← Back to Distinction 8

Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8

Textus Latinus
p. 166

Articulus unicus

Quaestio I. Utrum Deus sit summe simplex.

Circa primum, quod in Deo sit summa simplicitas, sic probatur1.

1. Omne primum est simplicissimum, quia quanto aliquid prius, tanto simplicius4; sed Deus est primum in genere entium, eo quod nec est nec esse potest nec cogitari prius: ergo est ita simplex, quod ipso nihil simplicius esse potest vel cogitari: ergo est simplicissimum.

2. Item, omne quod est quidquid habet, est simplicissimum5; sed Deus est quidquid habet: ergo etc. Prima2 patet in se. Minor probatur sic: Deus habet potentiam, sapientiam, et sic de aliis: aut ergo est sua potentia, aut non. Si sic, habeo propositum. Si non est sua potentia, cum sit potens potentia, habet posse ab alio3 — ergo Deus est ab alio; quod si hoc est falsum, ergo [falsum est] illud ex quo sequitur.

3. Item, in esse nobilissimo debet omnis conditio nobilitatis poni in summo; sed Deus est ens nobilissimum, et simplicitas est conditio nobilitatis: ergo ponenda est in Deo in summo: ergo Deus est summe simplex.

4. Item, quanto aliquid est simplicius, tanto est potentius in virtute, et e converso, quia «virtus unita plus potest quam multiplicata»6; sed Deus est infinitus et immensus virtute: ergo est infinitus simplicitate: ergo in Deo est summa simplicitas.

Contra:

1. Simplicius cogitatur aliquid cum cogitatur ut abstractum a pluribus, quam quod7 cogitatur ut contentum in pluribus: ergo cum fides nostra cogitet Deum ut in pluribus, non cogitat eum ut simplicissimum: ergo si fides vere cogitat, Deus non est simplicissimus.

2. Item, maior est simplicitas ubi est identitas sine diversitate quam cum diversitate; sed in Deo est identitas cum diversitate suppositorum: ergo in Deo non est summa simplicitas.

3. Item, maior est simplicitas ubi est unitas sine pluralitate8, quia numerus dicit aliquo modo compositionem, respectu cuius unitas est simplex: ergo cum in Deo sit unitas cum pluralitate personarum, patet etc.

4. Item, maior est simplicitas ubi non tantum subiectum, sed etiam proprietas est eadem cum proprietate9 — quia quando proprietas differt a proprietate in uno, sunt plura differentia, ergo non est simplex. Sed in divinis personis in eadem persona

p. 167

differt proprietas a proprietate, unde innascibilitas differt a paternitate: ergo etc.

Conclusio. Summa simplicitas est in Deo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut primae rationes probant, in Deo ponenda est summa simplicitas.

Ad argumenta contra:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod fides10 non intelligit ipsum ut simplicissimum; dicendum, quod fides intelligit eum ut simplicissimum, et qui aliter intelligit non intelligit ut summe simplex.

Triplex modus simplicitatis. Quod patet sic: quoniam est intelligere unum in uno, et unum in pluribus multiplicatum, et unum in pluribus non multiplicatum. Simplicius autem12 intelligitur unum in pluribus esse multiplicatum quam unum in uno — quod patet, quia universale est simplicius singulari11; et adhuc multo simplicius intelligitur quod est unum in pluribus non multiplicatum. Hoc modo intelligit fides nostra Deum. Et ideo simplicior est Deus, quia est in omnibus13 non-multiplicatus, quam si esset in uno solo, vel14 in pluribus multiplicatus. Hinc est, quod Deus simplicissimus est, et fides nostra eum ut simplicissimum intelligit.

Et qui intelligit Deum plurificatum in essentia, vel unum in supposito, derogat summae simplicitati eius, derogat etiam nobilitati simplicitatis15 eius. Quoniam ubi summa simplicitas intelligitur, oportet summam actualitatem intelligi, si summe nobilis est. Et ubi est summa actualitas, summa diffusio et communicatio debet poni; et ista non potest esse nisi in sempiterna productione rei omnino infinitae et aequalis in virtute; et hoc non potest esse in alietate16 essentiae: ergo non potest intelligi divina essentia simplicissima, nisi in tribus personis intelligatur tota esse, quarum una sit ab alia.

Quando ergo obiicitur, quod simplicius est abstractum a pluribus quam17 in pluribus: verum est, si in illis pluribus plurificetur. Si autem non plurificatur, non est verum.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est simplicitas ubi nulla diversitas; dicendum, quod diversitas dupliciter potest venire: vel ex additione, vel ex origine.

Ex additione — cum est diversitas in proprietatibus absolutis, quae diversae sunt in diversis, ut albedo in Petro et nigredo in18 Paulo; et haec [diversitas] privat simplicitatem, quia ponit compositionem.

Est alia diversitas veniens ex sola origine — ut puta, quia una persona emanat19 ab alia, differt ab ea; et haec20 non repugnat simplicitati, quia nullam ponit compositionem, sed solum ordinem et respectum ad alium; et haec non proprie dicitur diversitas, sed distinctio et discretio. Et hoc manifestum est, si intelligamus Patrem se ipso generare Filium, et intelligamus eum generare et iterum non generare — nulla est hic compositio, quia nulla additio.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maior est simplicitas ubi nulla pluralitas; dicendum, quod duplex est pluralitas.

Quaedam, in qua plus est in duobus quam in uno — ut in duobus hominibus plus est de bonitate quam in uno; et ista pluralitas repugnat simplicitati, quia unitas addit supra unitatem.

Quaedam autem est pluralitas, in qua tantum in pluribus est quantum in uno; et haec est in divinis, quia tantum de esse et bonitate et virtute est in una persona quantum in pluribus; et ista pluralitas nihil addit ad unitatem: et ideo nullam omnino ponit compositionem nec privat simplicitatem.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in Patre differt proprietas a proprietate; dicendum, quod proprietas differt a proprietate tripliciter: aut respectu subiecti, aut respectu sui, aut respectu obiecti.

Si respectu subiecti, quia causantur ex diversis naturis21 in ipso repertis — sic ponit compositionem, quia ponit subiectum esse ex22 pluribus.

Si respectu sui, sic differt musica et grammatica in Petro; et sic ponit similiter compositionem, quia ponit subiectum subesse pluribus.

Si respectu obiecti, sic ponit subiectum comparari pluribus; et ex hoc23 non ponitur compositio, sed distinctio. Exemplum est in puncto, quod est principium et finis respectu diversarum linearum. Hoc modo est differentia proprietatum in divinis.

p. 168
Scholion

I. Simplicitas dicit modum quendam unitatis nobilissimum, et simplicitas divina summam simul actualitatem. Distinguitur hic et in sequenti quaestione id quod est simpliciter simplex et quod est summe simplex. Primum invenitur etiam in creaturis, et est illud quod non est resolubile in partes essentiales sive constitutivas; sic et materia prima per ablationem omnis actus et perfectionis dicitur simplex. Summa vero simplicitas excludit qualemcumque compositionem, tam activam sive compositionem ex aliis, quam passivam sive compositionem cum aliis. Haec summa simplicitas certe importat non tantum privationem compositionis, sed etiam «modum unitatis nobilissimum, quem Deus nulli communicat creaturae» (q. seq. ad 1).

II. Quoad argum. 3 in fund. notandum, illud axioma (quo utitur etiam S. Thom., S. c. Gent. I, c. 18, et Richard. a Med., hic a. 3, q. 1), quod simpliciora sint nobiliora, valere tantum ceteris paribus. In rebus enim corruptibilibus totum compositum, quod complectitur perfectionem sui et partium, potest esse perfectius quam pars simplex — sicut homo nobilior est quam materia, vel etiam quam sola anima. Cfr. Richard., loc. cit. q. 2.

III. Conclusio ipsa, qua eliditur error Gilberti Porretani et abbatis Ioachim, definita est primo in Concilio Rhemensi, tum in Lateran. IV, c. Firmiter, de S. Trinit.: «Deus est... una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino.» Cfr. infra dub. 6. — Alex. Hal., Summa p. I, q. 5, mm. 1–2, et q. 14, m. 1. — Scotus, hic q. 1; Report., hic q. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 1 et q. 4, a. 1; S. Th. I, q. 3, aa. 3, 4, 7, 8; S. c. Gent. I, cc. 16, 18. — B. Albert, hic a. 22. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 5, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3, q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. — Henr. Gand., Summa aa. 28 et 29. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 5. — Biel, hic q. 7, dub. 2.

---

English Translation

Article unique

Question I. Whether God is supremely simple.

Concerning the first [question] — that there is supreme simplicity in God — it is proved thus1.

1. Every first [thing] is most simple, since "the more prior something is, the more simple it is"4; but God is first in the genus of beings, since nothing prior to Him is, nor can be, nor can be thought: therefore He is so simple that nothing simpler than He can be or be thought: therefore He is most simple.

2. Likewise, everything that is whatever it has, is most simple5; but God is whatever He has: therefore etc. The major2 is clear in itself. The minor is proved thus: God has power, wisdom, and so on; either, therefore, He is His power, or He is not. If He is, I have what was to be proved. If He is not His power, then since He is powerful by a power, He has to-be-able from another3 — therefore God is from another; but if this is false, then false also is that from which it follows.

3. Likewise, in the noblest being every condition of nobility ought to be placed in the highest degree; but God is the noblest being, and simplicity is a condition of nobility: therefore it ought to be placed in God in the highest degree: therefore God is supremely simple.

4. Likewise, the simpler a thing is, the more powerful it is in strength, and conversely — since "a united power can do more than one multiplied"6; but God is infinite and immense in strength: therefore He is infinite in simplicity: therefore in God is supreme simplicity.

On the contrary:

1. Something is thought as simpler when it is thought as abstracted from many, than when7 it is thought as contained in many: therefore since our faith thinks God as in many, it does not think Him as most simple: therefore, if faith truly thinks, God is not most simple.

2. Likewise, greater is the simplicity where there is identity without diversity, than with diversity; but in God there is identity with diversity of supposits: therefore in God there is not supreme simplicity.

3. Likewise, greater is the simplicity where there is unity without plurality8 — because number signifies in some way composition, with respect to which unity is simple: therefore since in God there is unity with plurality of persons, the conclusion is plain etc.

4. Likewise, greater is the simplicity where not only the subject, but also the property itself is the same as another property9 — because when property differs from property in one [subject], there are several things differing, therefore it is not simple. But in the divine persons, in the same person

p. 167

property differs from property — hence innascibility differs from paternity: therefore etc.

Conclusion. Supreme simplicity is in God.

I respond: It must be said that, as the first reasons prove, supreme simplicity is to be placed in God.

To the arguments for the contrary:

To 1. As for the objection that faith10 does not understand Him as most simple, it must be said that faith does understand Him as most simple, and whoever understands Him otherwise does not understand Him as supremely simple.

Threefold mode of simplicity. This is plain thus: for there is the understanding of one in one, of one in many multiplied, and of one in many not multiplied. Now12 one in many multiplied is understood as simpler than one in one — which is plain, since the universal is simpler than the singular11; and still simpler is that which is one in many, not multiplied. It is in this way that our faith understands God. And therefore God is simpler because He is not-multiplied in all13, than if He were in one alone, or14 in many multiplied. Hence God is most simple, and our faith understands Him as most simple.

And whoever understands God multiplied in essence, or as one in a supposit, detracts from His supreme simplicity, and also from the nobility of His simplicity15. For where supreme simplicity is understood, supreme actuality must also be understood, if He is supremely noble. And where there is supreme actuality, supreme diffusion and communication must be placed; and this cannot be except in the eternal production of a thing altogether infinite and equal in strength; and this cannot be in otherness16 of essence: therefore the divine essence cannot be understood as most simple unless it is understood to be wholly in three persons, of whom one is from another.

When, therefore, it is objected that abstracted from many is simpler than17 in many: that is true, if it is multiplied in those many. But if it is not multiplied, it is not true.

To 2. As for the objection that greater is simplicity where no diversity is; it must be said that diversity can come in two ways: either from addition, or from origin.

From addition — when there is diversity in absolute properties, which are diverse in diverse things, as whiteness in Peter and blackness in18 Paul; and this [diversity] takes away simplicity, since it posits composition.

There is another diversity coming from origin alone — as, for example, because one person emanates19 from another, it differs from it; and this20 does not conflict with simplicity, since it posits no composition, but only order and relation to another; and this is not properly called diversity, but distinction and discretion. And this is manifest if we understand the Father generating the Son by Himself, and we understand Him generating and also not generating — there is here no composition, because no addition.

To 3. As for the objection that greater is simplicity where no plurality is; it must be said that plurality is twofold.

One kind, in which there is more in two than in one — as in two men there is more goodness than in one; and this plurality conflicts with simplicity, since unity adds upon unity.

But there is another plurality, in which there is as much in many as in one; and this is in the divine [persons], since there is as much being and goodness and power in one person as in many; and this plurality adds nothing to unity: and therefore it posits no composition at all, nor takes away simplicity.

To 4. As for the objection that in the Father property differs from property, it must be said that property differs from property in three ways: with respect to subject, with respect to itself, or with respect to object.

If with respect to subject — because [the properties] are caused from diverse natures21 found in it — thus it posits composition, since it posits the subject to be from22 many.

If with respect to itself — as music and grammar differ in Peter; and thus it likewise posits composition, since it posits the subject to underlie many.

If with respect to object — thus it posits the subject as compared to many; and from this23 no composition is posited, but distinction. The example is in a point, which is principle and end with respect to diverse lines. In this way is the difference of properties in God.

p. 168
Scholion

I. Simplicity signifies a certain most-noble mode of unity, and the divine simplicity signifies at the same time supreme actuality. Here and in the following question a distinction is made between what is simpliciter simple and what is supremely simple. The first is found also in creatures, and is that which is not resolvable into essential or constitutive parts; thus prime matter, by the removal of every act and perfection, is called simple. But supreme simplicity excludes composition of any kind — both active (composition from other things) and passive (composition with other things). This supreme simplicity certainly implies not only the privation of composition, but also "that most noble mode of unity, which God communicates to no creature" (following q., ad 1).

II. Regarding the 3rd argument in the affirmative, it should be noted that the axiom (used also by St. Thomas, S. c. Gent. I, c. 18, and Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1) that simpler things are nobler holds only ceteris paribus. For in corruptible things, the whole composite, which embraces the perfection of itself and its parts, can be more perfect than a simple part — as a man is nobler than matter, or even than the soul alone. Cf. Richard, loc. cit. q. 2.

III. The conclusion itself, by which the error of Gilbert Porretanus and of Abbot Joachim is struck down, was defined first in the Council of Rheims, then in the Fourth Lateran Council, chapter Firmiter, on the Holy Trinity: "God is... one essence, one substance or nature altogether simple." Cf. below dub. 6. — Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 5, mm. 1–2, and q. 14, m. 1. — Scotus, here q. 1; Report., here q. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, and q. 4, a. 1; S. Th. I, q. 3, aa. 3, 4, 7, 8; S. c. Gent. I, cc. 16, 18. — B. Albert, here a. 22. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 5, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 1. princ. q. 4. — Henry of Ghent, Summa aa. 28–29. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 5. — Biel, here q. 7, dub. 2.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cod. I addit: Et primo per rationem communem, et secundo per propriam, ibi: Nihil enim simplex.
    Codex I adds: "And first by common reason, and secondly by proper, at that point: For nothing is simple."
  2. Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 praemittit tertia.
    The Vatican edition, against most codices and ed. 1, prefixes tertia ("the third").
  3. Fide omnium mss. et ed. 1 restituimus verba in parte ista.
    On the authority of all the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have restored the words in this part.
  4. Cfr. Aristot., XI Metaph. c. 1 (X, c. 1). — Paulo infra post prius cod. O adiungit eo.
    Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics XI, c. 1 (X, c. 1). — A little below, after prius, codex O adds eo.
  5. Boeth., de Hebdomadibus. — Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus sed. — De hoc argumento vide August., XI de Civ. Dei c. 10, et Boeth., de Trinitate c. 2.
    Boethius, On the Hebdomads. — Then, on the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we added sed. — On this argument see Augustine, City of God XI, c. 10, and Boethius, On the Trinity c. 2.
  6. Liber de Causis, prop. 17. — In princ. huius argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc bis omittit est, quod tamen in aliis codd. et ed. 1 habetur. Cod. M post simplicius bene addit in essentia.
    Book of Causes, proposition 17. — At the start of this argument the Vatican edition, with codex cc, twice omits est, which is nevertheless found in the other codices and ed. 1. Codex M, after simplicius, well adds in essentia.
  7. Aliqui codd. ut H ee ff cum ed. 1 forte melius cum loco quod. Mox pauci codd. ut H V ee concretum pro contentum.
    Some codices, as H ee ff with ed. 1, perhaps better, read cum in place of quod. Then a few codices, as H V ee, read concretum for contentum.
  8. Supple cum cod. Z quam cum pluralitate vel cum cod. I quam ubi non.
    Supply with codex Z quam cum pluralitate ("than with plurality") or with codex I quam ubi non ("than where it is not").
  9. Subaudi cum cod. Z: quam ubi differunt; vel cum codd. Q bb: quam quando proprietas differt a proprietate.
    Understand with codex Z: quam ubi differunt ("than where they differ"); or with codices Q bb: quam quando proprietas differt a proprietate ("than when property differs from property").
  10. Codd. inter se non conveniunt; plures enim ut FHIN P Q R U cum ed. 1 loco fides habent immo; alii ut C L O Z bene; alii ut A T aa legunt quod ipsum intelligit ut; alii demum, sicut Vaticana et ed. nostra.
    The codices do not agree among themselves; for many, as FHIN P Q R U with ed. 1, in place of fides have immo; others, as C L O Z, [read] correctly; others, as A T aa, read quod ipsum intelligit ut ("that it understands Him as"); and finally others as the Vatican edition and our own.
  11. Cfr. Aristot., I Poster. c. 20 (c. 24).
    Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 20 (c. 24).
  12. Plures codd. ut E I P Q X Z cum ed. 1 addunt autem.
    Many codices, as E I P Q X Z with ed. 1, add autem ("however").
  13. Hoc est, in tribus personis divinis; aliqui codd. ut H I Z cum ed. 1 pluribus pro omnibus, quae lectio in se praeferenda videtur.
    That is, in the three divine persons; some codices, as H I Z with ed. 1, [read] pluribus ("many") for omnibus ("all"), which reading in itself seems preferable.
  14. Cod. Y adiungit vel.
    Codex Y adds vel ("or").
  15. Supplevimus ope vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 minus bene omissum simplicitatis.
    We have supplied, with the help of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, simplicitatis ("of simplicity"), which had been less well omitted.
  16. Cod. Z nisi in identitate pro in alietate.
    Codex Z [reads] nisi in identitate ("except in identity") for in alietate ("in otherness").
  17. Supple: contentum; vel cum cod. H contractum.
    Supply: contentum ("contained"); or with codex H contractum ("contracted").
  18. Auctoritate multorum mss. ut EHKMPQUVZ etc. et ed. 1 adiecimus et nigredo in, quod et contextus postulare videtur. Vat. cum cod. cc contra alios codd. et ed. 1 post Paulo addit et Gregorio.
    On the authority of many manuscripts, as EHKMPQUVZ etc. and ed. 1, we have added et nigredo in ("and blackness in"), which the context also seems to require. The Vatican edition, with codex cc, against the other codices and ed. 1, after Paulo adds et Gregorio ("and in Gregory").
  19. Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus emanat loco [manat].
    From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted emanat ("emanates") in place of [manat]. [Quaracchi footer truncated in OCR — the displaced reading is `manat` per witness pattern.]
  20. Faventibus pluribus mss. ut A I T etc. et ed. 1 nec non contextu, reposuimus haec pro hoc. Cod. V hoc modo. Paulo ante cod. O aliam loco alium.
    With the support of many manuscripts, as A I T etc. and ed. 1, and also of the context, we have restored haec in place of hoc. Codex V [reads] hoc modo. A little before, codex O [reads] aliam in place of alium.
  21. Codd. aa bb addunt vel principiis.
    Codices aa bb add vel principiis ("or from principles").
  22. Praeferimus lectionem multorum mss. ut H I K L O T X Z aa bb etc. ex pro in, quae et contextu confirmatur.
    We prefer the reading of many manuscripts, as H I K L O T X Z aa bb etc., ex ("from") in place of in ("in"), which is also confirmed by the context.
  23. Vat. hoc modo pro ex hoc, sed obstat auctoritas antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition [reads] hoc modo in place of ex hoc, but the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 is opposed.
← Dist. 8, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2Dist. 8, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2→