Bonaventure

Articulus Unicus.

De comparatione personae ad naturam et de appropriatione et translatione.

Quaestio I.

Utrum in divinis res naturae addat supra naturam.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur, utrum sit ponere in divinis additionem, utrum scilicet res naturae addat supra naturam. Et quod sic, videtur hoc modo.

1. Hilarius de Trinitate¹: «Aliud est natura, aliud res naturae»; sed intellectus naturae clauditur in re naturae: ergo si est aliud, necesse est, quod in ratione alicuius additi.

2. Item, Boethius de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi²: «Natura et persona distinguenda sunt et propriis rationibus separanda»: sed quorum definitiones sunt diversae, ipsa sunt diversa: cum ergo natura cadat in definitione personae, necesse est, quod diversitas veniat a ratione additi, ergo etc. Si dicas, quod definitiones naturae et personae non sunt diversae re, sed secundum rationem intelligendi; tunc concluditur, quod intellectus ille cassus est et vanus, cum in re nihil sibi respondeat.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia quanto aliquid in pluribus invenitur, tanto simplicius est³: sed essentia vel natura est in pluribus, persona vero in uno solo: ergo natura simplicior. Sed non est aliquid minus simplex quam aliud nisi per aliquam additionem: ergo etc.

4. Item, quanto aliquid est maioris abstractionis, tanto simplicius est⁴; sed natura est maioris abstractionis quam persona, quoniam abstractis proprietatibus est intelligere naturam, sed non personam: ergo persona addit aliquid supra naturam; ergo etc.

5. Item, hoc est principium per se notum: «De nullo eodem et secundum idem vera est affirmatio et negatio»⁵; sed aliquid vere affirmatur de persona, ut distingui, quod negatur de natura, ergo non secundum idem; ergo in persona aliquid est, quod non est in natura, vel e converso. Et si hoc, ergo unum addit supra alterum.

6. Item, hoc est principium per se notum: «Quaecumque sunt eadem uni et eidem secundum omnimodam indifferentiam, etiam inter se sunt eadem»⁶: cum ergo natura sit una et eadem, si personae omnino idem sunt cum natura et nihil addunt, ergo personae ad invicem sunt eaedem; et sic redit error Sabellii, quod una persona secundum rem sit alia, ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Augustinus septimo de Trinitate⁷: «Non est aliud Deo esse, et aliud personam esse»: ergo persona nihil addit supra esse, ergo nec supra naturam.

2. Item, in⁸ summe simplici nulla potest esse additio; sed divina persona sive res naturae est summe simplex: ergo etc.

3. Item, quaecumque duo sic se habent, quod quidquid est in uno, est alterum per essentiam, unum nihil addit super reliquum; sed quidquid est in persona, est deitas: ergo etc. Maior manifesta est, minor patet sic: in persona non est nisi substantia et proprietas, et substantia illa est deitas, quia est Deus, et Deus non alio quam se ipso — quia tunc⁹ esset per participationem — ergo se ipso est Deus et deitate est Deus; et substantia, quae est de intellectu personae, est ipsa natura per essentiam, et similiter proprietas est essentia, ut supra¹⁰ probatum est. Restat ergo primum, quod nihil addit.

4. Item, si addit, aut addit aliud, aut idem. Addere idem sibi non est intelligibile. Si aliud, aut ergo aliud substantialiter, aut accidentaliter: non accidentaliter, quia non est accidens in divinis; nec substantialiter, quia tunc essent ibi diversae substantiae. Ergo natura secundum essentiam non differt a persona, et hoc est manifestum.

5. Item, si addit aliquid, aut illud est materiale, aut formale: non materiale, quia Deus est purus actus; non formale, quia formale non est nisi respectu materialis. Ergo cum in Deo non sit aliquid materiale, non poterit addi aliquid formale: ergo nullo modo.

6. Item, si aliquid addit supra divinam naturam, aut est melius divina natura, aut aequale, aut minus: non melius, constat; constat etiam, quod non peius, quia tunc esset creatura; non aequale, quia nihil potest aequari divinae naturae: ergo omnino nihil.

Conclusio.

Persona sive res naturae secundum rem nihil addit supra naturam, tamen ab ipsa differt secundum rationem, quia persona habet relationem ad aliam, non autem natura.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur, utrum persona sive res naturae addat aliquid supra naturam, respondendum est, quod est loqui de additione dupliciter: aut quantum ad rem, aut quantum ad intellectum.

Si quantum ad intellectum, cum intellectus huius nominis persona sive hypostasis sive res naturae includat intellectum naturae et adhuc det intelligere aliquid; sic dicendum¹¹, quod necessario est compositio circa intellectum et additio. Et hoc patet. Persona enim dicitur suppositum rationalis naturae distinctum proprietate. Ecce intellectus personae ex pluribus intellectibus componitur; et cadit ibi intellectus naturae: ergo constans est, quod quantum ad intellectum addit persona supra naturam. — Iste autem intellectus falsus non est, quia nec naturam per illam additionem distinguit, nec componit personam. Non distinguit naturam, quoniam, etsi addat supra intellectum naturae proprietatem, non addit¹² in recto, ut intelligas, personam esse naturam proprietate distinctam; sed in obliquo est intelligendum, personam esse suppositum rationalis naturae distinctum, sive quod est hypostasis distincta; et ideo non ponit distinctionem circa naturam nec intelligit eam distingui. — Rursus, personam non componit nec aliquid ei, quod non sit in ipsa, imponit. Et hoc patet, quia intellectus sanus et fidelis intelligit et credit, personam¹³ esse simplicissimam; intelligit eam nihilominus esse perfectissimam. Unde sicut circa essentiam, propter hoc quod perfectissima est, intelligit omnes conditiones nobilitatis et vere, quia ibi sunt; et tamen illas conditiones quamvis intelligat ut multas, scilicet potentiam, sapientiam, bonitatem, cum credat et sciat omnia haec in Deo unum esse; intellectus nec est falsus nec vanus, quia non ponit in Deo quod non sit, nec componit Deum: per hunc modum se habet circa intellectum personae. Unde ipsam dicit simplicem, quia, quamvis in ipsa dicat naturam esse et vere naturam, et suppositum, quod vere est suppositum, et proprietatem, quae vere est proprietas: tamen dicit, haec omnia esse unum, et unum esse alterum. Re igitur existente simplicissima, vere est additio et compositio circa intellectum, sine vanitate et falsitate.

Si autem loquamur a parte rei, sic dicendum, quod cum additio ex parte rei ponat compositionem, et divina persona simplicissima sit, quod impossibile est omnino, quod ibi sit aliqua additio, et ita secundum rem nihil addit res naturae supra naturam.

Sed tunc videtur illud non intelligibile, quod persona sit distincta secundum rem, et natura non, et tamen nulla est additio et nulla differentia secundum rem inter personam et naturam. Et ad hoc qualitercumque intelligendum, cum hoc sit supra vires humani intellectus, notandum, sicut vult Richardus¹⁴, quod est distinctio per qualitatem, et distinctio per originem. Distinctio per qualitatem est in creaturis, nec potest esse sine additione, quia haec distinctio habet ortum ex additione materiae ad formam. Distinctio autem per qualitatem dicitur, quando unus distinguitur ab alio per proprietates absolutas, ut patet, cum unus est albus, et alter niger. Distinctio per originem est, cum unus producit, et alter producitur. Et quemadmodum distinctio per qualitatem vera distinctio est et secundum rem, ita distinctio per veram originem vera est distinctio. Sicut enim unus non potest simul esse albus et niger, ita non potest unus et idem producere se ipsum.

Quoniam igitur in divinis intelligitur esse vera origo, ideo intelligitur ibi esse vera distinctio. — Rursus, cum intelligo, Patrem producere, intelligo, ipsum se ipso producere; sicut cum intelligo, divinam substantiam agere, intelligo, ipsam se ipsa¹⁵ agere, pari ratione et Filium se ipso produci: ergo productio nihil addit. — Similiter non ponit aliquam compositionem circa Filium. Ergo cum ubi est vera origo, ibi sit vera distinctio, et origo intelligitur ibi esse sine additione; et distinctio sine additione intelligitur ibi esse.

Quamvis autem persona sive res naturae non se habeat ad naturam per additionem, tamen nihilominus differt secundum rationem; alioquin non esset intelligibile, quod plurificaretur persona, natura existente unica. Differentia autem secundum rationem est, quia essentia non oritur ab essentia nec se habet ad aliam essentiam; sed persona bene oritur a persona et se habet ad illam. — Si tu quaeras rationem huius, respondeo, quia unitas et nobilitas divini esse non admittit circa essentiam plurificationem, sicut circa personam; et huius ratio dicta est supra, distinctione nona. Quoniam igitur modus se habendi ad alium et oriendi ab alio non ponit compositionem in persona secundum rem, sed distinctionem realem ab alia persona: ideo modus ille comparatus ad essentiam vel personam, cuius est, modus tantum est; comparatus vero ad illum, ad quem est, cum faciat distinctionem secundum rem, vere res est; et ita uno modo facit differre re, alio modo ratione. Hinc est quod quamvis una persona non sit alia, tamen res naturae est natura. Patet igitur, quod ista sunt compossibilia, quod persona sit simplex et nihil addat supra naturam, nec differant nisi ratione; et tamen haec est communicabilis, scilicet natura, illa incommunicabilis, scilicet persona; haec distincta, illa indistincta.

Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, quod persona sive res naturae nihil omnino addat secundum rem supra naturam.

Ad argumenta:

1. 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod aliud est res naturae, aliud natura, et similiter aliam habent rationem persona et natura: potest dici, quod Boethius et Hilarius loquuntur — in creaturis. Si autem intelligamus in Deo, tunc dicemus, quod est diversitas rationis, quae fundatur non super absolutum, sed super respectivum, quod¹⁶ nullam inducit compositionem. Nam essentia non refertur, persona autem refertur et oritur, nec tamen est composita, quia ipsa est suus respectus.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod simplicius est quod in pluribus reperitur; dicendum, quod reperiri in pluribus, hoc est dupliciter: aut ita quod unum illorum alicubi potest esse, ubi non est alterum, ut homo est in pluribus hominibus, et sic habet propositio veritatem; aut ita in pluribus, quod unum non est sine alio, et sic est in personis — nam una non est sine alia — et sic non habet veritatem. Nam sicut natura est semper et ubique, ita et persona; et sic patet, quod nihil addit, a quo arctetur.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maioris est abstractionis etc.; dicendum, quod illud habet veritatem ubi illud, a quo abstrahitur, aliquam facit compositionem cum eo quod abstrahitur; sic autem non est in Deo.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod affirmatio et negatio non est simul vera de eodem; dicendum, quod quantulacumque differentia rationis sufficit ad affirmationem et negationem. Unde intelligenda est propositio de eodem re et ratione; et persona aliquo modo differt a natura, licet non per additionem realem.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quaecumque sunt eadem uni et eidem inter se sunt eadem etc.; dicendum, quod illud fallit, ubi est convenientia plurium tanquam in communi, ut differentiarum in genere. Fallit etiam, ubi aliqua plura distinguuntur per suas origines, ut radii diversarum stellarum in uno puncto aeris uniuntur, et tamen ad invicem distinguuntur. Quoniam igitur divinae personae in natura conveniunt tanquam in uno communi et praeterea distinguuntur ad invicem per originem; ideo patens est, quod non valet. — Potest tamen dici, quod regula ubique vera est, si sane intelligatur. Propter quod notandum, quod quaedam sunt absoluta, quaedam respectiva. Diversitas autem in respectivis venit non tantum a parte subiecti, verum etiam termini; in his non tenet regula, nisi intelligatur ad idem. Quoniam ergo personae per suas proprietates referuntur, quamvis unum sint in natura, quia tamen non sunt ad unum, ideo non sequitur, quod sint idem. Et sic patet illud.

Article Unique.

On the comparison of person to nature, and on appropriation and translation.

Question I.

Whether in the divine the thing of the nature adds anything beyond the nature.

So as to the first, it is asked whether addition is to be posited in the divine, that is, whether the thing of the nature adds anything beyond the nature. And that it does, appears in this way.

1. Hilary On the Trinity¹: "Nature is one thing, the thing of the nature is another"; but the understanding of nature is enclosed in the thing of the nature: therefore if it is something other, it is necessary that it be in the account of something added.

2. Likewise, Boethius On the Two Natures and the One Person of Christ²: "Nature and person must be distinguished and separated by their proper accounts": but those whose definitions are diverse, are themselves diverse: since therefore nature falls in the definition of person, it is necessary that the diversity come from the account of something added; therefore etc. If you say that the definitions of nature and person are not diverse in the thing, but according to the mode of understanding; then it is concluded that that understanding is empty and vain, since in the thing nothing corresponds to it.

3. Likewise, this same point appears by reason, since the more something is found in many, the simpler it is³: but essence or nature is in many, while person is in one only: therefore nature is simpler. But nothing is less simple than another except through some addition: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the more something is of greater abstraction, the simpler it is⁴; but nature is of greater abstraction than person, since with the properties abstracted away one can understand the nature, but not the person: therefore person adds something beyond the nature; therefore etc.

5. Likewise, this is a per se known principle: "Of no same and according to the same is affirmation and negation true [together]"⁵; but something is truly affirmed of the person, as to be distinguished, which is denied of the nature, therefore not according to the same; therefore in the person there is something which is not in the nature, or vice versa. And if so, then one adds something beyond the other.

6. Likewise, this is a per se known principle: "Whatever things are the same as one and the same according to every kind of indifference, are also the same among themselves"⁶: since therefore the nature is one and the same, if the persons are altogether the same as the nature and add nothing, therefore the persons are the same among themselves; and thus the error of Sabellius returns, [or else] one person according to the thing is another, therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. Augustine, On the Trinity, book seven⁷: "It is not one thing for God to be, and another for [him] to be a person": therefore person adds nothing beyond to be, therefore nor beyond nature.

2. Likewise, in⁸ what is supremely simple there can be no addition; but the divine person, or thing of the nature, is supremely simple: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, whatever two so behave that whatever is in one is the other by essence, the one adds nothing over the rest; but whatever is in the person is deity: therefore etc. The major is manifest; the minor is clear thus: in the person there is nothing but substance and property, and that substance is deity, since it is God, and God [is so] not by anything other than himself — for then⁹ he would be [God] by participation — therefore by himself he is God and by deity he is God; and the substance, which is of the understanding of the person, is the very nature by essence, and likewise the property is the essence, as has been proved above¹⁰. There remains therefore the first [point], that it adds nothing.

4. Likewise, if it adds, it either adds something other or the same. To add the same to itself is not intelligible. If something other, then either substantially other or accidentally other: not accidentally, since there is no accident in the divine; nor substantially, since then there would be diverse substances there. Therefore nature according to essence does not differ from person, and this is manifest.

5. Likewise, if it adds something, that thing is either material or formal: not material, since God is pure act; not formal, since formal is only with respect to material. Therefore since in God there is nothing material, nothing formal can be added: therefore in no way [can anything be added].

6. Likewise, if it adds something beyond the divine nature, [that thing] is either better than the divine nature, or equal, or less: not better, that is established; it is also established that not worse, since then it would be a creature; not equal, since nothing can be equated to the divine nature: therefore altogether nothing.

Conclusion.

Person, or the thing of the nature, according to the thing adds nothing beyond the nature, yet differs from it according to reason, since the person has a relation to another, but the nature does not.

I respond: It must be said that, when it is asked whether person or the thing of the nature adds anything beyond the nature, the response is that one can speak of addition in two ways: either as to the thing, or as to the understanding.

If as to the understanding, since the understanding of this name person or hypostasis or thing of the nature includes the understanding of the nature, and gives still further to understand something else; thus it must be said¹¹ that necessarily there is composition and addition with respect to the understanding. And this is clear. For person is called a supposit of rational nature distinguished by a property. Behold, the understanding of person is composed out of several understandings; and there falls within it the understanding of nature: therefore it is constant that as to the understanding the person adds [something] beyond the nature. — But this understanding is not false, since it neither distinguishes the nature by that addition, nor composes the person. It does not distinguish the nature, since, even if it adds the property beyond the understanding of the nature, it does not add¹² in the direct case [in recto], so that you understand the person to be the nature distinguished by a property; but it must be understood in the oblique case, [namely] that the person is a supposit of rational nature [that is] distinguished, or that which is a distinct hypostasis; and therefore it does not posit a distinction concerning the nature, nor does it understand the nature to be distinguished. — Again, it does not compose the person, nor does it impose on it anything which is not in it. And this is clear, because a sound and faithful understanding understands and believes the person¹³ to be most simple; it nonetheless understands it to be most perfect. Whence just as concerning the essence, on account of this, that it is most perfect, it understands all the conditions of nobility, and truly, since they are there; and yet, although it understands those conditions as many, namely power, wisdom, goodness, since it believes and knows all these to be one in God; the understanding is neither false nor vain, since it does not posit in God what is not [there], nor does it compose God: in this way the understanding stands with respect to the person. Whence it calls the person simple, since, although in it [the understanding] says nature to be [there] and truly nature, and supposit, which is truly a supposit, and property, which is truly a property: nevertheless it says all these to be one, and one to be the other. Therefore, the thing being most simple, there is truly addition and composition with respect to the understanding, without vanity and falsity.

But if we speak from the side of the thing, thus it must be said that, since addition from the side of the thing posits composition, and the divine person is most simple, it is altogether impossible that there be any addition there, and so according to the thing the thing of the nature adds nothing beyond the nature.

But then it seems unintelligible that the person be distinct according to the thing, and the nature not, and yet there be no addition and no difference according to the thing between the person and the nature. And to understand this in any way at all, since this is above the powers of the human understanding, it must be noted, as Richard wishes¹⁴, that there is a distinction by quality, and a distinction by origin. The distinction by quality is in creatures, nor can it be without addition, since this distinction takes its rise from the addition of matter to form. The distinction by quality is so called when one is distinguished from another by absolute properties, as is clear, when one is white, and another black. The distinction by origin is when one produces, and another is produced. And just as the distinction by quality is a true distinction and according to the thing, so the distinction by true origin is a true distinction. For just as one cannot be at the same time white and black, so one and the same cannot produce itself.

Therefore since in the divine there is understood to be a true origin, therefore there is understood to be there a true distinction. — Again, when I understand the Father to produce, I understand him to produce by himself; just as when I understand the divine substance to act, I understand it to act by itself¹⁵, by parity of reason also the Son to be produced by himself: therefore production adds nothing. — Likewise it does not posit any composition with respect to the Son. Therefore since where there is true origin, there is true distinction, and origin is understood to be there without addition; the distinction also is understood to be there without addition.

But although person, or the thing of the nature, does not stand to nature by addition, nevertheless it differs according to reason; otherwise it would not be intelligible that the person be plurified, the nature being unique. The difference according to reason is, that the essence does not arise from an essence, nor stand to another essence; but the person well arises from a person and stands to it. — If you ask the reason for this, I respond, that the unity and nobility of the divine being does not admit a plurification with respect to the essence, as with respect to the person; and the reason of this has been said above, in the ninth distinction. Since therefore the mode of standing-to-another and of arising-from-another does not posit composition in the person according to the thing, but a real distinction from another person: therefore that mode, compared to the essence or to the person whose [mode] it is, is mode only; but compared to that to which it is, since it makes a distinction according to the thing, it is truly a thing; and so in one way it makes [them] differ in reality, in another way in reason. Hence it is that, although one person is not another, yet the thing of the nature is the nature. It is clear therefore that these are compossible: that the person be simple and add nothing beyond the nature, nor differ except in reason; and yet that this — namely the nature — be communicable, that — namely the person — incommunicable; this be distinct, that be undistinct.

The reasons proving that the person, or thing of the nature, adds nothing whatever according to the thing beyond the nature must therefore be conceded.

To the arguments:

1. 2. To that which is objected, that the thing of the nature is one thing, the nature another, and likewise that person and nature have another account: it can be said that Boethius and Hilary speak — in creatures. But if we understand [the matter] in God, then we shall say that there is a diversity of reason, which is founded not on something absolute, but on something relative, which¹⁶ introduces no composition. For the essence is not referred [to another], but the person is referred and arises, nor however is it composite, since it itself is its own respect.

3. To that which is objected, that what is found in many is simpler; it must be said that to be found in many is twofold: either so that one of those can sometimes be where the other is not, as man is in many men, and thus the proposition has truth; or so in many, that one is not without the other, and thus it is in the persons — for one is not without another — and thus it does not have truth. For just as the nature is always and everywhere, so also the person; and thus it is clear that it adds nothing by which it might be straitened.

4. To that which is objected, that it is of greater abstraction etc.; it must be said that this has truth where that from which one abstracts makes some composition with that which is abstracted; but it is not so in God.

5. To that which is objected, that affirmation and negation are not at the same time true of the same; it must be said that any difference of reason, however small, suffices for affirmation and negation. Whence the proposition must be understood of the same in thing and in reason; and the person in some way differs from the nature, although not by a real addition.

6. To that which is objected, that whatever things are the same as one and the same are also the same among themselves etc.; it must be said that this fails where there is a coming-together of several as in something common, as of differentiae in a genus. It also fails where several things are distinguished by their origins, as the rays of various stars are united in one point of air, and yet are distinguished from one another. Since therefore the divine persons come together in nature as in one common [thing], and besides are distinguished from one another by origin; therefore it is clear that [the rule] does not hold. — It can however be said that the rule is everywhere true, if it be soundly understood. On account of which it must be noted that some things are absolute, some relative. But diversity in relatives comes not only from the side of the subject, but also of the term; in these the rule does not hold, unless it be understood with reference to the same. Since therefore the persons are referred by their properties, although they are one in nature, since nevertheless they are not [referred] to one [thing], therefore it does not follow that they are the same. And so that is clear.