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Dist. 12, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 12

Textus Latinus
p. 295

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum materia producta sit in perfecta actualitate.

Ad oppositum. Secundo quaeritur, utrum materia illa producta sit in perfecta actualitate. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Primo per textum Genesis secundo1: Istae sunt generationes caeli et terrae in die, qua creavit Deus caelum et terram et omne virgultum agri etc.: ergo in eodem die producta sunt quae prius dixit per sex dierum numerum fuisse distincta.

2. Item, Ecclesiastici decimo octavo2: Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul. Si omnia simul sunt creata, ergo corporalia et spiritualia et omnis corporalium differentia.

3. Item, Iob quadragesimo3: Ecce Behemoth, quem feci tecum; sed Behemoth est Angelus primo factus, et homo ultimo die factus: ergo omnia simul facta sunt. — His auctoritatibus arguit Augustinus pro sua opinione in hac parte.

4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione. Ab agente perfectae potentiae debet exire effectus, secundum quod magis est manifestativus summae potentiae; sed maioris potentiae est posse simul omnia producere quam successive: ergo magis est declarativa divinae potentiae productio materiae cum perfecta actualitate formae simul et semel sibi collatae, quam postmodum ex illa successive eductae: si ergo Deus operatur, secundum quod eius potentiam magis decet4, videtur etc.

5. Item, «perfecte sapientis est ordinare»5: ergo si confusio repugnat ordinationi, videtur, quod Deus nihil produxerit cum confusione, cum sit perfecte sapiens; produxit igitur sub ordine. Sed ordo praesupponit distinctionem: ergo etc.

6. Item, perfectio effectus attestatur perfectae p. 296 bonitati in efficiente: si ergo Deus est bonitatis perfectissimae, videtur, quod statim cum produxit materiam, debuit ipsam formis plene perficere, cum ipse hoc posset, et materia etiam exigeret. Si tu dicas, quod hoc non concludit, quod statim debuit perficere, sed quod ex rationabili causa et potuit et debuit differre; obiicitur contra hoc: quia natura et ars operatur quam citius potest, et de excellentia virtutis et bonitatis est, quod effectum suum compleat velociter: ergo si tam natura quam ars est imitatrix divinae artis et virtutis6, videtur, quod Deus, cum statim complere potuerit, quod nulla mora temporis vel durationis distulerit.

Fundamenta. Sed contra: 1. Primo per textum Genesis7 arguitur, ubi dicitur, quod per sex dierum spatium complevit Dominus opus, quod inchoaverat: ergo videtur, quod non subito materia sit in perfecta actualitate producta, secundum sacrae Scripturae sententiam. Si igitur «maior est huius Scripturae auctoritas quam omnis humani ingenii perspicacitas», ut dicit Augustinus8, magis standum est huic sententiae quam omni persuasioni humanae. Si dicas, quod rudibus loquebatur legislator, nec potuit simul dicere quod simul potuit Deus facere; neutra istarum responsionum videtur sufficiens, quia propter ruditatem auditoris non debet ei aliquis dare occasionem deceptionis; Moyses autem bene noverat, quod ipsi verba eius ad litteram intelligerent: ergo scienter docebat eos id, unde possent decipi et errare. Item, quamvis non simul potuerit omnia dicere et opera illa exprimere, tamen potuit exprimere, omnia simul facta esse.

2. Item, Chrysostomus super Ioannem, homilia vigesima secunda9 ait, «quod simul exstitit per substantiam materiae non simul apparuit per speciem formae»: ergo non videtur, quod simul producta sit sub formis. — Ad hoc sunt auctoritates communiter Sanctorum et doctorum, ut Ambrosii10, Hieronymi, Gregorii, Basilii, Dionysii et Damasceni et aliorum plurium, tam Graecorum quam Latinorum.

3. Item, per rationem videtur hoc ipsum. Quamvis Deus posset statim hominem in beatitudine collocare et universum in ea perfectione, in qua erit post iudicium, facere; maluit tamen ordinem servare non solum in mundi existentia, sed etiam in decursu, quia efficacius sic manifestatur eius sapientia11. Ergo similiter videtur, quod in primario rerum exitu non tantummodo servaverit ordinem quantum ad ipsum esse, sed etiam quantum ad ipsum producere sive facere: ergo non videtur, quod omnia simul produxerit, sed successive.

4. Item, divina potentia non tantum manifestatur in productione formae, sed etiam tantum et amplius manifestatur in eductione materiae; materia autem secundum maiorem sui capacitatem magis declarat efficientis potestatem. Sed tanto maior est capacitas in materia, quanto maior est in ea informitas: si ergo ad manifestationem divinae potentiae debuit materia produci capax, secundum quod erat possibile, videtur, quod Deus debuit eam producere in tanta informitate, in quanta materia posset aliquo modo subsistere: ergo non sub perfecta formarum distinctione.

5. Item, impossibile est, dies materiales12 simul esse: ergo impossibile est hoc intelligere, quod Deus simul omnia produxerit, et tamen ea produxerit per sex dies. Oportet ergo secundum positionem, quae ponit, omnia simul esse producta, senarium illum dierum intelligere spiritualiter, et ita lucem spiritualem et noctem spiritualem. Ergo si haec omnia simul producta sunt, in primo instanti divisa est lux a tenebris, id est boni Angeli a malis: ergo non fuit mora inter creationem et lapsum, quod est supra13 improbatum, et ostensum est esse contra Augustinum.

6. Item, cum sacra Scriptura ordinat opera sex dierum, aut ordinat quantum ad ordinem durationis, aut quantum ad ordinem naturae, aut quantum ad ordinem dignitatis. Si quantum ad ordinem dignitatis: ergo cum homo sit dignissima creaturarum, debuit eius productio attribui primae diei. Si quantum ad ordinem naturae: ergo productio solis et lunae14 ante productionem plantarum et herbae. Restat igitur, hoc esse dictum quantum ad ordinem temporis sive durationis.

CONCLUSIO.

Probabilius est, omnia corporalia simul esse creata secundum materiam, non autem simul, sed per sex dies esse distincta secundum formam.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod circa hanc quaestionem diversae fuerunt Sanctorum opiniones.

Quidam enim Sancti in hac quaestione magis secuti sunt viam theologicam, trahentes rationem ad ea quae sunt fidei. Opinio Augustini. Quidam vero, inter quos praecipuus fuit Augustinus, magis secuti sunt viam philosophicam, quae illa ponit, quae magis videntur rationi consona: unde et intellectum Scripturae traxit ad rationis confirmationem et attestationem. Unde cum videatur rationabilius, a summa potentia omnia produci simul, et mora temporis interiacentis nullius videatur esse utilitatis vel necessitatis; posuit, omnia simul esse producta, suam positionem confirmans per auctoritates sacrae Scripturae, et exponens illud quod videtur sibi contraire, videlicet de dierum distinctione, ostendens, quod illi dies non fuerunt dies materiales, sed potius spirituales, qui omnes simul potuerunt esse. — Et haec positio multum fuit rationabilis et valde subtilis.

Non omnibus placet. Verumtamen, quia ad hanc positionem videtur intellectus Scripturae distrahi, et securius est et magis meritorium, intellectum nostrum et rationem omnino Scripturae supponere, quam ipsam aliquo modo distrahere: ideo communiter alii doctores, et qui praecesserunt Augustinum, et qui secuti sunt, sic intellexerunt et posuerunt, sicut textus et littera sacrae Scripturae Genesis sonare videtur. Unde posuerunt, omnia corporalia Conclusio. simul esse creata in materia, sed non simul, sed per senarium dierum, esse distincta in forma. — Defenditur rationibus. Hanc positionem, etsi minus videatur rationabilis quam alia, non tamen p. 297 est irrationabile sustinere. Quamvis enim ratio non percipiat huius positionis congruitatem, prout considerationi suae innititur, percipit tamen, prout sub lumine fidei captivatur. Est enim huius successivae formationis et distinctionis ratio quadruplex, videlicet litteralis, moralis, allegorica et anagogica.

Ratio 1. Litteralis in hoc, quod Deus non tantum intendit facere quod potest, quantum15 etiam communicare creaturae quod potest recipere. Unde cum possit dare beatitudinem absque meritis, vult tamen, quod mereamur. Sic cum posset statim perficere materiam, maluit tamen ipsam sub quadam informitate et imperfectione facere, ut ex sua imperfectione quasi materia ad Deum clamaret, ut ipsam perficeret16. Et hoc idem voluit per senarium dierum differre, ut in perfectione numeri simul ostenderetur perfectio universi17. Secundum enim arithmeticum senarius est numerus perfectus, quia constat ex omnibus suis partibus aliquotis, ita quod nec deficit nec excrescit. Partes autem aliquotae dicuntur, quae sumtae aliquoties reddunt totum.

Ratio 2. Ratio moralis est, ut in hoc erudiatur homo, quod sicut natura corporea per se ipsam informis existit, tunc autem formatur, cum divina bonitas eius informitati tribuit formam; sic anima formari non potest per se ipsam, nisi Deus gratiam suam infundat18. Cui etiam senarius numerus attestatur, quia tempus est merendi per universum tempus vitae praesentis, ut postmodum detur homini quies, quia non pervenitur ad perfectionem meriti usque ad consummationem gratiae finalis, post quam nulla sequitur vespera: et ideo dies septimus non habet sibi assignatum vespere in Scriptura19.

Ratio 3. Allegorica vero ratio est, quia, sicut expresse Augustinus20 ostendit, in illa prima mundi conditione, quae distincta est per senarium, totum spatium decursus mundi praesentis secundum sex aetates praesignatur: ut primus dies primae aetati respondeat, secundus secundae, et sic deinceps, secundum quod plane adaptat Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram21; quod hic longum esset repetere.

Ratio 4. Ratio autem anagogica est, ut in illa dierum distinctione intelligatur perfectio cognitionis in angelica natura beatificata, secundum quod plane ostendit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram quasi per totum22, quod ideo vocat ad litteram, quia expositionem istam, quam alii reputabant anagogicam, dixit legislatorem intendisse ad litteram. Notandum. Nihil tamen ibi asserendo dicit, sed protestatur ipse, modo inquisitorio se ibi procedere. Et sicut patet ex eius intentione ibidem23, magis volebat intellectum ex Scriptura elicere, ex quo Scriptura non posset a viris philosophicis derideri, nec propter hoc aliquis, naturali philosophia imbutus, a fidei veritate retardari, sicut ipse aliquando fuerat retardatus, magis, inquam, quam intellectum principalem exponere, quem ibi habuit legislator; et magis intendit ostendere, quid congruum fuerit vel tunc esse potuerit, quam quid factum fuerit. Notandum. Et in duodecimo Confessionum24 ostendit, quod una et eadem Scriptura multipliciter potest intelligi, et in omnibus sensibus vere, quorum nullus Spiritum sanctum latuit, ex cuius inspiratione Scriptura edita fuit. Et in hoc manifeste ostendit, quod aliis non contradicit. — Hanc igitur positionem sustinendo, ad obiecta in contrarium respondendum est.

Solutio oppositorum. Ad 1. Ad illud enim quod primo obiicitur de textu Genesis, dicendum, quod illud dictum est per recapitulationem, et iste terminus die ibi confunditur, ut teneatur pro diversis diebus, vel tenetur zeugmatice25, ut reddatur singulis membris illius recapitulationis.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Ecclesiastici decimo octavo26: Qui vivit in aeternum etc.; dicendum, quod Scriptura facit vim inter creare et facere. Nam creationem vocat productionem ex nihilo, factionem vero ipsam distinctionem; et hoc bene significatur Genesis secundo, ubi dicitur, quod cessavit ab omni opere suo, quod creavit, ut faceret. Omnes igitur Sancti in hoc concordant, quod omnia sunt simul producta in materia; et ideo concedunt, omnia simul esse creata, sed tamen non simul facta. p. 298

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Iob quadragesimo, dicendum, quod Gregorius27 exponit, quod cum dicit ibi simultatem non temporis, sed similitudinem rationis, quasi dicat, ecce Behemoth, quem feci tecum, id est tibi similem in rationis capacitate.

Ad 4. 5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maioris potentiae est declarativum, producere multa simul; dicendum, quod Deus potentiam suam magis intendebat manifestare in productione de non-esse in esse quam postmodum in formatione; ibi enim magis manifestat sapientiam et bonitatem. Et ut singillatim et distinctim et appropriatim in productione effectuum manifestaretur perfectio potentiae, sapientiae et bonitatis: placuit divino Auctori praemittere opus creationis, postmodum subiungere opus distinctionis, postremo vero opus ornatus et decorationis. Et in primo manifestatur potentia, in secundo sapientia, in tertio vero bonitas perfecta, licet omnia in quolibet horum manifestari possint. Notandum. Et ideo28 bene manifestata sunt post consummatum esse rerum illa tria, sicut si in principio statim materia fuisset producta et distincta et ornata. — Et per hoc patent duo sequentia, quae procedunt consimili via, videlicet de bonitatis et sapientiae perfectione. Illae enim rationes non concludunt, nisi quod Deus materiam in informitate non debuit relinquere, quia hoc esset contra ordinem et perfectionem; sed dum fecit informem, ut formaret, et imperfectam, ut perficeret, ostendit, et perfectionem et ordinem a se materiae dari. Et si tu obiicias, quod ad perfectionem omnium horum spectat velociter effectum perficere et ordinare29 et distinguere; dicendum, quod illud verum est, ubi agens agit secundum totum suum posse; ubi vero condescendit possibilitati et infirmitati et utilitati alienae, non habet veritatem; et sic est in proposito. Notandum. Sicut enim Deus sacram Scripturam nobis tradidit quasi rudi modo et inepto, ut quilibet posset capere et intelligere, cum tamen in Christo sint infiniti thesauri sapientiae et scientiae30; sic etiam in formatione rerum, quantum decebat, condescendit modo naturae et etiam eruditioni rationalis creaturae. Et quia ex illa dilatione homo erudiebatur, sicut prius visum est; ideo placuit divinae potentiae, bonitati et sapientiae, rerum formas sub dierum successione distinguere, cum tamen posset eis subito materiam distinguere et ornare.

Scholion

I. S. Augustinus ob rationes, quae hic ad opposit. tactae sunt, singularem expositionem duorum primorum capitulorum Genesis fecit, quam S. Thom. (hic q. unica, a. 2.) sic explicat: «Augustinus enim vult, in ipso creationis principio quasdam res per species suas distinctas fuisse in natura propria, ut elementa, corpora caelestia et substantias spirituales, alia vero in rationibus seminalibus tantum, ut animalia, plantas et homines, quae omnia postmodum in naturis propriis producta sunt in illo opere, quo post senarium illorum dierum Deus naturam prius conditam administrat... Nec in distinctione rerum attendendum esse ordinem temporis, sed naturae et doctrinae: naturae, sicut sonus praecedit cantum natura, sed non tempore; et ita quae naturaliter priora sunt prius facta memorantur, sicut terra prius quam animalia, et aqua prius quam pisces, et sic de aliis; doctrinae vero ordine, sicut patet in docentibus geometriam. Quamvis enim partes figurae sine ordine temporis figuram constituant, tamen geometria docet, constitutionem fieri protrahendo lineam post lineam» etc. Unde Augustinus sex dies creationis intellexit esse spirituales, quia una dies, distincta secundum diversa rerum genera, sex illuminationibus ab intellectu angelico cognoscitur (cfr. infra d. 13. a. I. q. 1.). — Sed aliorum Ss. Patrum communis interpretatio sex illos dies intellexit in ordine temporis sibi succedentes; quam sententiam Scholastici communiter magis verbis s. Scripturae consonam et magis securam esse censebant. Sed de sententia S. Augustini S. Thomas (loc. cit.) dicit: «Haec opinio plus mihi placet»; cui consentiunt B. Albert. et Uldaricus; alii autem ob auctoritatem S. Augustini eam aestimant esse probabilem et valde rationabilem. — Licet igitur fide certum sit, mundum a Deo esse creatum nec esse aeternum, tamen circa modum et ordinem distinctionis rerum et circa interpretationem illorum capitulorum Genesis diversae semper fuerunt sententiae in Ecclesia. Sapienter autem cavendum esse admonet S. Thom. (de Potent. q. 4. a. 1.), «ne aliquis ita Scripturam ad unum sensum cogere velit, quod alios sensus, qui in se veritatem continent et possunt, salva circumstantia litterae, Scripturae aptari, penitus excludantur».

Hoc monitum pro nostra aetate eo maioris momenti esse videtur, quia ex ipsa rerum naturalium scientia nova orta sunt systemata, vel potius magna ex parte coniecturae circa geogoniam, ut dicunt, quae ex positione et ordine rerum destructarum, praecipue organicarum, sub terra latentium, res istas successive, per longas periodos et certo quodam ordine productas esse concludunt. Nec desunt nostra aetate catholici auctores, qui egregie, licet diversis viis, probaverunt, ea quae certa explorataque sunt secundum scientiam naturalem, nullo modo contradicere verbis s. Scripturae, immo potius eadem confirmare.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 46. m. 1-4, q. 49. m. 2. — Scot., apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. q. 66. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 2. 3; S. 1. q. 66. a. 1; de Potent. q. 4. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. II. tr. II. q. 46. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unica, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 2.

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English Translation

QUESTION II.

Whether matter was produced in perfect actuality.

Ad oppositum. Secondly it is asked whether that matter was produced in perfect actuality. And that yes, it seems:

1. First by the text of Genesis 21: These are the generations of the heavens and the earth in the day when God created the heavens and the earth and every plant of the field etc.: therefore in the same day were produced those things which he had earlier said were distinguished through the number of six days.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 182: He who lives forever created all things at once. If all things were created at once, then both corporeal and spiritual and every difference of corporeal things [were so created].

3. Likewise, Job 403: Behold Behemoth, whom I made with thee; but Behemoth is the Angel first made, and man was made on the last day: therefore all things were made at once. — By these authorities Augustine argues for his opinion in this part.

4. Likewise, the same thing is shown by reason. From an agent of perfect potency the effect ought to come forth in such measure as is more manifestative of supreme potency; but it is of greater potency to be able to produce all things at once than successively: therefore the production of matter with the perfect actuality of form conferred all at once and simultaneously is more declarative of divine potency than [the production] of matter [first], from which [the forms] are afterwards successively brought forth: if therefore God works according to what most befits his potency4, it seems [that he did so] etc.

5. Likewise, «it belongs to the perfectly wise to order»5: therefore if confusion is repugnant to ordering, it seems that God produced nothing with confusion, since he is perfectly wise; therefore he produced [things] under order. But order presupposes distinction: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the perfection of the effect attests to perfect p. 296 goodness in the efficient [cause]: if therefore God is of most perfect goodness, it seems that immediately when he produced matter, he ought to have perfected it fully with forms, since he himself could do this, and matter also was demanding it. If you say that this does not conclude that he ought to have perfected [matter] immediately, but that from a reasonable cause he both could and ought to defer; it is objected against this: that nature and art work as quickly as they can, and it belongs to excellence of power and goodness that one's effect be completed swiftly: therefore if both nature and art are an imitator of divine art and power6, it seems that God, since he could have completed [the work] at once, would not have allowed any delay of time or duration.

Fundamenta. On the contrary: 1. First by the text of Genesis7 one argues, where it is said that through the space of six days the Lord completed the work which he had begun: therefore it seems that matter was not produced suddenly in perfect actuality, according to the meaning of sacred Scripture. If therefore «the authority of this Scripture is greater than all the perspicacity of human ingenuity», as Augustine says8, one must rather stand by this opinion than by every human persuasion. If you say that the legislator was speaking to the rude, and could not say at once what God could do at once; neither of these responses seems sufficient, since on account of the rudeness of the hearer one ought not to give him occasion of deception; but Moses well knew that they would understand his words to the letter: therefore he was knowingly teaching them that by which they could be deceived and err. Likewise, although he could not say all things at once and express those works, yet he could express that all things were made at once.

2. Likewise, Chrysostom, on John, homily twenty-two9, says, «what existed at once in the substance of matter did not at once appear through the species of form»: therefore it seems not that [matter] was produced simul under forms. — To this point there are the authorities commonly of the Saints and doctors, such as Ambrose10, Jerome, Gregory, Basil, Dionysius, and Damascene, and many others, both Greek and Latin.

3. Likewise, the same is shown by reason. Although God could immediately place man in beatitude and make the universe in that perfection in which it will be after the Judgment; yet he chose to preserve order not only in the world's existence but also in its course, since thus his wisdom is more efficaciously manifested11. Therefore likewise it seems that in the primary going-forth of things he preserved order not only as regards their being but also as regards their producing or making: therefore it seems that he did not produce all things at once, but successively.

4. Likewise, the divine potency is manifested not only in the production of form, but also as much and more is manifested in the bringing forth of matter; for matter, according to its greater capacity, more declares the power of its efficient [cause]. But the capacity in matter is so much the greater as informity in it is the greater: if therefore for the manifestation of divine potency matter ought to be produced as capacious as possible, it seems that God ought to have produced it in as much informity as matter could in some way subsist in: therefore not under perfect distinction of forms.

5. Likewise, it is impossible that material days12 be simul: therefore it is impossible to understand this — that God produced all things at once, and yet produced them through six days. It is therefore necessary, according to the position which holds that all things were produced at once, to understand that senary of days spiritually, and so the spiritual light and spiritual night. Therefore if all these things were produced at once, in the first instant light was divided from darkness, that is, the good Angels from the evil: therefore there was no delay between creation and the [angelic] fall, which is rejected above13 and shown to be against Augustine.

6. Likewise, when sacred Scripture orders the works of the six days, it either orders [them] as to the order of duration, or as to the order of nature, or as to the order of dignity. If as to the order of dignity: then since man is the most dignified of creatures, his production ought to have been assigned to the first day. If as to the order of nature: then the production of sun and moon14 [ought to be] before the production of plants and grass. It remains therefore that this was said as to the order of time or duration.

CONCLUSION.

It is more probable that all corporeal things were created at once according to matter, but not at once — rather, were distinguished through six days according to form.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that concerning this question there have been diverse opinions of the Saints.

For some Saints in this question followed more the theological way, drawing reasoning toward those things which are of the faith. Opinion of Augustine. But others, among whom the principal was Augustine, followed more the philosophical way, which lays down those things which seem more consonant with reason: hence he also drew the meaning of Scripture toward the confirmation and attestation of reason. Therefore, since it seems more reasonable that all things be produced at once by the supreme power, and that an intervening delay of time would seem to be of no utility or necessity, he held that all things were produced at once, confirming his position through the authorities of sacred Scripture, and explaining that which seems to him to contradict it — namely, the distinction of days — by showing that those days were not material days but rather spiritual [days], which could all be at once. — And this position was very reasonable and very subtle.

Not pleasing to all. Nevertheless, because the meaning of Scripture seems to be twisted by this position, and it is safer and more meritorious to submit our understanding and reason wholly to Scripture rather than in any way to twist it: therefore commonly the other doctors, both those who preceded Augustine and those who came after, understood and held [the matter] as the text and letter of sacred Scripture of Genesis seems to sound. Hence they held that all corporeal things were created at once Conclusion. in matter, but not at once — rather, through a senary of days — were distinguished in form. — Defended by reasons. This position, even though it may seem less reasonable than the other, nevertheless is not p. 297 unreasonable to maintain. For although reason does not perceive the fittingness of this position so far as it relies on its own consideration, yet it perceives [it] so far as it is taken captive under the light of faith. For of this successive formation and distinction there is a fourfold reason, namely literal, moral, allegorical, and anagogical.

Ratio 1. The literal [reason] is in this, that God intends not only to make what he can, but rather15 also to communicate to the creature what it can receive. Hence, since he can give beatitude without merits, yet he wills that we merit. So although he could immediately perfect matter, he preferred rather to make it under a certain informity and imperfection, so that, from its imperfection, matter as it were might cry out to God, that he might perfect it16. And he willed to defer this same thing through a senary of days, so that in the perfection of the number the perfection of the universe might at once be shown forth17. For according to the arithmetician, the senary is a perfect number, since it consists of all its aliquot parts, in such a way that it neither falls short nor exceeds. Now aliquot parts are called those which, taken some number of times, yield the whole.

Ratio 2. The moral reason is, that in this man may be instructed: that just as corporeal nature of itself exists formless, but is then formed when the divine goodness bestows form on its informity; so the soul cannot be formed of itself, unless God pour in his grace18. To this the senary number also attests, since [our] time is for meriting through the whole time of the present life, so that afterwards rest may be given to man, since one does not attain the perfection of merit until the consummation of final grace, after which no evening follows: and therefore the seventh day has no evening assigned to it in Scripture19.

Ratio 3. The allegorical reason is — since, as Augustine expressly20 shows — in that first establishment of the world, which was distinguished by the senary, the whole span of the course of the present world is prefigured according to six ages: such that the first day corresponds to the first age, the second to the second, and so on, according as Augustine plainly adapts in On Genesis according to the Letter21; which would here be long to repeat.

Ratio 4. The anagogical reason is, that in that distinction of days the perfection of cognition in the beatified angelic nature may be understood, according as Augustine plainly shows in On Genesis according to the Letter almost throughout22; which he therefore calls to the letter because he said that the legislator intended to the letter this exposition which others reputed anagogical. Note. Yet he says nothing there by way of assertion, but himself protests that he there proceeds in an inquisitive manner. And, as is evident from his intention in the same place23, he wished rather to elicit from Scripture a meaning according to which Scripture could not be ridiculed by philosophical men, nor on this account anyone, imbued with natural philosophy, be deterred from the truth of the faith, as he himself had once been deterred — [he wished], I say, rather [this] than to set forth the principal meaning which the legislator had there; and he intends rather to show what fitting there may have been or could then have been, than what was done. Note. And in the twelfth [book] of the Confessions24 he shows that one and the same Scripture can be understood in many ways, and in all senses truly, none of which was hidden from the Holy Spirit, by whose inspiration Scripture was put forth. And in this he manifestly shows that he does not contradict the others. — Therefore, maintaining this position, the objections to the contrary must be answered.

Solution of the contrary [arguments]. To 1. To that which is first objected from the text of Genesis, it must be said that this is said by way of recapitulation, and the term day there is used confusedly, so that it is taken for diverse days, or it is taken zeugmatically25, so that it is rendered for the individual members of that recapitulation.

To 2. To that which is objected from Ecclesiasticus 1826: He who lives forever etc.; it must be said that Scripture makes a distinction between creating and making. For it calls creation the production from nothing, but making the very distinction; and this is well signified in Genesis 2, where it is said that he rested from every work which he created, that he might make. All the Saints therefore concord in this — that all things are produced at once in matter; and they therefore concede that all things were created at once, but not yet made at once. p. 298

To 3. To that which is objected from Job 40, it must be said that Gregory27 explains that cum there indicates not simultaneity of time, but a likeness of reason — as if to say, Behold Behemoth, whom I made with thee, that is, like to thee in the capacity of reason.

To 4. 5. 6. To that which is objected, that it is more declarative of greater potency to produce many things at once, it must be said that God intended to manifest his potency more in the production from non-being to being than afterwards in formation; for there he more manifests wisdom and goodness. And so that individually and distinctly and appropriately in the production of effects the perfection of potency, wisdom and goodness might be manifested, it pleased the divine Author to send forth first the work of creation, then to add the work of distinction, finally the work of adornment and decoration. And in the first potency is manifested, in the second wisdom, in the third perfect goodness, though all may be manifested in any of these. Note. And therefore28 those three are well manifested after the consummate being of things, just as if matter had been produced and distinguished and adorned immediately at the beginning. — And by this the two following [arguments] are evident, which proceed by a like way, namely concerning the perfection of goodness and wisdom. For those reasons do not conclude anything except that God ought not to have left matter in informity, since this would be against order and perfection; but in making it formless that he might form it, and imperfect that he might perfect it, he showed that both perfection and order are given to matter from himself. And if you object that to the perfection of all these belongs swiftly to perfect and order29 and distinguish the effect, it must be said that this is true where an agent acts according to its whole power; but where it condescends to the possibility and infirmity and utility of another, it does not hold; and so it is in the present case. Note. For just as God handed down sacred Scripture to us as it were in a rude and unrefined manner, so that anyone might be able to grasp and understand, even though in Christ are the infinite treasures of wisdom and knowledge30; so also in the formation of things, as far as was fitting, he condescended to the manner of nature and also to the instruction of the rational creature. And since by that delay man was instructed, as has been seen above, therefore it pleased the divine potency, goodness and wisdom to distinguish the forms of things under the succession of days, even though he could have suddenly distinguished and adorned matter for them.

Scholion

I. Saint Augustine, on account of the reasons which were here touched on the side of the opposit., made a singular exposition of the first two chapters of Genesis, which Saint Thomas (here, the single question, a. 2) thus explains: «For Augustine wills that in the very principle of creation certain things were distinguished by their own species in their own nature — such as the elements, the heavenly bodies, and the spiritual substances — while others [were created] only in their seminal reasons — such as animals, plants, and men — all of which afterwards were produced in their own natures in that work by which, after the senary of those days, God administers the nature first established... Nor in the distinction of things is the order of time to be attended to, but [the order] of nature and of teaching: of nature, as sound precedes song by nature but not by time; and so those things which are by nature prior are recorded as made first — as earth before animals, and water before fishes, and so on; but [also the order] of teaching, as is evident in those teaching geometry. For although the parts of a figure constitute the figure without order of time, yet geometry teaches that the construction takes place by drawing line after line» etc. Hence Augustine understood the six days of creation to be spiritual days, since one day, distinguished according to the diverse genera of things, is known by six illuminations from the angelic intellect (cf. below d. 13, a. I, q. 1.). — But the common interpretation of the other holy Fathers understood those six days as following one another in the order of time; which view the Scholastics commonly considered as more consonant with the words of sacred Scripture and more secure. But concerning the opinion of Saint Augustine, Saint Thomas (loc. cit.) says: «This opinion pleases me more»; with whom Blessed Albert and Ulric agree; others, however, on account of the authority of Saint Augustine, esteem it to be probable and very reasonable. — Therefore, although it is certain by faith that the world was created by God and is not eternal, nevertheless concerning the mode and order of the distinction of things, and concerning the interpretation of those chapters of Genesis, there have always been diverse opinions in the Church. But Saint Thomas (de Potent. q. 4, a. 1) wisely admonishes us to take care «lest anyone wish to compel Scripture to one sense in such a way that other senses, which contain truth in themselves and could, with the circumstances of the letter preserved, be fitted to Scripture, be wholly excluded».

This admonition seems to be of so much the greater importance in our age, since from the very science of natural things have arisen new systems, or rather, in great part, conjectures about geogony, as they say, which conclude — from the position and order of destroyed things, especially organic ones, lying hidden under the earth — that those things were produced successively, over long periods and in a certain order. Nor are there lacking in our age Catholic authors who, by various ways, have excellently proved that those things which are certain and explored according to natural science in no way contradict the words of sacred Scripture, but rather confirm them.

II. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. II, q. 46, m. 1-4; q. 49, m. 2. — Scotus, in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. II, q. 66, a. 1. — Saint Thomas, here, the single question, a. 2. 3; Summa I, q. 66, a. 1; de Potent. q. 4, a. 1. — Blessed Albert, here, a. 1; Summa, p. II, tr. II, q. 46. — Peter of Tarentaise, here, the single question, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, q. 6. — Giles of Rome, here, q. 1, a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 1. — Biel, here, q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 4. — Paulo inferius plures codd. omittunt sex.
    Verse 4. — A little lower, several codices omit six.
  2. Vers. 1.
    Verse 1.
  3. Vers. 10. — Sententiam Augustini vide IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 33. n. 52. seqq.; V. c. 3. n. 5. seqq. et c. 23. n. 44. seqq.; VI. c. 1. seq.; XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 6. seq.
    Verse 10. — For Augustine's view see On Genesis according to the Letter IV, c. 33, n. 52 ff.; V, c. 3, n. 5 ff. and c. 23, n. 44 ff.; VI, c. 1 f.; On the City of God XI, c. 6 f.
  4. Deut. 32, 4: Dei perfecta sunt opera. — Paulo ante non pauci codd. successione eductae pro successive eductae.
    Deuteronomy 32, 4: God's works are perfect. — A little earlier, not a few codices [read] by succession brought forth in place of successively brought forth.
  5. Aristot., I. Metaph. c. 2. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 685, nota 1. — Cod. cc cum ed. 1 et Vat. ordinate operari. Paulo inferius cod. Y sub confusione pro cum confusione, et deinde post sub ordine cod. O bene addit omnia.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 2. Cf. vol. I, p. 685, note 1. — Codex cc with edition 1 and the Vatican [edition read] to work in an ordered way. A little lower, codex Y [reads] under confusion for with confusion; and then after under order codex O well adds all things.
  6. Cfr. August., 83 Qq. q. 78.
    Cf. Augustine, On 83 Different Questions, q. 78.
  7. Cap. 2, 2, ubi Vulgata patrarat pro inchoaverat.
    Chapter 2, 2, where the Vulgate has had accomplished in place of had begun.
  8. Libr. II. de Gen. ad lit. c. 5. n. 9.
    Book II On Genesis according to the Letter, c. 5, n. 9.
  9. Hom. 22. (alias 21.) n. 1, ubi in explicatione illius verbi Nondum venit hora mea (Ioan. 2, 4.) ait: Verum per haec dicta hoc vult significare, se omnia congruenti tempore operari nec simul facere, ne hinc rerum ordo turbaretur, si non opportuno tempore singula ederet, sed omnia simul misceret, generationem, resurrectionem, iudicium. Hic animum adhibe: oportuit creaturam facere, sed non omnem simul; hominem et mulierem, sed non una ambos. Idem docet hom. 2. n. 4. et hom. 3. n. 3. seq. in cap. 1. Gen. — Ipsa autem verba huius sententiae inveniuntur in Gregor., XXXII. Moral. c. 12. n. 16: Rerum quippe substantia simul creata est, sed simul species formata non est; et quod simul exstitit per substantiam materiae, non simul apparuit per speciem formae.
    Homily 22 (alias 21), n. 1, where in the explanation of that word My hour has not yet come (John 2, 4) he says: Truly by these words he wishes to signify this — that he works all things at a fitting time and does not make them at once, lest from this the order of things be disturbed, if he were to produce individual things at an unsuitable time, but rather mix all things together — generation, resurrection, judgment. Apply your mind here: it was fitting to make the creature, but not all at once; man and woman, but not both at once. He teaches the same thing in hom. 2, n. 4 and hom. 3, n. 3 ff. on Gen. c. 1. — The very words of this opinion are found in Gregory, Moralia XXXII, c. 12, n. 16: For the substance of things was created at once, but the species was not formed at once; and what existed at once through the substance of matter did not at once appear through the species of form.
  10. Libr. I. Hexaem. c. 7. seq. — Hieron., Comment. in Epist. ad Titum, 1, 3. seq. — Gregorii verba vide in nota praecedente. — Basil., Hom. 2. in Hexaem. — Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 4. § 4. et c. 5. § 7. seq. — Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 5. seqq. — Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3. seqq.
    Book I Hexaemeron c. 7 f. — Jerome, Commentary on the Epistle to Titus, 1, 3 f. — For Gregory's words see the preceding note. — Basil, Homily 2 on the Hexaemeron. — Dionysius, On the Divine Names, c. 4 § 4 and c. 5 § 7 f. — Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith II, c. 5 ff. — Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 3 ff.
  11. Cfr. verba Chrysost. hic nota 1.
    Cf. the words of Chrysostom here, note 1 [= apparatus entry 9].
  12. Codd. H W bb substituunt naturales pro materiales; sed infra in corp. legitur etiam in his materiales.
    Codices H, W, bb substitute natural for material; but below, in the body, material is also read in these [codices].
  13. Dist. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq.
    Distinction 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 f.
  14. Supple cum cod. aa debuit esse, pro quo Vat. fuit. Eadem Vat. dein planetarum et herbarum pro plantarum et herbae substituit.
    Supply with codex aa ought to be, in place of which the Vatican [edition has] was. The Vatican [edition] then substitutes of planets and grasses for of plants and grass.
  15. Cod. Q praemittit nec. Vat. substituit tantum et bis quantum potest pro quod potest. Cod. bb post etiam a manu suppari addit intendit. Sed lectiones codd. et edd. sunt parum congruae.
    Codex Q prefixes nec. The Vatican [edition] substitutes only and twice as much as he can for what he can. Codex bb after also, by a near-contemporary hand, adds intends. But the readings of the codices and editions are little congruent.
  16. Cfr. August., I. de Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 9. seq.
    Cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter I, c. 4, n. 9 f.
  17. Cfr. August., IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 2. n. 2. seqq. et Bonav., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 4, scholion. — Paulo superius unus alterque cod. cum edd. 2, 3 Augustinum pro arithmeticum.
    Cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter IV, c. 2, n. 2 ff., and Bonaventure, I Sent., d. 2, q. 4, scholion. — A little higher, one or another codex with editions 2 and 3 [reads] Augustine in place of arithmetician.
  18. Vide August., 1. contra Advers. legis et proph. c. 8. n. 11.
    See Augustine, Against the Adversaries of the Law and the Prophets I, c. 8, n. 11.
  19. Gen. 2, 2. seq. — Cfr. August., IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 18. n. 31.
    Genesis 2, 2 f. — Cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter IV, c. 18, n. 31.
  20. Libr. I. de Genesi contra Manich. c. 23. n. 35. seqq.; XXII. de Civ. Dei, c. 30. n. 5; IV. de Trin. c. 4. n. 7; Enarrat. in Ps. 92. n. 1.
    Book I On Genesis against the Manichees, c. 23, n. 35 ff.; On the City of God XXII, c. 30, n. 5; On the Trinity IV, c. 4, n. 7; Commentary on the Psalms, Ps. 92, n. 1.
  21. Intellige: Librum I. de Genesi contra Manichaeos, c. 23. n. 35. seqq., cuius ipse Augustinus, VIII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 2. n. 3, mentionem facit. — Paulo superius cod. aa praefiguratur pro praesignatur.
    Understand: Book I On Genesis against the Manichees, c. 23, n. 35 ff., of which Augustine himself makes mention in On Genesis according to the Letter VIII, c. 2, n. 3. — A little higher, codex aa [reads] prefigured in place of presignified.
  22. Praecipue libr. IV. c. 21. n. 38. seqq. — August., II. Retract. c. 24. n. 1. ait: Tituli eorum librorum inscribitur de Genesi ad litteram, id est, non secundum allegoricas significationes, sed secundum rerum gestarum proprietatem. In quo opere plura quaesita quam inventa sunt, et eorum quae inventa sunt, pauciora firmata, cetera vero ita posita, velut adhuc requirenda sint. Cfr. I. de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. n. 1, c. 17. n. 34, c. 21. n. 41; IV. c. 28. n. 45 et VIII. c. 1. n. 4. seq.; I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 1. seq. — Cod. T quem ideo pro quod ideo.
    Especially Book IV, c. 21, n. 38 ff. — Augustine, Retractations II, c. 24, n. 1, says: The title of those books is inscribed On Genesis according to the Letter, that is, not according to allegorical significations, but according to the propriety of the things done. In this work more things are inquired than discovered, and of those discovered, fewer are firmly established; the rest are set down as though still to be sought. Cf. On Genesis according to the Letter I, c. 1, n. 1; c. 17, n. 34; c. 21, n. 41; IV, c. 28, n. 45 and VIII, c. 1, n. 4 f.; On Genesis against the Manichees I, c. 1 f. — Codex T [reads] quem ideo (whom therefore) for quod ideo (which therefore).
  23. Libr. I. de Gen. ad lit. c. 19-21; IX. c. 12. n. 22. — In fine propositionis non pauci codd. cum ed. 2 gratum, Vat. creatum pro congruum, quod tamen recurrit etiam infra d. 15. dub. 3, in quo respicitur hic locus; dein post vel tunc ex pluribus codd. et ed. 1 supplevimus esse.
    Book I On Genesis according to the Letter, c. 19–21; IX, c. 12, n. 22. — At the end of the proposition, not a few codices with edition 2 [read] grateful, the Vatican [edition] created, in place of fitting — which, however, recurs also below in d. 15, dub. 3, where this passage is referenced; then, after or then, from several codices and edition 1 we have supplied to be.
  24. Cap. 18-32.
    Chapters 18–32.
  25. A Graeco vocabulo ζεῦγμα, i. e. connexio, per quod apud grammaticos significatur illa dictionis figura, qua plura (plures sensus) uno verbo connectuntur. — Verbum confunditur accipitur pro distribuitur; cfr. I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1, scholion.
    From the Greek word zeugma, that is, connection, by which among the grammarians is signified that figure of speech by which several things (several senses) are connected by one word. — The verb confunditur (is used confusedly) is to be taken for distribuitur (is distributed); cf. I Sent., d. 4, q. 1, scholion.
  26. Vers. 1. — Seq. textus est Gen. 2, 3, ubi Vulgata post creavit subiungit Deus.
    Verse 1. — The following text is Genesis 2, 3, where the Vulgate, after created, adds God.
  27. Vers. 10. Verba Gregorii, XXXII. Moral. c. 12. n. 17, sunt: Sed si rerum causas subtili discussione pensamus, simul Angelum factum hominemque cognoscimus: simul videlicet non unitate temporis, sed cognitione rationis; simul per acceptam imaginem sapientiae, et non simul per coniunctam substantiam formae... In cuncta igitur creatura homo et Angelus simul conditus exstitit, quia ab omni creatura irrationali distinctus processit. Quia ergo in cuncta conditione rerum nullum rationale animal nisi Angelus et homo est, quidquid ratione uti non potest, cum homine factum non est. — Ed. 1 et Vat. simultatem rationis pro similitudinem rationis. Dein multi codd. sui similem pro tibi similem.
    Verse 10. The words of Gregory, Moralia XXXII, c. 12, n. 17, are: But if we weigh the causes of things with subtle discussion, we recognize the Angel and man to have been made at once: at once, namely, not by unity of time, but by knowledge of reason; at once through the received image of wisdom, and not at once through the conjoined substance of form... In the whole of the creature, therefore, man and Angel were at once established, since [the rational creature] went forth distinct from every irrational creature. Since therefore in the whole establishment of things there is no rational animal except the Angel and man, whatever cannot use reason was not made with man. — Edition 1 and the Vatican [edition read] simultaneity of reason for likeness of reason. Then many codices [read] like himself for like to thee.
  28. In codd. L O additur adeo; in Vat. ita.
    In codices L, O adeo (so much) is added; in the Vatican [edition], ita (thus).
  29. Vat. ornare.
    The Vatican [edition reads] to adorn.
  30. Colos. 2, 3: In quo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae absconditi. — Mox post formatione in multis codd. et ed. 1 desideratur rerum. In fine solutionis plures codd. cum edd. 2, 3 ordinare pro ornare.
    Colossians 2, 3: In whom are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden. — Soon after formation, in many codices and edition 1, of things is missing. At the end of the solution, several codices with editions 2 and 3 [read] to order in place of to adorn. ---
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