales¹⁵ effectus, propter quos et Dominus illa duo ligna collocavit in medio paradisi, et unum posuit iuxta alterum, ut ex uno conciperet homo affectum amoris, et ex alio affectum timoris — et quasi opposita iuxta se posita elucescerent¹⁶ — et faciendo abstinentiam ab uno mereretur habere refectionem sufficientem ex altero. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus de Civitate Dei¹⁷, loquens de primis parentibus: « Status immortalitatis eis de ligno vitae, quod in medio paradisi cum arbore vetita simul erat, mirabilis Dei gratia monstrabatur; tamen et alios sumebant cibos praeter unam arborem, quae fuerat interdicta ». — Et sic patet, quare illa duo ligna specialiter nominantur. Unum autem, scilicet lignum vitae, nominatur ab effectu, non quem fecit, sed ad quem ordinabatur; aliud vero, scilicet lignum scientiae, ab eventu; et utrumque satis congruit, quia tam ille effectus quam ille eventus valde notabiles erant. Licet autem lignum vitae primum effectum non habuerit in actu, habuit tamen in habitu; nec tamen frustra fuit, quia, quamvis ex ipso primus homo non acceperit refectionem, eius tamen posteri recipiunt instructionem, dum per illud lignum intelligunt Christum¹⁸.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: A ligno homo prohibitus est, quod malum non erat. Videtur enim, quod Deus inconvenienter fecerit; primum, quia, sicut prohibere malum est bonum, ita prohibere bonum est malum: ergo videtur, quod Deus fecerit male, dum prohibuit illius ligni usum. — Item, bene sciebat Deus, quod ipsi prohibitionem suam non servarent: ergo si sine illa prohibitione poterat esse salus, videtur, quod non fecerit aliud quam laqueum eis iniicere, dum prohibuit. — Item, si omnia facta sunt propter hominem, ergo lignum illud erat hominis; sed nulli debet subtrahi res propria absque culpa: ergo videtur, quod Deus iniuriatus fuerit homini et eum puniverit, prohibendo quod suum erat, in quo tamen nulla culpa praecesserat.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Duplex finis. Deus homini illud lignum prohibuit propter obedientiae meritum acquirendum ex parte hominis, et propter ostendendum suae iurisdictionis dominium, quod habebat in hominem¹⁹. Quia prohibuit propter obedientiae meritum; ut illud meritum esset purum et plenum, a tali re prohibuit, a qua non deberet cessari nisi solius obedientiae intuitu, et ideo a re bona. — Item, quia prohibuit ad ostendendum suae iurisdictionis dominium; ideo a tali re debuit prohibere, a qua homo non deberet manum retrahere nisi propter solius Dei imperium, et haec quidem fuit res bona. Et propterea illud mandatum dicitur esse Mandatum disciplinae, quia ad hoc homo non obligabatur ex se sive ex aliquo rationis naturalis dictamine, sed ex sola divina praeceptione; quamvis et alia possit reddi ratio, quod datum sit illud mandatum divinum, ut per hoc disceret, de quo Deo²⁰ deberet esse subiectus, et quantum etiam differret inter eum qui Deo obedit, et eum qui contemnit eius imperium. — Nulla igitur ex hoc fiebat homini iniu- p. 429 ria, immo fiebat utilitas, dum praecipiebatur ad eius eruditionem et meriti amplificationem. Quodsi contrarium evenit, hoc fuit ex culpa sua, ex qua convertit sibi bonum in malum, sicut impiis et peccatoribus bona convertuntur in mala. Propter istius tamen eventus praevisionem non debuit Deus dimittere dare tale mandatum, quia ordo et decor, qui attenditur in operibus Dei secundum regulam divinae sapientiae, non debet intermitti propter incommodum alicuius specialis²¹ creaturae. Praeterea, ex illo malo inde sequente poterat Deus et sciebat multo maius bonum elicere.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta, excepto primo, quia non est simile. Prohibere enim malum bonum est, quia non potest aliquis malum perpetrare sine culpa; sed prohibere bonum non est ita malum, quia abstinere potest homo absque culpa; abstinere enim a bono commodi cadit in genere boni honesti²². Alia satis patent per iam dicta.

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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part there are questions about the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says in the text: The will of the Creator is necessity. For that necessarily will come to be which he wills and foreknows. If this is true, since God wills all future goods, no future good comes about contingently: therefore freedom of choice perishes. — Furthermore, it seems that he says something false in what he adds: Many things are future according to inferior causes, but in the foreknowledge of God they are not future; for what is future will be; what is not future in the foreknowledge of God will not be: therefore the same thing at once will be and will not be.

I respond: It must be said that the first statement is to be understood of the necessity not of the consequent, but of the consequence¹, because the very thing willed necessarily follows upon God's willing it to be or to be future. The second statement is to be understood in this way: that by the participle future is signified the order of an effect to its causes, not the event itself; so that the sense is: many things are future according to inferior causes, that is, ordered to come to be, which nonetheless are not future according to truth or foreknowledge, because they will not come about.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that man was created outside paradise, and afterwards placed in paradise. For since paradise was the place of habitation owed to man in the state of innocence, and a place fit for habitation is fit² for generation and production, it seems that man ought to have been produced in paradise. — Likewise, since the whole earth was then fruitful and the air tranquil, it seems that the whole was fit to be inhabited by man: therefore if man was produced outside paradise, it seems that outside paradise he ought to have been left to dwell. — Likewise, if the whole earth was produced for man's sake, then it seems that, if man had stood, the other part of the earth beyond paradise would have been superfluous. — On account of this Connected question. there is a question here, what is here called paradise, in which man was placed.

I respond: Reply to the connected question. For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, as the Master says³, there were three opinions about paradise.

Opinion 1. For some said that the paradise in which man was placed was a bodily place, which on account of its pleasantness was called paradise, and that there is no other paradise except a bodily one⁴.

Opinion 2. Others, attending to the fact that man's beatification is in paradise, and that this consists in the enjoyment of God, not in bodily pleasantness, said that this paradise was not a bodily place but a spiritual one; and that all the things said in Genesis about paradise were said metaphorically. Hence in his formation man is said to have been placed in paradise, not because he was moved locally, but because he was placed in spiritual pleasantness and delights from the love and knowledge and enjoyment of God. In confirmation of this opinion they adduce what is said of the thief, Luke twenty-three⁵: Today you will be with me in paradise;

and what is said of Lucifer, Ezekiel twenty-eight: You were in the delights of God's paradise.

Opinion 3, with a distinction. The third position is that there is a spiritual paradise and a bodily paradise. Spiritual paradise denotes a state of quiet and the pleasantness of spiritual delights; and this can be according to a twofold state, namely of the Church triumphant and of the Church militant. Subdistinction. Hence spiritual paradise is twofold or said in two ways: one is in the Church militant, the other in the Church triumphant. Hence the things said in Genesis about that spiritual paradise can be expounded metaphorically. — But bodily paradise is a place of delights and pleasantness; and this likewise Further subdistinction. is twofold according to a twofold state, namely perfect and imperfect. According to the perfect state, paradise is the empyrean. According to the imperfect state, paradise is a certain pleasant place in the regions of the East, of which Damascene says⁶: « The divine paradise was planted by God's hands in Eden, a storehouse of joy and exultation of every kind ».

Reasons of fittingness. In this place it was fitting for man to be placed, that he might easily reach his fatherland, and that God might show man his benevolence, for whom he had prepared the most pleasant place for habitation, and so that the pleasantness of the outer dwelling might correspond to the inner delights such as the soul has, which is the temple of God, and such as the soul of the first man had. — But outside this place man had to be produced, that he might better recognize God's gift, while he saw himself as it were brought from elsewhere; and also that by this it might be shown that man was not made there to dwell eternally, but to journey temporally. And because God foreknew man's fall, he willed to place him in paradise, so that by his expulsion from the place of pleasure he might sensibly recognize how great spiritual goods he had lost through his fault; and might none the less recognize how great a difference there is between him who humbly obeys the Lord and him who proudly despises him⁷.

Reply to the objections. And by this the reply to the objections is clear. For the place of paradise was fittingly made for man as instituted; and the rest of the earth was fittingly made for man, whom God had foreseen would fall; and because he had at once seen both man and sin, he took him from that earth to which he was afterwards to return. — Nor however, if man had stood, would the other part of the world have been superfluous, because it would have provided a dwelling for the beasts that serve man, and would have shown forth the dwelling of man as excelling by its very inferiority and would have adorned it by its great extent, just as a great courtyard adorns a palace, and as a hall⁸ adorns a chamber.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: The place of paradise as set on high, reaching up to the lunar circle. This seems false: first, because between the lunar circle and the air there is a sphere of fire⁹, which would not allow a man to live there. — Likewise, the air in its upper region is of such subtlety that birds cannot live there, as Augustine says¹⁰: therefore if the place of paradise were so elevated, a man having an animal body could not live there. — Furthermore, if that place were so elevated, since it would come closest to the sun, it would therefore be hottest and most intemperate. It would also follow from this that earth would be above water and above air.

I respond: It must be said that, as the doctors¹¹ say, the site of the bodily paradise is very prominent and high and near the equator in the East, somewhat tending toward the South. It is moreover of such height that the vapors raised in the air do not ascend thither, but the air there is clean and pure, fit for the state of perpetuity; and on account of the purity of the air there is there a temperance¹² of heat, and because it is near the equator there is there a great moderation of season. — When therefore it is said to reach up to the lunar circle, this is said not according to site, but according to a certain property, either because it is conformed in rarity and luminosity and tranquility,

or because the vapors over which the moon presides do not reach thither. And so the matter is clear.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: In paradise there were trees of diverse kinds etc.; why does he name only two¹³ of those trees, and not more? — Likewise, since the tree concerning which the prohibition was made was not a tree of the knowledge of good and evil except on account of Adam's transgression, it does not seem that it ought to have been so named from its beginning. — Likewise, since the tree of life did not have that effect of vivifying, it seems that either it was in vain, or it ought not to have been named from that effect.

I respond: It must be said that Threefold differentiation of trees. the entire body of trees¹⁴ is comprehended under three differences, according as they could be ordered to the threefold utility of man: either with respect to the body, or with respect to the soul, or with respect to the composite. If with respect to the body, thus there were fruit-bearing trees, which furnished him nourishment for the sustenance of the body. If with respect to the soul, thus there was the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which was ordered to the testing of man's obedience. If with respect to the composite, thus there was the tree of life, which made for the perpetuation of human life. And of these trees only two are named on account of special¹⁵ effects, on account of which the Lord also placed those two trees in the middle of paradise, and set one beside the other, so that from the one man might conceive an affection of love, and from the other an affection of fear — and that as opposites placed beside each other they might shine forth¹⁶ — and that by abstaining from the one he might merit to have sufficient refreshment from the other. And this is what Augustine says in the City of God¹⁷, speaking of our first parents: « The state of immortality was shown forth to them by the tree of life, which was in the middle of paradise together with the forbidden tree, by the wonderful grace of God; nevertheless they took other foods also, besides the one tree which had been forbidden ». — And so it is clear why those two trees are specially named. And the one, namely the tree of life, is named from an effect, not which it produced, but to which it was ordered; the other, namely the tree of knowledge, from an event; and each is fitting enough, because both that effect and that event were very notable. Now although the tree of life did not have its first effect in act, it nonetheless had it in habit; nor was it in vain, because, although the first man did not receive refreshment from it, his posterity nonetheless receive instruction, when through that tree they understand Christ¹⁸.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: Man was forbidden from a tree which was not evil. For it seems that God acted unfittingly; first, because, just as to forbid evil is good, so to forbid good is evil: therefore it seems that God did wrong in forbidding the use of that tree. — Likewise, God well knew that they would not keep his prohibition: therefore if salvation could be had without that prohibition, it seems that he did nothing other than cast a snare upon them by forbidding. — Likewise, if all things were made for man, then that tree was man's; but nothing ought to be taken away from anyone without fault: therefore it seems that God did injury to man and punished him by forbidding what was his own, in which moreover no fault had preceded.

I respond: It must be said that Twofold end. God forbade that tree to man for the sake of acquiring the merit of obedience on man's part, and for the sake of showing forth the dominion of his jurisdiction which he had over man¹⁹. Because he forbade it for the sake of the merit of obedience: that that merit might be pure and full, he forbade something from which one ought not to cease except out of regard for obedience alone, and therefore something good. — Likewise, because he forbade it to show forth the dominion of his jurisdiction: therefore he ought to have forbidden something from which man ought not to withdraw his hand except on account of God's sole command, and this indeed was a good thing. And therefore that commandment is said to be a Precept of discipline, because to this man was not bound from himself or from any dictate of natural reason, but solely from divine precept; although another reason can also be given why that divine commandment was given, namely that through it he might learn to which God²⁰ he ought to be subject, and how great a difference there is between him who obeys God and him who despises his command. — No injury therefore was done to man from this,

but rather a utility was done to him, since it was commanded for his instruction and for the amplification of merit. And if the contrary happened, this was from his own fault, by which he turned good into evil for himself, just as for the impious and for sinners goods are turned into evils. Nevertheless on account of the foresight of this event God ought not to have failed to give such a commandment, because the order and beauty that is to be regarded in God's works according to the rule of divine wisdom ought not to be omitted on account of the disadvantage of some particular²¹ creature. Furthermore, from that evil that followed God could and knew how to draw out a much greater good.

And by this the reply to the objections is clear, except for the first, because it is not similar. For to forbid evil is good, because no one can perpetrate evil without fault; but to forbid good is not equally evil, because a man can abstain without fault; for to abstain from a good of advantage falls under the genus of the good of the honourable²². The other points are sufficiently clear from what has already been said.

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