Dist. 13, Art. 3, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 13
Quaestio II. Utrum lumen sit forma substantialis, an accidentalis.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum lumen sit forma substantialis, vel accidentalis. Et quod sit forma accidentalis, videtur.
Fundamenta.
1. Quod advenit iam completo in esse est accidentale1; sed lumen advenit aëri iam completo in esse: ergo est accidentale.
2. Item, «quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem, est accidens2»; lumen adest et abest praeter aëris corruptionem, quod est subiectum eius: ergo etc.
3. Item, sicut se habet color ad corpus terminatum, ita se habet lumen ad corpus transparens3; sed color est accidens in corpore terminato: ergo lumen est accidens in corpore transparenti.
4. Item, si unum oppositorum, in subiecto existens, est accidens, et reliquum est accidens4; sed obnubilatio accidit ipsi aëri: ergo pari ratione et illuminatio.
Ad oppositum:
1. Impossibile est, duo accidentia eiusdem speciei esse in eodem subiecto, quia accidens numeratur per subiectum, in quo est: sed duo lumina, sicut dicit Dionysius5, sunt in eodem aëris medio: ergo impossibile est, lumen esse accidens aëris.
2. Item, accidens cum generatur, ex propriis principiis subiecti habet ortum, et cum resolvitur, resolvitur in suum subiectum6; sed lumen nec educitur ex aëre nec resolvitur in aërem: ergo lumen non est accidens aëris. Et constat, quod est in aëre: ergo si eius non est accidens, nullius est accidens.
3. Item, nullum accidens transit a subiecto in subiectum7; sed radius mutatur ab una parte aëris in aliam, et lumen similiter: ergo lumen accidens esse non potest.
4. Item, nullum accidens manet immobile, moto eo in quo est8; sed radius manet immobilis, moto aëre: ergo radius accidens non est. Si tu dicas, hoc esse propter hoc, quod lumen in medio habet esse spirituale, sicut idolum9; obiicitur contra hoc, quia radius et lumen habet ibi operationem naturalem et principium operationis naturalis: ergo videtur, quod sit ibi naturaliter et concrete, non spiritualiter et abstracte.
CONCLUSIO.
Lumen in medio, quatenus dicit vim activam, dicit substantiam, habentem modum accidentis; quatenus dicit qualitatem sensibilem, dicit accidens, quod non plene habet rationem accidentis naturalis, sed similitudinis vel intentionis.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc triplex est modus dicendi, quorum quilibet supponit, lumen in medio esse formam, sive qualitatem aliquam.
Opinio 1. Quidam enim dicunt, quod lumen in medio est substantia; existit tamen in medio per modum accidentis, quia non est ipsi aëri substantialis; et hoc dicunt propter hoc, quod generatio luminis a luce est secundum viam univocationis10; et ideo, cum lux sit forma substantialis in suo fonte, dicunt, lumen substantiam esse in medio, licet modum essendi habeat accidentalem, maxime cum luminis et lucis non videatur alia essentia esse, sed solummodo differre videantur per modum essendi sive per esse.
Sed quia lumen in medio est illud quod Opinio 2. potissime sentitur et facit alia sentiri11; ideo est secunda positio, quod lumen in medio est accidens; non enim causatur a corpore luminoso, nisi in quantum fulgidum est; et ita est accidens per comparationem ad principium a quo. Dicunt etiam, quod est accidens per comparationem ad subiectum in quo, quia advenit iam completo et potest adesse et abesse praeter subiecti corruptionem; et ita plenam rationem accidentis habet lumen in medio, non tamen per comparationem ad idem. Accidens enim habet comparari ad substantiam sicut ad subiectum et causam; lumen vero, etsi his duobus modis habeat comparari ad substantiam, non tamen ad eandem, quia ad aërem comparatur sicut ad subiectum, quia est in illo; ad corpus luminosum, sicut ad principium, quia est ab illo12.
Sed quia lumen, prout est in medio existens, habet se ipso sentiri, ita quod positum supra sensum sensum facit; et iterum, in eadem parte medii habet sine confusione multiplicari, secundum positionem Dionysii: ideo est Opinio 3. tertia positio, quod lumen in medio nec est substantia nec est accidens proprie, quia non habet ibi esse naturale et materiae concretum, sed spirituale et abstractum. Unde dicunt, quod sicut comparatur species coloris in medio ad colorem existentem in corpore obiecto; sic lumen in medio ad lucem existentem in corpore luminoso. — Improbatur. Sed cum lumen in medio non solum habeat operationem spiritualem in animam, sed etiam naturalem in corpora naturalia; non solum videtur esse in aëre per modum spiritualem, sive esse ibi per modum habitus, sed etiam aliquo modo secundum esse naturale; et ita videtur, quod illud non sufficiat dicere, quamvis videatur esse valde verisimile.
Iudicium de praedictis. Propterea intelligendum est, quod omnes modi praedicti aliquid veritatis in se continent, et ex omnibus his elicitur una veritas integra; quod patet sic. — Lumen dicit 1. virtutem activam. Lumen enim in medio dicit virtutem activam, egredientem a corpore luminoso, per quam corpus luminosum agit et imprimit in haec inferiora; et haec est virtus substantialis ipsi corpori13. Et de hac dicit Damascenus, quod lumen, quod est ex igne, non est aliquid ministeriale ipsius ignis vel accidentale, sed virtus ei connaturalis et consubstantialis, sicut patet in auctoritate inducta in praecedenti problemate14; et haec virtus non est sensu perceptibilis nec solummodo operatur in sensu visus, sed etiam facit ad eductionem omnium sensuum in actum, sicut dicit Augustinus septimo super Genesim ad litteram15, quod habitum est in quadam auctoritate prius inducta. Sic etiam dicunt philosophi, quod corpus caeleste mediante suo lumine influit usque ad profundum terrae, ubi mineralia corpora generari habent. Et quantum ad hoc verum dicunt qui dicunt, quod lumen dicit substantiam accidentaliter ad aërem comparatam, sicut virtus agentis ad deferens quodammodo accidentaliter comparatur.
2. qualitatem sensibilem. Non solum autem lumen dicit illam vim activam, quam non percipit sensus, sed etiam quandam qualitatem sensibilem, qua sensus visus efficitur sentiens in actu; et illa est qualitas accidentalis in tertia specie qualitatis. Et secundum hoc dicit Avicenna in libro de Sufficientia naturali16, quod «lumen est affectio corporis habentis lucem, cum oppositum fuerit illi», scilicet pervium. Et sic verum dicebat illa secunda opinio, quae dicebat, lumen esse accidens, non solum per comparationem ad aërem, in quo recipitur, sed etiam in comparatione ad corpus, a quo causatur, quia ab ipso oritur, in quantum illud17 est fulgidum et habet esse obiectum sensus.
Notandum. Secundum autem utramque istarum naturarum in lumine repertarum lumen ad aërem comparatur, non sicut ad primum subiectum, sed sicut ad deferens et ad medium; et ideo per comparationem ad ipsum aërem non habet modum existendi naturalem, sed per modum habitus; nec est forma naturalis, sed potius similitudo eius; sicut species18 in medio non est proprie color, sed ut color sive similitudo coloris. Maximam tamen habet approximationem ad illum; et adeo illi innititur, ut non indigeat principio extrinseco, ex quo educatur. Unde lumen in medio non habet principium materiale
ex quo, sed potius originale, a quo fluit et ad quod etiam redit, cum in medio desinit esse, sicut dicitur de similitudine. Et hoc modo dicit Commentator super secundum de Anima19, quod lux est habitus diaphani, et quod est in ipso, sicut intentio vel species vel similitudo. Et quartum ad hoc verum dicebat tertia opinio.
Conclusio de membris. Ex his igitur patet, quod lumen in medio, in quantum dicit vim activam, dicit substantiam, habentem modum accidentis; in quantum dicit qualitatem sensibilem, dicit accidens. Sed accidens illud relatum ad aërem non habet plene rationem accidentis naturalis, sed similitudinis vel intentionis, quia est ibi non sicut in subiecto sustinente, sed sicut in deferente20. — Ex his patent rationes ad utramque partem.
Ad fundamenta.
1. 2. Quod enim obiicitur, quod advenit iam completo et recedit21 praeter subiecti corruptionem, hoc ostendit, quod habet modum accidentis, secundum quod est in medio.
3. 4. Quod vero obiicit, quod se habet ad modum coloris et est qualitas sensibilis; de lumine loquitur, secundum quod in se habet naturam accidentis.
Ad opposita. Rationes vero ad oppositum, quae probant, quod non sit accidens, quia non numeratur a numeratione subiecti, quia non movetur ad motum aëris, quia non causatur ab aëre nec resolvitur in aërem; concludunt solum, quod non habet ibi plene rationem accidentis naturalis, De accidente naturali. quod comparatur ad illud, in quo est, sicut ad subiectum et causam, et quod etiam sustinetur et dependet ab eo, in quo est, principaliter et ei coniungitur inseparabili vinculo. — De lumine ut accidente. Hoc autem non est in proposito, quia lumen, quamvis sit in aëre, causatur a corpore luminoso et ab illo principaliter dependet; nec est in aëre sicut in sustinente, sed sicut in deferente; et ideo durationem et mutationem et numerationem potius recipit a lucido influente quam ab aëre suscipiente. Et ob hoc dicit Dionysius22, plura lumina esse in eodem medio inconfusa et convelli sive separari ab invicem secundum absentationem corporum illuminantium. Distinctio enim illa est propter continuationem luminum cum sua origine, a qua procedunt naturaliter et virtute eius agunt, quamvis in medio sint quodam modo spiritualiter et abstracte. Et sic cetera circa hoc quaesita iam patent.
I. Hic agitur de lumine, inquantum est in medio, non in corpore luminoso. S. Bonav. hoc iterum dupliciter distinguit, scil. quatenus est virtus activa, non sensibilis, quae multiplicem actionem habet in hunc mundum corporeum et egreditur a corpore luminoso, cui est consubstantialis; et quatenus est phaenomenon visibile et accidentalis qualitas sensibilis. De natura huius qualitatis dissentiunt Scholastici, cum «distinguatur qualitas in qualitatem sensibilem, et in qualitatem, quae est species sive intentio qualitatis sensibilis» (Scot. hic q. unica, n. 3.). Controvertitur autem, utrum lumen sensibile sit qualitas intentionalis et non naturalis, an naturalis et non intentionalis, an formaliter tum naturalis tum intentionalis. Quae controversia ut melius intelligatur, duo praenotamus.
1. Quoad sensum termini intentio Scot. (II. Report. hic q. unica n. 4.) dicit: «Nomen intentio aequivocum uno modo dicitur actus voluntatis; secundo, ratio formalis in re, sicut intentio rei, a qua accipitur genus, differt ab intentione, a qua accipitur differentia; tertio modo dicitur conceptus; quarto, ratio tendendi in obiectum, sicut similitudo dicitur ratio tendendi in illud cuius est. Et isto modo dicitur lumen intentio vel species lucis».
2. Scholastici communiter loquuntur de duabus generationibus formarum, quae experientia comprobantur, scil. formarum realium, quae in generatione educuntur de potentia materiae, et intentionalium, quae non educuntur de potentia materiae. De differentia et similitudine utriusque generationis plura profert Aegid. R. (hic q. 2. a. 2. et dub. lat.). — De utraque generatione loquitur S. Bonav. mira subtilitate in Hexaëm. Serm. II, ubi distinguit duodecim generationes, quarum quatuor fiunt per diffusionem, quatuor per expressionem, quatuor per propagationem. Inter generationes per diffusionem primo loco ponit generationem splendoris a luce, inter generationes autem per expressionem generationem speciei ab obiecto, de qua dicit: «Et hoc est mirabile, quomodo species generatur, quia non de materia aëris, quia, cum non dicat essentiam, sed modum essendi, sufficit, ut habeat principium originativum, medium inter principium materiale et principium effectivum. Unde Deus dedit virtutem cuilibet rei, ut gigneret similitudinem suam ex naturali fecunditate. Unde secundum quod obiectum gignit similitudinem suam, sic repraesentat generationem aeternam; secundum quod intentio animae eam oculo unit, sic repraesentat incarnationem Verbi» (quoad aliam distinctionem generationum cfr. I. Sent. d. 13. dub. 8.). — De hac duplici generatione, sive potius in genere de duplici actione corporum loquitur pluries S. Thom., ut de Potent. q. 5. a. 8. in corp., ubi inter alia dicit: «Haec autem est actio corporis, quae non est ad transmutationem materiae, sed ad quandam diffusionem similitudinis formae in medio, secundum similitudinem spiritualis intentionis, quae recipitur de re in sensu, vel intellectu; et hoc modo sol illuminat aërem, et color speciem suam multi-
plicat in medio. Uterque autem modus actionis in istis inferioribus causatur ex corporibus caelestibus». Idem S. I. q. 78. a. 3. plura dicit de duplici immutatione, quae est in corporibus, vel secundum esse naturale, vel secundum esse spirituale (immateriale). — Utriusque autem generationis mirabilis vis attribuenda est formis rerum, et eadem est reducenda originaliter ad rationes ideales in mente Dei (cfr. I. Sent. d. 38. q. 1, scholion, et S. Thom. S. I. q. 115. a. 2. ad 1.).
II. Quoad memoratam controversiam Aegid. R. (loc. cit. a. 2. ad 2.) dicit, quod «lux habet esse reale, sed lumen habet esse intentionale». Ex quo concludit, quod lumen et lux non sint eiusdem speciei. Etiam Scoto attribuitur opinio, quod lumen sit forma intentionalis, non naturalis; tamen (hic q. unica, n. 3.) non negat, lumen esse qualitatem naturalem in hoc sensu, quod realiter existat, sed vult, quod proprie et formaliter sit intentio, id est species impressa visibilis ipsius lucis (cfr. Comment. Lychet. ad hunc locum n. 9. seqq.). — Sententia S. Thomae (ut eam exponit Phil. a ss. Trinitate, Sum. philos. secund. secundae q. 34. a. 1.) haec est, quod lux «est qualitas pure naturalis, quae definitur esse actus perspicui, ut perspicuum est, sive ut illustratum et illuminatum est» (cfr. S. I, q. 67. a. 3.). In Comment. autem (hic q. unica, a. 3.) de opinione, quod lux sit tantum intentio, dicit primo: «Et haec opinio valde probabilis est»; deinde autem addit: «Unde non potest esse, quod habeat esse intentionis tantum». — S. Bonav. mediam quandam viam ingreditur, ut patet. — Ceterum si lumen cum recentioribus concipitur stricte, ut dicit motus undulatorios aetheris, tunc certe distinguendum est ab eo quod proprie intentio vocatur, ad quam isti motus se habent tantum in ratione causae materialis.
Auctores non citatos vide a. 2. q. 1, scholion.
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Question II. Whether lumen is a substantial form or an accidental one.
Secondly it is asked whether lumen is a substantial form or an accidental one. And that it is an accidental form is shown.
Fundamenta.
1. That which comes upon something already complete in being is accidental1; but lumen comes upon air already complete in being: therefore it is accidental.
2. Likewise, «that which is present and absent apart from the corruption of the subject is an accident2»; lumen is present and absent apart from the corruption of the air, which is its subject: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, as color stands to a terminated body, so lumen stands to a transparent body3; but color is an accident in the terminated body: therefore lumen is an accident in the transparent body.
4. Likewise, if one of opposites, existing in a subject, is an accident, the other is also an accident4; but obscuration happens to air itself: therefore by parity of reasoning so does illumination.
To the contrary:
1. It is impossible that two accidents of the same species be in the same subject, because an accident is numbered by the subject in which it is: but two lumina, as Dionysius5 says, are in the same air medium: therefore it is impossible that lumen be an accident of the air.
2. Likewise, an accident, when it is generated, has its origin from the proper principles of the subject, and when it is resolved, is resolved into its subject6; but lumen is neither educed out of air nor resolved into air: therefore lumen is not an accident of air. And it is settled that it is in air: therefore if it is not an accident of it, it is an accident of nothing.
3. Likewise, no accident passes from subject to subject7; but a ray is transferred from one part of air to another, and lumen likewise: therefore lumen cannot be an accident.
4. Likewise, no accident remains immobile when that in which it is is moved8; but a ray remains immobile when the air is moved: therefore the ray is not an accident. If you say this is because lumen in the medium has spiritual being, like an idolum9; against this it is objected that ray and lumen there have natural operation and the principle of a natural operation: therefore it seems that it is there naturally and concretely, not spiritually and abstractly.
CONCLUSION.
Lumen in the medium, insofar as it denotes an active power, denotes a substance having the mode of an accident; insofar as it denotes a sensible quality, it denotes an accident — one which does not fully have the character of a natural accident, but [the character] of a likeness or intention.
I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that on this point there is a threefold way of speaking, each of which presupposes that lumen in the medium is some form or quality.
Opinion 1. For some say that lumen in the medium is a substance; yet it exists in the medium by the mode of an accident, because it is not substantial to the air itself; and they say this because the generation of lumen from lux is by the way of univocation10; and so, since lux is a substantial form in its source, they say that lumen is a substance in the medium, although it has an accidental mode of being — especially since there does not seem to be any other essence belonging to lumen and lux, but only that they seem to differ by mode of being or by esse.
But because lumen in the medium is that which Opinion 2. is most especially sensed and which makes other things to be sensed11; therefore there is a second position, that lumen in the medium is an accident; for it is not caused by the luminous body except insofar as it is shining; and so it is an accident by comparison to the principle from which. They also say that it is an accident by comparison to the subject in which, because it comes upon [something] already complete and can be present and absent apart from the corruption of the subject; and thus lumen in the medium has the full character of an accident, though not by comparison to the same [term]. For an accident is wont to be compared to a substance as to subject and cause; but lumen, although it has to be compared to substance in these two modes, [is compared] not to the same one, because it is compared to air as to subject, since it is in it; to the luminous body, as to principle, since it is from it12.
But because lumen, insofar as it exists in the medium, is sensed of itself, so that, placed before the sense, it makes [it] sense; and again, in the same part of the medium it can be multiplied without confusion, according to the position of Dionysius: therefore there is a Opinion 3. third position, that lumen in the medium is neither substance nor accident properly, because it does not have there natural being concrete with matter, but spiritual and abstract [being]. Hence they say that, just as the species of color in the medium is compared to the color existing in the object body, so lumen in the medium [is compared] to the lux existing in the luminous body. — Improbatur. But since lumen in the medium has not only a spiritual operation upon the soul but also a natural one upon natural bodies, it seems to be in the air not only in a spiritual mode (i.e. to be there by the mode of a habit) but also in some way according to natural being; and so it seems that this is not enough to say, although it seems very probable.
Judgement on the foregoing. Therefore it is to be understood that all the above ways contain something of truth in themselves, and from all these one integral truth is elicited; which is clear thus. — Lumen denotes 1. an active power. For lumen in the medium denotes an active power, going forth from the luminous body, by which the luminous body acts and impresses upon these lower things; and this is a power substantial to the body itself13. And of this Damascene says that lumen, which is from fire, is not something ministerial to fire itself or accidental, but a power connatural and consubstantial to it, as is clear in the authority adduced in the preceding problem14; and this power is not perceptible by sense, nor does it operate only in the sense of sight, but it also conduces to the eduction of all the senses into act, as Augustine says in the seventh [book] On Genesis according to the Letter15, which was held in a certain authority previously adduced. Thus also the philosophers say that the celestial body, by means of its lumen, influences down to the depths of the earth, where mineral bodies are wont to be generated. And as to this, those say truly who say that lumen denotes substance accidentally compared to air, just as the power of an agent is in a certain way accidentally compared to that which carries [it].
2. a sensible quality. But lumen denotes not only that active power, which sense does not perceive, but also a certain sensible quality, by which the sense of sight is made actually sensing; and that is an accidental quality in the third species of quality. And accordingly Avicenna says in the book On the Natural Sufficiency16 that «lumen is an affection of a body having lux, when its opposite is present to it», namely the pervious. And so that second opinion was speaking truly, which said that lumen is an accident, not only by comparison to the air in which it is received, but also in comparison to the body by which it is caused, since it arises from it inasmuch as that17 is shining and has being as an object of sense.
Notandum. According to each of these natures found in lumen, lumen is compared to the air not as to a first subject, but as to a carrier and to a medium; and therefore by comparison to the air itself it does not have a natural mode of existing, but [exists] by the mode of a habit; nor is it a natural form, but rather a likeness of one; just as a species18 in the medium is not properly color, but as color or a likeness of color. Yet it has the maximum approximation to it; and it rests upon it so closely that it does not need an extrinsic principle out of which it may be educed. Hence lumen in the medium does not have a material principle
out of which, but rather an originative one, from which it flows and to which it also returns when it ceases to be in the medium, as is said of a likeness. And in this way the Commentator on the second [book] On the Soul19 says that lux is the habit of the diaphanous, and that it is in it as intention or species or likeness. And as to this fourth point the third opinion was speaking truly.
Conclusion as to the members. From these things, therefore, it is clear that lumen in the medium, insofar as it denotes active power, denotes substance having the mode of accident; insofar as it denotes sensible quality, it denotes accident. But that accident, referred to air, does not fully have the character of a natural accident, but [that] of a likeness or intention, because it is there not as in a sustaining subject, but as in a carrier20. — From these things the answers to both sides are clear.
To the fundamenta.
1. 2. As for the objection that it comes upon [something] already complete and recedes21 apart from the corruption of the subject, this shows that it has the mode of an accident, according as it is in the medium.
3. 4. As for the objection that it stands in the mode of color and is a sensible quality, this speaks of lumen according as it has in itself the nature of an accident.
To the contrary [arguments]. The reasons on the contrary, which prove that it is not an accident — because it is not numbered by the numbering of the subject, because it is not moved at the motion of the air, because it is not caused by the air nor resolved into the air — conclude only that it does not there have fully the character of a natural accident; On the natural accident. which is compared to that in which it is as to subject and cause, and which is also sustained and depends upon that in which it is principally and is joined to it by an inseparable bond. — On lumen as accident. But this is not the case in the matter at hand, because lumen, although it is in air, is caused by the luminous body and depends upon it principally; nor is it in air as in a sustainer, but as in a carrier; and therefore it receives duration and change and numbering rather from the lucid [body] which influences than from the air which receives. And on this account Dionysius22 says that many lumina are in the same medium unconfused, and are torn apart or separated from one another according to the withdrawal of the illuminating bodies. For that distinction is owing to the continuation of the lumina with their origin, from which they proceed naturally and by whose power they act, although in the medium they are in a certain way spiritually and abstractly. And thus the other things asked about this matter are now clear.
I. Here it is treated of lumen as it is in the medium, not in the luminous body. S. Bonaventure again distinguishes this in two ways, namely insofar as it is an active power, not sensible, which has a manifold action upon this corporeal world and goes forth from the luminous body, to which it is consubstantial; and insofar as it is a visible phenomenon and an accidental sensible quality. On the nature of this quality the Scholastics disagree, since «quality is distinguished into sensible quality and into the quality which is the species or intention of a sensible quality» (Scotus, here q. unica, n. 3). It is controverted whether sensible lumen is an intentional and not natural quality, or a natural and not intentional one, or formally both natural and intentional. That this controversy may be better understood, we premise two things.
1. As to the sense of the term intentio, Scotus (II Report., here q. unica, n. 4) says: «The name intentio is equivocal: in one way it is said [to mean] an act of the will; secondly, a formal account in the thing, as the intentio of the thing from which genus is taken differs from the intentio from which differentia is taken; in a third mode it is said [to mean] concept; fourth, a ratio of tending toward an object, as a likeness is said to be the ratio of tending toward that whose [likeness] it is. And in this mode lumen is said [to be] the intentio or species of lux».
2. The Scholastics commonly speak of two generations of forms which are verified by experience, namely real forms, which in generation are educed from the potency of matter, and intentional forms, which are not educed from the potency of matter. On the difference and likeness of each generation, Aegidius R. brings forward much (here q. 2, a. 2, and dub. lat.). — Of each generation S. Bonaventure speaks with marvellous subtlety in Hexaëm., Sermo II, where he distinguishes twelve generations, of which four are by diffusion, four by expression, four by propagation. Among the generations by diffusion he puts in the first place the generation of splendor from lux; among the generations by expression, the generation of the species from the object, of which he says: «And this is marvellous, how a species is generated, because not from the matter of the air, because, since it does not denote essence but mode of being, it suffices that it have an originative principle, a middle between the material principle and the effective principle. Hence God gave a power to every thing, that it might beget its likeness from natural fecundity. Hence accordingly as the object begets its likeness, it represents the eternal generation; accordingly as the intention of the soul unites it to the eye, it represents the incarnation of the Word» (on the other distinction of generations cf. I Sent. d. 13, dub. 8). — Of this twofold generation, or rather in general of the twofold action of bodies, S. Thomas speaks many times, as in De Potent. q. 5, a. 8, in the body, where among other things he says: «But this is an action of body which is not unto the transmutation of matter, but unto a certain diffusion of a likeness of form in the medium, according to the likeness of the spiritual intention which is received from the thing in sense or in the intellect; and in this way the sun illumines the air, and color multi-
plies its species in the medium. Each mode of action in these lower things is caused by the celestial bodies». The same [Thomas] S. I, q. 78, a. 3, says many things of the twofold change which is in bodies, either according to natural being or according to spiritual (immaterial) being. — The marvellous force of each generation is to be attributed to the forms of things, and the same is to be reduced originally to the ideal accounts in the mind of God (cf. I Sent. d. 38, q. 1, scholion, and S. Thom. S. I, q. 115, a. 2, ad 1).
II. As to the aforesaid controversy, Aegidius R. (loc. cit., a. 2, ad 2) says that «lux has real being, but lumen has intentional being». From which he concludes that lumen and lux are not of the same species. To Scotus also is attributed the opinion that lumen is an intentional and not a natural form; yet (here q. unica, n. 3) he does not deny that lumen is a natural quality in this sense, that it really exists, but he holds that properly and formally it is intention, i.e. an impressed visible species of lux itself (cf. Comment. Lychet. on this place, n. 9 and following). — The opinion of S. Thomas (as Philip of the Holy Trinity expounds it, Sum. philos., secund. secundae q. 34, a. 1) is that lux «is a purely natural quality, which is defined as the act of the perspicuous, insofar as it is perspicuous, or as it is illuminated and illumined» (cf. S. I, q. 67, a. 3). But in [his] Comment. (here q. unica, a. 3), on the opinion that lux is only intention, he says first: «And this opinion is very probable»; then he adds: «Hence it cannot be that it has only intentional being». — S. Bonaventure enters upon a certain middle way, as is plain. — Furthermore, if lumen is conceived strictly with the moderns, as denoting undulatory motions of the aether, then certainly it is to be distinguished from what is properly called intentio, to which those motions stand only in the ratio of material cause.
For the authors not cited, see a. 2, q. 1, scholion.
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- Averroes, de Substantia orbis, c. 1. (sive Prologus): «Est dispositio in omnibus accidentibus in prima materia, scil. quod non inveniuntur in ea, nisi secundum quod habet formam existentem in actu». Et super II. de Anima, text. 4: Subiectum enim accidentis est corpus compositum ex materia et forma, et est aliud existens in actu et non indiget in suo esse accidenti.Averroes, On the Substance of the Orb, c. 1 (or Prologue): «There is a disposition in all accidents in prime matter, namely that they are not found in it except according as it has a form existing in act». And on On the Soul II, text 4: For the subject of an accident is a body composed of matter and form, and it is something else existing in act and does not need an accident for its esse.
- Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Accidente, secundum Aristot., I. Topic. c. 4.Porphyry, On the Predicables, chapter On the Accident, according to Aristotle, Topics I, c. 4.
- Vide supra pag. 320, nota 5.See above p. 320, note 5.
- Simile occurrit in Aristot., I. Topic. c. 13, qui hanc regulam generalem statuit: Quot modis dicitur unum oppositorum, tot modis dicitur et reliquum.A similar thing occurs in Aristotle, Topics I, c. 13, who lays down this general rule: In as many modes as one of opposites is said, in so many is the other also said.
- De Div. Nom. c. 2. § 4. Vide supra pag. 119, nota 9. — De maiori cfr. ibid. nota 8.[Dionysius,] On the Divine Names, c. 2, § 4. See above p. 119, note 9. — On the major [premise] cf. ibid. note 8.
- Pro hac propositione allegatur Aristot., I. Phys. text. 80. (c. 9.): «Permanens enim materia cum forma causa est eorum quae fiunt, sicut mater». Et VII. Metaph. text. 3. seqq. (VI. c. 1.), ubi agit de relatione accidentium ad substantiam substantiaeque attribuit prioritatem respectu accidentium. In versione Arabico-latina, loc. cit. text. 3, legitur: «Manifestum est igitur, quod haec [substantia] est causa essentiae cuiuslibet illorum [accidentium], et illa sunt propter istam». Idem ait Averroes ibid. — Sententia Boethii, Dialog. II; IV. et V. Comment. in Porphyr. (de Communit. et different. speciei, proprii et accidentis) in has redacta est propositiones: proprium consequitur principia speciei et causatur ex ipsis: accidens vero, sive sit separabile sive sit inseparabile, consequitur principia individui et causatur ex ipsis. «Haec enim [individua], generationi et corruptioni supposita, variis semper accidentibus permutantur».For this proposition Aristotle is adduced, Physics I, text 80 (c. 9): «For matter remaining with form is the cause of things which come to be, as mother». And Metaphysics VII, text 3 and following (VI, c. 1), where he treats of the relation of accidents to substance and attributes priority to substance with respect to accidents. In the Arabic-Latin version, loc. cit., text 3, it reads: «It is therefore manifest that this [substance] is the cause of the essence of each of those [accidents], and those are on account of this». Averroes says the same, ibid. — The opinion of Boethius (Dialog. II; IV and V Comment. in Porphyr., On the Community and difference of species, of the proper and of the accident) has been reduced to these propositions: the proper follows the principles of the species and is caused by them; the accident, however, whether it be separable or inseparable, follows the principles of the individual and is caused by them. «For these [individuals], subjected to generation and corruption, are always changed by various accidents».
- Boeth., I. Comment. in Categorias seu Praedicam. Aristotelis. Verba vide tom. I. pag. 162, nota 11.Boethius, I Commentary on the Categories or Predicaments of Aristotle. For the words, see volume I, p. 162, note 11.
- Sub hoc respectu ait Aristot., II. Topic. c. 3. (c. 7.): Nam motis nobis, necessarium est, et quae in nobis sunt omnia simul moveri. Cfr. IV. Phys. text. 32. (c. 4.), ubi docet, accidentia moveri non posse per se, sed per accidens, i. e. moto subiecto, in quo sunt.Under this aspect Aristotle, Topics II, c. 3 (c. 7) says: For when we are moved, it is necessary that those things also which are in us all be moved together. Cf. Physics IV, text 32 (c. 4), where he teaches that accidents cannot be moved per se but per accidens, i.e. when the subject in which they are is moved.
- Cfr. supra pag. 83, nota 1. — Mox Vat. voci principium praemittit est.Cf. above p. 83, note 1. — Then the Vatican [edition] prefixes est to the word principium.
- Secundum Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 30. seqq. (VI. c. 9.), ut substantia generetur, «necesse est, praeexistere semper aliam substantiam actu existentem, quae facit, ut puta animal, si animal fit», scil. eiusdem speciei (univocam). Cfr. supra pag. 15, nota 11.According to Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 30 and following (VI, c. 9), in order that a substance be generated, «it is necessary that there always pre-exist another substance existing in act, which makes, for instance, an animal, if an animal comes to be», namely of the same species (univocal). Cf. above p. 15, note 11.
- Nulla siquidem substantia per sensum cognoscitur, sed solum accidens. Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2. arg. 2. ad opp.Indeed no substance is known by sense, but only an accident. Cf. above a. 2, q. 2, arg. 2, ad opp.
- Avicenna, de Anima sive Sexto Naturalium, p. III. c. 3. ait: «Lux enim est qualitas, quae ex sua essentia est perfectio translucentis, secundum quod est translucens; est etiam aliqua qualitas in eo, quod est visibile ex sua essentia et non per aliud… Lumen vero est qualitas, quam mutat corpus non translucens a lucido, et translucens efficitur per eam translucens in effectu». — Ad pleniorem intelligentiam eorum, quae mox de lumine dicuntur, notandum, quod S. Doctor ibi respicit ea, quae ad sensationem eliciendam requiruntur. Sub quo respectu Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 73. (c. 7.), de colore dicit: Nunc autem in tantum manifestum est, quod id quidem quod in lumine videtur color est; unde non videtur sine lumine; hoc enim erat ipsi colori esse motivum esse secundum actum perspicui. Actus autem perspicui lumen est. Signum autem huius manifestum; si quis enim ponat id quod habet colorem, super ipsum visum, non videbit; sed color quidem movet perspicuum, puta aërem; ab hoc autem, continuo existente, movetur sensorium.Avicenna, On the Soul or [book] of the Sixth of the Naturalia, p. III, c. 3, says: «For lux is a quality which from its essence is the perfection of the translucent, insofar as it is translucent; there is also some quality in that which is visible from its own essence and not through another… But lumen is a quality which a non-translucent body changes from a lucid [body], and the translucent is made through it to be actually translucent». — For a fuller understanding of what is soon said of lumen, it is to be noted that S. Doctor there has in view those things which are required for the eliciting of sensation. Under which respect Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 73 (c. 7), says of color: But now it is manifest to this extent, that that which is seen in lumen is color; whence it is not seen without lumen; for this was for color itself to be moving according to the act of the perspicuous. But the act of the perspicuous is lumen. The sign of this is manifest: for if anyone places that which has color upon the sight itself, he will not see; but color does move the perspicuous, e.g. the air; and from this, being continuous, the sensorium is moved.
- Ex codd. A W Y bb cc supplevimus secundum.From codd. A, W, Y, bb, cc we supplied secundum.
- In cod. I additur luminoso.In cod. I is added luminoso.
- In solutione ad 1. obiectum.In the solution to the first objection.
- Cap. 15. n. 21. et c. 19. n. 25. Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2. arg. 2. ad opp., ubi XII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 16. n. 32. citatur. — De generatione lapidum et metallorum vide B. Albert., I. de Mineral. tr. 1. c. 4. seqq. et III. tr. 1. c. 3. et c. 10, ubi diversae opiniones philosophorum hac de re recensentur.[Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter VII,] c. 15, n. 21 and c. 19, n. 25. Cf. above a. 2, q. 2, arg. 2, ad opp., where On Genesis according to the Letter XII, c. 16, n. 32 is cited. — On the generation of stones and metals see B. Albert, I On Minerals, tr. 1, c. 4 and following, and III, tr. 1, c. 3 and c. 10, where various opinions of philosophers on this matter are recounted.
- Distinctius: in libro de Anima, qui Sextus Naturalium dicitur, p. III. c. 1. — De tertia qualitatis specie, XIII. passione et qualitate patibili, cuius paulo superius mentio fit, cfr. supra pag. 229, nota 7.More distinctly: in the book On the Soul, which is called Sixth of the Naturalia, p. III, c. 1. — On the third species of quality, the XIII passion and patible quality, of which mention is made a little above, cf. above p. 229, note 7.
- Plures codd. cum ed. 1 ipsum.Several codices with edition 1 [read] ipsum.
- Vat. sed potius similitudo eius, scilicet lucis, sic species coloris in medio etc., quae et paulo inferius substituit principio intrinseco pro principio extrinseco.The Vatican [edition reads] sed potius similitudo eius, scilicet lucis, sic species coloris in medio, etc., which also a little later substitutes principio intrinseco for principio extrinseco.
- Text. 70. (c. 7.): Lux non est corpus, sed est praesentia intentionis in diaphano, cuius privatio dicitur obscuritas apud praesentiam corporis luminosi. Et hoc quod dixit [Aristoteles] manifestum est, quoniam subiectum obscuritatis et lucis est corpus et est diaphanum, et lux est forma et habitus huius corporis; et si esset corpus, tunc corpus penetraret corpus.[Averroes, on On the Soul II,] text 70 (c. 7): Lux is not a body, but is the presence of an intentio in the diaphanous, the privation of which is called darkness in the presence of a luminous body. And this which [Aristotle] said is manifest, since the subject of darkness and of lux is body and is diaphanous, and lux is a form and habit of this body; and if it were a body, then body would penetrate body.
- Hanc distinctionem insinuat Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 76. (c. 7.), in cuius expositione Averroes ait: Color habet duplex esse, quorum unum est in diaphano non terminato, et est illud in quo est extraneum; et aliud in diaphano terminato, et est esse eius naturale.Aristotle suggests this distinction, On the Soul II, text 76 (c. 7), on whose exposition Averroes says: Color has a twofold being, of which one is in the unterminated diaphanous, and is that in which it is extraneous; and the other in the terminated diaphanous, and is its natural being.
- Cod. O et potest adesse et abesse pro et recedit. Vat. post completo addit in esse, cod. T est accidens.Cod. O [reads] et potest adesse et abesse for et recedit. The Vatican [edition] after completo adds in esse; cod. T [reads] est accidens.