Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 20
ARTICULUS I. De potentiae adaequatione in divinis.
### QUAESTIO I. Utrum in divinis personis potentia sit aequalis quantum ad extensionem possibilium.
Quod sit ibi ponere potentiae adaequationem quantum ad numerum possibilium, ostenditur sic.
1. Quaecumque habent eandem naturam, habent eandem potentiam naturalem1; sed quaecumque habent omnino eandem potentiam, quidquid potest unum, et alterum; sed Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus habent eandem potentiam: ergo etc.
2. Item, quaecumque habent omnino eandem operationem, nihil potest unum operari sine altero; sed Pater et Filius habent eandem operationem: ergo nihil potest Pater sine Filio, Ioannis quinto2: Quaecumque Pater facit, haec omnia similiter Filius facit.
3. Item, nullus potest plura omnipotente; sed Verbum Dei est omnipotens, sicut dicitur Sapientiae decimo octavo3: Omnipotens sermo tuus, Domine etc. Maior patet, quia qui omne dicit nihil excipit.
4. Item, infinitis non est ponere aliqua esse plura4; sed Filius potest infinita, quia non potest tot, quin plura: ergo Pater non potest plura quam Filius, pari ratione nec quam Spiritus sanctus.
Contra:
1. Quanto producta sunt magis distantia, tanto potentia producens est latior sive amplior; sed potentia Patris se extendit ad creatum et increatum, potentia Filii ad creatum tantum, et magis distat creatum et increatum quam creata5 solum: ergo etc.
2. Item, Filius Dei et creatura sunt aliud et aliud, quia creatura est quid creatum, sed Filius est essentia increata; ergo si6 Filius et creatura sunt aliud et aliud, ergo plura: ergo potentia, quae potest in Filium et creaturam, potentior est, quam quae potest in creaturam tantum, sive potens est in plura; sed potentia Patris est talis: ergo etc.
3. Item, tantum vel aeque magnum vel maius est producere personam aequalem, sicut creaturam; sed Pater potest sine Filio producere personam, ergo et producere creaturam: ergo videtur, quod potentia in Patre se extendat ad plura.
4. Item, quamvis Spiritus sanctus7 et Filius non sint aliquid plus, tamen plures sunt quam Filius solus: ergo cum in Patre potentia possit in productionem utriusque, in Filio in alteram tantum, in plures8 potest potentia in Patre quam in Filio: ergo extensione possibilium est maior.
Conclusio. Potentia essentialis in divinis personis est aequalis quantum ad extensionem possibilium.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod loquendo de potentia essentiali, quae est respectu actus essentialis sive productionis, ad nihil se extendit in Patre, ad quod pariter non extendat se in Filio. Et ideo, quia aequalitas9 consistit quantum ad potentiam essentialem, concedendum est sine calumnia, quod Pater et Filius aequaliter sunt10 potentes quantum ad extensionem possibilium.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod latior est potentia, quae potest in magis distantia; dicendum, quod istud verum est de potentia eodem modo dicta et quantum ad consimilem modum producendi; sed Patrem posse producere quid creatum est potentiae essentialis et operis creationis; Patrem vero posse producere Filium est potentiae ut in persona et generationis; ideo ratio illa non valet.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod creatura et Filius sunt plura; dicendum, quod verum est, quod sunt plura, et11 tamen non sunt plura producta. Quamvis enim Filius sit aliud quam creatura, tamen non est aliud productum. Filius enim est essentia et natura, sed tamen non est essentia vel natura producta, quia producere Filium non est producere aliquid, sed aliquem. Et ideo non sequitur, quod producere Filium et creaturam sit posse producere plura quam12 producere alterum.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod producit personam sine Filio; dicendum, quod non est simile; quia cum producere creaturam sit producere essentiam, tam productio quam potentia est essentialis; et quia essentia est indivisa13 in Patre et Filio, ideo et potentia et actio, proinde et productio illa. Quia vero producere Filium est producere personam, ideo productio illa et potentia dicit quid personale; et quoniam Pater et Filius non conveniunt in persona, sed in essentia, ideo14 patet etc.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt plures etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, quod potest etiam in plures, sed quantum ad hoc non attenditur aequalitas vel inaequalitas, ut visum est15.
I. Non agitur hic de potentia, quatenus distinguitur contra actum, quae omnino removenda est a Deo, sed de potentia, quatenus est principium activum et effectivum aliorum, sive de omnipotentia. — Aequalitas huius potentiae intelligi potest vel extensive sive quoad numerum obiectorum causabilium, vel intensive sive, ut dicit Richard. a Med. (loc. cit. infra), quan-
tum ad vigoris potentiae intensionem. Specialiter quaeritur de aequalitate trium personarum in potentia, quia etiam specialis difficultas circa potentiam solvenda est, cum in Patre sit potentia activa generandi, quae non est in Filio neque in Spiritu sancto; similiter est iudicandum de potentia spirandi, quae non est in Spiritu sancto. Ex hac difficultate sumta sunt omnia argumenta ad oppositum, quae tamen iam supra d. 7. q. 3. et 4. fere soluta sunt. Fundamentum huius solutionis est distinctio potentiae in corp. posita, scil. in potentiam essentialem et notionalem (quae in solut. ad 1. vocatur potentia in persona). Illa respicit productionem ad extra, quae tribus personis est communis, haec vero productionem ad intra, sive potentiam generandi in Patre et spirandi in Patre et Filio. Potest quidem potentia et omnipotentia sumi in sensu largo pro qualibet potentia productiva, sive producat ad intra sive ad extra; attamen proprie sub omnipotentia non intelligitur nisi potentia essentialis. Ad solvendam obiectionem, quod generare in Deo sit simpliciter potentia, quae non convenit Filio et Spiritui sancto, bene observat Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit. ad I.): «Dissimiliter est generare in homine et in Deo, quia in divinis ipsum generare est de tota substantia, non de parte, et propter hoc in divinis eadem est substantia. In homine autem non est sic; non enim fit generatio de tota substantia, sed per decisionem de parte. Unde ibi non est omnino eadem substantia patris et filii, licet eadem sit forma specifica; et propter hoc in generatione, qua homo generat hominem, multiplicatur substantia et relatio. Et ideo in homine est generare posse quid et ad aliquid; posse quid dicit per multiplicationem substantiae, posse ad aliquid per multiplicationem relationis. In divinis autem in generatione non multiplicatur substantia, sed solum relatio; et propter hoc generare posse in divinis non est posse quid, sed posse ad aliquid». His positis, intelligitur solutio eiusdem Alexandri ad obiectionem: aliqua potentia est in Patre, quae tamen non est in Filio, sic respondentis: «Mutatio est praedicamenti, mutatur enim quid in ad aliquid». — De ipsa potentia in se agitur infra dd. 42. 43. 44.
II. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 21. m. 1. a. 3. — Scot., de hac et seq. hic q. unic.; Report., hic q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2; S. I. q. 42. a. 6. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. hic a. 5; de hac et seq. q. S. p. I. tr. II. q. 47. m. 3. partic. 1-3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., de hac et seq. hic q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. S. a. 70. q. 2. n. 41-63. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unic.
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ARTICLE I. On the equality of power in divine things.
### Question I. Whether in the divine persons power is equal as to the extension of the possibles.
That an equality of power as to the number of possibles is to be posited there is shown thus.
1. Whatever things have the same nature have the same natural power1; but whatever things have altogether the same power, whatever the one can do, the other can also; but the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit have the same power: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, of whatever things have altogether the same operation, the one cannot operate anything without the other; but the Father and the Son have the same operation: therefore the Father can do nothing without the Son, John 52: Whatever things the Father does, all these likewise does the Son.
3. Likewise, no one can [do] more things than the omnipotent; but the Word of God is omnipotent, as is said in Wisdom 183: Thy almighty word, O Lord, etc. The major is plain, since he who says all excepts nothing.
4. Likewise, beyond the infinite no things can be posited as more4; but the Son can [do] infinite things, since He cannot [do] so many but [there can be] more: therefore the Father cannot [do] more than the Son, and by like reason neither than the Holy Spirit.
On the contrary:
1. The more distant the things produced are, the wider or ampler is the producing power; but the power of the Father extends to the created and the uncreated, the power of the Son to the created only, and the created and the uncreated stand at a greater distance than [things] created5 alone: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the Son of God and a creature are one thing and another, since a creature is something created, but the Son is uncreated essence; therefore if6 the Son and a creature are one thing and another, therefore [they are] more [than one]: therefore the power which can [extend] to the Son and to a creature is more powerful than that which can [extend] to a creature only, that is, is able [to extend] to more; but such is the power of the Father: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, it is as much, or equally great, or greater to produce an equal person as to produce a creature; but the Father can without the Son produce a person; therefore [He can] also produce a creature [without the Son]: therefore it seems that the power in the Father extends to more.
4. Likewise, although the Holy Spirit7 and the Son are not anything more, nevertheless they are more [in number] than the Son alone: therefore since in the Father the power can [extend] to the production of both, in the Son [only] to one of them, the power in the Father can [extend] to more8 than [the power] in the Son: therefore by extension of possibles it is greater.
Conclusion. The essential power in the divine persons is equal as to the extension of the possibles.
I respond: It must be said that, speaking of the essential power, which is in respect to an essential act or production, [the power] in the Father extends to nothing to which it does not equally extend in the Son. And therefore, since equality9 consists with respect to essential power, it is to be conceded without cavil that the Father and the Son are10 equally powerful as to the extension of the possibles.
1. To that, therefore, which is objected on the contrary, that the power which can [extend] to more distant things is wider; it must be said that this is true of power said in the same way and with respect to a like manner of producing; but for the Father to be able to produce something created [pertains] to essential power and to the work of creation; whereas for the Father to be able to produce the Son [pertains] to power as in a person and to generation; therefore that argument is not valid.
2. To that which is objected, that the creature and the Son are more [than one]; it must be said that it is true that they are more, and11 yet they are not more produced [things]. For although the Son is other than a creature, nevertheless He is not another produced [thing]. For the Son is essence and nature, but nevertheless He is not produced essence or nature, since to produce the Son is not to produce something [a "what"], but someone. And therefore it does not follow that to produce the Son and a creature is to be able to produce more than12 to produce one of them.
3. To that which is objected, that He produces a person without the Son; it must be said that it is not similar; since, since to produce a creature is to produce an essence, both the production and the power are essential; and since the essence is undivided13 in the Father and in the Son, therefore also the power and the action, and consequently that production. But since to produce the Son is to produce a person, therefore that production and power expresses something personal; and since the Father and the Son do not agree in person, but in essence, therefore14 it is plain etc.
4. To that which is objected, that the Son and the Holy Spirit are more etc.; it must be said that it is true that [the Father] is also able [to extend] to more, but as to this equality or inequality is not regarded, as has been seen15.
I. It is not treated here of power as it is distinguished against act — which [sense] is altogether to be removed from God — but of power as it is the active and effective principle of other things, that is, of omnipotence. — The equality of this power can be understood either extensively, that is, as to the number of objects that can be caused, or intensively, that is, as Richard of Mediavilla says (loc. cit. below), as to the intension of the vigor of the power. The equality of the three persons in power is asked specially, since also a special difficulty concerning power is to be solved, since in the Father there is the active power of generating, which is not in the Son nor in the Holy Spirit; similarly it must be judged concerning the power of spirating, which is not in the Holy Spirit. From this difficulty are taken all the arguments to the opposite, which however have already been almost solved above at d. 7, q. 3 and 4. The foundation of this solution is the distinction of power placed in the corpus, namely into essential and notional power (which in the solution to [objection] 1 is called power in a person). The former regards production ad extra, which is common to the three persons; the latter, however, [regards] production ad intra, that is, the power of generating in the Father and of spirating in the Father and the Son. Indeed, power and omnipotence can be taken in a broad sense for any productive power, whether it produces ad intra or ad extra; nevertheless properly under omnipotence is understood nothing but essential power. To solve the objection that to generate in God is simply [a] power which does not befit the Son and the Holy Spirit, Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. below ad I.) well observes: «To generate in man and in God is dissimilar, since in divine things this very generating is from the whole substance, not from a part, and on this account in divine things the substance is the same. But in man it is not so; for generation does not occur from the whole substance, but by a separation from a part. Hence there [in man] the substance of father and son is not altogether the same, although the specific form is the same; and on this account in the generation by which a man generates a man, substance and relation are multiplied. And therefore in man to generate is to be able [in respect of] what and [in respect of] toward something; to be able [in respect of] what speaks by way of multiplication of substance, to be able [in respect of] toward something by multiplication of relation. But in divine things, in generation, substance is not multiplied, but only relation; and on this account to be able to generate in divine things is not to be able [in respect of] what, but to be able [in respect of] toward something». These things being supposed, the solution of the same Alexander is understood as to the objection: there is some power in the Father, which nevertheless is not in the Son, in this way responding: «It is a change of category, for what is changed into toward something». — Concerning power itself in itself it is treated below at dd. 42, 43, 44.
II. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 21, m. 1, a. 3. — Scotus, on this and the following [question] here q. unic.; Reportata, here q. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, 2; Summa I, q. 42, a. 6. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following here a. 5; on this and the following q., Summa p. I, tr. II, q. 47, m. 3, partic. 1-3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, on this and the following here q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1st principium, q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following, Summa a. 70, q. 2, n. 41-63. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here q. unic.
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- De hac propositione cfr. supra pag. 51 nota II. — Paulo infra cod. M terminis et alterum praefigit verbum potest, certe supplendum.On this proposition cf. above p. 51, note II. — A little below cod. M prefixes to terminis et alterum the word potest, which is certainly to be supplied.
- Vers. 19, ubi Vulgata: Quaecumque enim ille (Pater) fecerit, haec et Filius similiter facit.Verse 19, where the Vulgate has: For whatever things he (the Father) does, these the Son also does in like manner.
- Vers. 15, in quo textu Vulgata omittit Domine.Verse 15, in which text the Vulgate omits Domine ("O Lord").
- Propositio haec communiter ita exhibetur: infinito non potest fieri additio. — Aliqui codd. ut CIU cc verbo infinitis praemittunt in, et cod. U si in. Dein pauci codd. ut SY omittunt aliqua.This proposition is commonly given thus: no addition can be made to the infinite. — Some codices such as CIU cc prefix in to the word infinitis, and cod. U [reads] si in. Then a few codices such as SY omit aliqua.
- Ita maior pars codd. cum edd. 2, 3; alii ut IKXZ aa ee legunt vel creatum vel cum ed. 1 et Vat. creatura, sed minus distincte. Paulo ante cod. Z Spiritus sancti pro Filii, quae lectio per se praeferenda videri posset, sed ex responsione infra posita patet, quod nomine potentiae intelligitur praeter potentiam creandi potentia generandi, quae soli Patri competit.Thus the greater part of the codices, with editions 2, 3; others, such as IKXZ aa ee, read either creatum, or, with ed. 1 and the Vatican, creatura, but less distinctly. A little before, cod. Z [reads] Spiritus sancti in place of Filii, which reading might per se seem preferable, but from the response placed below it is plain that by the name potentiae is understood, besides the power of creating, the power of generating, which befits the Father alone.
- Addendo particulam si praestamus meliorem lectionem, quae et in multis mss. ut AFGHSTY etc. et ed. 1 reperitur.By adding the particle si we present a better reading, which is also found in many manuscripts such as AFGHSTY etc. and in ed. 1.
- Plures codd. ut AITW aa bb Pater loco Spiritus sanctus, sed contra subnexa.Several codices such as AITW aa bb [read] Pater in place of Spiritus sanctus, but against what follows.
- Praeferimus lectionem aliquorum mss. ut EXZ ponendo plures pro plura, utpote quae magis cum praecedentibus cohaeret.We prefer the reading of some manuscripts such as EXZ, putting plures in place of plura, as one which agrees better with what precedes.
- Supple: potentiae; Vat. autem contra finem in hac quaestione a S. Doctore intentum addit personarum, quod deest in mss. et ed. 1. Paulo supra post Filio codd. aa bb addunt et Spiritu sancto.Supply: potentiae ("of power"); the Vatican, however, contrary to the end intended by the Holy Doctor in this question, adds personarum ("of the persons"), which is missing in the manuscripts and in ed. 1. A little above, after Filio, codices aa bb add et Spiritu sancto ("and the Holy Spirit").
- Vat. praeter fidem plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 sint. Cod. bb post Filius adiungit et Spiritus sanctus.The Vatican, against the authority of very many codices and of ed. 1, [reads] sint. Cod. bb, after Filius, appends et Spiritus sanctus ("and the Holy Spirit").
- Fide multorum mss. ut A S T V W X Y aa bb cc et edd. 2, 3, 6 supplevimus particulam et, pro qua plures codd. ut GHIKZ cum ed. 1 ponunt sed, quamque Vat. cum uno alterove codice omittit. Immediate post in Vat., contradicentibus vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1, deest sunt.On the authority of many manuscripts such as A S T V W X Y aa bb cc and editions 2, 3, 6 we have supplied the particle et, in place of which several codices such as GHIKZ with ed. 1 put sed, and which the Vatican with one or another codex omits. Immediately afterwards in the Vatican, against the older manuscripts and ed. 1, sunt is missing.
- Minus bene et antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 reluctantibus, Vat. adiungit posse; quodsi lectionem Vat. servare velis, addas cum cod. K posse etiam supra potest sequitur quod.Less well, and against the older manuscripts and ed. 1, the Vatican appends posse; but if you wish to keep the reading of the Vatican, you should add with cod. K posse also above, [where] potest follows quod.
- Ita mss. cum ed. 1, excepto codice cc, qui cum Vat. ponit individua.Thus the manuscripts with ed. 1, except codex cc, which with the Vatican puts individua ("indivisible").
- Ex plurimis codd. et ed. 1 supplevimus ideo.From very many codices and ed. 1 we have supplied ideo ("therefore").
- In corp. huius q.In the corpus of this question.