Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 37
Quaestio II.
Utrum Deus sit in omnibus locis.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus sit ubique localiter, id est, utrum sit in omnibus locis. Et quod non, videtur.
1. Boethius in libro de Trinitate1: «Deus ita esse ubique dici videtur, non quod in omni loco, sed quod omnino in loco esse non potest».
2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia, sicut vult Philosophus2, locus ad locatum magis comparatur in ratione formae; sed Deus est forma excellentissima: ergo respectu eius nulla est forma, ergo nullus locus.
3. Item, alia ratione videtur, quia quadruplex est conditio loci in respectu ad locatum, scilicet continere, salvare, mensurare et terminare3. Continet locus ut vas, mensurat ut quantitas, salvat ut natura, terminat ut finis; sed Deus secundum nullam harum conditionum comparatur ad locum: ergo etc.
4. Item, prima et propria passio essendi in loco est dimensio4, ergo quod magis recedit a dimensione, minus est in loco; et quod maxime, minime; et quod omnino recedit, nullo modo est in loco; sed Deus est huiusmodi: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Ieremias vigesimo tertio5: Caelum et terram ego impleo; sed omne quod est in loco ipsum implendo, est in loco secundum quod locus.
2. Item, hoc videtur ratione, quia loci, secundum quod locus, est indigentia ad locatum, ut ab ipso repleatur6; sed omnis creatura vanitas, vanitas autem non replet nisi per veritatis praesentiam: ergo ad hoc, quod locus repleatur, necesse est, Deum adesse. Sed hoc posito, ponitur Deus esse in loco, ut locus est.
3. Item, maior est indivisio7 formae ad materiam quam locati ad locum; sed forma non unitur materiae nec permanet nisi per Dei praesentiam: ergo multo minus nec locatum loco. Sed quia per Dei praesentiam forma unitur materiae, Deus est in qualibet re ut natura: ergo cum per Dei praesentiam uniatur et salvetur locatum in loco, Deus est in loco, ut est locus.
4. Item, est praesentia et simultas secundum locum et secundum tempus; sed Deus perfectissime est praesens cuilibet rei: ergo secundum locum et tempus. Sed quae sunt praesentia secundum tempus, sunt in eodem tempore: ergo et illa quae sunt praesentia secundum locum, sunt in eodem loco: si ergo Deus est praesens omni loco, Deus est in loco, non tantum, ut est res, sed etiam, ut est locus.
Conclusio.
Deus est in omni loco, non autem circumscriptive, nec definitive, sed secundum excellentiam et per praesentiam supplens loci indigentiam.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod triplex est conditio, secundum quam comparatur locatum ad locum. Prima, secundum quam8 excellitur, et haec est proprietas salvationis; sic enim locatum indiget loco, et locus complet eius indigentiam et conservat naturam, et secundum hanc proprietatem sola corporalia sunt in loco, non autem spiritualia, quia non recipiunt influentiam a loco corporeo.
Alia est proprietas, secundum quam locatum aequatur et proportionatur loco; et haec est proprietas commensurationis, et secundum hanc conditionem proprie corporalia sunt in loco, quia illa sola sunt commensurabilia, unde circumscribuntur. Spiritualia autem minus proprie; nam non sunt commensurative respectu partium9, sunt tamen definitive respectu totius. Tertia est conditio, secundum quam locatum excellit locum, videlicet quod per sui praesentiam replet et supplet indigentiam loci. Locus enim sine locato privatus est et indigens, sicut concavitas oculi sine organo.
Quoniam igitur Deus ad nullam creaturam comparatur, nec secundum rationem inferioritatis nec aequalitatis, sed superioritatis et excellentiae; Deus non est in loco quantum ad primam et secundam proprietatem, sed solum quantum ad tertiam, scilicet quod per praesentiam supplet loci indigentiam. Nam locatum per praesentiam replet vacuitatem distantiae; Deus autem per praesentiam replet vanitatem essentiae, et illa quidem sine hac esse non potest10.
Ex his patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam rationes probantes, Deum esse in loco, ut est locus, procedunt secundum tertiam conditionem, ut patet; rationes vero ad oppositum secundum primam et secundam, scilicet salvationis et terminationis.
I. Haec quaestio differt a praecedente, cum S. Bonav. (4. arg. ad opposit.) distinguat locum, ut est res, sub quo respectu ad quaestionem praeced. pertinet, et ut est locus, sub quo respectu speciales difficultates discutiendae sunt. Ad rem Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 9. m. 3. q. collater.) de differentia inter locutionem: Deus est in omni re, et aliam: Deus est ubique, sic ait: «Cum dico: Deus est in omni re, dico habitudinem conservantis ad conservatum. Sed conservatum magis est in conservante quam e converso, quia conservans continet conservatum ad minus virtualiter. Ergo ex hoc, quod dicitur: Deus est in omni re, ponitur, quod res sint in Deo et contineantur ab illo, et non e converso. Sed cum dico: Deus est ubique, nihil pono esse in Deo, sed pono ipsum replere omnia loca». — Pro intelligentia quaestionis notanda est quadruplex conditio loci ad locatum (arg. 3. in fundam., et infra p. II. a. I. q. I. in corp.; II. Sent. d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. I.).
II. Communiter distinguitur quadruplex modus essendi in loco: circumscriptive, quando totum locatum respondet toti loco, et partes locati respondent partibus loci, sic sunt corpora in loco; definitive, quando res est in uno loco ita, ut non in alio, sed tamen tota in toto loco et tota in partibus loci, sic anima est in corpore et Angelus in loco; sacramentaliter, sicut solummodo ss. Corpus Christi est totum sub tota specie et eius partibus, sed simul etiam sub aliis speciebus, non autem ubique; repletive, ut dicunt S. Bonav. et Alex. Hal. ad significandum modum prorsus singularem, quo Deus inconfuse et impermixte omnibus inest, omnia replet, continet et in immensum superexcedit. Hic modus loquendi mutuatus esse videtur ex Ier. 23, 24, et S. August. (I. Conf. c. 3.): «Quae imples omnia, continendo imples... quae imples omnia, te toto imples omnia». — Verba in fine corp. «Deus per praesentiam replet vacuitatem essentiae» etc. bene explicantur a S. Thom. (S. p. I. q. 8. a. 2.): «Deus omnem locum replet, non sicut corpus; corpus enim dicitur replere locum in quantum non compatitur secum aliud corpus; sed per hoc quod Deus est in aliquo loco, non excluditur, quin alia sint ibi, immo per hoc replet omnia loca, quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quae replent omnia loca».
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 9. m. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. I. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. I. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. I. — Durand., hic p. I. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et duabus seqq. qq. hic q. unica.
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Question II.
Whether God is in all places.
Secondly it is asked, whether God is everywhere locally, that is, whether he is in all places. And it appears that he is not.
1. Boethius in the book On the Trinity1: "God is said to be everywhere in such a way, not that he is in every place, but that he cannot be in a place at all."
2. Likewise, this same thing appears by reason, since, as the Philosopher holds2, place is more compared to the thing placed in the account of form; but God is the most excellent form: therefore with respect to him there is no form, therefore no place.
3. Likewise, it appears by another reason, because there is a fourfold condition of place in respect to the thing placed, namely to contain, to preserve, to measure, and to terminate3. Place contains as a vessel, measures as a quantity, preserves as a nature, terminates as an end; but God according to none of these conditions is compared to place: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, the first and proper attribute of being in place is dimension4, therefore what more recedes from dimension, is less in place; and what most [recedes], least [is in place]; and what altogether recedes, in no way is in place; but God is of this kind: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. Jeremiah, twenty-third5: Heaven and earth I fill; but everything that is in place by filling it, is in place insofar as [there is] place.
2. Likewise, this appears by reason, since place, insofar as it is place, has a need toward the thing placed, that it be filled by it6; but every creature [is] vanity, and vanity does not fill except through the presence of truth: therefore for this, that place be filled, it is necessary that God be present. But this being posited, God is posited to be in place, insofar as place is place.
3. Likewise, greater is the union7 of form to matter than of the thing placed to place; but form is not united to matter nor does it remain except through God's presence: therefore much less [is] the thing placed [united] to place. But since through God's presence form is united to matter, God is in every thing as nature: therefore since through God's presence the thing placed is united and preserved in place, God is in place, insofar as it is place.
4. Likewise, there is presence and simultaneity according to place and according to time; but God is most perfectly present to every thing: therefore according to place and time. But things which are present according to time, are in the same time: therefore also those which are present according to place, are in the same place: if therefore God is present to every place, God is in place, not only insofar as he is a thing, but also insofar as he is place.
Conclusion.
God is in every place, not however circumscriptively, nor definitively, but according to excellence and by his presence supplying the indigence of place.
I respond: It must be said that there is a threefold condition according to which the thing placed is compared to place. The first, according to which8 [the thing placed] is excelled, and this is the property of preservation; for thus the thing placed is in need of place, and place fulfills its indigence and conserves its nature, and according to this property only corporeal things are in place, and not spiritual things, since they do not receive influence from corporeal place.
Another is the property according to which the thing placed is equated and proportioned to place; and this is the property of commensuration, and according to this condition properly corporeal things are in place, since these alone are commensurable, whence they are circumscribed. Spiritual things, however, [are in place] less properly; for they are not [in place] commensuratively with respect to parts9, yet they are definitively with respect to the whole. The third is the condition according to which the thing placed excels place, namely that by its presence it fills and supplies the indigence of place. For place without a thing placed is deprived and indigent, like the concavity of an eye without an organ.
Since therefore God is compared to no creature, neither according to the account of inferiority nor of equality, but of superiority and excellence; God is not in place as to the first and second property, but only as to the third, namely that by his presence he supplies the indigence of place. For the thing placed by its presence fills the emptiness of distance; but God by his presence fills the vanity of essence, and the former indeed cannot be without the latter10.
From these the response to the objections is clear. For the reasons proving that God is in place, insofar as it is place, proceed according to the third condition, as is clear; but the reasons to the contrary [proceed] according to the first and second, namely of preservation and termination.
I. This question differs from the preceding, since St. Bonaventure (4. arg. ad oppositum) distinguishes place, insofar as it is a thing, under which respect it pertains to the preceding question, and insofar as it is place, under which respect special difficulties are to be discussed. To the point Alex. Hal. (S. p. I, q. 9, m. 3, q. collateralis) on the difference between the locution: God is in every thing, and the other: God is everywhere, speaks thus: "When I say: God is in every thing, I express the relation of the conserving to the conserved. But the conserved is more in the conserver than conversely, since the conserver contains the conserved at least virtually. Therefore from this, that it is said: God is in every thing, it is posited that things are in God and contained by him, and not conversely. But when I say: God is everywhere, I posit nothing to be in God, but I posit him to fill all places". — For the understanding of the question, the fourfold condition of place to the thing placed is to be noted (arg. 3. in fundamentis, and below p. II, a. I, q. I, in corpore; II Sent. d. 2, p. II, a. 2, q. I).
II. A fourfold mode of being in place is commonly distinguished: circumscriptively, when the whole thing placed corresponds to the whole place, and the parts of the thing placed correspond to the parts of place, thus bodies are in place; definitively, when a thing is in one place in such a way as not [to be] in another, but yet whole in the whole place and whole in the parts of place, thus the soul is in the body and an angel in place; sacramentally, as only the most holy Body of Christ is whole under the whole species and its parts, but at the same time also under other species, yet not everywhere; repletively, as St. Bonav. and Alex. Hal. say, to signify the wholly singular mode by which God, unconfusedly and unmixedly, indwells all things, fills all things, contains [them], and exceeds them immeasurably. This mode of speaking seems to be borrowed from Jer. 23, 24, and St. Augustine (I Conf. c. 3): "Thou who fillest all things, by containing fillest [them]... Thou who fillest all things, fillest all things wholly with thyself." — The words at the end of the body, "God by his presence fills the vanity of essence" etc., are well explained by St. Thomas (S. p. I, q. 8, a. 2): "God fills every place, not as a body; for a body is said to fill a place inasmuch as it does not allow another body with itself; but from the fact that God is in some place, it is not excluded that other things be there, rather by this he fills all places, since he gives being to all things placed, which fill all places."
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 9, m. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. I. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2, a. I. — Ægid. R., here 2 princ. q. I. — Durand., here p. I, q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., on this and the following q. here q. 1. — Biel, on this and the two following qq. here q. unica.
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- Cap. 4: Quod [Deus] ubique est, ita dici videtur, non quod in omni sit loco (omnino enim in loco esse non potest), sed quod ei omnis locus adsit ad eum capiendum, cum ipse non suscipiatur in loco; atque ideo nusquam in loco esse dicitur, quoniam ubique est, sed non in loco.Cap. 4: "That [God] is everywhere, is said to be so, not that he is in every place (for he cannot be in place at all), but that every place is present to him for grasping him, since he himself is not received in place; and therefore he is said to be nowhere in place, because he is everywhere, but not in place."
- Libr. IV. Phys. text. 14. (c. 2.): «Quare videbitur species ac forma cuiusque locus esse, quo terminatur magnitudo et materia magnitudinis; hic enim est uniuscuiusque terminus». Et IV. de Caelo et Mundo, text. 33. (c. 4.): «Dicimus autem id quidem quod continet, formae esse, quod autem continetur, materiae». — Paulo inferius post formae Vat. cum cod. cc addit quam in ratione alterius generis causae.Physics IV, text 14 (c. 2): "Wherefore the species and form of each thing will seem to be its place, by which the magnitude and the matter of the magnitude is terminated; for this is the limit of each thing." And IV On the Heaven and the Earth, text 33 (c. 4): "We say, however, that what contains belongs to form, what is contained to matter." — A little below, after formae, the Vatican [edition] with codex cc adds quam in ratione alterius generis causae ("than in the account of another kind of cause").
- Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 30. (c. 4.).Aristotle, Physics IV, text 30 (c. 4).
- Vide textum Aristotelis hic, nota 2.See the text of Aristotle here, note 2.
- Vers. 24.Verse 24.
- Quod sequitur ex definitione loci apud Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 41. (c. 4.): «Locus est continentis terminus immobilis primus», quae definitio iuxta Aristotelem convenit loco, ut locus est, non loco, ut vas est: sic enim locus non est immobilis. — Propositio subsequens alludit ad illud Rom. 8, 20: Vanitati enim creatura subiecta est. — Paulo post pro replet codd. G K T ff perperam repletur.Which follows from the definition of place in Aristotle, Physics IV, text 41 (c. 4): "Place is the first immobile boundary of the container," which definition according to Aristotle suits place insofar as it is place, not place insofar as it is a vessel: for thus place is not immobile. — The following proposition alludes to that of Rom. 8, 20: For the creature is subject to vanity. — A little after, in place of replet, codices G K T ff wrongly [read] repletur.
- Sive unio. — Aliquanto inferius verba ut natura non pertinent ad vocem Deus, sed ad qualibet re, ita ut scriptoris mens haec sit: Deus est in qualibet re, quatenus res est natura.Or unio ("union"). — A little below, the words ut natura do not pertain to the word Deus, but to qualibet re, so that the meaning of the writer is this: God is in every thing, insofar as the thing is a nature.
- Vat. et ed. 1 repetunt hic locatum.The Vatican [edition] and ed. 1 here repeat locatum.
- Supple hic et paulo superius post partium vocem loci. — Vat. commensurabilia pro commensurative, et definibilia pro definitive.Supply here and a little above, after partium, the word loci ("of place"). — The Vatican [edition] [reads] commensurabilia in place of commensurative, and definibilia in place of definitive.
- Sensus est: et illa repletio, qua locatum replet vacuitatem distantiae, esse non potest sine hac repletione, qua Deus replet vanitatem essentiae creaturae. Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 13. seq. et c. 20. seqq. — Paulo ante pro vanitatem essentiae Vat. cum nonnullis codd. vacuitatem essentiae.The meaning is: that filling by which the thing placed fills the emptiness of distance cannot exist without this filling by which God fills the vanity of the creature's essence. Cf. Anselm, Monologion c. 13 ff. and c. 20 ff. — A little before, in place of vanitatem essentiae, the Vatican [edition] with some codices [reads] vacuitatem essentiae.