Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 37
Articulus I.
Quod esse ubique conveniat Deo.
Quaestio I.
Utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Quod autem sit in omnibus rebus, ostenditur sic.
1. Philosophus in prima Philosophia: «Quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto a pluribus indigetur et in pluribus invenitur»1; sed Deus est simplicissimus in fine simplicitatis: ergo invenitur in omnibus. Sed non reperitur nisi ubi est: ergo est in omnibus.
2. Item, quanto causa prior, tanto universalior, ergo causa prima est universalissima; sed quanto aliquid universalius, tanto influit in plura: ergo cum prima causa sit universalissima, influit in omnia2. Sed omne quod influit in aliquid, est illi praesens secundum virtutem — nusquam enim et nunquam operatur agens nisi per praesentiam virtutis — sed Deus propter suam simplicitatem est idem quod sua virtus: cum ergo virtus Dei sit in omnibus, et substantia est in omnibus.
3. Item, hoc videtur per impossibile: quia omne quod est in una re limitata, ita quod non est in alia, est limitatum et arctatum; sed hoc est impossibile circa Deum: ergo non est in una re, quin in omnibus sit.
4. Item, si Deus est in una re, ita quod non in alia, aut potest esse in illa, in qua non est, aut non: si non potest, ergo non est omnipotens; si potest esse, et non est, cum res non mutetur, ergo mutari potest. Ergo si Deus non est in omnibus rebus, aut non est omnipotens, aut non immutabilis; quorum utrumque est impossibile.
Contra:
1. Quanto aliquid magis seiungitur a natura tenebrosa, tanto est impermixtius et sub nobiliori luce cognoscit; sed Deus clarissime cognoscit: ergo maxime a natura tenebrosa seiungitur. Sed omnis creatura tenebra: ergo Deus aut in nullis, aut in paucissimis est rebus creatis.
2. Item, quanto motor magis distat a mobili, tanto sufficientius movet — unde sufficientius movet anima quam forma naturalis3, et Intelligentia quam anima — sed Deus est motor et operator sufficientissimus: ergo summe distat ab omni mobili: ergo aut in nullis est rebus, aut in paucis.
3. Item, «omnis virtus unita plus est infinita quam multiplicata»4; sed divina virtus est infinitissima: ergo unitissima. Sed quanto aliquid magis est unitum, tanto minus diffusum et in paucioribus repertum: ergo etc.
4. Item, quaeritur: quae necessitas est, Deum ponere5 in rebus omnibus? Videtur, quod nulla ex parte Dei. Nobilitatis enim est in agente, quod possit agere ubi non est, similiter, quod possit facere effectum per se stantem — alioquin opera Dei magis sunt debilia quam opera creatorum, artificum quae salvantur in esse, ipsis absentibus — ergo si nulla necessitas est, videtur ergo esse superfluitas. Sed impossibile est, in Deo esse superfluitatem: ergo etc.
Conclusio.
Deus est in omnibus rebus, cuius ratio est tum perfectio ipsius, tum indigentia rerum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Deus in omnibus rebus est, sicut ipse David6 testatur dicens: Si ascendero in caelum, tu illic es etc.
Necessitas autem existendi Deum in omnibus sumitur tum a parte perfectionis ipsius, tum a parte indigentiae rerum. A parte ipsius propter summam immensitatem et summam potestatem;
et utriusque ratio est summa simplicitas. Quia enim summe simplex est, ad nihil arctatum, ideo in omnibus invenitur tanquam immensum; quia summe simplex, ideo in infinitum virtuosissimum, et ideo virtus eius in omnibus; et virtus idem est quod substantia, et ideo necesse est, quod sit in omnibus7.
Ex parte creaturae est necessitas, quia creatura tum habet in se possibilitatem et vanitatem, et utriusque causa est, quia producta est de nihilo. Quia enim creatura est et accepit8 esse ab alio, qui eam fecit esse, cum prius non esset; ex hoc non est suum esse, et ideo non est purus actus, sed habet possibilitatem; et ratione huius habet fluxibilitatem et variabilitatem, ideo caret stabilitate, et ideo non potest esse nisi per praesentiam eius qui dedit ei esse. Exemplum huius apertum est in impressione formae sigilli in aqua, quae non conservatur ad momentum, nisi praesente sigillo. — Et iterum, quia creatura de nihilo producta est, ideo habet vanitatem; et quia nihil vanum in se ipso fulcitur, necesse est, quod omnis creatura sustentetur per praesentiam Veritatis. Et est simile: si quis poneret corpus ponderosum in aere, quod est quasi vanum, non sustentaretur. Sic et in proposito.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de distantia et impermixtione, dicendum, quod tripliciter unitur aliquid alicui: aut secundum praesentiam tantum, aut secundum praesentiam et dependentiam, aut secundum praesentiam et dependentiam et concomitantiam in materia. Primo modo est radius in aere, secundo modo anima in corpore, tertio modo liquor in liquore. Quod primo modo est in aliquo non permiscetur, similiter quod secundo modo est non permiscetur proprie, sed solum quod tertio. Et primo quidem modo est Deus in rebus, non secundo vel tertio.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de distantia motoris a mobili, dicendum, quod est distantia per absentiam, et haec impedit, non iuvat ad motum; et est distantia per independentiam, et haec iuvat, quia quanto motor perfectior est et absolutior, minus dependet et est sufficientior; et hoc modo distat Deus etiam praesens.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod virtus unita est magis infinita; dicendum, quod unitas virtutis, quae facit ad eius magnitudinem, per se attenditur respectu subiecti, per accidens respectu obiecti. Respectu autem subiecti attenditur per subiecti simplicitatem, respectu autem obiecti per indistantiam a virtute, quia virtus tanto potentior, quanto obiecto9 propinquior. Quoniam igitur virtus divina in substantia est simplicissima et nunquam a substantia elongatur, ideo in multis est infinitissima, quia unitissima in multis, ut in uno. «Ubique enim est centrum illius potentiae», sicut dicit Trismegistus10.
4. Quod ultimo obiicitur iam solutum est, quia necessitas est ex parte Dei et creaturae, sicut visum est. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod agens creatum ubi non est operatur et effectum producit, qui sine ipso stat; dicendum, quod non est simile in Deo. Nam si attendatur hoc in artifice creato, hoc venit ex defectu perfectionis: quia enim agens creatum limitatum est, et differt a sua virtute, potest operari per virtutem ubi non est; rursus, quoniam agit ex suppositione et non potest in totum, ideo effectus non totaliter dependet ab ipso. Deus autem habet condiciones oppositas, quia infinitus, et idem est in eo virtus et substantia, et totum producit; ideo non est simile.
I. Simul cum quaestione principali solvitur alia connexa quaestio, in 4. ad opposit. proposita, scil. de causa, quare Deus est in omnibus rebus.
Deum inesse omnibus rebus et locis, fide certum est. Haec inexistentia Dei secundum omnes doctores est prorsus singularis et supereminenter continet omnes modos praesentiae, secundum quos creaturae, et corporales et spirituales, sibi possunt esse praesentes, sed seclusa omni imperfectione, quae comitatur illos modos in creaturis. Unde Dei praesentia implicat 1. quandam «praesentialitatis indistantiam» (infra a. 3. q. 2.) vel coexistentiam, sed non eam, qua substantiae corporales quantitate praeditae sibi coexistunt, ita ut sit una extra aliam, et tantum pars alterius contingat alterius partem; 2. implicat «intimitatis existentiam, ut illud quod est continens intra, ut anima in corpore» (ibid.), seclusa tamen omni dependentia, analogo modo, sicut lux est in aere; 3. implicat causalitatem, qua Deus immediate operatur «per virtutis influentiam» (ibid.) «portans omnia verbo virtutis suae» (Hebr. 1, 3.). Constat etiam, quod simplicissima Dei essentia simul est eius potentia et operatio.
II. Attamen de ratione propria et formali ubiquitatis Dei est controversia inter Scotum eiusque scholam et scholam S. Thomae. Nam S. Thom. (S. I. q. 8. a. 1. et alibi) ex praesentia Dei per operationem concludit eiusdem praesentiam per essentiam. Omnes concedunt, hanc argumentationem esse veram, si est a posteriori, cum essentia, potentia et operatio in Deo in re minimo ab invicem separari vel distingui possint; si vero intelligitur a priori, ita ut ipsa ratio operandi sit ratio formalis divinae ubiquitatis, Scotus (hic q. unica, et II. Sent. d. 2. q. 1.) contradicit, asserens, quod, si per impossibile Deus non operaretur in aliqua re, tamen ibi esset, et e contrario, si non esset in aliqua re, tamen posset ibi operari, scil. in distans. De hac controversia cfr. Caietanus ad locum cit.; Rada controv. 28; Macedo, coll. 9. diff. 3. aliique plurimi. S. Bonav. a diversis trahitur ad utramque partem; ipse autem praesentiam Dei utroque modo probat, scil. a priori quidem per immensitatem et simplicitatem Dei, quae ad nihil arctatur quoad intimitatis praesentiam; a posteriori autem per causalitatem et operationem, a qua ipsa essentia et potentia et operatio creaturarum intime dependet. Haec fundamenta conceduntur ab omnibus. Actionem in distans, quam contra Scotum S. Thom. (loc. cit. ad 3.) in nullo agente admittit, etiam S. Bonav. (2. fundam. et solut. ad 4.) negat. Infra a. 3. q. 2. etiam asserit, quod «praesentialiter principaliter non respondet operationi; nam praesens est aliquis alicubi, etiamsi non operetur».
— Notandum est id quod in solut. ad 4. dicitur de triplici differentia inter agens creatum et increatum, scil. quod agens creatum habet esse limitatum, unde praesens esse non potest nisi uni loco — quod virtus eius differt ab ipso — quod agat ex suppositione non in totum, id est supponendo materiam, circa quam agit; unde etiam effectus dependet ab ipso in fieri, non in esse.
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 9. m. 3. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. hic q. unica; Report. hic q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 8. a. 1; S. c. Gent. III. c. 68. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 1. 2. 3. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. 2. — Durand., hic p. I. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. unica.
---
Article I.
That to be everywhere is fitting to God.
Question I.
Whether God is in all things.
That [God], however, is in all things, is shown thus:
1. The Philosopher in the first [book of the] Philosophy [says]: "The simpler something is, the more it is needed by many and is found in many things"1; but God is most simple at the limit of simplicity: therefore he is found in all things. But he is not found except where he is: therefore he is in all.
2. Likewise, the prior the cause, the more universal; therefore the first cause is the most universal; but the more universal something is, the more it flows into many things: therefore since the first cause is the most universal, it flows into all things2. But everything which flows into something is present to it according to power — for nowhere and never does an agent operate except through the presence of [its] power — but God by reason of his simplicity is the same as his power: therefore since the power of God is in all things, his substance also is in all things.
3. Likewise, this is seen by the impossible: because everything which is in one limited thing in such a way that it is not in another, is limited and constrained; but this is impossible concerning God: therefore he is not in one thing without being in all.
4. Likewise, if God is in one thing in such a way that he is not in another, either he can be in that in which he is not, or not: if he cannot, then he is not omnipotent; if he can be, and is not, since the thing is not changed, then he can be changed. Therefore if God is not in all things, either he is not omnipotent, or [he is] not unchangeable; both of which are impossible.
On the contrary:
1. The more something is separated from a dark nature, the more it is unmixed and knows under a more noble light; but God knows most clearly: therefore he is most separated from a dark nature. But every creature is darkness: therefore God is in no, or in very few, created things.
2. Likewise, the more a mover is distant from the movable, the more sufficiently it moves — whence the soul moves more sufficiently than a natural form3, and the Intelligence than the soul — but God is the most sufficient mover and operator: therefore he is supremely distant from every movable thing: therefore either he is in no things, or in few.
3. Likewise, "every united power is more infinite than [a power] multiplied"4; but the divine power is most infinite: therefore most united. But the more something is united, the less diffused and found in fewer things: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, it is asked: what necessity is there to place5 God in all things? It seems, that none on God's part. For it belongs to nobility in an agent, that it can act where it is not, likewise, that it can make an effect standing by itself — otherwise the works of God are weaker than the works of created [agents], of artisans, which are preserved in being when they themselves are absent — therefore if there is no necessity, it seems then to be a superfluity. But it is impossible that there be superfluity in God: therefore etc.
Conclusion.
God is in all things, the reason for which is both his own perfection and the indigence of things.
I respond: It must be said that God is in all things, just as David6 himself testifies, saying: If I ascend into heaven, thou art there etc.
The necessity, however, of God's existing in all things is taken both on the part of his perfection, and on the part of the indigence of things. On his own part, on account of the highest immensity and the highest power;
and the ground of both is the highest simplicity. For because he is supremely simple, constrained to nothing, therefore he is found in all things as immense; because he is supremely simple, therefore [he is] infinitely most powerful, and therefore his power is in all things; and the power is the same as the substance, and therefore it is necessary that he be in all things7.
On the part of the creature there is necessity, because the creature has in itself both possibility and emptiness, and the cause of both is that it has been produced from nothing. For because the creature is and has received8 being from another, who made it to be, since previously it was not; from this it is not its own being, and therefore is not pure act, but has possibility; and by reason of this it has fluxibility and variability, therefore it lacks stability, and therefore it cannot be except through the presence of him who gave it being. An open example of this is in the impression of the form of a seal in water, which is not preserved for a moment except with the seal present. — And again, because the creature has been produced from nothing, therefore it has emptiness; and because nothing empty is supported in itself, it is necessary that every creature be sustained through the presence of Truth. And there is a similar [example]: if someone were to place a heavy body in the air, which is as it were empty, it would not be sustained. So also in the matter at hand.
1. To that which is objected concerning distance and unmixedness, it must be said that something is united to something else in three ways: either according to presence only, or according to presence and dependence, or according to presence and dependence and concomitance in matter. In the first way is the [sun's] ray in the air, in the second way the soul in the body, in the third way liquid in liquid. What is in something in the first way is not mixed [with it], likewise what is [in it] in the second way is not properly mixed, but only what is [in it] in the third [way]. And in the first way indeed God is in things, not in the second or third.
2. To that which is objected concerning the distance of the mover from the movable, it must be said that there is distance through absence, and this impedes, [it does] not help motion; and there is distance through independence, and this helps, since the more perfect and more absolute the mover is, the less it depends and the more sufficient it is; and in this way God is distant even [while] present.
3. To that which is objected, that a united power is more infinite; it must be said that the unity of a power, which makes for its magnitude, is per se attended to with respect to the subject, per accidens with respect to the object. With respect to the subject it is attended to according to the simplicity of the subject, but with respect to the object according to non-distance from the power, since a power is the more potent the closer to the object9. Since therefore the divine power in [its] substance is most simple and is never separated from the substance, therefore in many things it is most infinite, since most united in many [things], as in one. "For everywhere is the center of that power," as Trismegistus says10.
4. What is objected last has already been solved, since the necessity is on the part of God and of the creature, as has been seen. — As for what is objected, that a created agent operates where it is not and produces an effect which stands without it; it must be said that it is not similar in God. For if this is observed in a created artisan, this comes from a defect of perfection: because a created agent is limited, and differs from its power, it can operate through [its] power where it is not; again, since it acts on a presupposition and cannot [act] as to the whole, therefore the effect does not totally depend on it. But God has the opposite conditions, since [he is] infinite, and the power and the substance in him are the same, and he produces the whole; therefore [the case] is not similar.
I. Together with the principal question another connected question is solved, proposed in 4 ad oppositum, namely about the cause why God is in all things.
That God is in all things and places, is certain by faith. This in-existence of God, according to all the doctors, is altogether singular and supereminently contains all the modes of presence according to which creatures, both corporeal and spiritual, can be present to themselves, but with every imperfection excluded which accompanies those modes in creatures. Hence God's presence implies 1. a certain "non-distance of presentiality" (below a. 3. q. 2.) or coexistence, but not that by which corporeal substances endowed with quantity coexist with themselves, such that one is outside another, and only a part of one touches a part of another; 2. it implies "intimacy of existence, such that what is contained within, as the soul in the body" (ibid.), with however every dependence excluded, in an analogous mode, just as light is in air; 3. it implies causality, by which God immediately operates "through the influence of [his] power" (ibid.), "bearing all things by the word of his power" (Heb. 1, 3). It is also evident, that the most simple essence of God is at once his power and his operation.
II. However, on the proper and formal ground of God's ubiquity there is controversy between Scotus and his school and the school of St. Thomas. For St. Thomas (S. I. q. 8. a. 1. and elsewhere) from God's presence by operation concludes the same [God's] presence by essence. All concede that this argumentation is true, if it is a posteriori, since in God essence, power and operation in reality can scarcely be separated or distinguished from one another; but if it is understood a priori, in such a way that the very ground of operating is the formal ground of divine ubiquity, Scotus (here q. unica, and II Sent. d. 2. q. 1.) contradicts, asserting that, if by the impossible God did not operate in some thing, yet he would be there, and on the contrary, if he were not in some thing, yet he could operate there, namely at a distance. On this controversy cf. Cajetan at the place cited; Rada controv. 28; Macedo, coll. 9. diff. 3. and very many others. St. Bonaventure is drawn by various [authors] to either side; he himself, however, proves God's presence in either way, namely a priori indeed by the immensity and simplicity of God, which is constrained to nothing as regards the presence of intimacy; a posteriori, however, by causality and operation, on which the very essence and power and operation of creatures intimately depend. These foundations are conceded by all. Action at a distance, which against Scotus St. Thomas (loc. cit. ad 3.) admits in no agent, St. Bonaventure too (2. fundam. and solut. ad 4.) denies. Below a. 3. q. 2. he also asserts that "presentiality principally does not correspond to operation; for someone is present somewhere even if he does not operate."
— It must be noted what is said in solut. ad 4. concerning the threefold difference between created and uncreated agent, namely that the created agent has limited being, whence it cannot be present except in one place — that its power differs from itself — that it acts on a presupposition not as to the whole, that is, supposing matter about which it acts; whence also the effect depends on it in becoming, not in being.
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 9, m. 3. — Scotus, on this and the following q., here q. unica; Report. here q. 1, 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 8, a. 1; S. c. Gent. III, c. 68. — B. Albert., on this and the following q., here a. 1, 2, 3, 7. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 1. — Ægid. R., here 1, princ. q. 1, 2. — Durand., here p. I, q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following q., here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the two following qq., here q. unica.
---
- Haec propositio collecta videtur ex iis, quae Aristot., XI. Metaph. c. 1. (X. c. 1.) de primis principiis eloquitur, scil. quod sint simpliciora, contineant omnia, et quod, ipsis peremptis, cetera simul pereant. — Verba mox subsequentia in fine simplicitatis sumta sunt ex libro de Causis, prop. 20. (ed. Bardenhewer, alias 21.) In pluribus edd. libri de Causis legitur sic: infinita simplicitatis simplex.This proposition seems to be collected from those things which Aristotle, Metaphysics XI, c. 1 (X, c. 1) speaks about the first principles, namely that they are simpler, contain all things, and that, when they are taken away, the rest also perish together. — The words immediately following, at the limit of simplicity, are taken from the book On Causes, prop. 20 (ed. Bardenhewer, alias 21). In several editions of the book On Causes it reads thus: infinita simplicitatis simplex ("simple of infinite simplicity").
- Cfr. libr. de Causis, prop. 1. et 20, iam supra pag. 471, nota 3. allegatae. — De propositione proxime subsequenti ait Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 9. (c. 2.): Unde est principium motus, est simul cum eo quod movetur. Cfr. et I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 84. (c. 7.). — Aliquanto inferius pro suam simplicitatem codd. S Z summam simplicitatem, cod. K summam suam simplicitatem.Cf. the book On Causes, prop. 1 and 20, already cited above on page 471, note 3. — On the proposition immediately following, Aristotle, Physics VII, text 9 (c. 2) says: "Whence the principle of motion is, [it is] together with that which is moved." Cf. also I On Generation and Corruption text 84 (c. 7). — A little below, in place of suam simplicitatem, codices S Z [read] summam simplicitatem, codex K summam suam simplicitatem.
- Vat. voci naturalis praemittit materialis vel. Vocabulum Intelligentia, quod proxime sequitur, significat hic Angelum.The Vatican [edition] prefixes to the word naturalis the words materialis vel. The word Intelligentia, which next follows, here signifies Angel.
- Libr. de Causis, prop. 17.Book On Causes, prop. 17.
- Pro ponere codd. L esse.In place of ponere, codices L [read] esse.
- Psalm. 138, 8.Psalm 138, 8.
- Miro modo S. Doctor de hoc loquitur in Itinerario mentis in Deum, c. 5. et 6.In a wonderful way the Holy Doctor speaks of this in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum, c. 5 and 6.
- Nonnulli codd. ut F I V cc accipit; Vat. ed. 1. creata pro creatura. Paulo inferius pro sed Vat. cum cod. cc perperam quia.Several codices, such as F I V cc, [read] accipit; Vatican ed. 1, creata in place of creatura. A little below, in place of sed, the Vatican [edition] together with codex cc wrongly [reads] quia.
- Permulti codd. cum sex primis edd. subiecto; lectio prava, quia contextui non respondet. — Cod. T hic inserit ergo, et paulo superius ante nihil cum pluribus aliis codd. et ed. 1 omittit quia. Paulo inferius pro Veritatis codd. X bb cc cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 virtutis. De rationibus hic allatis cfr. supra d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 7, et Anselm., Monolog. c. 13. n. 20. seqq.Very many codices with the first six editions [read] subiecto; a corrupt reading, since it does not correspond to the context. — Codex T here inserts ergo, and a little above, before nihil, with several other codices and ed. 1, omits quia. A little below, in place of Veritatis, codices X bb cc with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] virtutis. On the grounds here adduced cf. above d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 7, and Anselm, Monologion c. 13, n. 20 ff.
- Haec verba in Hermetis Trismegisti operibus non invenimus, at in Alani ab Insulis libro, Theolog. Regulae, regul. 7, ubi sic legitur: «Deus est sphaera intelligibilis, cuius centrum ubique, circumferentia nusquam», quae verba etiam ab Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 7. m. 1. citantur et Trismegisto adscribuntur. B. Albert. vero in Comment. I. Sent. d. 3. a. 18. ait: Nescio, quis fuit iste Trismegistus, et credo, quod liber confictus est. Omnia enim quae dicitur dixisse Trismegistus, inveni in quodam libro magistri Alani, qui confectus est de quibusdam propositionibus generalibus et supponitur [esse] eorundem. — Cfr. August., IV. de Gen. ad lit. c. 12. n. 22.These words we have not found in the works of Hermes Trismegistus, but in the book of Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, regula 7, where it reads thus: "God is an intelligible sphere, whose center is everywhere, [whose] circumference nowhere," which words are also cited by Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 7, m. 1, and ascribed to Trismegistus. B. Albert, however, in his Commentary on I Sent. d. 3, a. 18, says: "I do not know who that Trismegistus was, and I believe that the book is fabricated. For all things which Trismegistus is said to have said, I found in a certain book of master Alan, which was composed of certain general propositions and is supposed [to be] of the same [authors]." — Cf. Augustine, IV On Genesis according to the Letter, c. 12, n. 22.