Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 20
QUAESTIO II.
Utrum in divinis personis sit aequalitas quantum ad intensionem potentiae.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit aequalitas quantum ad intensionem potentiae. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.
1. Nihil est potentius sua virtute; sed Christus est Dei virtus1: ergo Pater non est potentior Filio; similiter pari ratione nec Filius Spiritu sancto.
2. Item, substantiae aeque nobilis2 aeque nobilis et excellens est potentia; sed substantia est aeque nobilis in Filio ut in Patre, ergo et potentia aeque nobilis: ergo nihil potentius potest Pater quam Filius.
3. Item, ea potentia, qua potest quis supra infinitam et summam distantiam, nihil est potentius; sed potentia Verbi potest supra infinitam et summam distantiam, quae est inter ens et non ens, quia omnia per ipsum facta sunt3: ergo etc.
4. Item, ea potentia, cui nihil potest resistere nec aliquid potest eam retardare, nihil est potentius; sed potentiam Filii nihil potest retardare nec aliquid potest ei resistere, quia subito facit et libere, Psalmus4: Dixit et facta sunt: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Potentior est potentia in eo qui5 solum potest agere, quam in eo qui agere et pati; sed in Patre est solum agere, in Filio agere et pati: ergo etc.
2. Item, potentius aliquid potest quod est primum principium, quam quod non est primum, quia «omnis causa primaria plus influit quam secunda6»; sed Pater est primum principium: ergo unum et idem potentius potest Pater quam Filius.
3. Item, potentius potest qui habet potentiam a se, quam qui ab alio; qui enim aliquid a se habet multo melius habet, quam qui ab alio accipit7: ergo cum Filius habeat posse a Patre, Pater autem per se et a se, ergo etc.
4. Item, plus potest aliquis, qui potest et per se et per alium, quam qui tantum per se; sed Pater potest operari per Filium, Spiritus sanctus non potest per Filium, nec etiam ipse Filius proprie loquendo: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Potentia in divinis personis est aeque intensa.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod potentia in Patre et Filio est aeque intensa, quia in utroque summa est et aeque nobilis, quia in utroque una per naturam non degenerans8 — similiter et in Spiritu sancto — et hoc, loquendo de Filio secundum divinam naturam, secundum quam est aequalis Patri.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Filius potest pati; dicendum, quod istud9 non est secundum potentiam divinam, sed secundum infirmitatem humanam; et secundum illam inferior est Patre et minus potens; secundum autem divinam non potest pati, sicut nec Pater.
2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod primum principium magis potest; dicendum, quod primum et10 principium aut solum dicit ordinem, aut substantialem differentiam. Si solum ordinem, cum unum et idem sit utrobique, non est potentius hic quam ibi. Si autem differentiam substantialem cum ordine, sic verum est, quod potentius est primum quam secundum, quia secundum addit aliquid supra primum, quod dum facit magis compositum11, magis reddit limitatum, et ita minus potens.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio, iam solutum est: quia habere ab alio, hoc est aut differente substantialiter, aut personaliter. Si substantialiter, sic12 verum est, quia cum habeat ab alio per essentiam, non habet essentialiter, sed participatione; sed quando habet ab alio personaliter, eodem tamen essentialiter, tunc habet aeque nobiliter, quia totaliter et essentialiter. Unde Ioannis quinto13: Sicut Pater habet vitam in semetipso, sic dedit Filio etc.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur quarto, quod Pater potest per se14 et per alium; dicendum, quod posse per alium est dupliciter: aut per aliam causam inferiorem simul agentem, aut per aliam personam. Primo modo potentius est posse per se et per alium, quam per se tantum; quia posse per alium dicit dominium, et ita potestatem; sed posse per alium ut15 per personam consubstantialem non dicit dominium, sed tantum auctoritatem. Auctoritas autem non dicit majoritatem, sed solum dicit originem, sicut posse ab alio et non ab alio non dicit minoritatem in potentia16, sed solum subauctoritatem et originem; et sic intelligendum in proposito de posse per alium et non posse per alium.
De hac quaestione non invenimus speciatim tractare nisi Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica a. 2. Alex. Hal. autem eadem obiecta solvit S. p. I. q. 47. m. 2. 3. Quoad 2. oppositionis ita dicit: «Descensus causarum creatarum est secundum minorem distantiam a causa prima, propter quod, secundum quod magis descendunt, minus participant de virtute primae causae; non sic in divinis, licet sit ibi ordo naturae; sunt enim omnino idem secundum substantiam; unde in illis non potest esse differentia virtutis vel potentiae.»
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QUESTION II.
Whether in the divine persons there is equality as to the intensity of power.
Secondly it is asked, whether in the divine [persons] there is equality as to the intensity of power. And that it is so, is shown in this manner.
1. Nothing is more powerful than its own virtue; but Christ is the virtue of God1: therefore the Father is not more powerful than the Son; likewise by parity of reason neither [is] the Son [more powerful] than the Holy Spirit.
2. Likewise, of an equally noble substance2 [there] is an equally noble and excellent power; but the substance is equally noble in the Son as in the Father, therefore also the power [is] equally noble: therefore the Father can [do] nothing more powerful than the Son.
3. Likewise, than that power by which someone is able [to act] over an infinite and supreme distance, nothing is more powerful; but the power of the Word is able [to act] over an infinite and supreme distance, which is between being and non-being, since all things were made through him3: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, than that power which nothing can resist nor anything can hinder, nothing is more powerful; but nothing can hinder the power of the Son nor can anything resist it, since he acts suddenly and freely, the Psalm4: He spoke, and things were made: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. The power in him who5 only is able to act is more powerful than [the power] in him who [is able] to act and to be acted upon; but in the Father there is only acting, in the Son acting and being acted upon: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, that which is the first principle is able to do something more powerful than that which is not the first, since «every primary cause influences more than the second6»; but the Father is the first principle: therefore the Father can [do] one and the same thing more powerfully than the Son.
3. Likewise, he who has power from himself can [do] more powerfully than he who [has it] from another; for he who has something from himself has [it] much better than he who receives [it] from another7: therefore since the Son has [his] power-to-be from the Father, but the Father [has it] through himself and from himself, therefore etc.
4. Likewise, he who is able [to act] both through himself and through another can [do] more than he who [is able] only through himself; but the Father can operate through the Son, [whereas] the Holy Spirit cannot [operate] through the Son, nor even the Son himself, properly speaking: therefore etc.
Conclusion. Power in the divine persons is equally intense.
I respond: It must be said, that the power in the Father and the Son is equally intense, since in both it is supreme and equally noble, since in both [it is] one through nature, not degenerating8 — likewise also in the Holy Spirit — and this, speaking of the Son according to the divine nature, according to which he is equal to the Father.
1. To that, then, which is objected, that the Son can be acted upon; it must be said, that this9 is not according to the divine power, but according to human infirmity; and according to that he is inferior to the Father and less powerful; but according to the divine [nature] he cannot be acted upon, just as neither [can] the Father.
2. To that which is objected secondly, that the first principle is more able; it must be said, that first and10 principle either expresses only order, or substantial difference. If only order, since there is one and the same [thing] in both, it is not more powerful here than there. But if [it expresses] substantial difference together with order, in this way it is true that the first is more powerful than the second, since the second adds something over and above the first, which, while it makes [it] more composite11, renders [it] more limited, and so less powerful.
3. To that which is objected thirdly, [the answer] is already resolved: because to have from another is either by a substantial difference, or a personal one. If substantially, in this way12 it is true, since when he has from another by essence, he does not have essentially, but by participation; but when he has from another personally, yet by the same [thing] essentially, then he has equally nobly, because totally and essentially. Whence in John the fifth13: As the Father has life in himself, so he has given to the Son etc.
4. To that which is objected fourthly, that the Father can [act] through himself14 and through another; it must be said, that to-be-able through another is in two ways: either through another inferior cause acting at the same time, or through another person. In the first way it is more powerful to be able [to act] through oneself and through another, than through oneself only; since to be able through another expresses dominion, and so power; but to be able through another as15 through a consubstantial person does not express dominion, but only authority. But authority does not express majority, but only expresses origin, just as to-be-able from another and not from another does not express minority in power16, but only sub-authority and origin; and so it is to be understood in the present matter concerning to-be-able through another and not-to-be-able through another.
On this question we have not found [anyone] who treats [it] in particular except Peter of Tarentaise, here q. unica, a. 2. But Alex. of Hales solves the same objections [in] S. p. I, q. 47, m. 2, 3. As to the second of the opposing arguments he speaks thus: «The descent of created causes is according to a lesser distance from the first cause, on account of which, according as they descend more, they participate less in the virtue of the first cause; not so in the divine [persons], although there is there an order of nature; for they are altogether the same according to substance; whence in them there cannot be a difference of virtue or of power.»
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- I. Cor. I, 24. — Paulo ante post virtute codd. aa bb addunt nec extensive nec intensive.1 Cor. 1, 24. — A little before, after virtute, codices aa, bb add nec extensive nec intensive ("neither extensively nor intensively").
- In lectione, quae in mss. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 communior est, ponitur genitivus nobilis pro nobili, quod habet Vat. Paulo infra post ergo et potentia cod. bb adiungit est.In the reading which is more common in the manuscripts together with editions 1, 2, 3, the genitive nobilis is set in place of nobili, which the Vatican edition has. A little below, after ergo et potentia, codex bb adds est.
- Ioan. 1, 3.John 1, 3.
- 148, 5. — Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis autem codd. cum ed. 1 reluctantibus, patet quia loco Psalmus.[Psalm] 148, 5. — The Vatican edition with codex cc, with the other codices together with edition 1 however resisting, [reads] patet quia in place of Psalmus.
- Supple cum cod. V potest. Habentur hic in codicibus diversae lectiones: sic in aliquibus ut A T et in ed. 1 post quam omittitur in eo, immo inveniuntur mss. ut Z, in quibus desunt verba in eo qui. Paulo infra post Filio cod. X addit est, e contra plures codd. ut S T V cum ed. 1 omittunt agere et.Supply with codex V potest ("is able"). Various readings are found here in the codices: thus in some such as A, T and in edition 1, after quam the words in eo are omitted, indeed there are found manuscripts such as Z in which the words in eo qui are missing. A little below, after Filio, codex X adds est; on the contrary, several codices such as S, T, V together with edition 1 omit agere et.
- Libr. de Causis, propos. 1: Omnis causa primaria plus est influens supra causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda. — Paulo ante post quod non in edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 et in pluribus mss. ut T V Y omittitur est.The book On Causes, proposition 1: Every primary cause is more influential upon its caused [effect] than the universal second cause. — A little before, after quod non, in editions 1, 2, 3, 6 and in many manuscripts such as T, V, Y, est is omitted.
- Praestamus antiquam lectionem ed. 1 et mss., quorum tamen aliqui ut A G P Q habent recipit loco accipit, dum Vat. legit quam si ab alio recipiat. Paulo supra cod. V post ab alio addit accipit, qui et dein cum aliquibus mss. ut V X loco a se ponit per se, cod. T autem a se et per se, quae lectio subnexis conformior est.We offer the ancient reading of edition 1 and of the manuscripts, of which however some such as A, G, P, Q have recipit in place of accipit, whereas the Vatican edition reads quam si ab alio recipiat ("than if he should receive from another"). A little above, codex V after ab alio adds accipit; the same [codex] also then, with some manuscripts such as V, X, in place of a se sets per se, but codex T [reads] a se et per se, which reading is more conformable to what follows.
- Alludit ad verba Hilarii supra d. XIX. p. 1. c. 4. allegata et ibid. dub. II. explicata. — Paulo infra post Spiritu sancto Vat. cum cod. cc adiungit est.[Bonaventure] alludes to the words of Hilary cited above d. XIX, p. 1, c. 4 and explained ibid. dub. II. — A little below, after Spiritu sancto, the Vatican edition with codex cc adds est.
- Aliqui codd. ut Y Z cum ed. 1 illud. Mox post potentiam in cod. bb additur vel naturam.Some codices such as Y, Z together with edition 1 [read] illud. Soon after, after potentiam, in codex bb is added vel naturam ("or nature").
- Ex plurimis mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 supplevimus particulam et, quae a cod. V etiam paulo supra, ubi eadem propositio occurrit, minus bene ponitur, quia ibi est tantum repetitio obiectionis, hic autem ipsius resolutio.From very many manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have supplied the particle et, which by codex V is also a little above — where the same proposition occurs — less well set [there], since there it is only the repetition of the objection, but here [it is] the resolution of it.
- Cod. T hic addit est, ac post compositum particulam et; lectio non spernenda. — Cfr. supra pag. 169 nota 4.Codex T here adds est, and after compositum the particle et; a reading not to be despised. — Cf. above p. 169, note 4.
- Aliqui codd. ut X Z cum ed. 1 tunc. Mox post habeat ab alio in cod. X additur differente ab alio, et paulo infra verbo personaliter praefigitur differente. Cod. Y per participationem pro participatione.Some codices such as X, Z together with edition 1 [read] tunc ("then"). Soon after, after habeat ab alio, in codex X is added differente ab alio ("differing from another"), and a little below the word personaliter is prefixed with differente. Codex Y [reads] per participationem in place of participatione.
- Vers. 26, in quo textu Vulgata cum Vat. post dedit adiungit et, sed contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.Verse 26, in which text the Vulgate together with the Vatican edition after dedit adds et, but against the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6.
- In pluribus codd. ut A I T Y Z et ed. 1 deest per se et. Mox Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 post primum aut per substituit aliquam loco aliam.In many codices such as A, I, T, Y, Z and in edition 1 the words per se et are missing. Soon after, the Vatican edition, against nearly all the codices and edition 1, after primum aut per substitutes aliquam in place of aliam.
- Fide plurium mss. ut F G H M Y ee supplevimus ut, loco cuius codd. aa bb post personam addunt scilicet. Paulo ante cod. Y post quia posse adiungit sic, et dein ed. 1 omittit ita.On the authority of several manuscripts such as F, G, H, M, Y, ee we have supplied ut ("as"), in place of which codices aa, bb after personam add scilicet ("namely"). A little before, codex Y after quia posse adds sic, and then edition 1 omits ita.
- Supple: in eo qui potest ab alio. — Pauci codd. ut M N cum ed. 1 post minoritatem addunt vel maioritatem, unus alterve codex autem ut S ponit maioritatem loco minoritatem.Supply: in eo qui potest ab alio ("in him who is able [to act] from another"). — A few codices such as M, N together with edition 1 after minoritatem add vel maioritatem ("or majority"); but one or another codex such as S sets maioritatem in place of minoritatem.