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Dist. 17, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 17

Textus Latinus
p. 424

Quaestio III. Utrum corpus Adae constitutum fuerit ex elementis in complexione et compositione aequali.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum corpus primi hominis constitutum fuerit ex elementis in complexione et compositione aequali. Et quod sic, videtur.

Argg. pro parte affirmativa.

1. Quanto complexio et compositio magis accedit ad aequalitatem, tanto nobilior est, et quanto nobilior est, tanto nobilioris formae est susceptiva1; sed complexio corporis primi hominis fuit susceptibilis nobilissimae formae per naturam, quae etiam non erat depravata per culpam: ergo fuit complexio maxime nobilis; et si hoc: ergo maxime aequalis.

2. Item, tanto res complexionata est ad durandum habilior, quanto eius complexio est aequalior — inaequalitas enim miscibilium est via in corruptionem — sed corpus Adae habile erat ad durandum in sempiternum, quantum est ex sua prima constitutione: ergo videtur, quod in perfecta aequalitate complexionis et compositionis fuerit constitutum.

3. Item, ubi est inaequalitas complexionis, ibi necessario est pugna; ubi vero pugna est, forma non sic potest gubernare materiam, sicut si esset ibi pax et tranquillitas; ubi autem hoc est, ibi est aliqua poenalitas: ergo aut in corpore primi hominis fuit perfecta elementorum aequalitas, aut ante peccatum fuit in eo aliqua poenalitas. Sed nullo modo poena praecessit culpam: ergo etc.

4. Item, corpus Adae debuit fieri proportionabile animae, et ideo, quamdiu anima fuit immunis a morte culpae, corpus eius fuit immune a morte naturae: ergo pari ratione, quamdiu anima fuit aequalis in voluntate, corpus fuit aequale in complexione. Sed in anima primi hominis nulla erat obliquitas iustitiae2 in prima constitutione, immo perfecta innocentia: ergo nec in corpore erat aliqua inaequalitas, sed concordia et amicitia perfecta.

Sed contra:

Pro parte negativa.

1. Vita est per calidum et humidum, et omnis operatio animae in corpore est per calorem, sicut dicunt naturales et medici3; sed in corpore Adae anima habebat expeditas operationes: ergo magna erat ibi abundantia caloris, ergo praedominabatur calidum; et si hoc: ergo non erat perfecta aequalitas complexionis.

2. Item, etsi complexio hominis est deteriorata, tamen non est totaliter corrupta; sed nos videmus, quod cor per naturam est calidissimum, et hepar similiter4; et quaedam sunt alia membra, in quibus regnat phlegma et melancholia: ergo et tunc ita erat. Si ergo in corpore Adae erat praedominatio humorum, pari ratione et qualitatum elementarium: ergo non erat ibi perfecta adaequatio miscibilium.

3. Item, si esset ibi mixtio secundum omnimodam aequalitatem, ergo tantum esset ibi de gravi, quantum de levi: ergo corpus illud esset indifferens ad gravitatem et levitatem, ergo et ad motum et ad quietem. Si igitur nec esset natum moveri nec quiescere nec sursum nec deorsum esse: ergo non esset corpus naturale5.

4. Item, si corpus illud esset constitutum secundum omnimodam aequalitatem, tunc quantum unum elementum ageret, tantum reliquum resisteret et ipsum repelleret: ergo unum virtutem suam et actionem in alterum non profundaret; et si hoc, non esset ibi alteratio nec transmutatio, ac per hoc nec mixtio6. Aut ergo corpus Adae non fuit mixtum, aut si mixtum, non in perfecta aequalitate constitutum.

5. Item, si corpus Adae fuisset constitutum in perfecta aequalitate, ergo ignis sive calor in eo non consumeret, ergo alimento non indiguisset; sed constans est secundum Sanctos, et maxime secundum Augustinum7, quod alimento indiguit: ergo

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in aequalitate miscibilium corpus illud constitutum non fuit.

6. Item, cum Adam peccavit, non fuit ei ablatum aliquid, quod esset ex parte corporis: ergo si prius erat compositus complexione aequali, postea fuit similiter: ergo post peccatum nulla fuit in corpore eius pugna: ergo nec infirmitas nec mortalitas; quod si hoc falsum est, restat etc.

Conclusio.

Corpus primi hominis non fuit constitutum ex elementis in complexione aequalitatis a pondere, quia talis est impossibilis, sed in complexione aequalitatis a iustitia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, sicut distinguunt naturales et medici8, duobus modis dicitur aequalitas miscibilium in mixto, scilicet a pondere et a iustitia. Aequalitas a pondere, ut dicunt, non est possibilis in rerum natura.

Duplex aequalitas miscibilium.

Aequalitas a pondere modo 1. Aequalitas enim a pondere potest dici tripliciter. Uno modo dicitur aequalitas a pondere, quando miscibilia adaequantur et quantum ad quantitatem molis et quantum ad quantitatem virtutis; et haec duo sunt incompossibilia non solummodo secundum rem, sed etiam secundum intellectum, hoc intellecto, quod elementum, quod plus habet de materia, minus habet de specie, et e converso. Sicut enim impossibile est, quod verum aurum aequetur argento in quantitate et valore; sic impossibile est, elementa activa et passiva aequari ad invicem aequalitate ponderis in aliqua mixtione.

Modo 2. Alio modo potest dici aequalitas a pondere secundum adaequationem miscibilium in quantitate molis solum; et adhuc est impossibilis. Primum, quia corpus illud non esset durabile; elementa enim activa statim passiva consumerent. Si enim adaequarentur in substantia, adeo activa excederent in virtute, ut potius esset consumtio quam mixtio. Nec tantum corpus illud non esset durabile, immo etiam nec esset leve nec grave, cum motus gravis vel levis sequatur praedominans quantum ad quantitatem molis; et si non esset durabile nec leve nec grave, non esset de naturae intentione nec naturae possibile.

Modo 3. Tertio modo dicitur aequalitas a pondere aequalitas a quantitate virtutis; et sic adhuc dicunt, talem aequalitatem non esse in natura possibilem. Primo, quia si esset omnimoda aequalitas virtutum, virtus unius tantum resisteret, quantum virtus alterius ageret; et sic non esset profundatio et confractio usque ad minima, ac per hoc non esset mixtio. Item, si hoc esset, corpus illud careret operatione9 calidi et frigidi et aliarum qualitatum elementarium: ergo frustra esset ex diversis constitutum. Tale igitur corpus nec est naturae possibile, quia repugnat naturae mixtionis; nec etiam est ex intentione naturae, quia careret sibi debita operatione.

Conclusio 1. — Et sic quocumque modo accipiatur aequalitas a pondere, non potuit esse nec debuit in corpore Adae. Et hoc satis apparet, cum corpus Adae magis esset grave quam leve, magis esset idoneum ad agendum quam ad patiendum: ergo non habuit aequalitatem miscibilium nec quantum ad quantitatem molis, nec quantum ad quantitatem virtutis: et ita non habuit aequalitatem a pondere.

Ad rationes pro parte negativa. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes, quoniam procedunt ista via, sicut patet consideranti.

Aequalitas a iustitia. Est et alia aequalitas a iustitia, et haec aequalitas attenditur in commensuratione miscibilium secundum proportionem debitam et secundum exigentiam formae introducendae. Et haec aequalitas reperitur in his quae miscentur naturaliter10, et inter omnia potissime reperitur in homine, quia nobilior debet esse in eius corpore proportio et harmonia miscibilium, secundum quod disponitur ad nobiliorem formam. Haec autem aequalitas non est aequalitas punctalis, sed latitudinem habet et gradus, et hoc secundum diversos status.

Triplex est aequalitas secundum 3 status. Est enim status gloriae, et est status miseriae, et est status innocentiae. Secundum statum gloriae, qui est perfectus, debetur corpori humano aequalitas a iustitia, aequalitas, inquam, perfecta, in qua nec cadit discordia nec repugnantia, nec actu nec potentia. — Secundum statum miseriae, qui est status imperfectus, debetur corpori hominis aequalitas, sed diminuta, quae permisceri habet inaequalitati et discordiae, non solum possibilitate, sed etiam quadam necessitate. — Secundum statum vero medium, scilicet innocentiae, debetur corpori hominis aequalitas media, quae a discordia et repugnantia miscibilium erat aliena in actu per adiutorium intrinsecum animae gubernantis, et per adiutorium extrinsecum alimenti nutrientis. Erat tamen haec aequalitas possibilis ad inaequalitatem, sive ob defectum virtutis contentivae, sive etiam ob defectum alimoniae. Nullus autem horum defectuum esse poterat in homine, nisi praecederet transgressio inobedientiae.

Conclusio 2. Et sic patet, quod corpus primi hominis constitutum fuit in aequalitate a iustitia, quasi media inter aequalitatem, quae erit in gloria, et aequalitatem, quae nunc est in miseria, secundum quod status animae exigebat. — Et hanc aequalitatem pro-

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Ad rationes pro parte affirm. bant fuisse in corpore primi hominis rationes inductae ad astruendam partem istam; et ideo concedendae sunt, quia verum concludunt. Si autem ex eis velint concludere omnimodam aequalitatem a pondere, rationes illae non valent, quia illa aequalitas ad nobilitatem non spectat. Si autem velint concludere aequalitatem omnimodam a iustitia, adhuc non concludunt, quia, etsi corpus illud haberet nobilissimam formam, non tamen adhuc erat in statu suo nobilissimo, sicut erit in gloria. Hoc autem solummodo concludunt, quod ibi erat tanta aequalitas a iustitia, quod non erat ibi miscibilium actualis repugnantia; et hoc quidem est verum. Et ita patet responsio ad totum.

Scholion

I. Distinctio inter aequalitatem a pondere et aequalitatem a iustitia, immo tota fere huius quaestionis doctrina sumta est ex scriptis Avicennae de medicina, ut ex adiectis nostris notis videri potest. Illam distinctionem Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 2.) sic explicat: « Duplex est aequalitas componentium: aut ponderis, aut iustitiae, cuius exemplum est in modico auro et multo plumbo; aequivalet enim ei secundum aequalitatem iustitiae, non ponderis. Aequalitas ponderis est aequalitas aequiparantiae... Aequalitas vero iustitiae est aequalitas proportionis in comparatione unius ad alterum et omnium ad formam suam ».

II. De hac quaestione specialiter tractant Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 77. m. 2. a. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. 4. — Alios auctores vide in scholio ad q. 1.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether the body of Adam was constituted out of the elements in an equal complexion and composition.

Thirdly it is asked whether the body of the first man was constituted out of the elements in an equal complexion and composition. And that it was so, it seems.

Arguments for the affirmative.

1. The more a complexion and composition approaches equality, the nobler it is, and the nobler it is, the more capable it is of receiving a nobler form1; but the complexion of the body of the first man was capable of receiving the noblest form by nature, which was also not depraved by sin: therefore it was a most noble complexion; and if so, then most equal.

2. Likewise, the more a complexioned thing is fit for enduring, the more equal its complexion is — for the inequality of mixables is a path to corruption — but the body of Adam was fit for enduring forever, as far as concerns its first constitution: therefore it seems that it was constituted in perfect equality of complexion and composition.

3. Likewise, where there is inequality of complexion, there is necessarily strife; but where there is strife, the form cannot govern matter as it could if there were peace and tranquillity there; and where this is so, there is some penalty: therefore either in the body of the first man there was perfect equality of the elements, or before sin there was in him some penalty. But in no way did penalty precede fault: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the body of Adam ought to have been made proportionable to the soul, and therefore, so long as the soul was immune from the death of fault, his body was immune from the death of nature: therefore by parity of reasoning, so long as the soul was equal in will, the body was equal in complexion. But in the soul of the first man there was no obliquity of justice2 in its first constitution, but rather perfect innocence: therefore there was not in the body either any inequality, but perfect concord and friendship.

On the contrary:

For the negative side.

1. Life is by what is hot and moist, and every operation of the soul in the body is through heat, as the natural philosophers and physicians say3; but in the body of Adam the soul had unimpeded operations: therefore there was a great abundance of heat there, therefore the hot was predominant; and if so, then there was not perfect equality of complexion.

2. Likewise, although the complexion of man is deteriorated, yet it is not totally corrupted; but we see that the heart by nature is the hottest, and the liver likewise4; and there are certain other members in which phlegm and melancholy reign: therefore so was it then too. If therefore in the body of Adam there was a predominance of humors, by parity of reasoning also of elementary qualities: therefore there was not there a perfect equating of the mixables.

3. Likewise, if there were there a mixture according to total equality, therefore there would be just as much of the heavy as of the light: therefore that body would be indifferent to heaviness and lightness, therefore also to motion and rest. If therefore it were not born either to be moved or to be at rest, nor to be upward or downward: therefore it would not be a natural body5.

4. Likewise, if that body were constituted according to total equality, then as much as one element acted, so much would the remaining one resist and repel it: therefore one would not pour forth its power and action into another; and if so, there would be in it neither alteration nor transmutation, and through this no mixture6. Therefore either the body of Adam was not mixed, or, if mixed, was not constituted in perfect equality.

5. Likewise, if the body of Adam had been constituted in perfect equality, then fire or heat in it would not consume, therefore he would not have needed food; but it is constant according to the Saints, and most of all according to Augustine7, that he did need food: therefore

that body was not constituted in equality of mixables.

6. Likewise, when Adam sinned, nothing was taken from him that was on the side of the body: therefore if he was previously composed in an equal complexion, afterwards he was so likewise: therefore after sin there was no strife in his body: therefore neither infirmity nor mortality; and since this is false, the rest follows etc.

Conclusion.

The body of the first man was not constituted out of the elements in a complexion of equality by weight, because such is impossible, but in a complexion of equality by justice.

I respond: It must be said that, as the natural philosophers and physicians distinguish8, equality of mixables in a mixture is said in two ways, namely by weight and by justice. Equality by weight, as they say, is not possible in the nature of things.

A twofold equality of mixables.

Equality by weight, mode 1. For equality by weight can be said in three ways. In one way equality is called by weight when the mixables are made equal both as to quantity of mass and as to quantity of power; and these two are incompossible not only as to thing, but also as to understanding, given that an element which has more of matter has less of species, and conversely. For just as it is impossible for true gold to be equated to silver in quantity and value, so it is impossible for active and passive elements to be equated to one another by an equality of weight in any mixture.

Mode 2. In another way equality by weight can be said according to an equating of the mixables in quantity of mass alone; and this too is impossible. First, because that body would not be durable; for the active elements would at once consume the passive. For if they were equated in substance, the active would so exceed in power that there would be consumption rather than mixture. Nor only would that body not be durable, but it would not even be light or heavy, since the motion of the heavy or the light follows what is predominant as to the quantity of mass; and if it were neither durable nor light nor heavy, it would be neither of nature's intention nor naturally possible.

Mode 3. In a third way equality by weight is said to be equality from quantity of power; and thus too they say that such an equality is not possible in nature. First, because if there were a total equality of powers, the power of one would resist just as much as the power of another would act; and so there would be no penetration or breaking down to the smallest parts, and through this no mixture. Likewise, if this were so, that body would lack the operation9 of heat and cold and the other elementary qualities: therefore it would be constituted of diverse things in vain. Therefore such a body is neither naturally possible, because it is repugnant to the nature of mixture; nor is it from the intention of nature, because it would lack its due operation.

Conclusion 1. — And so in whatever way equality by weight is taken, it could not be nor ought it to have been in the body of Adam. And this appears sufficiently, since the body of Adam was more heavy than light, more apt for acting than for being acted upon: therefore it did not have equality of mixables either as to quantity of mass or as to quantity of power: and so it did not have equality by weight.

To the arguments for the negative side. — Hence the arguments showing this are to be conceded, since they proceed in this way, as is plain to one considering them.

Equality by justice. There is also another equality by justice, and this equality is attended to in the commensuration of the mixables according to the due proportion and according to the requirement of the form to be introduced. And this equality is found in those things which are mixed naturally10, and among all things it is most found in man, because the proportion and harmony of the mixables in his body ought to be nobler, according as it is disposed to a nobler form. But this equality is not a point-like equality, but has latitude and degrees, and this according to diverse states.

A threefold equality according to three states. For there is the state of glory, and there is the state of misery, and there is the state of innocence. According to the state of glory, which is perfect, there is owed to the human body equality by justice, equality, I say, perfect, in which neither discord nor repugnance falls, neither in act nor in potency. — According to the state of misery, which is the imperfect state, there is owed to the body of man an equality, but diminished, which has to be intermingled with inequality and discord, not only by possibility but also by a certain necessity. — But according to the middle state, namely of innocence, there is owed to the body of man a middle equality, which was alien from the discord and repugnance of the mixables in act through the intrinsic help of the soul governing it, and through the extrinsic help of nourishing food. Yet this equality was possible of being made unequal, either because of a defect of the retentive power, or also because of a defect of nourishment. But none of these defects could be in man unless the transgression of disobedience preceded.

Conclusion 2. And thus it is plain that the body of the first man was constituted in equality by justice, as if a mean between the equality which will be in glory, and the equality which now is in misery, according as the state of the soul required. — And this equality

To the arguments on the affirmative side. the arguments adduced to establish that side prove to have been in the body of the first man; and therefore they are to be conceded, because they conclude truly. But if they wish from them to conclude total equality by weight, those arguments are not valid, because that equality does not pertain to nobility. But if they wish to conclude total equality by justice, they still do not conclude it, because, even if that body had the noblest form, it was not yet in its noblest state, as it will be in glory. They conclude only this, that there was so great an equality by justice there that there was no actual repugnance of the mixables; and this indeed is true. And thus the response to the whole is plain.

Scholion

I. The distinction between equality by weight and equality by justice, indeed nearly the whole doctrine of this question, has been taken from the writings of Avicenna on medicine, as can be seen from our added notes. Petr. a Tar. (here q. 2 a. 2) explains that distinction thus: « The equality of components is twofold: either of weight or of justice, of which the example is in a little gold and much lead; for it is equivalent to it according to the equality of justice, not of weight. The equality of weight is the equality of equiparation... But the equality of justice is the equality of proportion in the comparison of one to another and of all to their form ».

II. On this question Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 77. m. 2. a. 1. 2 treats specially. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2 q. 3. 4. — See the other authors in the scholion to q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. supra pag. 380, nota 1.
    Cf. above page 380, note 1.
  2. Vat. iniustitiae.
    The Vatican edition reads iniustitiae (of injustice).
  3. Cfr. supra pag. 379, nota 6; et Avicenna, Canon. l. I. Fen 1. doctr. 3. c. 1, ubi principium vitae reponitur in corde et spiritu, « quae quidem ambo vehementer calida existunt ad superfluitatem declinantia; et vita quidem existit per caliditatem et augmentum per humiditatem, et etiam caliditas in humiditate existit et ab ea nutritur ». Et ibid. doctr. 6. c. 3. ait: « Et frigiditas quidem est paralyticum faciens et mortificans et ab omnibus prohibens operationibus ». Ibid. Fen 2. doctr. 3. c. 3: Calor igitur innatus virtutum omnium est instrumentum, sed frigiditas est ei inconveniens.
    Cf. above page 379, note 6; and Avicenna, Canon bk. I, Fen 1, doctr. 3, c. 1, where the principle of life is placed in the heart and the spirit, « both of which are vehemently hot, inclining to superfluity; and life indeed exists through heat, and growth through moisture, and heat too exists in moisture and is nourished by it ». And ibid., doctr. 6, c. 3, he says: « Coldness indeed is what causes paralysis and brings death, and prohibits all operations ». Ibid., Fen 2, doctr. 3, c. 3: Innate heat therefore is the instrument of all the powers, but coldness is inappropriate to it.
  4. Vide Aristot., II. de Partib. animal. c. 7. et III. c. 4. et 7; de Sensu et sens. c. 2. — De phlegmate et melancholia, quae sunt duae species humorum animalium, dicit Avicenna, Canon. l. I. Fen 1. doctr. 4. c. 1: Naturale [phlegma] est, quod est aptum, ut in aliquo tempore fiat sanguis; quoniam est sanguis non plene coctus... hoc namque phlegma sanguini propinquam habet similitudinem, et egent eo membra omnia, ideoque fecit natura, ut cum sanguine vadat... Naturalis [cholera nigra sive melancholia] est boni sanguinis faex et turbulentia et superfluitas, cuius sapor inter dulcedinem et ponticitatem existit, quae, cum in hepate generatur, in duas separatur partes, quarum una in sanguinem penetrat, et alia ad splenem transmittitur.
    See Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals bk. II c. 7 and bk. III c. 4 and 7; On Sense and the Sensible c. 2. — Concerning phlegm and melancholy, which are two species of animal humors, Avicenna says, Canon bk. I, Fen 1, doctr. 4, c. 1: Natural [phlegm] is that which is apt at some time to become blood; for it is blood not yet fully concocted... for this phlegm has a likeness close to blood, and all the members have need of it, and so nature made it so as to go with the blood... Natural [black bile, or melancholy] is the dregs and turbulence and superfluity of good blood, whose taste exists between sweetness and pontic sharpness, which, when it is generated in the liver, is separated into two parts, of which the one penetrates into the blood, and the other is transmitted to the spleen.
  5. Cfr. Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 7. (c. 2.), in cuius expositione Averroes hoc arg. proponit. Cfr. et ibid. IV. text. 1. seqq. — Supra cod. aa sic igitur pro si igitur.
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Heavens and the World bk. I, text 7 (c. 2), in whose exposition Averroes proposes this argument. Cf. also ibid. bk. IV, text 1 and following. — Above, codex aa reads igitur for si igitur.
  6. Hac ratione Averroes in II. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 18; IV. Meteor. text. 10; X. Metaph. text. 23 impugnat sententiam Galeni (I. de Temperam. c. 9.) ponentis « temperantiam, quae est secundum extrema, quae sunt in fine, non temperantiam, quae est secundum extrema complexionis speciei ». — Paulo inferius post aut si mixtum, non Vat. supplet fuit.
    By this argument Averroes in bk. II On Generation and Corruption, text 18; bk. IV Meteorologica, text 10; bk. X Metaphysics, text 23, impugns the opinion of Galen (bk. I On Temperaments c. 9) who posits « a temperance which is according to the extremes that are at the end, not the temperance which is according to the extremes of the complexion of the species ». — A little below, after aut si mixtum, non the Vatican edition supplies fuit.
  7. Libr. XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 20. et 23. n. 1; XIV. c. 26; I. de Peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvul. c. 3. n. 3. Cfr. infra dub. 4. et d. 19. a. 2. et 3.
    Augustine, City of God bk. XIII c. 20 and 23 n. 1; bk. XIV c. 26; bk. I On the Merits and Remission of Sins and on the Baptism of Little Ones c. 3 n. 3. Cf. below dub. 4 and d. 19 a. 2 and 3.
  8. Avicenna, Canon. l. I. Fen 1. doctr. 3. c. 1. ait: Debes autem scire, quod aequale, de quo medici in suis inquisitionibus tractant, non est denominatum ab aequalitate, in qua aequalitas cum pondere aequaliter existit, sed denominatur a iustitia in divisione. Et hoc est, quod in complexionato in primis attenditur, sive sit corpus totum, sive sit membrum unum, ut sit in eo de elementis cum suis quantitatibus et qualitatibus mensura, quam humana natura habere debet secundum meliorem proportionis et divisionis aequalitatem.
    Avicenna, Canon bk. I, Fen 1, doctr. 3, c. 1, says: But you ought to know that the equal, of which the physicians treat in their inquiries, is not named from the equality in which equality with weight equally exists, but is named from justice in division. And this is what is attended to first in a complexioned thing, whether it be the whole body or one member, namely that there be in it of the elements with their quantities and qualities a measure which human nature ought to have according to the better equality of proportion and of division.
  9. Vat. ratione.
    The Vatican edition reads ratione (by reason).
  10. In edd. 2, 3, 4 et Vat. deest reperitur in his quae miscentur naturaliter, et inter omnia potissime.
    In editions 2, 3, 4 and the Vatican edition the words reperitur in his quae miscentur naturaliter, et inter omnia potissime are lacking. ---
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