Bonaventure

Quaestio III.

Utrum in divinis sit ponere appropriationem.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere appropriationem. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia per communia est devenire in intellectum propriorum, sicut patet, quod per memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem venitur in cognitionem Trinitatis; similiter per unitatem, per veritatem et bonitatem, in quibus consistit ratio vestigii¹; sed non devenitur a communibus ad propria, nisi communia aliquo modo approprientur: cum ergo sit devenire in divinis per communia ad cognitionem proprii, est ibi appropriatio.

2. Item, ad hoc est auctoritas sacrae Scripturae, quae appropriat communia personis, ut potentiam Patri, sapientiam Filio et bonitatem Spiritui sancto².

Sed contra:

1. Sicut se habet proprium ad commune, ita commune ad proprium; sed proprium non potest communicari nisi falso: ergo nec commune appropriari. Sicut ergo proprium Patris numquam aliis fit commune, sic nec commune proprium.

2. Item, si est appropriatio in divinis, aut est secundum rem, aut secundum intellectum: si secundum rem; sed ubi³ est appropriatio secundum rem, aliquid per prius dicitur de illo cui appropriatur: ergo in divinis est prius et posterius quantum ad essentialia, quod est inconveniens. Si secundum intellectum, sed intellectus illi appropriat, cui magis iudicat convenire: ergo cum magis iudicet intellectus inesse sapientiam Patri tanquam antiquiori, illi debet appropriari. Sed appropriatur in contrarium: ergo appropriatio est contra intellectum: non ergo attenditur secundum intellectum.

3. Item, ubi est appropriatio, prius⁴ est secundum rationem intelligendi proprium quam appropriatum — ratio enim appropriationis prius est in proprio — ergo cum appropriatum commune sit, secundum rationem intelligendi prius erit proprium quam commune; quod est inconveniens.

Conclusio.

Communia, quae aliquatenus connotant originem personarum, habent rationem appropriandi a parte rei; quatenus non connotant originem, non sunt appropriabilia, nisi forte propter errorem intellectus nostri amovendum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de appropriatis est loqui dupliciter: aut quantum ad id quod significant, aut quantum ad ordinem, quem connotant. Si quantum ad significatum, cum illud sit commune, et omnino conveniat per indifferentiam⁵, non contingit appropriari ratione sumta a parte rei, appropriatur tamen ratione sumta a parte intellectus nostri propter errorem amovendum. Quoniam enim intellectus carnalis in patre carnali videt defectum potentiae, et in filio defectum sapientiae et in spiritu intelligit furorem iracundiae; ideo spiritualis intellectus, ut elevet⁶ a carnalitate, potentiam Patri attribuit, quamvis non magis conveniat ei, sed ne minus videatur convenire; et sic⁷ de aliis.

Si autem loquamur quantum ad ordinem vel originem quem connotant, sic appropriantur a parte rei propter convenientiam cum propriis personarum. Unde quia Pater a nullo est, et Filius a Patre, et Spiritus sanctus ab utroque, et huiusmodi ordo attenditur in potentia, sapientia et bonitate; ideo patet ratio appropriandi. Unde illa quae non connotant aliquo modo ordinem vel originem, non sunt appropriabilia.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod proprium non communicatur, ergo etc., dicendum, quod non est simile, quia ex hoc, quod commune appropriatur, non attribuitur nisi ei cui convenit; sed si proprium fiat commune, tunc attribuitur ei cui non convenit: et ideo non est simile.

2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum appropriatio sit secundum rem vel secundum intellectum;

dicendum, quod per hoc quod est secundum potest dici vis appropriativa sive principium approprians, vel potest hoc quod est secundum importare rationem appropriandi. Si primo modo, sic cum appropriare sit virtutis cognoscentis, sic appropriatio est secundum intellectum nostrum. Si autem secundum dicat rationem appropriandi, sic uno modo est secundum rem, scilicet quantum ad ordinem connotatum; alio modo secundum intellectum quantum ad significatum. Unde intellectus appropriat⁸ propter intellectum, sed non idem intellectus propter se, sed intellectus sanus et fidelis propter intellectum carnalem, non ut cum eo concordet, sed ut ei obviet. Et ideo cum intellectus carnalis credat parum de potentia in Patre, spiritualis appropriat ei potentiam. Nec tamen intellectus est falsus, quia non intelligit plus esse de potentia in Patre, sed non minus quam⁹ in Filio. Si autem potentiam appropriaret Filio, tunc intellectus carnalis plus crederet esse in Filio, et ideo falsus esset; et sic patet illud.

3. Ad ultimum dicendum, quod appropriatum, secundum id quod est, prius est secundum rationem intelligendi quam proprium; appropriatum autem sub hac intentione¹⁰ consequitur rationem proprii, et hoc nullum est inconveniens.

Question III.

Whether appropriation is to be posited in the divine.

Thirdly it is asked, whether appropriation is to be posited in the divine. And that it is so, appears thus:

1. Because by way of the common things one comes to the understanding of the proper, just as it is clear, that by memory, intelligence and will one comes to the knowledge of the Trinity; likewise by unity, by truth and goodness, in which consists the account of the vestige¹; but one does not come from the common to the proper, unless the common things are in some way appropriated: since therefore in the divine one comes through common things to the knowledge of the proper, there is appropriation there.

2. Likewise, for this there is the authority of sacred Scripture, which appropriates common things to the persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son and goodness to the Holy Spirit².

On the contrary:

1. As the proper stands to the common, so the common to the proper; but the proper cannot be communicated except falsely: therefore neither can the common be appropriated. As, therefore, what is proper to the Father is never made common to the others, so neither is the common [made] proper.

2. Likewise, if there is appropriation in the divine, either it is according to the thing, or according to the understanding: if according to the thing; but where³ there is appropriation according to the thing, something is said of that to which it is appropriated by way of priority: therefore in the divine there is a prior and a posterior as to the essentials, which is unfitting. If according to the understanding, but the understanding appropriates [a thing] to that to which it judges it more to befit: therefore since the understanding more judges that wisdom is in the Father as in the more ancient, to him it ought to be appropriated. But it is appropriated to the contrary: therefore appropriation is against the understanding: therefore it is not taken according to the understanding.

3. Likewise, where there is appropriation, the proper is prior⁴ according to the account of understanding to the appropriated — for the account of appropriation is prior in the proper — therefore since the appropriated is common, according to the account of understanding the proper will be prior to the common; which is unfitting.

Conclusion.

Common things, which in some way connote the origin of the persons, have a ground for being appropriated on the side of the thing; insofar as they do not connote origin, they are not appropriable, except perhaps for the sake of removing an error of our understanding.

I respond: It must be said, that of appropriated things one may speak in two ways: either as to that which they signify, or as to the order which they connote. If as to the signified, since that is common and altogether befits [each person] indifferently⁵, it does not happen to be appropriated by reason taken on the side of the thing; nevertheless it is appropriated by reason taken on the side of our understanding, for the sake of removing error. For since the carnal understanding sees in a carnal father a defect of power, and in a son a defect of wisdom, and in a [breath/]spirit understands the fury of wrath; therefore the spiritual understanding, in order that it may raise [us] up⁶ from carnality, attributes power to the Father, although it does not befit him more, but lest it seem to befit him less; and so⁷ of the others.

But if we speak as to the order or origin which they connote, then they are appropriated on the side of the thing on account of a fittingness with the propers of the persons. Whence since the Father is from no one, and the Son from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both, and an order of this sort is regarded in power, wisdom and goodness; therefore the ground of appropriating is clear. Whence those things which do not in some way connote order or origin are not appropriable.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that the proper is not communicated, therefore etc., it must be said that the case is not similar, since from the fact that the common is appropriated, it is not attributed except to him to whom it befits; but if the proper were made common, then it would be attributed to him to whom it does not befit: and therefore the case is not similar.

2. To that which is asked, whether appropriation is according to the thing or according to the understanding;

it must be said, that by this [word] which is according to there can be meant the appropriative power or the principle which appropriates, or this [word] which is according to can convey the ground of appropriating. If in the first way, then since to appropriate belongs to a knowing power, in this way appropriation is according to our understanding. But if according to states the ground of appropriating, then in one way it is according to the thing, namely as to the connoted order; in another way according to the understanding as to the signified. Whence the understanding appropriates⁸ on account of [the] understanding, but not the same understanding on account of itself, but the sound and faithful understanding on account of the carnal understanding, not that it may agree with it, but that it may go to meet it. And therefore since the carnal understanding believes [there to be] little of power in the Father, the spiritual [understanding] appropriates power to him. Nor however is the understanding false, because it does not understand more of power to be in the Father, but not less than⁹ in the Son. But if it appropriated power to the Son, then the carnal understanding would believe there to be more in the Son, and therefore would be false; and so this is clear.

3. To the last it must be said, that the appropriated, according to that which it is, is prior according to the account of understanding to the proper; but the appropriated under this intention¹⁰ follows the account of the proper, and this is no inconvenience.