Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Utrum solus Deus immutabilis sit.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum immutabilitas sit divinae essentiae proprietas, ita quod nulli creaturae conveniat. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Primae ad Timotheum ultimo¹ dicitur de Deo, quod solus habet immortalitatem. Et Augustinus dicit contra Maximinum²: «In omni natura mutabili nonnulla mors est ipsa mutatio»: ergo si solus Deus habet immortalitatem, solus habet immutabilitatem.

2. Item, omne vertibile est mutabile; sed omnis creatura est vertibilis; unde Damascenus³: «Omne quod a versione incipit, in versionem tendit»: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod sibi relictum in nihilum cedit⁴, quantum est de se, est mutabile: sed omnis creatura est huiusmodi: unde Gregorius⁵: «Cuncta in nihilum tenderent, nisi manus Conditoris ea retineret»: ergo etc.

4. Item, nullum accidens de se habet stabilitatem; sed esse omni creaturae accidit, sicut dicit Hilarius et habetur in littera⁶, quia ab alio venit: ergo omnis creatura quantum ad esse est instabilis.

5. Item, omne vanum est subiectum variabilitati; sed omnis creatura vana, cum sit ex nihilo; unde ad Romanos octavo⁷: Vanitati subiecta est creatura etc.: ergo si omnis creatura vana, nulla immutabilis.

6. Item, omne mutatum habet in se mutabilitatem; sed omnis creatura facta est: ergo omnis creatura mutata, ergo nulla immutabilis.

Contra: Immutabilitas non dicitur nisi tripliciter. Dicitur enim immutabilitas aut invariabilitas, aut incorruptibilitas, aut invertibilitas.

1. Ostenditur autem, quod invariabilitas conveniat creaturis, utpote principiis. Nam Augustinus ostendit in duodecimo Confessionum⁸, quod materia informis est invariabilis; quia quod caret forma, caret ordine, et quod caret ordine, caret vicissitudine, ergo variatione. Auctor autem sex Principiorum⁹ dicit hoc de forma, «quod est in simplici et invariabili essentia consistens».

2. Item videtur, quod invariabilitas conveniat Beatis, quia ubi perfecta beatitudo, ibi nulla deperditio, et ubi hoc¹⁰, nulla variatio.

3. Item, variatio attenditur, sicut dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram¹¹, aut secundum locum, aut secundum tempus; sed aliqua creatura caret determinato loco et tempore, ut universale, quod est semper et ubique¹², et caelum empyreum, quod est extra tempus et locum: ergo etc.

4. Item, si immutabilitas dicatur incorruptibilitas, idem ostenditur. «Nam omnis corruptio naturalis venit ex contrarietate», sicut dicit Philosophus in libro de Morte et vita¹³; sed multae creaturae carent contrarietate: ergo et corruptibilitate.

5. Item, omnis corruptio est in aliquid prius se, quia corruptio naturalis in aliquid est¹⁴; sed principia non habent aliquid prius, utpote materia: ergo sunt incorruptibilia.

6. Item, omne perpetuum incorruptibile; sed aliqua creatura naturaliter est perpetua: ergo etc. Minor probari potest sic: perpetuitas est de ratione imaginis; unde Augustinus¹⁵: «Non esset anima imago, si mortis termino clauderetur»; cum ergo anima naturaliter sit imago, ergo naturaliter est immortalis sive perpetua.

7. Item, ostenditur, quod creatura sit invertibilis, sic: vertibilitas est in non esse; sed nihil est, quod possit creaturam aliquam vertere in non esse, quia a se non vertitur, cum nihil se corrumpat¹⁶; ab alio non, quia actio creaturae in id terminatur, ex quo incipit; sed nullius creaturae actio incipit a non esse: ergo etc. Praeterea, distantia infinita est inter esse creaturae et nihil; sed inter extrema in infinitum distantia non potest fieri mutatio per virtutem finitam: ergo nihil potest cedere in nihil, nisi Deo faciente.

8. Item, vertibilitas dicitur per corruptionem in non esse omnino; sed nihil, quod corrumpitur, secedit omnino in non ens¹⁷: ergo nullum corruptibile vertibile. Si tu dicas, quod invertibilitatem non habet creatura per naturam, sed solum per gratiam¹⁸; contra: quod omnibus inest, est naturale,

quoniam gratia speciale est; sed naturale est quod est idem apud omnes¹⁹; sed fere omnis creatura est invertibilis, quia nulla redigitur in nihilum: ergo hoc est naturale.

9. Item, ostenditur, quod nec per gratiam; quia gratia est perfectio naturae: ergo quod repugnat naturae, non datur per gratiam: ergo si invertibilitas est contra naturam creaturae, ergo non datur per gratiam.

10. Item, obiicitur de illa gratia, quia si est creatura, est²⁰ vertibilis; si ergo conveniat ei invertibilitas, oportet quod per aliam gratiam; et sic erit abire in infinitum. Si ergo oportet stare, patet quod non per gratiam. Si dicas, quod gratia illa non dicitur habitus, sed Deus gratis conservans; hoc nihil est, quia sine Deo operante²¹ nulla creatura operatur: ergo sicut nulla creatura est invertibilis nisi per gratiam, sic nulla creatura operatur nisi per gratiam: ergo nulla operatio est naturalis, quod stultum est dicere.

Conclusio. Immutabilitas, accepta ut invariabilitas, est propria solius Dei, accepta ut incorruptibilitas aut invertibilitas, a Deo communicatur aliquibus creaturis vel per naturam vel per gratiam.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod immutabilitas dicitur per privationem mutabilitatis. Mutatio autem dicitur tripliciter: uno modo ab ente in ens; et haec est mutatio secundum accidens²² et dicitur variatio; alio modo ab ente simpliciter in ens potentia sive secundum quid; et haec est mutatio secundum formam et dicitur corruptio; alio modo est mutatio ab ente in simpliciter non ens; et haec est secundum totam rei substantiam et dicitur versio. Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod immutabilitas dicitur tripliciter: uno modo invariabilitas, alio modo incorruptibilitas, et tertio modo invertibilitas.

Si ergo immutabilitas dicatur invariabilitas, sic dico, quod in nulla omnino est creatura neque per naturam neque per gratiam; nam omne creatum aut est accidens, aut habet accidens, et ita variabile; et haec²³ est proprie proprium ipsius Dei.

Si autem dicatur immutabilitas incorruptibilitas, sic dico, quod in aliquibus est creaturis: in quibusdam per naturam, ut puta in simplicibus, in quibusdam per gratiam, ut puta in glorificatis corporibus. Nec sic est proprie proprium divinae essentiae.

Si vero tertio modo dicatur immutabilitas²⁴, sic omnibus creaturis inest per gratiam, nulli autem per naturam nisi soli Deo. Invertibile enim per naturam est, quod ex se ipso habet, ut possit stare; hoc autem est, in quo nulla est vanitas²⁵ et in quo omnino nulla essentiae mutatio nec ad esse, nec ad non esse; et hoc est solum aeternum. Ideo haec invertibilitas est in solo Deo et est proprie proprium eius. Invertibilitas autem per gratiam inest omnibus vel pluribus creaturis, quia Deus sua gratuita bonitate cetera continet, ne in nihil cedant; et loquor de creaturis, quae dicunt quid completum et per se.

Concedendum igitur, quod immutabilitas, prout privat variationem secundum accidens quantum ad actum²⁶ et potentiam, solius Dei est. Similiter prout privat mutationem in non esse secundum actum et potentiam, quantum est de natura, solius Dei est, licet per gratiam conveniat multis creaturis; et sic procedunt rationes ad primam partem, unde concedendae sunt.

Ad argumenta in contrarium:

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod principia rerum sunt invariabilia; dicendum, quod verum est, si considerentur secundum essentiam abstractam; sed si considerentur secundum esse naturae, sic de necessitate habent accidentia coniuncta et possunt variari; variatio autem²⁷ accidentalis respicit esse.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in Beatis non potest esse variatio; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad substantiam praemii sive quantum ad praemium substantiale; cadit tamen quantum ad conversionem ad inferius, tum quantum ad affectiones, sicut patet in Angelis, tum quantum ad actiones. Unde Beati erunt agiles et poterunt moveri.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de universali et de empyreo, dicendum, quod utrumque recipit variationem; sed universale ratione eius in quo est; quia, «motis²⁸ nobis, moventur ea quae in nobis

sunt»; empyreum vero ratione contenti. Potest enim aliquid continere, quod non continet, et aliquid non continere, quod continet.

4. 5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de incorruptibilitate, dicendum, sicut praetactum est, quod convenit creaturis; aliquae enim creaturae sunt ita simplices et ita bona coniunctione coniunctae, quod nulla cadit in eis contrarietas, nec est in eis maior ratio corruptionis quam in principiis. Unde sicut principia non sunt resolubilia in aliquid, tamen cederent in nihil, si sibi relinquerentur; sic intelligendum in aliquibus substantiis. Unde non est dicendum, quod sit verum, quod omne compositum sit resolubile secundum rem; sed sicut dicit Anselmus²⁹, «est resolubile re, vel intellectu». Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

7. 8. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de vertibilitate, dicendum, quod quaelibet creatura³⁰ vertibilis est per naturam, si sibi relinquatur.

Si quaeritur causa huius, dicendum, quod huius versionis, cum sit defectus purus, non est reddenda causa efficiens vel reducens in non esse, sed solum deficiens. Propter quod notandum, quod natura dicitur naturalis origo. Origo autem creaturae et est ex nihilo et est ex suis principiis: secundum hoc dupliciter dicitur aliquid ipsi creaturae naturale, vel quia inest ei ex eo, quod est ex nihilo, vel quia inest ei ex eo, quod est ex suis principiis. Et quia nihil nullius est causa efficiens, sed deficiens, ideo proprietates, quae insunt creaturae ratione eius, quod est ex nihilo, non sunt positiones, sed defectus, nec sunt a virtute, sed a defectu virtutis, nec habent causam efficientem, sed deficientem: et tales sunt vanitas, instabilitas, vertibilitas. Si igitur quaeratur, a quo est vertibilis creatura, dico, quod non ab aliquo efficiente, sed per defectum in se ipsa. Secundum autem quod naturale dicitur quod inest³¹ rei per propria et intrinseca principia, sic non dicuntur naturaliter inesse privationes vel defectus, sed habilitates: et ideo hoc modo accipiendo naturale, nulla creatura est vertibilis in non esse; nec tamen dicitur invertibilis naturaliter, quia naturale est in quod potest natura; sed principia rei non possunt in rei conservationem nec conservationem sui; et ideo invertibilitas non est huiusmodi naturalis. Nec tamen est contra naturam, immo est ei consona; quia omnis natura³² appetit salvari, quamvis ex se non possit, et maxime illa creatura, quae appetit beatificari, et haec est illa quae ad Dei imaginem facta est. Et quia desiderium naturae non est frustra³³, ubi deficit natura, supplet Dei gratuita influentia. Et sic patet, quod vertibilitas inest per naturam, sed invertibilitas per gratiam.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione gratiae ad naturam, intelligendum est, quod gratia dicitur adiutorium, veniens a superiori, respectu eius quod est supra posse naturae. Hoc autem adiutorium est duplex: aut respectu esse simpliciter, aut respectu esse perfecti.

Si respectu esse simpliciter, ut puta conservationis esse, quia nulla principia, cum sint vana³⁴, de se possunt se ipsa conservare, sic non est mediante aliquo habitu infuso vel dato. Quia respicit esse, et quia³⁵ esse est commune omnibus, ideo haec gratia est omnibus communis. Unde haec est gratia habens modum naturae, et haec est gratia, qua dicuntur cetera invertibilia³⁶.

Alio modo dicitur gratia adiutorium respectu perfecti esse, et quia perfectio esse est in his quae ad beatitudinem ordinantur, respicit bene esse et³⁷ quod non est omnium. Ideo haec est habitus specialis aliquorum, non omnium, et haec est gratia per modum gratiae. Ex his patet quod obiicit³⁸ de gratia: obiicit enim secundum quod gratia est specialis habitus divisus contra naturam, quia sic dicit aliquid de novo creatum; sed gratia praedicto modo non.

10. Et ex hoc patet ultimo obiectum: quia gratia dicitur adiutorium respectu eius quod est supra posse naturae; et quia conservatio principiorum est supra posse naturae, non autem egressus actionum, immo infra, ideo patet etc.

Question II. Whether God alone is unchangeable.

Secondly, it is asked whether unchangeability is a property of the divine essence, in such a way that it belongs to no creature. And that it is so, seems [evident].

1. In the last [chapter] of First Timothy¹ it is said of God that He alone has immortality. And Augustine says against Maximinus²: «In every changeable nature change itself is a certain death»: therefore if God alone has immortality, He alone has unchangeability.

2. Likewise, everything turnable is changeable; but every creature is turnable; whence Damascene³: «Everything that begins from a turning, tends toward a turning»: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything which, left to itself, slips into nothing⁴, is of itself changeable: but every creature is of this sort: whence Gregory⁵: «All things would tend into nothing, unless the hand of the Creator held them back»: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no accident has stability of itself; but being is accidental to every creature, as Hilary says and as is contained in the littera⁶, because it comes from another: therefore every creature is unstable as to being.

5. Likewise, every vain thing is subject to variability; but every creature is vain, since it is from nothing; whence Romans 8⁷: The creature is made subject to vanity, etc.: therefore if every creature is vain, none is unchangeable.

6. Likewise, everything changed has changeability in itself; but every creature has been made: therefore every creature has been changed, therefore none is unchangeable.

On the contrary: Unchangeability is said only in three ways. For unchangeability is said either as invariability, or as incorruptibility, or as inconvertibility.

1. Now it is shown that invariability belongs to creatures, namely as principles. For Augustine shows in the twelfth book of the Confessions⁸ that unformed matter is invariable; because what lacks form, lacks order, and what lacks order, lacks alternation, therefore variation. And the author of the Six Principles⁹ says this of form, «which consists in a simple and invariable essence».

2. Likewise, it seems that invariability belongs to the Blessed, because where there is perfect blessedness, there is no loss, and where this [is the case]¹⁰, no variation.

3. Likewise, variation is attended to, as Augustine says in On Genesis according to the Letter¹¹, either according to place, or according to time; but some creature lacks a determined place and time, such as the universal, which is always and everywhere¹², and the empyrean heaven, which is outside time and place: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if unchangeability is taken as incorruptibility, the same is shown. «For all natural corruption comes from contrariety», as the Philosopher says in the book On Death and Life¹³; but many creatures lack contrariety: therefore [they lack] also corruptibility.

5. Likewise, all corruption is into something prior to itself, because natural corruption is into something¹⁴; but principles do not have anything prior, as matter: therefore they are incorruptible.

6. Likewise, every perpetual thing is incorruptible; but some creature is naturally perpetual: therefore etc. The minor can be proved thus: perpetuity belongs to the account of an image; whence Augustine¹⁵: «The soul would not be an image, if it were enclosed by the term of death»; since therefore the soul is naturally an image, therefore it is naturally immortal or perpetual.

7. Likewise, it is shown that the creature is inconvertible, thus: turnability is into non-being; but there is nothing which can turn any creature into non-being, since it is not turned by itself, because nothing corrupts itself¹⁶; nor by another, because the action of a creature terminates in that from which it begins; but no creature's action begins from non-being: therefore etc. Furthermore, there is an infinite distance between the being of a creature and nothing; but between extremes infinitely distant change cannot occur by a finite power: therefore nothing can slip into nothing, except by God's doing.

8. Likewise, turnability is said by corruption into non-being altogether; but nothing which is corrupted withdraws altogether into non-being¹⁷: therefore no corruptible [thing] is turnable. If you say that the creature does not have inconvertibility by nature, but only through grace¹⁸; on the contrary: what belongs to all is natural, since grace is something special; but the natural is what is the same in all¹⁹; but nearly every creature is inconvertible, because none is reduced to nothing: therefore this is natural.

9. Likewise, it is shown that neither [is it] through grace; because grace is the perfection of nature: therefore what is repugnant to nature is not given through grace: therefore if inconvertibility is contrary to the creature's nature, therefore it is not given through grace.

10. Likewise, it is objected concerning that grace, that if it is a creature, it is²⁰ turnable; if then inconvertibility belongs to it, it must be through another grace; and so there will be a going on to infinity. If therefore one must stop, it is clear that [it is] not through grace. If you say that that grace is not called a habit, but God graciously conserving; this is nothing, because without God working²¹ no creature operates: therefore just as no creature is inconvertible except through grace, so no creature operates except through grace: therefore no operation is natural, which is foolish to say.

Conclusion. Unchangeability, taken as invariability, is proper to God alone; taken as incorruptibility or inconvertibility, it is communicated by God to some creatures either through nature or through grace.

I respond: It must be said that unchangeability is said by the privation of changeability. Now change is said in three ways: in one way, from being into being; and this is change according to accident²² and is called variation; in another way, from being simply into being in potency or in a qualified sense; and this is change according to form and is called corruption; in another way change is from being into simply non-being; and this is according to the whole substance of the thing and is called conversion. According to this it must be understood that unchangeability is said in three ways: in one way as invariability, in another way as incorruptibility, and in a third way as inconvertibility.

If, then, unchangeability is said as invariability, thus I say that it exists in no creature at all neither through nature nor through grace; for everything created either is an accident or has accidents, and so is variable; and this²³ is properly proper to God Himself.

But if unchangeability is said as incorruptibility, thus I say that it is in some creatures: in some through nature, as for example in simples; in some through grace, as for example in glorified bodies. Nor in this way is it properly proper to the divine essence.

But if unchangeability is said in the third way²⁴, thus it is in all creatures through grace, but in none through nature except in God alone. For that is inconvertible by nature, which has from itself that it can stand; and this is that in which there is no vanity²⁵, and in which there is no change of essence whatsoever, neither toward being nor toward non-being; and this alone is eternal. Therefore this inconvertibility is in God alone and is properly proper to Him. But inconvertibility through grace is in all or in many creatures, because God by His gratuitous goodness contains the rest, lest they slip into nothing; and I speak of creatures which signify something complete and per se.

Therefore it is to be conceded that unchangeability, insofar as it removes variation according to accident as to act²⁶ and potency, is God's alone. Likewise, insofar as it removes change into non-being according to act and potency, as far as concerns nature, it is God's alone, although through grace it belongs to many creatures; and thus the arguments to the first part proceed, whence they are to be conceded.

To the arguments to the contrary:

1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that the principles of things are invariable; it must be said that this is true, if they are considered according to their abstract essence; but if they are considered according to their natural being, thus they necessarily have accidents conjoined and can be varied; and accidental²⁷ variation regards being.

2. To that which is objected, that in the Blessed there cannot be variation; it must be said that this is true as to the substance of the reward or as to the substantial reward; yet it falls [otherwise] as to conversion to what is below, both as to affections, as is plain in the Angels, and as to actions. Whence the Blessed will be agile and will be able to be moved.

3. To that which is objected concerning the universal and the empyrean, it must be said that each receives variation; but the universal by reason of that in which it is; because, «we being moved²⁸, those things which are in us are moved»; but the empyrean by reason of what it contains. For something can contain that which it does not contain, and something not contain that which it contains.

4. 5. 6. To that which is objected concerning incorruptibility, it must be said, as has already been touched, that it belongs to creatures; for some creatures are so simple and so well joined together, that no contrariety befalls them, nor is there a greater ground of corruption in them than in principles. Whence just as principles are not resolvable into anything, yet would slip into nothing, if they were left to themselves; so it is to be understood in some substances. Whence it is not to be said that it is true that every composite is resolvable in reality; but as Anselm²⁹ says, «it is resolvable in reality, or in understanding». Whence the arguments adduced to this point are to be conceded.

7. 8. To that which is objected concerning turnability, it must be said that every creature³⁰ is turnable by nature, if it is left to itself.

If the cause of this is asked, it must be said that of this conversion, since it is a pure defect, an efficient cause or one reducing into non-being is not to be assigned, but only a deficient one. On account of which it must be noted that nature is called natural origin. Now the origin of the creature is both from nothing and from its [own] principles: according to this, something is said to be natural to the creature in two ways, either because it belongs to it from the fact that it is from nothing, or because it belongs to it from the fact that it is from its principles. And because nothing is the efficient cause of nothing, but [only] a deficient one, therefore the properties which belong to the creature by reason of its being from nothing are not positings, but defects, nor are they from power, but from defect of power, nor do they have an efficient cause, but a deficient one: and such are vanity, instability, turnability. If, then, it be asked by what the creature is turnable, I say that [it is] not by anything efficient, but through a defect in itself. But according as the natural is called that which belongs³¹ to a thing through its proper and intrinsic principles, thus privations or defects are not said to belong naturally, but [only] aptitudes: and therefore taking natural in this way, no creature is turnable into non-being; nor yet is it said to be inconvertible naturally, because the natural is that which nature can [reach]; but the principles of a thing cannot effect the conservation of the thing nor the conservation of themselves; and therefore inconvertibility is not natural in this manner. Yet neither is it contrary to nature, but rather consonant with it; because every nature³² desires to be preserved, although it cannot by itself, and especially that creature which desires to be beatified, and this is that which has been made to the image of God. And because the desire of nature is not in vain³³, where nature falls short, the gratuitous influence of God supplies. And thus it is plain that turnability belongs through nature, but inconvertibility through grace.

9. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of grace to nature, it must be understood that grace is called a help coming from above, with respect to that which is beyond the power of nature. Now this help is twofold: either with respect to being simply, or with respect to being perfected.

If with respect to being simply, namely the conservation of being, since no principles, being vain³⁴, can preserve themselves of themselves, in this way it is not by means of any infused or given habit. Because it regards being, and because³⁵ being is common to all, therefore this grace is common to all. Whence this is grace having the mode of nature, and this is the grace by which the rest are said to be inconvertible³⁶.

In another way grace is called a help with respect to perfected being, and because the perfection of being is in those things which are ordered to beatitude, it regards well-being and³⁷ [is] that which is not of all. Therefore this is a special habit of some, not of all, and this is grace by the mode of grace. From these things is clear what is objected³⁸ concerning grace: for he objects according as grace is a special habit divided against nature, since thus it signifies something newly created; but grace in the aforesaid manner is not so.

10. And from this the last objection is clear: because grace is called a help with respect to that which is above the power of nature; and because the conservation of principles is above the power of nature, but not the issuing forth of actions, but rather below it, therefore [the matter] is clear, etc.