← Back to Distinction 8

Dist. 8, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 8

Textus Latinus
p. 189

Quaestio III. Utrum homo veraciter dicatur de divina natura.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum homo veraciter dicatur de divina natura. Et quod sic, videtur.

(Fundamenta.)

1. Haec est vera: divina natura est persona Filii Dei propter summam simplicitatem et identitatem, quae est in Deo; sed de quocumque praedicatur Filius Dei, praedicatur homo1: igitur haec est vera: divina natura est homo.

2. Item, homo est divina natura; haec est vera, quia aliquis homo, utpote Christus, est divina essentia vel natura: ergo a simplici conversa2 divina natura est homo.

3. Item, Deus et divina natura convertuntur, igitur de quocumque praedicatur unum, et alterum; sed haec est vera: Deus est homo3: igitur haec est vera: divina natura est homo.

4. Item, aut divina natura est homo, aut non-homo. Si est homo, habeo propositum; si est non-homo, sed Filius Dei est divina natura: ergo Filius Dei est non-homo. Quodsi hoc est impossibile, restat, quod haec est vera: divina natura est homo.

Sed contra: (Ad oppositum.)

1. Sicut se habet humana natura ad esse Deum, sic se habet divina ad esse hominem; sed haec est simpliciter falsa: humana natura est Deus: ergo et haec est simpliciter falsa: divina natura est homo.

2. Item, de quocumque praedicatur esse hominem, praedicatur esse mortale4: ergo si divina natura est homo, divina natura est mortalis.

p. 190

3. Item, de quocumque praedicatur homo, inest ei humanitas; sed cuicumque inest humanitas, informatur humanitate: ergo de illo solo praedicatur homo, respectu cuius humanitas est forma. Sed humanitas non est forma divinae naturae: ergo haec est simpliciter falsa: divina natura est homo.

4. Item, si divina natura est homo, aut ratione essentiae, aut ratione personae. Non ratione essentiae, quia humanitatis et divinitatis essentiae simpliciter sunt distinctae; non ratione personae, quia natura non supponit pro persona, sicut supra in primo libro5 dictum est: ergo haec est simpliciter falsa: divina natura est homo.

Conclusio. Locutio: divina natura est homo, potest tantum concedi, si praedicatur ratione suppositi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut in primo libro6 habitum fuit, in divinis est reperire praedicationem per identitatem et per denominationem (Duplex praedicatio), licet non usquequaque proprie omnino. Differt autem praedicatio per denominationem a praedicatione per identitatem, quia, cum aliquid praedicatur per modum denominativum, praedicatur sub ratione formae; ut cum dicitur: Pater generat. Cum autem praedicatio est per identitatem, potest praedicari ratione suppositi; ut cum dicitur: divina essentia est Pater, sensus est: divina essentia est ille qui est Pater. Et hoc modo non praedicatur ratione suppositi nisi illud nomen, quod claudit intra se suum suppositum, sicut est nomen substantivum, vel substantivatum. Hunc igitur duplicem modum praedicandi reperimus in divinis secundum catholicum modum loquendi, ut aliquid praedicetur ratione formae, aliquid ratione suppositi.

(Conclusio 1.) Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum divina natura sit homo; distinguendum est, quia iste terminus homo dupliciter potest intelligi praedicari: quia si intelligatur praedicari ratione suppositi, tunc est vera, et est sensus: divina essentia7 est homo, id est, divina essentia est ille qui est homo; et reducitur ista praedicatio ad praedicationem, quae est per identitatem quantum ad principalem compositionem; quantum vero ad implicationem8 clauditur ibi praedicatio per unionem. Divina enim essentia est Filius Dei per identitatem; sed Filius Dei est homo per unionem.

(Conclusio 2.) — Si autem fit praedicatio ratione formae sive per modum cuiusdam denominationis, falsa est; et est sensus: divina natura est homo, id est, divina natura est humanitate informata. Et hoc modo locutio est falsa, licet secundum sensum priorem habeat veritatem, sicut ostendunt rationes ad primam partem inductae.

Ad argumenta: (Solutio oppositorum.)

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod sicut se habet humana natura ad esse Deum etc.; dicendum, quod falsum est, pro eo quod humana natura non praedicatur de sua hypostasi per identitatem, sicut divina praedicatur9 propter summam simplicitatem (Notandum). Unde haec est falsa: Christus est humana natura; quamvis haec sit vera: Christus est divina natura. Et ideo non sequitur, si haec est falsa: humana natura est Deus, quod haec sit falsa: divina natura est homo.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de quocumque praedicatur esse hominem, praedicatur esse mortale; dicendum, quod hoc est verum quantum ad praedicationem, qua homo praedicatur per modum denominandi (Distinctio). Quantum vero ad praedicationem, qua praedicatur ratione suppositi, non habet veritatem. Homo enim, cum sit nomen substantivum, ratione suppositi potest praedicari; mortale vero, cum sit nomen adiectivum, adiective retentum10 ponit rem suam circa illud, de quo praedicatur (Notandum). Et sicut non sequitur: divina essentia est Pater, ergo divina essentia generat; sic non sequitur: divina essentia est homo, ergo moritur vel nascitur.

Ad 3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod de quocumque praedicatur homo, inest ei humanitas; dicendum, quod verum est de illo modo praedicationis, quo modo praedicatur ratione formae; sed non de illo quo praedicatur ratione suppositi; tunc enim non significatur, quod humanitas insit ei, de quo praedicatur, sed quod inest alicui, quod habet identitatem cum eo, de quo praedicatur.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec non est vera ratione substantiae vel personae: divina natura est homo; dicendum, quod etsi divina natura non supponat pro persona, homo tamen pro persona potest supponere, divina vero natura subiicitur ratione sui; ita quod veritatem habet11 ratione utriusque: ratione unius ex parte subiecti, ratione vero alterius ex parte praedicati, videlicet ratione personae12.

---

English Translation

Question III. Whether "man" is truly said of the divine nature.

Thirdly it is asked whether "man" is truly said of the divine nature. And that it is so, it seems.

(The grounds.)

1. This is true: the divine nature is the person of the Son of God, on account of the supreme simplicity and identity that is in God; but of whatever the Son of God is predicated, "man" is predicated1: therefore this is true: the divine nature is man.

2. Likewise, man is the divine nature; this is true, because some man, namely Christ, is the divine essence or nature: therefore, by simple conversion2, the divine nature is man.

3. Likewise, "God" and "the divine nature" are convertible, therefore of whatever the one is predicated, the other is too; but this is true: God is man3: therefore this is true: the divine nature is man.

4. Likewise, either the divine nature is man, or not-man. If it is man, I have what was proposed; if it is not-man — but the Son of God is the divine nature: therefore the Son of God is not-man. But if this is impossible, it remains that this is true: the divine nature is man.

On the contrary: (To the opposite.)

1. As the human nature stands to being God, so the divine stands to being man; but this is simply false: the human nature is God: therefore this also is simply false: the divine nature is man.

2. Likewise, of whatever "to be man" is predicated, "to be mortal" is predicated4: therefore if the divine nature is man, the divine nature is mortal.

3. Likewise, of whatever "man" is predicated, humanity is in it; but in whatever humanity is, it is informed by humanity: therefore "man" is predicated only of that with respect to which humanity is a form. But humanity is not the form of the divine nature: therefore this is simply false: the divine nature is man.

4. Likewise, if the divine nature is man, it is either by reason of the essence or by reason of the person. Not by reason of the essence, because the essences of humanity and of divinity are simply distinct; not by reason of the person, because the nature does not stand for the person, as was said above in the first book5: therefore this is simply false: the divine nature is man.

Conclusion. The locution "the divine nature is man" can be conceded only if it is predicated by reason of the supposit.

I respond: It must be said that, as was held in the first book6, in divine matters one finds predication by identity and by denomination (twofold predication), although not altogether wholly properly. Now predication by denomination differs from predication by identity, because, when something is predicated in a denominative manner, it is predicated under the aspect of a form; as when one says: the Father generates. But when the predication is by identity, it can be predicated by reason of the supposit; as when one says: the divine essence is the Father, the sense is: the divine essence is He who is the Father. And in this way nothing is predicated by reason of the supposit except that noun which encloses within itself its own supposit, such as a substantive noun, or one made substantive. This twofold mode of predicating, therefore, we find in divine matters according to the catholic manner of speaking: that something be predicated by reason of the form, something by reason of the supposit.

(Conclusion 1.) When, therefore, it is asked whether the divine nature is man, a distinction must be made, because this term man can be understood to be predicated in two ways: for if it is understood to be predicated by reason of the supposit, then it is true, and the sense is: the divine essence7 is man, that is, the divine essence is He who is man; and this predication is reduced to the predication that is by identity as regards the principal composition; but as regards the implication8, the predication by union is enclosed there. For the divine essence is the Son of God by identity; but the Son of God is man by union.

(Conclusion 2.) — But if the predication is made by reason of the form or through the manner of a certain denomination, it is false; and the sense is: the divine nature is man, that is, the divine nature is informed by humanity. And in this way the locution is false, although according to the prior sense it has truth, as the reasons adduced for the first part show.

To the arguments: (Solution of the opposing arguments.)

To 1. To that, then, which is objected first, that as the human nature stands to being God, etc.; it must be said that it is false, for this reason: that the human nature is not predicated of its own hypostasis by identity, as the divine is predicated9 on account of the supreme simplicity (note). Hence this is false: Christ is the human nature; although this is true: Christ is the divine nature. And therefore it does not follow, if this is false: the human nature is God, that this is false: the divine nature is man.

To 2. To that which is objected, that of whatever "to be man" is predicated, "to be mortal" is predicated; it must be said that this is true as regards the predication by which "man" is predicated by the manner of denominating (distinction). But as regards the predication by which it is predicated by reason of the supposit, it does not hold true. For "man," since it is a substantive noun, can be predicated by reason of the supposit; but "mortal," since it is an adjectival noun, taken adjectivally10 sets its own thing about that of which it is predicated (note). And just as it does not follow: the divine essence is the Father, therefore the divine essence generates; so it does not follow: the divine essence is man, therefore it dies or is born.

To 3. To that, however, which is objected, that of whatever "man" is predicated, humanity is in it; it must be said that it is true of that mode of predication by which it is predicated by reason of the form; but not of that by which it is predicated by reason of the supposit; for then it is not signified that humanity is in that of which it is predicated, but that it is in something which has identity with that of which it is predicated.

To 4. To that which is objected, that this is not true by reason of the substance or of the person: the divine nature is man; it must be said that, although the divine nature does not stand for the person, "man" can nonetheless stand for the person, while the divine nature is made subject by reason of itself; so that it has truth11 by reason of both: by reason of the one on the part of the subject, by reason of the other on the part of the predicate, namely by reason of the person12.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Quia, ut supra d. 7. a. I. q. I. monstratum est, Filius Dei propter unionem hypostaticam est homo. (p. 189, nota 6.)
    Because, as was shown above in d. 7, a. I, q. I, the Son of God is man on account of the hypostatic union. (p. 189, note 6.)
  2. Vide supra pag. 175, nota 10. (p. 189, nota 7.)
    See above, p. 175, note 10. (p. 189, note 7.)
  3. Cfr. supra d. 7. a. I. q. I. — Paulo superius ante et alterum edd. repetunt praedicatur. Pro et alterum codd. K X exhibent et reliquum. (p. 189, nota 8.)
    Cf. above, d. 7, a. I, q. I. — A little before, ahead of et alterum ("and the other") the editions repeat praedicatur ("is predicated"). For et alterum codices K X give et reliquum ("and the rest"). (p. 189, note 8.)
  4. Prophyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia, dicit, quod «rationalis et mortalis differentiae constitutivae fiunt hominis, rationalis vero et immortalis Dei, irrationalis autem et mortalis irrationalium animalium». (p. 189, nota 9.)
    Porphyry, On the Predicables, chapter on Difference, says that "rational and mortal become the constitutive differences of man, but rational and immortal of God, while irrational and mortal of irrational animals." (p. 189, note 9.)
  5. Dist. 4. q. 1. et d. 5. a. 1. q. I. (p. 190, nota 1.)
    Distinction 4, q. 1, and d. 5, a. 1, q. I. (p. 190, note 1.)
  6. Dist. 3. a. I. q. I. ad 2. et 3; d. 33. q. 3; d. 34. q. 2. (p. 190, nota 2.)
    Distinction 3, a. I, q. I, to 2 and 3; d. 33, q. 3; d. 34, q. 2. (p. 190, note 2.)
  7. Codd. I L N Z aa cc et edd. 1, 2 natura. Paulo superius pro quia iste non pauci codd. male quod quia iste. (p. 190, nota 3.)
    Codices I L N Z aa cc and editions 1, 2 read natura ("nature"). A little before, for quia iste ("because this") not a few codices wrongly have quod quia iste. (p. 190, note 3.)
  8. Quae intelligit propositionem relativam: qui est homo. Cfr. supra pag. 171, nota 4. (p. 190, nota 4.)
    By which is understood the relative proposition: who is man. Cf. above, p. 171, note 4. (p. 190, note 4.)
  9. Codd. F U supplent de sua. Subinde pro summam simplicitatem codd. A N suam simplicitatem. — De simplicitate Dei et compositione creaturarum cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. (p. 190, nota 5.)
    Codices F U supply de sua ("of its own"). Thereupon, for summam simplicitatem ("supreme simplicity") codices A N read suam simplicitatem ("its own simplicity"). — On the simplicity of God and the composition of creatures, cf. I Sent., d. 8, p. II, q. 2. (p. 190, note 5.)
  10. Pro retentum Vat. tantum, edd. 1, 2 tentum. (p. 190, nota 6.)
    For retentum ("retained") the Vatican edition reads tantum ("only"), editions 1, 2 tentum. (p. 190, note 6.)
  11. Supple: illa propositio. (p. 190, nota 7.)
    Supply: that proposition. (p. 190, note 7.)
  12. Vide scholion ad 1. q. huius art. (p. 190, nota 8.)
    See the scholion to the first question of this article. (p. 190, note 8.) ---
← Dist. 8, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 8, Art. 2, Q. 1→