Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8
Quaestio IV. Utrum Deus sit in aliquo determinato genere sive praedicamento.
Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum Deus sit in aliquo determinato genere. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.
1. Quod distinguitur ab aliis entibus, est aliqua natura determinata; sed Deus est huiusmodi, quia distinguitur a creaturis omnibus, quia nullum creatum est Deus: ergo est natura determinata; sed quod est natura determinata est in genere determinato1: ergo etc.
2. Item, quod habet superius univocum et essentiale, habet esse in genere determinato; sed Deus habet superius se2, ut substantiam, quae dicitur de Deo et creaturis et essentialiter et univoce, quia secundum istam rationem quae est, res per se existens: ergo etc.
3. Item, quod sit in quolibet genere, videtur. Quia omne, quod est completionis3 in creatura, attribuendum est Deo; sed omne praedicamentum habet aliquid completionis: ergo res omnium praedicamentorum sunt in Deo; sed quidquid est in Deo est Deus, et e converso4: ergo Deus essentialiter subiicitur rei omnis praedicamenti: ergo est in quolibet.
4. Item, summo bono nihil deficit de bonitate: ergo summo enti nihil5 de entitate: ergo in Deo est omnis entitas et omnis differentia entitatis: ergo cum differentiae entium sint decem praedicamenta, omnia sunt in Deo.
Contra:
1. Augustinus in libro quinto de Trinitate6: «Deus est bonus sine qualitate, magnus sine quantitate»: ergo magnitudo Dei non est in genere quantitatis nec bonitas in genere qualitatis: ergo nec substantia in genere substantiae: ergo in nullo est7.
2. Item, videtur quod non est in genere determinato; quia omne, quod est in genere determinato, habet esse finitum et limitatum; Deus autem est infinitus: ergo etc.
3. Item, quod non in quolibet genere, videtur, quia quod habet in se res plurium generum est compositum; Deus autem est simplicissimus: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Deus nec est in aliquo determinato genere, nec in pluribus.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod non convenit Deo8 esse in uno genere determinato, quia omne tale habet esse limitatum et arctatum et compositum. In pluribus9 generibus non potest esse. Aut enim aliquid est in pluribus propter naturarum et proprietatum diversitatem, ut album, in quantum dicit subiectum aliquod sive rem albam, est in genere substantiae, sed in quantum dicit formam, quae est albedo, est in praedicamento qualitatis; aut propter generalitatem, sicut unum et ens.
Propter naturarum multiformitatem10 non potest Deus esse in pluribus, quia omne tale compositum est et multiforme, Deus autem simplex. Non propter generalitatem, quia ens tale nihil est habens11 distinctum a rebus creatis. Deus autem est habens in se ens distinctum a rebus, et habens esse simplex et infinitum; et ideo nec in uno genere nec in pluribus esse potest.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod distinguitur ab aliis, est natura distincta etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, si distinguatur per aliquid, quod ipsum12 contrahat et arctet, sicut per differentiam cadentem in genere; Deus autem non sic distinguitur, sed se ipso.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus habet superius univocum; dicendum, quod Deo non est superius, quia13 non est simplicius; nec univocum,
quia illa ratio non convenit uniformiter creaturae et Creatori. Deus enim est ens per se, quia nullo egens; creatura est ens per se, quia non est in alio ut in subiecto, eget tamen alio ad sui conservationem.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne, quod est perfectionis et bonitatis, ponendum est in Deo; dicendum, quod hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel per14 diversitatem, et hoc facit esse in diversis generibus; vel secundum omnimodam unitatem, et hoc facit esse extra omne genus.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod Deo nihil deficit de bonitate; dicendum, quod Deus non dicitur non deficiens a bonitate propter hoc, quod omnis differentia boni particularis sit in Deo per differentiam, sed quia est in eo per aequivalentiam15. Quia enim est summum bonum, complectitur in se bonum omne; sic intelligendum est de entitate; et sic patet illud.
I. Genus determinatum, de quo est quaestio, est genus logicum seu praedicamentum, quod praedicatur de pluribus specie differentibus, v. g. substantia. — Aliqui Nominales, ut Gregorius Ariminensis, contra communem et veram sententiam affirmarunt, Deum esse in genere substantiae. Quaestionem S. Doctor duplici conclusione solvit docendo, Deum nec esse in uno determinato genere, nec esse in pluribus simul. Quod non sit in pluribus, probat per partes: cum enim duplici modo aliquid esse possit in pluribus praedicamentis, neuter modus Deo convenit. Primus modus patet ex littera; secundus modus est «propter generalitatem, sicut unum et ens». Quod ut intelligatur, sciendum, quod ens, unum, verum, bonum vocantur transcendentia, quia ita ponuntur in omnibus praedicamentis, ut praedicentur quidem de eis, sed non sint aliquod praedicamentum. Non enim haec transcendentia esse habent distinctum a praedicamentis, in quibus ponuntur, v. g. ens in praedicamento substantiae est substantia, in praedicamento quantitatis est quantitas. Unde hic modus minime convenit Deo, qui habet esse omnino determinatum et distinctum a rebus. Hac doctrina eliditur pantheismus.
II. Solutio ad 1. eruitur ex distinctione inter naturam determinatam per aliquam differentiam, et determinatam per se ipsam; in primo casu differentia contrahit genus ad aliquam speciem, quae est in aliquo praedicamento; tunc et ipsa natura, sic determinata, est in hoc praedicamento. Aliter dicendum de Deo, qui est actus purissimus, determinatus per se et ideo extra omne praedicamentum. Cfr. Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.
III. Quoad rem principalem antiqui doctores consentiunt. De sententia S. Thomae, qui in Commentar. (hic q. 4. a. 2.), paulo aliter loquitur quam in Summa (I. q. 3. a. 5. 7.), cfr. Caietanus ad ult. locum. — Scot. (hic q. 3. n. 20.) non conclusionem, sed tantum eam rationem oppugnat, quae a S. Thom. ex hoc eruitur, quod Deus omnium generum perfectiones in se continet. Tamen Scot. (loc. cit. n. 16.) putat, rationem entis Deo et creaturis univoce convenire, quod quomodo cohaereat cum aliis doctrinis Scoti varie a Scotistis explicatur. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 2. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 32; S. tr. 4. q. 20. m. 3. in fine. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 26. — Durand., II. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 6. — Biel, hic q. 1. 2.
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Question IV. Whether God is in any determinate genus or predicament.
Fourthly and lastly it is asked whether God is in any determinate genus. And that he is, is shown thus.
1. That which is distinguished from other beings is some determinate nature; but God is of this sort, since he is distinguished from all creatures, because no creature is God: therefore he is a determinate nature; but what is a determinate nature is in a determinate genus1: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, that which has something univocal and essential above itself has its being in a determinate genus; but God has above himself2 substance, which is said of God and of creatures both essentially and univocally, since according to that account it is a thing existing through itself: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, that he is in every genus appears thus. Because everything that belongs to completion3 in a creature is to be attributed to God; but every predicament has something of completion: therefore the realities of all the predicaments are in God; but whatever is in God is God, and conversely4: therefore God is essentially subject to the reality of every predicament: therefore he is in every one.
4. Likewise, to the highest good nothing of goodness is lacking: therefore to the highest being nothing5 of entity is lacking: therefore in God is every entity and every difference of entity: therefore, since the differences of beings are the ten predicaments, all are in God.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine in the fifth book On the Trinity6: «God is good without quality, great without quantity»: therefore the greatness of God is not in the genus of quantity, nor his goodness in the genus of quality: therefore neither his substance in the genus of substance: therefore he is in none7.
2. Likewise, it appears that he is not in a determinate genus; because everything that is in a determinate genus has being that is finite and limited; but God is infinite: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, that he is not in every genus appears, because that which has in itself the realities of several genera is composite; but God is most simple: therefore etc.
Conclusion. God is neither in any determinate genus, nor in several.
I respond: It must be said that it is not fitting for God8 to be in one determinate genus, because every such thing has being that is limited and contracted and composite. In several9 genera he cannot be. For either something is in several on account of the diversity of natures and properties — as white, insofar as it signifies some subject or white thing, is in the genus of substance, but insofar as it signifies the form, which is whiteness, is in the predicament of quality — or on account of generality, as one and being.
On account of the multiformity of natures10 God cannot be in several, because everything such is composite and multiform, whereas God is simple. Nor on account of generality, because such a being is nothing having11 anything distinct from created things. But God is one having in himself a being distinct from things, and having simple and infinite being; and therefore he can be neither in one genus nor in several.
To the arguments:
To 1. To that which is objected, that what is distinguished from others is a distinct nature, etc.; it must be said that this is true, if it be distinguished by something which contracts and constricts it12, as by a difference falling within a genus; but God is not so distinguished, but by himself.
To 2. To that which is objected, that God has something univocal above himself; it must be said that nothing is above God, because13 nothing is simpler; nor univocal,
because that account does not apply uniformly to creature and Creator. For God is a being through himself, because needing nothing; a creature is a being through itself, because it is not in another as in a subject, yet it needs another for its conservation.
To 3. To that which is objected, that everything that belongs to perfection and goodness is to be placed in God; it must be said that this can be in two ways: either by14 diversity, and this causes it to be in diverse genera; or according to entire unity, and this causes it to be outside every genus.
To 4. To that which is objected last, that to God nothing of goodness is lacking; it must be said that God is not called non-deficient in goodness on the ground that every difference of particular good is in God by way of difference, but because it is in him by equivalence15. For since he is the highest good, he encompasses in himself every good; the same is to be understood of entity; and so that point is plain.
I. The determinate genus, of which the question is, is the logical genus or predicament which is predicated of several things differing in species, e.g. substance. — Some Nominalists, such as Gregory of Rimini, against the common and true opinion affirmed that God is in the genus of substance. The holy Doctor resolves the question with a twofold conclusion, teaching that God is neither in one determinate genus, nor in several at once. That he is not in several, he proves by parts: for since something can be in several predicaments in a twofold way, neither way is fitting to God. The first way is plain from the text; the second way is "on account of generality, as one and being". That this may be understood, it must be known that being, one, true, good are called transcendentals, because they are so placed in all the predicaments that they are indeed predicated of them, but are not any predicament. For these transcendentals do not have being distinct from the predicaments in which they are placed, e.g. being in the predicament of substance is substance, in the predicament of quantity is quantity. Hence this mode least of all befits God, who has being altogether determinate and distinct from things. By this doctrine pantheism is refuted.
II. The solution to argument 1 is drawn from the distinction between a nature determined through some difference, and one determined through itself; in the first case the difference contracts the genus to some species, which is in some predicament; then that nature, so determined, is in this predicament. Otherwise it must be said of God, who is most pure act, determined through himself and therefore outside every predicament. Cf. Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2.
III. As to the principal matter the ancient doctors agree. On the opinion of St. Thomas, who in the Commentary (here q. 4. a. 2.) speaks somewhat otherwise than in the Summa (I. q. 3. a. 5. 7.), cf. Cajetan on the latter place. — Scotus (here q. 3. n. 20.) opposes not the conclusion, but only that argument which is drawn by St. Thomas from this, that God contains in himself the perfections of all the genera. Yet Scotus (loc. cit. n. 16.) holds that the account of being belongs univocally to God and to creatures, which how it coheres with the other doctrines of Scotus is variously explained by the Scotists. — Alex. of Hales, S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 2. 3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 32; S. tr. 4. q. 20. m. 3. at the end. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 5. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4. q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here 1. princ. q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 26. — Durandus, II. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 6. — Biel, here q. 1. 2.
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- Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. in princ., ubi quinque a Scholasticis communiter receptae conditiones pro eo quod aliquid ponatur in genere determinato assignantur, scil. quod sit univocum, quod sit ens incomplexum seu ens per se unum, quod sit ens reale, quod sit universale vel particulare, quod sit ens finitum seu quid determinabile ad specialem modum entis.Cf. Aristotle, Categories at the beginning, where the five conditions commonly received by the Scholastics for something to be placed in a determinate genus are laid down, namely: that it be univocal, that it be an incomplex being or a being one through itself, that it be a real being, that it be universal or particular, that it be a finite being or something determinable to a special mode of being.
- Plures codd. ut ABDFGKST etc. cum ed. 1 re loco se.Several codices such as ABDFGKST etc., together with the first edition, read re in place of se.
- Hoc est, perfectionis. — Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 15.That is, of perfection. — Cf. Anselm, Monologion c. 15.
- Cfr. Boeth., de Trin. c. 4, et Alan. ab Insul., Regul. theolog., reg. 9.Cf. Boethius, On the Trinity c. 4, and Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 9.
- Cod. V et ed. 1 repetunt hic deficit.Codex V and the first edition here repeat deficit.
- Cap. 1. n. 2: Ut sic intelligamus Deum.... sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum.Chap. 1, n. 2: That we may so understand God.... good without quality, great without quantity.
- Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus est.From the more ancient manuscripts and the first edition we have supplied est.
- Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. addit etiam.The Vatican edition, contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and of the six earliest editions, adds etiam.
- Quae, sicut et res, aliquid, verum, bonum propter maximam universalitatem, qua in omnibus generibus implicantur, vocantur transcendentalia.Which, like res, aliquid, verum, bonum, on account of their highest universality — by which they are implicated in all the genera — are called transcendentalia (transcendentals).
- Vat. multiplicitatem, sed contra mss. et ed. 1.The Vatican edition reads multiplicitatem, but against the manuscripts and the first edition.
- Unus alterve codex ut E V omittit habens.One or another codex such as E V omits habens.
- Cod. V rationem loco ipsum.Codex V reads rationem in place of ipsum.
- Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum eo, et paulo post substituimus illa pro substantiae.On the testimony of the more ancient manuscripts and the first edition we have removed the added eo here, and a little after we have substituted illa for substantiae.
- Codd. V X secundum, et paulo infra cod. T uniformitatem loco unitatem.Codices V and X read secundum, and a little after codex T reads uniformitatem in place of unitatem.
- Hoc est, per eminentiam seu eminenter.That is, by way of eminence or eminently.