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Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 34

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II.

Utrum in divinis persona praedicetur de natura, et natura de persona.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere praedicationem, scilicet ut res naturae sive persona praedicetur de natura, vel e converso. Et quod non videtur.

1. Boethius in libro de Trinitate1: «Deus est forma sine subiecto»; sed ubi non est subiectum, non est praedicatum: ergo etc.

2. Item, Dionysius2 dicit, quod «negationes de Deo sunt verae, affirmationes vero incompactae»; sed ubi est vere aliquid de aliquo praedicare, est etiam vere affirmare; sed in Deo non contingit vere affirmare: ergo etc.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: quia ubicumque est praedicatio, ibi est complexio et compositio3; sed in Deo nulla est complexio, ergo et nulla compositio: ergo et nulla praedicatio.

4. Item, in omni praedicatione subiectum se habet ad modum materiae; sed in divinis nec est reperire materiam nec modum materiae: ergo nec praedicationem.

5. Item, si est ibi praedicatio, aut praedicatur idem de eodem, aut aliud de alio. Si idem de eodem, nullus ex hoc capitur intellectus alius, quam si non esset praedicatio, ut patet cum dicitur: homo est homo. Si aliud de alio: ergo in divinis est aliud et aliud, ergo compositio.

6. Item, si est ibi praedicatio, aut praedicatur res naturae de natura, aut e converso. Res naturae non potest praedicari de natura, quia res naturae se habet per modum suppositi: ergo eius est subiici, non praedicari: ergo si praedicatur, tunc ergo natura de re naturae. Sed contra: natura est forma; sed omnis forma dicitur relative ad informatum, nullum autem relativum dicitur de alio4: ergo natura non praedicatur de re naturae: ergo non est praedicatio.

7. Item, quae habent oppositas proprietates, unum non praedicatur de altero; sed essentiae vel naturae proprietas est communicabilitas, personae vero incommunicabilitas: ergo unum de altero non praedicatur, nec una persona de altera: constat ergo ibi nullam esse praedicationem5.

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Contra:

1. Damascenus6: «Substantia de hypostasibus praedicatur».

2. Item, ratione videtur: quia fides habet obiectum verum et habet obiectum Deum, ergo verum est ponere in divinis; sed veritas et falsitas circa compositionem7, veritas, inquam, circa quam est credulitas vel opinio: ergo in divinis est ponere compositionem, ergo et praedicationem.

3. Item, ubicumque est vere8 commune et proprium, ibi est vere ponere praedicationem; sed in divinis est vere reperire commune et proprium, quia natura vere est communis, et persona proprium sive incommunicabile: ergo etc.

4. Item, hoc verbum est est nota identitatis9; sed omnis praedicatio est mediante hoc verbo est: ergo omnis praedicatio signum est identitatis. Sed ubi vere est significatum, vere est et signum; sed in Deo propriissime et verissime est identitas, sicut probatum est10, quia res naturae non addit supra naturam: ergo propriissime praedicatio. Et hoc est quod dicit Boethius, quod «nulla verior praedicatio illa, in qua idem de se praedicatur»: si ergo hoc est in divinis, ergo omnes praedicationes in divinis sunt verissimae.

Conclusio.

Persona praedicatur de natura et e converso praedicatione per identitatem; sed praedicatione per modum inhaerentiae tantum commune praedicatur de proprio.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est praedicatio per inhaerentiam, et est praedicatio per identitatem, et utramque est in Deo reperire: per inhaerentiam, ut cum dicitur: Pater generat, vel Deus creat; per identitatem, ut cum dicitur: Pater est generatio, vel Deus est creatio. Praedicationem autem per identitatem est reperire in Deo propriissime, propter ipsius rei qualitatem11, quoniam ibi est summa identitas: unde omnes locutiones importantes unitatem, ibi sunt verissimae. Praedicationem autem per inhaerentiam est ibi reperire propter intellectus nostri defectibilitatem12, quoniam, licet actus in divinis sit Dei substantia et ipsa proprietas etiam, tamen, quia intellectus noster intelligit per res inferiores, et enuntiat per vocabula rerum inferiorum, tenet modum enuntiandi, quem habet circa inferiora; et ideo praedicat per modum inhaerentiae, quamvis omnia quae in Deo sunt, realiter habeant modum substantiae.

Intellectus tamen iste non est falsus: quoniam, quemadmodum intellectus abstrahens lineam a materia non est falsus13, quia modum illum non ponit circa rem, sed circa suum intelligere, similiter intellectus noster in divinis complexionem non ponit circa rem, sed circa suum intelligere et suum exprimere. Quamvis enim in Deo sit summa simplicitas, tamen exprimi non potest nisi per complexionem. Et ideo bene dicit Augustinus14, «quod verius est Deus quam cogitatur, et verius cogitatur quam dicitur». Nam etsi intellectus aliquo modo per intelligentiam ascendat ad contuitum simplicitatis, non tamen potest hoc exprimere voce simplici, sed composita.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod in Deo non est subiectum; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum ad rem; est tamen15 quantum ad modum intelligendi vel enuntiandi.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod affirmationes sunt incompactae; dicendum, quod hoc dicitur, quia nullum nomen exprimit divinam essentiam, sicut est, omnino. — Vel dic, quod in affirmatione notatur identitas, et haec vere est in Deo a parte rei;

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et est compositio16, et respectu huius est incompactio, quia nulla est ibi realis compositio.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de complexione, dicendum, quod illa complexio in sermone significat compositionem in intellectu, sed unitatem in re.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod modus materiae in Deo non cadit; dicendum, quod verum est, quia17 non cadit modus materiae ut ex qua; modus autem ut de quo et in quo bene cadit.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur: Aut idem praedicatur de eodem etc.; dicendum, quod aliquando idem est re, diversum tamen secundum rationem intelligendi et dicendi, ut bonitas est[^18] substantia; aliquando idem secundum substantiam, diversum secundum modum se habendi, ut persona est substantia, sive relatio est substantia, et Deus generat: et ideo aliquis intellectus capitur ex complexione, qui non capitur ex simplici voce.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum res naturae praedicetur de natura; dicendum, quod praedicatione per identitatem utrumque de altero praedicatur, nec est compositio19 in ratione formae nec in ratione materiae; si autem per inhaerentiam, tunc commune praedicatur de proprio, ut Pater est Deus.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod natura est forma; respondendum est dupliciter20: quod forma uno modo dicitur relative ad informatum, et sic non est accipere in Deo; alio modo absolute, quod caret materia, et sic est in Deo; et sic patet illud. — Aliter potest dici, quod dici relative est dupliciter: vel secundum esse, vel secundum dici; secundum dici, ut videns ad visum, et intelligens ad intellectum, et sic unum de altero praedicatur; secundum esse, ut Pater ad Filium, et sic non praedicatur. Natura enim non dicit respectum ad personam secundum esse, sed secundum dici; et talis respectus importatur, cum dicitur, quod natura est forma respectu rei naturae. Hinc est, quod dicitur ratione illius respectus: tres personae unius essentiae vel naturae, et una natura trium personarum; non tamen dicitur tres personae unius Dei. Nam hoc nomen Deus non importat respectum secundum dici ad personam, sed solum ad creaturam. Ideo dicitur Deus Abraham, Isaac et Iacob21.

Ad 7. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod communicabilitas et incommunicabilitas non sunt oppositae proprietates, sed sic differunt, sicut habere proprietatem et non habere22. Quia enim persona habet proprietatem relativam, ideo distinguitur et est incommunicabilis; sed quia essentia caret illa proprietate, ideo communis est, et communicabilis pluribus; et ideo non distinguuntur ad invicem. — Vel potest dici, quod communicabilitas23 non est proprietas distinguens etiam in creaturis: unde quamvis homo sit commune, et Petrus proprium, non tamen impeditur, quin homo dicatur in Petro; quanto magis in Deo24. Illa autem propositio intelligitur de proprietatibus separantibus et distinguentibus illa, in quibus sunt, ad invicem.

Scholion

I. De speciebus praedicationis cfr. d. 30. q. 1. et d. 33. q. 3. — Observandum est, quod prima quinque argumenta ad oppositum probare nituntur, nullam prorsus in divinis admittendam esse praedicationem; sextum vero et septimum excludunt tantum praedicationem, de qua est quaestio. Quapropter etiam in responsione plura et egregia dicuntur de praedicatione generatim in divinis admittenda (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 13. a. 2. 4. 12.); solutio vero specialis quaestionis, in titulo indicatae, explicite tantum exhibetur in solut. ad 6, in qua notatu digna est responsio ad id quod replicatur in arg. 6. ad oppositum. S. Doctor dupliciter respondet, primo negans, formam in Deo dici relative ad informatum, secundo distinguens illud dici relative. Si hoc intelligitur de relatione reali, certe non est relatio realis inter naturam et hypostasim in Deo, sed tantum inter personam et personam; si autem intelligitur de relatione secundum dici, concedi potest, quod natura sit forma respectu personae, et quod ratione illius respectus concedi possit locutio: tres personae unius essentiae (de qua propositione vide hic dub. 3, et supra d. 3. p. II. dub. 3, et S. Thom., hic q. 2; S. I. q. 39. a. 2. aliosque communiter). — Quoad solut. ad 7. cfr. supra d. 19. p. II. q. 2. ad 4.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 56. m. 7. a. 3. — Scot., 1. Sent. d. 4. q. 2; Report. hic q. 2, et d. 4. q. 2. — S. Thom., 1. Sent. d. 4. q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 39. a. 6. — B. Albert., 1. Sent. d. 4. a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 75. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

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English Translation
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Question II.

Whether in divine matters person is predicated of nature, and nature of person.

Second, inquiry is made whether in divine matters predication is to be posited, namely so that the res naturae or person is predicated of nature, or conversely. And that it is not so seems to be shown:

1. Boethius in his book On the Trinity1: «God is form without subject»; but where there is no subject, there is no predicate: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Dionysius2 says that «negations concerning God are true, but affirmations are unfitting»; but where there is truly something to be predicated of something, there is also truly to affirm; but in God it does not happen to affirm truly: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems by reason: because wherever there is predication, there is conjunction and composition3; but in God there is no conjunction, therefore neither any composition: therefore neither any predication.

4. Likewise, in every predication the subject stands in the manner of matter; but in divine matters there is to be found neither matter nor the manner of matter: therefore neither predication.

5. Likewise, if there is predication there, then either the same is predicated of the same, or another of another. If the same of the same, no other understanding is grasped from this than if there were no predication, as is plain when one says: man is man. If another of another: then in divine matters there is one and another, therefore composition.

6. Likewise, if there is predication there, then either res naturae is predicated of nature, or conversely. Res naturae cannot be predicated of nature, because res naturae stands in the manner of a supposit: therefore its [office] is to be the subject, not to be predicated: therefore if it is predicated, then nature is predicated of res naturae. But on the contrary: nature is form; but every form is said relatively to that which is informed, and no relative is said of another4: therefore nature is not predicated of res naturae: therefore there is no predication.

7. Likewise, [things] which have opposite properties, the one is not predicated of the other; but the property of essence or nature is communicability, that of person incommunicability: therefore the one is not predicated of the other, nor is one person predicated of another: it is established, therefore, that there is no predication there5.

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On the contrary:

1. Damascene6: «Substance is predicated of the hypostases».

2. Likewise, it seems by reason: because faith has a true object, and has God as its object, therefore it is true to posit [predication] in divine matters; but truth and falsity concern composition7 — truth, I say, concerning which there is belief or opinion: therefore in divine matters composition is to be posited, therefore also predication.

3. Likewise, wherever there is truly8 common and proper, there predication is truly to be posited; but in divine matters common and proper are truly to be found, because nature is truly common, and person proper or incommunicable: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, this verb is is the mark of identity9; but every predication is by means of this verb is: therefore every predication is a sign of identity. But where there is truly the signified, there is also truly the sign; but in God there is most properly and most truly identity, as has been proved10, because res naturae does not add anything beyond nature: therefore most properly predication. And this is what Boethius says: «no predication is truer than that in which the same is predicated of itself»: if therefore this is in divine matters, therefore all predications in divine matters are most true.

Conclusion.

Person is predicated of nature and conversely by predication of identity; but by predication in the mode of inherence only the common is predicated of the proper.

I respond: It must be said that there is predication by inherence, and there is predication by identity, and both are to be found in God: by inherence, as when one says: the Father generates, or God creates; by identity, as when one says: the Father is generation, or God is creation. Predication by identity is to be found in God most properly, on account of the very quality of the thing11, because there is the highest identity there: whence all locutions importing unity are there most true. Predication by inherence is to be found there on account of the defectibility12 of our intellect, because, although the act in divine matters is the very substance of God and the property itself as well, nevertheless, since our intellect understands through inferior things and announces through the words of inferior things, it keeps the manner of announcing which it has concerning inferior things; and therefore it predicates in the mode of inherence, although all the things which are in God really have the mode of substance.

This understanding, however, is not false: for, just as the intellect abstracting a line from matter is not false13, because it does not place that mode in the thing, but in its own understanding, similarly our intellect in divine matters does not place conjunction in the thing, but in its own understanding and its own expressing. For although in God there is the highest simplicity, nevertheless it cannot be expressed except through conjunction. And therefore Augustine14 well says: «that God is more truly than he is thought, and is more truly thought than spoken». For even if the intellect in some way through intelligence ascends to the contemplation of simplicity, nevertheless it cannot express this in a simple voice, but only in a composite one.

To the arguments:

To 1. To that which is objected, that in God there is no subject; it must be said that this is true as to the thing; nevertheless it is so [a subject]15 as to the manner of understanding or announcing.

To 2. To that which is objected, that affirmations are unfitting; it must be said that this is said because no name expresses the divine essence as it is, altogether. — Or say that in affirmation identity is noted, and this is truly in God on the side of the thing;

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and there is composition16, and with respect to this there is unfittingness, because there is no real composition there.

To 3. To that which is objected concerning conjunction, it must be said that this conjunction in speech signifies a composition in the intellect, but a unity in the thing.

To 4. To that which is objected, that the mode of matter does not fall in God; it must be said that this is true, because17 the mode of matter as that out of which does not fall there; but the mode as that of which and that in which does indeed fall.

To 5. To that which is objected: Either the same is predicated of the same etc.; it must be said that sometimes [there is] the same as to the thing, but diverse according to the manner of understanding and speaking, as goodness is[^18] substance; sometimes the same according to substance, but diverse according to the manner of being-toward, as person is substance, or relation is substance, and God generates: and therefore some understanding is grasped from the conjunction which is not grasped from the simple word.

To 6. To that which is asked, whether res naturae is predicated of nature; it must be said that by predication of identity each is predicated of the other, and there is no composition19 in the account of form nor in the account of matter; but if by inherence, then the common is predicated of the proper, as the Father is God.

That, then, which is objected, that nature is form; the response must be made in two ways20: that form in one way is said relatively to that which is informed, and so it is not to be admitted in God; in another way absolutely, that which lacks matter, and so it is in God; and so that point is plain. — Otherwise it can be said that to be said relatively is twofold: either according to being, or according to being-said; according to being-said, as seeing with respect to the seen, and understanding with respect to the understood, and so the one is predicated of the other; according to being, as the Father with respect to the Son, and so it is not predicated. For nature does not state a relation toward person according to being, but according to being-said; and such a relation is imported when it is said that nature is form with respect to res naturae. Hence it is that, by reason of that relation, it is said: three persons of one essence or of one nature, and one nature of three persons; nevertheless it is not said three persons of one God. For this name God does not import a relation according to being-said toward person, but only toward the creature. Therefore it is said: the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob21.

To 7. To the last [objection] it must be said that communicability and incommunicability are not opposite properties, but they differ thus, as having a property and not having22. For because the person has a relative property, therefore it is distinguished and is incommunicable; but because the essence lacks that property, therefore it is common and communicable to many; and therefore they are not distinguished from one another. — Or it can be said that communicability23 is not a distinguishing property even in creatures: whence although man is common and Peter proper, still it is not prevented that man is said in Peter; how much more in God24. But that proposition is to be understood of properties separating and distinguishing those things in which they are from one another.

Scholion

I. Concerning the species of predication see d. 30, q. 1, and d. 33, q. 3. — It is to be observed that the first five arguments to the opposite [side] strive to prove that no predication whatever is to be admitted in divine matters; but the sixth and seventh exclude only the predication concerning which the question is. Wherefore also in the response many and excellent things are said about predication generally to be admitted in divine matters (cf. St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 13, a. 2, 4, 12); but the special solution of the question, indicated in the title, is explicitly given only in the solution to the sixth, in which a noteworthy response is made to that which is replied in arg. 6 to the opposite side. The Holy Doctor responds in two ways, first denying that form in God is said relatively to that which is informed, second distinguishing that to be said relatively. If this is understood of a real relation, certainly there is no real relation between nature and hypostasis in God, but only between person and person; if, however, it is understood of relation according to being-said, it can be conceded that nature is form with respect to person, and that by reason of that relation the locution can be conceded: three persons of one essence (concerning which proposition see here dub. 3, and above d. 3, p. II, dub. 3, and St. Thomas, here q. 2; S. I, q. 39, a. 2, and others commonly). — As to the solution to the seventh, cf. above d. 19, p. II, q. 2, ad 4.

II. Alexander of Hales, S. pt. I, q. 56, m. 7, a. 3. — Scotus, 1 Sent. d. 4, q. 2; Report. here q. 2, and d. 4, q. 2. — St. Thomas, 1 Sent. d. 4, q. 2, a. 2; S. I, q. 39, a. 6. — B. Albert, 1 Sent. d. 4, a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 75, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 2: Divina substantia sine materia forma est... forma enim est; formae vero subiectae esse non possunt.
    Chapter 2: «The divine substance is form without matter... for it is form; but forms cannot be subject to [anything]».
  2. Libr. de Caelest. Hier. c. 2. § 3: Αἱ μὲν ἀποφάσεις ἐπὶ τῶν θείων ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ καταφάσεις ἀνάρμοστοι. In textu pro incompactae, quod est versionis Scoti Erigenae, Corderius substituit incongruae.
    Book On the Celestial Hierarchy, c. 2, § 3: «Negations concerning divine things are true, but affirmations [are] unfitting». In the text, for incompactae (unfitting), which is from the version of Scotus Eriugena, Corderius substitutes incongruae (incongruous).
  3. Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. circa initium, ubi agitur de complexis et incomplexis; ac 1. Periherm. c. 3. seq., ubi agitur de verbo et enuntiatione. — Vat. cum cod. cc post ibi est complexio interiicit ergo. In multis codd. et ed. 1 desideratur ultima conclusio: ergo et nulla praedicatio.
    Cf. Aristotle, Categories, near the beginning, where complex and non-complex are treated; and 1 On Interpretation, c. 3 seq., where the verb and the enunciation are treated. — The Vatican edition with codex cc, after ibi est complexio (there is conjunction there), interjects ergo (therefore). In many codices and the first edition the final conclusion is missing: therefore neither any predication.
  4. Pro alio Vat. et cod. cc clarius sine correlativo, de quo cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis. Mox post ergo non est codd. B D bb cum ed. 1 bene interserunt ibi.
    For alio (another) the Vatican edition and codex cc more clearly read sine correlativo (without a correlative), concerning which see Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Opposites. Soon after ergo non est (therefore there is no), codices B D bb with the first edition rightly insert ibi (there).
  5. Codd. P Q W, omisso verbo constat, brevius: ergo nulla est ibi praedicatio.
    Codices P Q W, omitting the word constat (it is established), more briefly: therefore there is no predication there.
  6. Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 6: Κατηγορεῖται δὲ ἡ οὐσία τῆς ὑποστάσεως, i. e. praedicatur itaque essentia de persona (hypostasi).
    Book III, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 6: «Substance is predicated of the hypostasis», that is, essence is therefore predicated of the person (hypostasis).
  7. Aristot., VI. Metaph. text. 8. (V. c. 4.): «Verum etenim affirmationem in compositis habet, negationem vero in divisis; falsum vero huius partitionis contradictionem». Et postea ostendit, quod verum et falsum non sint in rebus, sicut bonum et malum, sed in intellectu, non omni, sed componente vel dividente. Cfr. etiam I. Periherm. c. 1. seqq., ubi docetur neque in nominibus neque in verbis esse veritatem et falsitatem (quia sine compositione et divisione sunt), sed solum in enuntiatione. — Vat. cum cod. cc voci compositionem adiungit sunt. Prima huius argumenti propositio in cod. T (a prima manu) sic sonat: quia fides habet obiectum Deum ut verum.
    Aristotle, VI Metaph. text 8 (V c. 4): «For truth has its affirmation in things composed, but its negation in things divided; but the false is the contradiction of this division». And afterward he shows that the true and the false are not in things, like good and evil, but in the intellect — not every intellect, but one composing or dividing. Cf. also 1 On Interpretation, c. 1 seq., where it is taught that neither in nouns nor in verbs is there truth and falsity (because they are without composition and division), but only in the enunciation. — The Vatican edition with codex cc adjoins sunt (are) to the word compositionem. The first proposition of this argument in codex T (in a first hand) reads thus: because faith has God as a true object.
  8. Ed. 1 addit reperire, quod etiam in minori habetur.
    The first edition adds reperire (to be found), which is also held in the minor [premise].
  9. Aristot., 1. Periherm. c. 3.
    Aristotle, 1 On Interpretation, c. 3.
  10. Quaest. praeced. — Paulo ante pro vere est et ed. 1 ibi est vere. — Praedicatio Boethii, quae mox commemoratur, invenitur in eius Comment. in libr. de Interpretatione, ed. prima, lib. II. circa finem, ubi auctor, agens de hac propositione bonum, quoniam bonum, et eius opposita, ait: «Bonum, inquit, et bonum est, et non malum, quorum unum secundum se et proxime et naturaliter est, hoc scilicet, quod bonum est; alterum vero est accidentaliter, i. e. quod malum non est... Quod si hoc est, verior est ea propositio, quae affirmat, quod secundum se est». Haec praedicatio vocari solet naturalis sive formaliter identica ad distinguendam eam ab alia, quae realiter vel materialiter identica nominatur, v. g. animalitas est rationalitas. Cfr. Mastrius, Cursus philos. tom. I. disp. 5. n. 107, et disp. 10. n. 63.
    The preceding question. — A little before, for vere est et (truly is also) the first edition reads ibi est vere (is there truly). — The predication of Boethius which is recalled shortly is found in his commentary on the book On Interpretation, first edition, book II near the end, where the author, treating this proposition good, because good, and its opposites, says: «Good, he says, both is good and not bad, of which the one is according to itself and immediately and naturally — namely, that which is good; the other, however, is accidentally — that is, that which is not bad... If this is so, then the proposition is truer which affirms what is according to itself». This predication is usually called natural or formally identical, to distinguish it from another, which is named really or materially identical, e.g. animality is rationality. Cf. Mastrius, Cursus philos. tom. I, disp. 5, n. 107, and disp. 10, n. 63.
  11. Cod. V aequalitatem.
    Codex V reads aequalitatem (equality).
  12. Cod. R defectum.
    Codex R reads defectum (defect).
  13. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 18. (c. 2.), ubi Philosophus agens de abstractione mathematica dicit: «neque fit mendacium abstrahentium». Vide etiam III. de Anima, text. 35. (c. 7.). — Paulo inferius pro complexionem (ed. 1 complexionem illam) cod. T complexionis, Vat. compositionem.
    Cf. Aristotle, II Physics, text 18 (c. 2), where the Philosopher, treating mathematical abstraction, says: «nor does any falsehood of the abstractors arise». See also III On the Soul, text 35 (c. 7). — A little below, for complexionem (conjunction) (the first edition: complexionem illam — that conjunction) codex T reads complexionis, the Vatican edition compositionem.
  14. Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 4. n. 7. Cfr. supra d. XXIII. c. 2, et in Comment. dub. 2. — Immediate ante pro nisi per complexionem codd. S T ibi per incomplexionem.
    Book VII, On the Trinity, c. 4, n. 7. Cf. above d. 23, c. 2, and in the Commentary, dub. 2. — Immediately before, for nisi per complexionem (except through conjunction) codices S T read ibi per incomplexionem (there through non-conjunction).
  15. Supple: subiectum.
    Supply: subiectum (a subject).
  16. Ed. 1 et non est compositio; cod. I non etiam compositio, in qua lectione verba immediate coniungenda sunt cum praecedentibus absque interpunctionis signo. Paulo ante pro et haec vere est codd. H T et hoc verum est.
    The first edition reads et non est compositio (and there is no composition); codex I non etiam compositio (nor even composition), in which reading the words are to be joined immediately to the preceding without a punctuation sign. A little before, for et haec vere est (and this is truly) codices H T read et hoc verum est (and this is true).
  17. Cod. T cum nonnullis aliis et ed. 1 quod. Subinde post modus in pluribus codd. et ed. 1 desideratur materiae.
    Codex T with several others and the first edition reads quod (that). Soon after modus (mode), in many codices and the first edition the word materiae (of matter) is missing.
  18. Contra Vat., quae hic ponit et, cum codd. L T X legendum duximus est, quia verbum est respondet illi alteri est in subsequenti propositione: ut persona est substantia. Paulo superius pro idem est re aliqui codd. ut T V cum ed. 1 idem re. Si quis malit illam lectionem idem re etc., suppleat ex praecedentibus praedicatur pro suppresso verbo est.
    Against the Vatican edition, which here puts et (and), with codices L T X we have considered est (is) the proper reading, because the verb est corresponds to that other est in the following proposition: as person is substance. A little above, for idem est re (the same in thing) some codices, such as T V with the first edition, read idem re. If anyone prefers that reading idem re etc., let him supply praedicatur (is predicated) from the preceding for the suppressed verb est.
  19. Pro voce compositio, quae in plerisque codd. invenitur, Vat. praedicatio; codd. F G P R S U cc ce ff cum ed. 1 comparatio.
    For the word compositio (composition), which is found in most codices, the Vatican edition reads praedicatio (predication); codices F G P R S U cc ce ff with the first edition read comparatio (comparison).
  20. Plures codd. responsio est duplex; Vat. solummodo respondeo; cod. X (cod. L in marg.) sic: respondendum est, quod forma dicitur dupliciter: uno modo etc.
    Several codices read responsio est duplex (the response is twofold); the Vatican edition only respondeo (I respond); codex X (codex L in the margin) thus: it must be answered that form is said in two ways: in one way etc.
  21. Exod. 3, 6. Matth. 22, 32.
    Exodus 3:6; Matthew 22:32.
  22. Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1, et d. 19. p. II. q. 2. ad 4.
    Cf. above d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1, and d. 19, p. II, q. 2, ad 4.
  23. Cod. bb (T in marg.) cum ed. 1 proprietas communicabilitatis.
    Codex bb (T in the margin) with the first edition reads proprietas communicabilitatis (property of communicability).
  24. Intellige: communicabilitas non est proprietas distinguens.
    Understand: communicability is not a distinguishing property.
← Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 1Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 3→