Dist. 12, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 12
ARTICULUS I.
Circa materiae informitatem.
QUAESTIO I.
Utrum materia corporalium creata sit in omnimoda possibilitate.
Ad oppositum. Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod materia creata sit in omnimoda possibilitate, ita quod nullam habuerit formam:
1. Primo per Augustinum in libro de Symbolo1, qui ait sic: «Primo omnium formarum capacitas facta est, ut ordinatissimo Dei munere cetera formarentur, quae formata sunt»: ergo videtur, quod in materia, secundum quod primo condita fuit, fuerit sola formarum capacitas et nulla forma.
2. Item, Augustinus in duodecimo libro Confessionum2: «Nonne tu, Domine, docuisti me, quia, priusquam istam informem materiam formares atque distingueres, non erat aliquid, non color, non figura, non corpus, non spiritus; tamen non omnino nihil erat informitas sine ulla specie»? Et post: «Illud totum prope nihil erat, quoniam adhuc omnino informe erat; iam tamen erat quod formari poterat». — Ex his duobus verbis expresse colligitur, quod materia corporum sub omnimoda informitate et possibilitate producta fuerit.
3. Item, quod illud sit possibile, videtur. Possibile est prius esse sine posteriori3; sed materia prior est omni forma: ergo possibile fuit, eam fieri absque omni forma.
4. Item, ad rerum conditionem concurrit duplex potentia, scilicet potentia activa et potentia passiva, ut potentia agentis et potentia materiae; sed possibile est, potentiam agentis praecedere effectum et natura et duratione: ergo possibile est, quod possibilitas vel capacitas materiae natura et duratione praeexistat omni formae.
5. Item, quod illud sit congruum, videtur sic. Si aliquod unum reperitur in universo, quod constitutum est ex pluribus naturis, et alteram illarum est per se invenire; similiter contingit invenire per se et reliquam, ad hoc quod universitas sit completa4. Sed res mundanae per materiam componuntur et formam, et est invenire puram formam, in qua nihil est de possibilitate materiae, utpote Deum: ergo erit reperire puram materiam, in qua nihil erit de actualitate formae. Sed hoc non fuit nisi in mundi exordio: ergo videtur, quod materia producta sit sine omni forma.
6. Item, Deus est agens ordinatissimus, ergo ab extremo in extremum pervenit per medium; sed medium inter omnino non-ens et ens in actu est ens omnino in potentia: ergo videtur, quod Deus in productione rerum prius de non-ente fecit5 ens in potentia, quam produxerit aliquam formam.
Fundamenta. Ad oppositum: 1. Hugo in libro de Sacramentis6: «Credo, illam primam materiam non ideo dictam informem fore, quod nullam omnino formam habuerit, quia non aliquid tale corporeum existere potest»; et hoc idem Magister dicit in littera.
2. Item, Boethius7: «Omne esse est a forma»; sed omne quod creatur, statim post creationem est: ergo vel est forma, vel habet formam. Si igitur materia prima creata fuit, vel fuit forma, vel habuit formam in suae eductionis principio; sed non fuit forma: ergo etc.
3. Item, Philosophus8: «Impossibile est materiam separari a morphea»; sed si materia tempore praeexisteret omni formae, posset ab ea separari: ergo non fuit creata in carentia omnis formae.
4. Item, unitas, veritas, bonitas, sive modus, species et ordo sunt in rebus ex parte principii formalis9: sed impossibile est, aliquid esse vel produci, in quo non sit vestigium Creatoris: ergo impossibile est, quod aliquid educatur carens omni forma.
5. Item, si materia illa careret omni forma: ergo et omni accidente: ergo nec haberet extendi p. 294 nec locari nec esse in motu nec in quiete10; sed nihil tale in rerum natura potest existere: ergo materia non potuit in sui conditione omni forma carere.
6. Item, materia hoc ipsum quod est dicitur a forma11, ergo essentialem habet dependentiam a forma: si ergo impossibile est, aliquid separari ab eo quod essentialiter sibi inhaeret, impossibile est, materiam praeter omnem formam existere.
CONCLUSIO.
Materia potest considerari ab anima secundum suam essentiam et ut omnino informis; sed secundum esse non potest existere sine omni forma, nec fuit creata informis.
Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est Materia consideratur dupliciter. notandum, quod dupliciter est loqui de materia: aut secundum quod existit in natura, aut secundum quod consideratur ab anima. Conclusio 1. Si secundum quod consideratur ab anima, sic potest considerari informis, sive per privationem formae distinctae, sive per privationem etiam omnis formae; et sic docet Augustinus in duodecimo Confessionum12 essentiam materiae intelligere. Nam materia secundum sui Notandum. essentiam est informis per possibilitatem omnimodam; et dum sic consideratur, ipsa formarum capacitas sive possibilitas est sibi pro forma. — Est iterum loqui de materia, secundum quod habet Conclusio 2. esse in natura; et sic nunquam est praeter locum et tempus, sive praeter quietem et motum; et hoc modo non solummodo non congruit, immo etiam impossibile est, materiam informem existere per privationem omnis formae.
Et hoc est quod dicit Magister et Hugo de sancto Victore, et omnes in hoc tractatores consenserunt, Conclusio 3. quod illa materia, quae primo producta est per creationem, non fuit in omnimoda possibilitate sive in carentia omnis formae. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hanc partem inductae.
Solutio oppositorum. Ad 1, 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod primo facta est omnium capacitas, et similiter de eo quod dicitur in duodecimo Confessionum; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de prioritate naturae, non de prioritate durationis13. Secundum enim ordinem naturae prius est materia omnimode in potentia, quam Notandum. sit sub aliqua forma, et ita omnimode informis quam aliquo modo formata, quia formationem habet aliunde, sed informitatem et possibilitatem habet ex propria natura; non tamen potest esse prior duratione. Nunquam enim informitas est nisi per aliquam formam, nec possibilitas nisi per aliquem actum.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod prius potest esse sine posteriori; dicendum, quod illud non habet veritatem, quando prius a posteriori dependet, vel quando ad ipsum necessariam habet ordinationem, vel etiam quando illud quod est prius in una consideratione, posterius est in altera: omnibus his de causis fallit praedicta ratio in proposito. Materia Notandum. enim a forma dependet et ad ipsam habet necessariam ordinationem; et quamvis sit prior productione sive generatione, posterior est tamen completione.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de potentia agentis et materiae, dicendum, quod non est simile, quia potentia agentis non sic dependet et completur per effectum, sicut potentia materiae dependet et completur per actum.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est reperire formam per se, ergo et materiam; dicendum, quod propositio illa non habet necessitatem, sed solum congruitatem. Peccatum est etiam in assumtione14, quia forma illa, quae cum materia facit compositum, nunquam sine materia reperitur. Cum enim dicitur: Notandum. Deus est pure forma, aequivocatur nomen formae, quia non dicitur ibi forma, prout est perfectio materiae; sed forma nominat ibi essentiam, quae habet esse in omnimoda actualitate et completione, et nullo modo potest pervenire ad alterius compositionem.
Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ordine in producendo, dicendum, quod ad hoc quod servetur ordo in productione, non oportet, quod quaecumque habent ordinem naturae, habeant ordinem durationis successivae. Contra hoc enim innumerabiles sunt instantiae15; et ideo, quamvis ens in potentia simpliciter inter non-ens et ens-actu sit medium, non oportet, quod duratione sequatur unum, et praecedat alterum.
I. De doctrina S. Doctoris circa materiam et formam cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. a. I. q. 1, scholion. Cum autem Gen. 1, 2. terra appelletur inanis et vacua, et Sap. 11, 18. dicatur, quod Deus creavit orbem terrarum ex materia invisa (ἐξ ὕλης ἀμόρφου), in hoc articulo inquiritur, quomodo haec intelligenda sint. In I. quaestione docetur, materiam nunquam fuisse sine aliqua forma, immo impossibile esse, «materiam informem existere per privationem omnis formae». Sed controvertitur, utrum terminus impossibile intelligi debeat non tantum respectu virium naturalium, quod in confesso est apud omnes, sed etiam absolute et respectu divinae potentiae, scil. propter intrinsecam rei impossibilitatem. Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 1. q. 10.) docet, «quod actione divina supernaturali materia potest per se subsistere nuda ab omni forma, et hoc multo magis quam accidentia... Unde qui modo negant, materiam Dei actione posse stare sine forma, nisi esset clarum et fide tenendum, quod accidentia subsistunt sine subiecto in Sacramento altaris, multo magis negarent, Dei actione accidens posse stare sine subiecto». Henrico praeter consuetudinem suam hic consentit Scot. (in utroque Scripto, hic q. 2.), Richard. a Med. (sed cum distinctione quadam), Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2) et plures gravesque doctores posteriores. Sed S. Thom. (S. 1. q. 66. a. 1.) dicit: «Dicere, materiam praecedere sine forma, est dicere ens actu sine actu, quod implicat contradictionem». Hoc iam dixit Averroes (cfr. supra pag. 293, nota 8.).
II. Praeter iam citatos: Alex. Hal., de hac et seq. S. p. II. q. 14. m. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 4. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. I. q. 4. m. I. a. 4. partic. I. ad 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 4. 5. — Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. I. 2. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 1.
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ARTICLE I.
Concerning the informity of matter.
QUESTION I.
Whether the matter of corporeal things was created in complete possibility.
Ad oppositum. Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is shown that matter was created in complete possibility, in such a way that it had no form at all:
1. First by Augustine in the book On the Creed1, who says thus: «First, the capacity of all forms was made, that by the most well-ordered gift of God the other things might be formed, which have been formed»: therefore it seems that in matter, according to what was first established, there was only the capacity of forms and no form.
2. Likewise, Augustine in the twelfth book of the Confessions2: «Have you not, O Lord, taught me that, before you formed and distinguished this formless matter, there was not anything — not color, not figure, not body, not spirit; yet [there] was not altogether nothing, [but] a formlessness without any species»? And after: «That whole was nearly nothing, since it was still altogether formless; yet there already was that which could be formed». — From these two passages it is expressly gathered that the matter of bodies was produced under complete informity and possibility.
3. Likewise, that this is possible is shown thus. The prior can be without the posterior3; but matter is prior to every form: therefore it was possible that it become without any form.
4. Likewise, for the establishment of things there concur two potencies, namely active potency and passive potency, as the potency of the agent and the potency of matter; but it is possible that the potency of the agent precede the effect both by nature and by duration: therefore it is possible that the possibility or capacity of matter pre-exist every form both by nature and by duration.
5. Likewise, that this is fitting is shown thus. If some one thing is found in the universe which is constituted out of several natures, and one of those [natures] is to be found per se, it likewise occurs that the other is found per se, with the result that the totality is complete4. But mundane things are composed of matter and form, and it is possible to find pure form, in which there is nothing of the possibility of matter — namely God: therefore it will be possible to find pure matter, in which there will be nothing of the actuality of form. But this was not [the case] except in the world's beginning: therefore it seems that matter was produced without any form.
6. Likewise, God is the most well-ordered agent, therefore he passes from extreme to extreme through a middle; but the middle between altogether non-being and being in act is being altogether in potency: therefore it seems that God in the production of things first made5 being in potency from non-being, before he produced any form.
Fundamenta. On the contrary: 1. Hugh in the book On the Sacraments6: «I believe that first matter was not called formless on the ground that it had no form at all, since no such corporeal thing can exist»; and the Master says this same thing in the text.
2. Likewise, Boethius7: «All being is from form»; but everything that is created, immediately after creation, is: therefore either it is form, or it has form. If therefore prime matter was created, either it was form, or it had form in the principle of its production; but it was not form: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the Philosopher8: «It is impossible for matter to be separated from morphē»; but if matter were to pre-exist every form in time, it could be separated from it: therefore it was not created in the lack of every form.
4. Likewise, unity, truth, goodness — that is, mode, species and order — are in things from the side of the formal principle9: but it is impossible that anything be or be produced in which there is not the vestige of the Creator: therefore it is impossible that anything be brought forth lacking every form.
5. Likewise, if that matter were to lack every form: therefore [it would lack] every accident also: therefore it would not have being extended p. 294 nor being located nor being in motion nor in rest10; but nothing such can exist in the nature of things: therefore matter could not, in its condition [of being established], lack every form.
6. Likewise, matter [taken as] this very thing which is takes its name from form11; therefore it has an essential dependence on form: if therefore it is impossible that anything be separated from that which essentially inheres in it, it is impossible that matter exist apart from every form.
CONCLUSION.
Matter can be considered by the soul according to its essence and as wholly formless; but according to being it cannot exist without every form, nor was it created formless.
I respond: For the understanding of what has been said it must be Matter is considered in two ways. noted that there are two ways of speaking of matter: either according to its existence in nature, or according to its being considered by the soul. Conclusion 1. If according to its being considered by the soul, then it can be considered formless, either by the privation of distinct form, or by the privation even of every form; and thus Augustine in the twelfth [book] of the Confessions12 teaches that the essence of matter is to be understood. For matter according to its Note. essence is formless through complete possibility; and while it is so considered, the very capacity or possibility of forms stands to it in place of form. — There is again [a way] of speaking of matter according as it has Conclusion 2. being in nature; and so it is never apart from place and time, or apart from rest and motion; and in this way it is not only unfitting but indeed impossible that matter exist as formless through the privation of every form.
And this is what the Master and Hugh of St. Victor say, and all who treat of this matter have agreed, Conclusion 3. that the matter which was first produced by creation was not in complete possibility, that is, in the lack of every form. — Hence the reasons brought forward for this part [of the question] are to be conceded.
Solution of the contrary [arguments]. To 1, 2. To that which is objected — that the capacity of all things was first made, and likewise to what is said in the twelfth [book] of the Confessions — it must be said that Augustine speaks of priority of nature, not of priority of duration13. For according to the order of nature matter is first in complete potency before Note. it is under any form, and so wholly formless before formed in any way, since it has formation from elsewhere, but it has informity and possibility from its own nature; yet it cannot be prior in duration. For there is never informity except through some form, nor possibility except through some act.
To 3. To that which is objected, that the prior can be without the posterior, it must be said that this does not hold when the prior depends on the posterior, or when it has a necessary ordering to it, or also when that which is prior in one consideration is posterior in another: for all these reasons the aforesaid reasoning fails in the present case. For matter Note. depends on form and has a necessary ordering to it; and although it is prior in production or generation, it is nevertheless posterior in completion.
To 4. To that which is objected concerning the potency of the agent and of matter, it must be said that there is no parallel, since the potency of the agent does not depend on and reach completion through its effect in the way that the potency of matter depends on and reaches completion through its act.
To 5. To that which is objected — that one can find form per se, therefore also matter [per se] — it must be said that that proposition does not have necessity but only fittingness. There is also a fault in the minor premise14, since the form which with matter makes a composite is never found without matter. For when it is said: Note. God is purely form, the term form is used equivocally, since form there is not said as it is the perfection of matter; rather form there names the essence, which has being in complete actuality and completion, and can in no way come to the composition of another.
To 6. To that which is objected concerning order in producing, it must be said that for order to be preserved in production it is not necessary that whatever things have an order of nature have an order of successive duration. For there are innumerable instances against this15; and therefore, although being in potency simply is the middle between non-being and being-in-act, it is not necessary that it follow the one and precede the other in duration.
I. On the doctrine of the holy Doctor concerning matter and form cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. I, q. 1, scholion. Now since in Genesis 1, 2 the earth is called void and empty, and in Wisdom 11, 18 it is said that God created the world from invisible matter (ἐξ ὕλης ἀμόρφου), in this article it is asked how these are to be understood. In Question I it is taught that matter was never without some form, indeed that it is impossible «for formless matter to exist by the privation of every form». But there is controversy whether the term impossible should be understood not only with respect to the natural powers (which is admitted by all), but also absolutely and with respect to the divine power — namely on account of the intrinsic impossibility of the thing. Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 1, q. 10) teaches «that by supernatural divine action matter can subsist of itself stripped of every form, and this much more than the accidents... Hence those who now deny that matter, by God's action, can stand without form, unless it were clear and to be held by faith that the accidents subsist without a subject in the Sacrament of the altar, would much more deny that, by God's action, an accident can stand without a subject». Beyond his usual practice, Scotus here agrees with Henry (in either Writing, here q. 2), [as does] Richard of Mediavilla (but with a certain distinction), Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 2), and many weighty later doctors. But Saint Thomas (Summa, 1, q. 66, a. 1) says: «To say that matter precedes without form is to say being-in-act without act, which implies a contradiction». This Averroes already said (cf. above p. 293, note 8).
II. Besides those already cited: Alexander of Hales, Summa, on this and the following [question], p. II, q. 14, m. 1. — Saint Thomas, here, the single question, a. 4. — Blessed Albert, Summa, p. II, tr. I, q. 4, m. I, a. 4, partic. I, ad 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, the single question, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, q. 4. 5. — Giles of Rome, here, q. 3, a. I. 2. — Durandus, here, q. 2. — Biel, here, q. 1.
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- Cap. 2. n. 2: Quapropter rectissime credimus, omnia Deum fecisse de nihilo; quia, etiamsi de aliqua materia factus est mundus, eadem ipsa materia de nihilo facta est, ut ordinatissimo Dei munere prima [alias: primo] capacitas formarum fieret, ac deinde formarentur quaecumque formata sunt.Chapter 2, n. 2: Wherefore we most rightly believe that God made all things out of nothing; since, even if the world was made out of some matter, that very matter was made out of nothing, so that by the most well-ordered gift of God the capacity of forms was first made, and then whatsoever things were formed were formed. [Variant: prima / primo.]
- Cap. 3. n. 3, ubi textus originalis ultimam partem verborum sic exhibet: non tamen omnino nihil, erat quaedam informitas sine ulla specie. — Seq. textus est ibid. c. 8. n. 8.Chapter 3, n. 3, where the original text presents the last part of the words thus: yet [it was] not altogether nothing, [for] there was a certain informity without any species. — The following text is from the same work, c. 8, n. 8.
- Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. 11.): Quaedam vero secundum naturam et substantiam [priora sunt], quaecumque contingunt absque aliis esse, ista vero sine illis minime.Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 16 (IV, c. 11): Some things [are prior] by nature and substance: namely whichever can be without the others, while the others cannot be without them.
- Secundum Aristotelem, VIII. Phys. text. 37. (c. 5.). Cfr. supra pag. 210, nota 11.According to Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 37 (c. 5). Cf. above, p. 210, note 11.
- Cod. K fecerit.Codex K [reads] fecerit [perfect subjunctive].
- Libr. I. p. I. c. 4. — Verba Magistri vide hic in lit. c. 5.Book I, p. I, c. 4. — For the words of the Master see here in the text, c. 5.
- In libro de Unitate et uno: Omne enim esse ex forma est in rebus creatis. Cfr. etiam de Trin. c. 2.In the book On Unity and the One: For all being is from form in created things. Cf. also On the Trinity, c. 2.
- Libr. I. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 29. (c. 5.): «Melius ergo est facere omnibus inseparabilem esse materiam... quam nunquam sine passione possibile est esse neque sine forma (ἄνευ μορφῆς)». Averroes in explicatione libri II. Phys. text. 12. ait: Materia autem differt a forma, sed nunquam denudatur a forma, immo cum separatur a forma induit aliam; quoniam, si denudaretur ab omnibus formis, scilicet prima materia, tunc quod non est in actu esset in actu. Cfr. supra pag. 96, nota 5. — Pro a morphea [morphē], quod ita exhibent codd. cum edd. 1, 2, Vat. cum aliis edd. substituit ab omni forma.Book I On Generation and Corruption, text 29 (c. 5): «Therefore it is better to say that matter is inseparable from all things... [matter] which can never be without passion nor without form (ἄνευ μορφῆς)». Averroes in his exposition of Physics II, text 12, says: Matter differs from form, but is never stripped of form; rather, when it is separated from one form it takes on another; since, if first matter were stripped of all forms, then what is not in act would be in act. Cf. above, p. 96, note 5. — In place of a morphea [from morphē], which the codices together with editions 1 and 2 thus present, the Vatican edition with the other editions substitutes ab omni forma.
- Vide August., de Vera Religione, c. 18. n. 35. seq. et c. 36. n. 66; de Natura boni, c. 3. seqq., ubi etiam minor insinuatur. Cfr. supra pag. 17, nota 4.See Augustine, On True Religion, c. 18, n. 35 f. and c. 36, n. 66; On the Nature of the Good, c. 3 ff., where the minor [premise] is also intimated. Cf. above, p. 17, note 4.
- Aristot., I. de Gener. et corrupt. text. 27. (c. 5.): Separata enim existens [materia] aut nullum possidebit locum, aut veluti punctus aliquis aut vacuum erit, vel corpus non sensatum erit; horum autem alterum quidem non contingit, alterum autem necesse est in aliquo esse. Semper enim alicubi erit quod generatur ex eo.Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, text 27 (c. 5): For [matter] existing separately will either possess no place, or will be like some point or void, or will be an insensible body; but of these the one [the latter] does not occur, while the other [the former] is necessarily in something. For that which is generated from it will always be somewhere.
- Aristot., II. Phys. text. 26. (c. 2.), de quo vide tom. I. pag. 153, nota 6. — Vid. dicitur esse ad formam.Aristotle, Physics II, text 26 (c. 2), on which see vol. I, p. 153, note 6. — That is, is said to be in relation to form.
- Cap. 3. n. 3, et c. 6. n. 6. seqq. — De iis quae sequuntur, cfr. supra pag. 17, nota 4. et d. 3. p. I. a. I. q. 2. in corp.Chapter 3, n. 3, and c. 6, n. 6 ff. — On what follows, cf. above p. 17, note 4, and d. 3, p. I, a. I, q. 2, in the body.
- Sicut ipse August., XII. Confess. c. 29. n. 40. testatur et explicat per exemplum soni, qui origine tantum prior est cantu, de quo vide supra d. 2. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. ad 4. Idem docet I. de Gen. ad lit. c. 15. n. 29; II. c. 11. n. 24. et V. c. 5. n. 13; I. Contra Advers. legis et proph. c. 9. n. 12.As Augustine himself testifies, Confessions XII, c. 29, n. 40, and explains by the example of sound, which is prior to song only in origin — on which see above d. 2, p. I, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4. He teaches the same thing in On Genesis according to the Letter I, c. 15, n. 29; II, c. 11, n. 24; and V, c. 5, n. 13; Against the Adversaries of the Law and the Prophets I, c. 9, n. 12.
- Id est: in minori obiectionis. — Paulo inferius post prout est in cod. T additur pura. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2.That is, in the minor [premise] of the objection. — A little lower, after prout est, in codex T is added pura. Cf. I Sent., d. 8, p. II, q. 2.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 20. a. 2. q. 2, ubi hoc ostenditur respectu personarum divinarum. — In fine solutionis in cod. Q a secunda manu adiungitur sed sufficit, quod ens in potentia praecedat origine ens-actu.Cf. I Sent., d. 20, a. 2, q. 2, where this is shown with respect to the divine persons. — At the end of the solution, in codex Q a second hand adds: but it suffices that being in potency precede being-in-act in origin. ---