Dist. 8, Part 1, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8
DUB. I
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo contingit dubitari de hoc quod dicit Magister: Nunc de veritate sive proprietate divinae essentiae etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia omne, quod habet proprium, distinguitur; sed divina essentia non est distinguibilis: ergo non habet proprium.
Respondeo:1 Dicendum, quod divina essentia eo modo est distinguibilis, quo modo habet proprietates, et e converso; quia quamvis in se non sit distinguibilis per plurificationem sui nec a persona per diversitatem, est tamen distinguibilis respectu essentiae creatae, respectu cuius habet has proprietates.
DUB. II
Item quaeritur de illis tribus proprietatibus, quas ponit, scilicet de veritate, immutabilitate, simplicitate, cum multae aliae conditiones sint divinae essentiae, quare solum de his tribus agit?
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod per has tres proprietates sufficienter distinguitur esse increatum a creato. Nam creatum,2 eo ipso quod creatum, habet esse post non esse, et ita esse vanum et possibile: ideo habet esse permixtum cum possibilitate, et propter hoc deficit a veritate, a stabilitate et simplicitate. Increatum vero esse habet contrarias proprietates, et in his sufficienter distinguitur. Nam veritas respicit quod est, immutabilitas quo est,3 simplicitas utrumque. Ideo patet sufficientia et ordo.
DUB. III
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod a sapere dicitur sapientia, quia non videtur dicere verum. Sicut enim albedo se habet ad album, ita sapientia ad sapere; sed albedo non dicitur ab albo, immo magis e contra4: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum intellectum componentem sapere dicitur a sapientia, quia intellectus componens procedit ab abstracto ad concretum; secundum vero intellectum resolventem est e converso; et quantum ad hunc loquitur Augustinus. — Vel posset dici, quod loquitur secundum considerationem grammatici, non logici.5
DUB. IV
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quis magis est quam ille, qui dixit famulo. Videtur enim male dicere, quia esse non recipit magis et minus, et maxime in Deo.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod magis et minus dupliciter possunt considerari, scilicet in comparatione ad idem; et sic6 dicunt intensionem et remissionem;
vel in comparatione ad diversas substantias et naturas; et sic dicunt gradum et excessum, et sic est bene7 ponere magis et minus in ente respectu Creatoris et creaturae, et respectu creaturarum ad invicem. Sed in comparatione Creatoris ad creaturam est excessus improportionabilis et infinitus; respectu creaturarum ad invicem est proportionabilis.
DUB. V
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Cuius essentia non novit praeteritum vel futurum. Videtur enim esse ista proprietas et Angelorum, quia Augustinus de Civitate Dei8 dicit, quod «immortalitas Angelorum non est praeterita, quasi non sit, nec futura, quasi nondum sit», sed semper est praesens: ergo non est proprium solius Dei.
Respondeo: Quidam dicunt, quod duratio aevi est simplex et tota simul, non habens praeteritum et futurum; nihilominus ipsum aeviternum9 habet praeteritum et futurum quantum ad affectiones; et ita10 proprium est solius Dei.
Alii dicunt, quod in omni duratione creata, quoniam differt a durante et11 habet esse possibile, est prius et posterius; sed distinguunt in priori et posteriori. Quoddam enim est quod dicit durationis successionem, quoddam successionis durationem cum variatione et innovatione. Primum est in aevo, secundum in tempore; et hoc vult Anselmus12 expresse, et hoc credo probabilius. Et patet responsio ad verbum Augustini; ipse enim loquitur de priori et posteriori, quod quidem dicit innovationem et variationem et corruptionem.
DUB. VI
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod divinae essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est. Videtur enim falsum, quia quod inest alicui substantialiter non adimitur comparatione aliqua; sed esse est substantiale rei cuilibet: ergo etc. Item ex comparatione ad Deum creatura melioratur, ut dicit Augustinus13, ergo magis est, quam si non comparetur: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dupliciter est accipere talem comparationem. Uno modo secundum rationem influentiae et receptionis; et sic creatura ad Deum comparata est magis, quam si non comparetur. Alio modo comparatur secundum habitudinem aequiparantiae et proportionis; et hoc modo verum est, quod nulla14 est proportionabilis secundum conditionem veritatis et nobilitatis esse divini; et ideo quasi nihil est, non omnino in se, sed nihil ad proportionem, quia non potest inveniri aliqua proportio quantitativa.
DUB. VII
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Dicatur ergo, quod semper fuit, est et erit. Videntur enim haec verba non dici15 de Deo, quia dicunt diversa tempora; sed in Deo non cadit diversitas temporum.
Respondeo: Quidam voluerunt dicere, quod actus isti non praedicant de Deo diversa tempora secundum essentiam, sed secundum concomitantiam; quia divinum esse omnino invariatum omne tempus concomitatur. Sed haec positio non solvit plene. Dicitur enim vere, quod Deus fuit ante omne tempus; tunc16 ergo concomitantiam non potest dicere. — Ideo dicunt alii, quod tempus consignificatum non est dispositio rei acceptae sive intellectae, quando dicitur de Deo, sed solum modi intelligendi; quando vero de re mobili, utroque modo. Exemplum patet de masculinitate17 in lapide et in viro: quoniam in viro est ut dispositio rei acceptae, in lapide ut modus intelligendi solum. Sed haec positio non videtur sufficiens, quia intellectus non ponit praeteritum circa suum intelligere, quando intelligit Deum fuisse: ergo oportet, quod ponat circa rem.
Propter hoc notandum, quod verba diversorum temporum aliter dicuntur de aeterno, aliter de aeviterno, aliter de temporali. Nam respectu temporalis important mutabilitatem et successionem et durationem. Secundum vero quod de aeviternis dicuntur, duo tantum important, successionem et durationem, sicut vult Hieronymus,18 Augustinus et Anselmus. Secundum vero quod dicuntur de Deo, important solum durationem. Unde dicitur: Deus fuit, quia eius du-
ratio non coepit; est, quia duratio eius non interrumpitur: erit, quia non desinit nec corrumpitur. Proprie ergo loquendo, non dicuntur de Deo, ut dicit Hieronymus: large autem loquendo, dicuntur, ut dicit Magister et Augustinus; et ad hoc vadit opinio Magistri.19
DUB. VIII
Item quaeritur de verbo Hilarii: Esse non est Deo accidens etc., quia nec creaturae est accidens — nulli enim omnino rei accidit esse — quomodo ergo per hoc notatur Deus differre a creatura?
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod accidens dicit quid natum in alio esse, ab alio exire, et ab illo recedere. Accidens enim dicitur quod inest subiecto et ab illo trahit ortum, et propterea potest adesse et abesse. In his tribus proprietatibus communicat esse creatum, licet non eodem modo omnino. Nam esse nostrum pendet ab alio sustinente, oritur ab alio efficiente, creatura etiam nata est suum esse perdere: ideo esse eius est quasi accidens, non tamen vere accidens, quia cum pendeat a Deo, non pendet sicut a subiecto. E contrario est in Deo; et ideo dicit Hilarius, quod esse non est accidens Deo; et hoc propter contrarias proprietates: quia accidens natum est alii inesse, propter hoc dicit: subsistens veritas; quia natum est ab alio exire, contra hoc dicit: manens causa; quia natum est etiam ab alio recedere, contra hoc dicit: naturalis generis proprietas, quae non dimittit esse.
DUB. IX
Item quaeritur, quomodo intelligitur immortalitas, cum dicitur: Solus habet immortalitatem, et dicit Augustinus, quod accipitur pro incommutabilitate; sed hoc non videtur conveniens. Mors enim non dicit omnem mutabilitatem, sed solum corruptibilitatem viventium: ergo non idem est dicere.
Respondeo: Sicut vita accipitur communiter et proprie, ita et mors, ita et immortalitas. Uno enim modo dicitur vita actus continuus et internus, qui est a forma spirituali; et sic dicitur proprie, et sic immortalitas dicit vitam talem cum impossibilitate ad eius privationem. Alio modo dicitur vita actus completus potentiae, quae est secundum rei naturam, sicut dicitur aqua viva, quae habet operationem aquae convenientem; et hoc modo importat repugnantiam ad corruptionem. Et ideo debet dici secundum hanc vitam immortale quod est ita in actu completo, quod nullo modo potest aliquam peiorationem recipere; et sic accipit Apostolus et exponit Augustinus.
DUB. X
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit beatus Iacobus et est in littera: Nec vicissitudinis obumbratio; quae differentia est inter vicissitudinem et obumbrationem, et quae convenientia, ratione cuius dicatur vicissitudo obumbrare?
Et dicendum, quod vicissitudo importat numerum vicis, et iste est numerus cum interruptione; sed obumbratio dicitur per privationem actus lucis. Quoniam igitur actus formae lux est, privatio eius recte dicitur obumbratio; et quia vicissitudo ratione numeri dicit interruptionem, et ratione interruptionis dicit privationem, et ratione privationis obumbrationem, hinc est, quod recte dicitur vicissitudinis obumbratio.
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DOUBT I
In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first there occurs a doubt about what the Master says: Now concerning the truth or property of the divine essence etc. For he seems to speak badly, because everything that has a property is distinguished; but the divine essence is not distinguishable: therefore it does not have a property.
I respond:1 It must be said that the divine essence is distinguishable in the same way as it has properties, and conversely; because although in itself it is not distinguishable by a multiplication of itself nor from a person by diversity, nevertheless it is distinguishable with respect to created essence, with respect to which it has these properties.
DOUBT II
Likewise it is asked about those three properties which he lays down, namely about truth, immutability, simplicity, since there are many other conditions of the divine essence, why does he treat only of these three?
I respond: It must be said that through these three properties uncreated being is sufficiently distinguished from created. For the created,2 by the very fact that it is created, has being after non-being, and so an empty and possible being: therefore it has being mixed with possibility, and on this account it falls short of truth, of stability, and of simplicity. Uncreated being, on the contrary, has the contrary properties, and in these it is sufficiently distinguished. For truth regards what it is, immutability that by which it is,3 simplicity both. Therefore the sufficiency and order are clear.
DOUBT III
Likewise it is asked about what he says, that wisdom is named from to-be-wise, because he does not seem to speak truly. For just as whiteness stands to the white, so wisdom to to-be-wise; but whiteness is not named from white, but rather conversely4: therefore etc.
I respond: It must be said that according to the composing intellect to-be-wise is named from wisdom, because the composing intellect proceeds from the abstract to the concrete; but according to the resolving intellect it is conversely; and Augustine speaks with respect to this. — Or it could be said that he speaks according to the consideration of the grammarian, not of the logician.5
DOUBT IV
Likewise it is asked about what he says: Who is more than he who said to his servant. For he seems to speak badly, because being does not admit of more and less, and most of all in God.
I respond: It must be said that more and less can be considered in two ways, namely in comparison to the same; and thus6 they signify intensification and remission;
or in comparison to different substances and natures; and thus they signify degree and excess, and thus it is good7 to posit more and less in being with respect to Creator and creature, and with respect to creatures among themselves. But in the comparison of Creator to creature there is a disproportionate and infinite excess; with respect to creatures among themselves it is proportionate.
DOUBT V
Likewise it is asked about what he says: Whose essence does not know past or future. For this property seems to belong also to the Angels, since Augustine in De Civitate Dei8 says that «the immortality of the Angels is not past, as though it were not, nor future, as though it were not yet», but is always present: therefore it is not proper to God alone.
I respond: Some say that the duration of aeviternity is simple and all at once, not having past and future; nevertheless the aeviternal thing itself9 has past and future as to its affections; and so10 it is proper to God alone.
Others say that in every created duration, since it differs from the one enduring and11 has possible being, there is a before and after; but they distinguish in the before and after. For there is something which signifies the succession of duration, and something the duration of succession with variation and innovation. The first is in aeviternity, the second in time; and this Anselm12 expressly maintains, and this I believe more probable. And the response to the word of Augustine is clear; for he speaks of a before and after which indeed signifies innovation and variation and corruption.
DOUBT VI
Likewise it is asked about what he says, that our being is nothing compared to the divine essence. For this seems false, because what belongs to something substantially is not taken away by any comparison; but being is substantial to each thing: therefore etc. Likewise from comparison to God a creature is improved, as Augustine says13, therefore it is more than if it were not compared: therefore etc.
I respond: Such a comparison can be taken in two ways. In one way according to the relation of influence and reception; and thus a creature compared to God is more than if it were not compared. In the other way it is compared according to the relation of equiparation and proportion; and in this way it is true that none14 is proportionable according to the condition of the truth and nobility of the divine being; and therefore it is as if nothing, not entirely in itself, but nothing as to proportion, because no quantitative proportion can be found.
DOUBT VII
Likewise it is asked about what he says: Let it therefore be said that he always was, is, and will be. For these words seem not to be said15 of God, because they signify different times; but in God no diversity of times falls.
I respond: Some have wished to say that these acts do not predicate of God different times according to essence, but according to concomitance; because the divine being, altogether unvaried, is accompanied by every time. But this position does not fully solve. For it is truly said that God was before every time; then16 therefore it cannot signify concomitance. — Therefore others say that time as cosignified is not a disposition of the thing received or understood, when it is said of God, but only of the mode of understanding; but when said of a mutable thing, in both ways. The example is plain from masculinity17 in a stone and in a man: for in a man it is as a disposition of the thing received, in a stone only as a mode of understanding. But this position does not seem sufficient, because the intellect does not posit a past about its own understanding when it understands that God was: therefore it is necessary that it posit it about the thing.
On account of this it must be noted that words of different times are said in one way of the eternal, in another of the aeviternal, in another of the temporal. For with respect to the temporal they import mutability and succession and duration. According to how they are said of aeviternal things, they import only two things, succession and duration, as Jerome,18 Augustine, and Anselm hold. But according to how they are said of God, they import only duration. Hence it is said: God was, because his du-
ration did not begin; is, because his duration is not interrupted; will be, because it does not cease nor is it corrupted. Strictly speaking, therefore, they are not said of God, as Jerome says: but broadly speaking, they are said, as the Master and Augustine say; and to this the Master's opinion tends.19
DOUBT VIII
Likewise it is asked about the word of Hilary: Being is not an accident to God etc., because being is not an accident to a creature either — for being is in no way accidental to anything whatever — how then is it noted through this that God differs from a creature?
I respond: It must be said that an accident signifies something whose nature is to be in another, to come forth from another, and to depart from it. For an accident is what is in a subject and draws its origin from it, and on this account can be present and absent. In these three properties created being shares, though not in entirely the same way. For our being depends on another that sustains it, arises from another that effects it, and the creature is of a nature even to lose its being: therefore its being is as it were an accident, yet not truly an accident, because, although it depends on God, it does not depend as on a subject. The contrary is in God; and therefore Hilary says that being is not an accident to God; and this on account of the contrary properties: because an accident is of a nature to be in another, on this account he says: subsisting truth; because it is of a nature to come forth from another, against this he says: abiding cause; because it is of a nature also to depart from another, against this he says: the property of the natural genus, which does not let go of being.
DOUBT IX
Likewise it is asked, how immortality is to be understood, when it is said: He alone has immortality, and Augustine says that it is taken for incommutability; but this does not seem fitting. For death does not signify every mutability, but only the corruptibility of living things: therefore it is not the same thing to say.
I respond: Just as life is taken commonly and properly, so also death, so also immortality. For in one way life is called a continuous and internal act which is from a spiritual form; and so it is called properly, and so immortality signifies such a life with an impossibility of its privation. In another way life is called the complete act of a potency that is according to the nature of the thing, as living water is so called which has the operation appropriate to water; and in this way it imports a repugnance to corruption. And therefore according to this life that must be called immortal which is so in complete act that it can in no way receive any worsening; and so the Apostle takes it and Augustine expounds it.
DOUBT X
Likewise it is asked about what blessed James says and which is in the text: Nor a shadow of vicissitude; what is the difference between vicissitude and adumbration, and what the agreement, by reason of which vicissitude is said to overshadow?
And it must be said that vicissitude implies the number of a turn, and this is a number with interruption; but adumbration is so called by the privation of the act of light. Since therefore the act of form is light, its privation is rightly called adumbration; and because vicissitude by reason of number signifies interruption, and by reason of interruption signifies privation, and by reason of privation adumbration, hence it is that it is rightly called a shadow of vicissitude.
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- Vat. cum cod. cc, ceteris tamen codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, addit Ad quod. Mox plerique codd. ut A F G K S V W X non bene illo pro eo, alii vero ut H T aa bb illo.The Vatican edition with codex cc, against the other codices and ed. 1, adds Ad quod. Shortly after, most codices such as A F G K S V W X (not well) [read] illo for eo, while others such as H T aa bb [read] illo.
- Aliqui codd. ut F T dd repetunt hic esse. Mox ed. 1 post creatum addit est.Some codices such as F T dd repeat esse here. Shortly after, ed. 1 adds est after creatum.
- Plurimi codd. omittunt est.Very many codices omit est.
- Plures mss. cum ed. 1 e converso.Several manuscripts with ed. 1 [read] e converso.
- De intellectu resolvente sive analytico, et componente sive synthetico vide infra d. 28. dub. 1, et IV. Sent. d. 50. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. — Secunda solutio inde sumitur, quod grammatici formam verborum abstractam derivant a forma concreta, logici autem sive philosophi (Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 1.) e contrario. Cfr. infra d. 33. q. 3.On the resolving or analytic intellect, and the composing or synthetic, see below d. 28. dub. 1, and IV Sent. d. 50. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. — The second solution is taken from this, that grammarians derive the abstract form of words from the concrete form, but logicians or philosophers (Aristotle, Categories ch. 1) [do] the contrary. Compare below d. 33. q. 3.
- Vat. praeter fidem omnium mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 addit non, sed falso, quia iuxta omnes Scholasticos intensio et remissio est motus eiusdem v. g. caloris a statu imperfectiore ad perfectiorem et viceversa. Vide S. Thomam, qui hic circa litteram idem dubium solvit consimili distinctione, scilicet: Magis et minus potest dici aliquid vel quantum ad ipsam naturam participatam, quae secundum se intenditur et remittitur secundum accessum ad terminum vel recessum; et hoc non est nisi in accidentibus; vel quantum ad modum participandi; et sic etiam in essentialibus dicitur magis et minus secundum diversum modum participandi, sicut Angelus dicitur magis intellectualis quam homo.The Vatican edition, against the testimony of all manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, adds non, but falsely, because according to all the Scholastics intensification and remission is a motion of the same thing, e.g. of heat, from a less perfect state to a more perfect and conversely. See St. Thomas, who here on the text resolves the same doubt with a similar distinction, namely: More and less can be said of a thing either as regards the participated nature itself, which in itself is intensified and remitted according to its approach to or recession from the term; and this is only in accidents; or as regards the mode of participating; and thus also in essentials more and less is said according to the different mode of participating, as an Angel is said to be more intellectual than a man.
- Cod. T vermi, cod. W ibi pro bene.Codex T [reads] vermi, codex W ibi in place of bene.
- Libr. XII. c. 15. n. 2.Book XII, ch. 15, n. 2.
- Hoc est res aeviterna sive subiectum aevi v. g. Angelus. — Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 non bene addit seu aeternum, quia non est idem cum aeviterno.That is, an aeviternal thing or the subject of aeviternity, e.g. an Angel. — The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, not well adds or eternal, because it is not the same as the aeviternal.
- Supple: non noscere sive non habere praeteritum vel futurum.Supply: not to know, or not to have, past or future.
- Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 etiam, et paulo post cum priori et posteriori (nonnulli codd. habent quidem cum loco est, sed solus cod. cc cum priori et posteriori). Pro nostra lectione militant etiam ea quae S. Doctor II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. habet, ubi fusius hanc quaestionem pertractans, ex creaturae possibilitate sive ex eo, quod nulla creatura omnino est actus, deducit durationem successionis sive prius et posterius in aevo. — Mox Vat., omnibus mss. et sex primis edd. obnitentibus, de loco in. Paulo infra post successionem cod. I satis bene addit sine variatione et innovatione.The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] etiam, and a little after with before and after (some codices indeed have cum in place of est, but only codex cc [has] with before and after). For our reading there also fight the things which the holy Doctor has in II Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. in corp., where, treating this question more fully, from the possibility of the creature, or from the fact that no creature is wholly act, he deduces the duration of succession or the before and after in aeviternity. — Shortly after, the Vatican edition, against all the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] de loco in [sic — Quaracchi prints the Vatican lemma as it stands]. A little below, after successionem, codex I quite well adds without variation and innovation.
- Vide Monolog. c. 28. et Proslog. c. 20. et 22.See Monologion ch. 28, and Proslogion ch. 20 and 22.
- Libr. I. de Genes. ad lit. c. 3. n. 9–10, et libr. contra Epist. Manichaei, c. 40. n. 46.Book I, On Genesis according to the letter, ch. 3, nn. 9–10, and the book Against the Epistle of Manichaeus, ch. 40, n. 46.
- Subaudi: creatura. — Vat. autem cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, addit ratio et paulo infra loco ad proportionem habet a proportione.Understand: creature. — The Vatican edition with codex cc, against the other codices and ed. 1, adds ratio, and a little below in place of ad proportionem has a proportione.
- Plurimis codd. obnitentibus, Vat. praemittit debere.Against very many codices, the Vatican edition prefixes debere.
- Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 supplevimus tunc.From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have supplied tunc.
- Substituimus fide antiquorum mss. et ed. 1 masculinitate pro masculino genere.On the authority of the ancient manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted masculinitate for masculino genere.
- De Hieronymo vide notam hic in lit. Magistri c. 1. — Augustini et Anselmi textus accipe ex dub. 5. — Cfr. Scot., I. Sent. d. 9. q. unica in fine. — Paulo ante post important aliqui codd. ut F aa bb cum ed. 1 addunt scilicet, aliqui ut G I n et.On Jerome see the note here on the Master's text, ch. 1. — Take the texts of Augustine and Anselm from dub. 5. — Compare Scotus, I Sent. d. 9. q. unica at the end. — Shortly before, after important, some codices such as F aa bb with ed. 1 add scilicet, others such as G I n [add] et.
- Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 3. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 10. a. 5.Compare Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 3. — St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 10, a. 5.