Dist. 7, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 7
Dubia circa litteram Magistri.
Dub. I.
In parte ista incidunt dubitationes circa litteram, et prima est de solutione ista Magistri, qua dicit, quod non sequitur: Pater potest generare, quod non1 Filium: ergo potest aliquid, quod non Filius; et respondet, quod posse generare non est posse aliquid subiectum divinae potentiae. Sed hoc non videtur solvere, sed aggravare argumentum. Tunc enim, cum posse generare2 sit posse maximum, videtur quod maius inconveniens sequatur, et magis derogetur potentiae Filii, si in hoc deficit, quam si in subiectis3 divinae potentiae.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister bene solvit. Potentia enim Patris habet comparari ad inferius et ad aequale, sed ad superius non, cum careat superiori. Cum comparatur ad inferius, tunc est potentia essentialis et essentialiter retenta4, quia connotat respectum in creatura; et respectu talis potentiae inconveniens esset, quod aliquid posset Pater, quod non posset Filius, quia tunc differrent per essentiam. Cum autem comparatur ad aequale, ut ad personam, tunc trahitur ad personam; et tunc nullum inconveniens est, si aliqua proprietas personalis est in Patre, quae non est in Filio. Ideo non sequitur, quod aliqua potentia sit in Patre, quae non sit in Filio.
Dub. II.
Item dubitatur de hoc quod dicitur, quod generatio Filii non est de omnibus. Videtur enim Richardus de sancto Victore5 dicere contrarium, qui dicit, quod quia omnipotens est, excusari non potest, quin Filium genuerit: ergo generatio Filii continetur sub omnipotentia: ergo Filius inter omnia continetur et est.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister, generatio Filii non continetur sub omnipotentia, nisi acciperetur omnipotentia per appropriationem. Et quod dicit Richardus non intelligitur6, tanquam Filius sit inter omnia, sed tanquam ante omnia; unde arguit a posteriori. Si enim emanatio naturae secundum rationem intelligendi praecedit emanationem secundum rationem voluntatis, nunquam Deus esset potens producere creaturam per voluntatem, nisi etiam produxisset Filium per naturam.
Dub. III.
Item videtur male dicere, cum dicit, quod esse Patrem non est esse aliquid; quia cum inter aliquid et nihil non cadat medium, si non est esse aliquid: ergo est esse nihil7.
Respondeo: Esse aliquid dicitur dupliciter: vel communiter ad essentiam et personam; et sic non cadit medium, et in hoc sensu esse Patrem est esse aliquid; alio modo, prout trahitur8 ad essentiam; et sic cadit inter esse aliquid et esse nihil medium, scilicet esse aliquem; persona enim praedicatur ut quis, non ut quid9.
Dub. IV.10
Item quaeritur de ista illatione Magistri: Spiritus sanctus potuit esse Filius, ergo potuit mutari, et ponitur ibi: Si enim nasci potuit, potuit esse Filius etc. Videtur ista illatio non valere, quia in creaturis, ubi
magis differt relatio a supposito, potest dici, quod11 similis potest esse alteri dissimilis sine sui mutatione: ergo cum filiatio et spiratio sint relationes, pari ratione Filius poterit esse Spiritus sanctus, et e converso sine mutatione. Item, omne mutabile est aliquid praeter illud, secundum quod mutatur, ut si non album fiat album, est aliud quam albedo: ergo si intelligatur Spiritus sanctus mutari, si generetur, tunc aliud esset in eo generatio, aliud ille qui generatur; sed hoc falsum: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Secus est in relationibus creaturae et Dei: quoniam relationes in creaturis non dant relativis existere; unde sine illis potest res esse et cum illis; in divinis autem dant personis existere; et ideo si in personis intelligatur, quod proprietas12 insit hypostasi, intelligitur esse hypostasis, et similiter, si intelligitur non inesse, intelligitur hypostasis non esse. Cum ergo Spiritus sanctus non possit simul spirari et generari — quia quamvis una persona possit duobus modis producere, tamen una persona non potest nisi uno modo produci — sequitur de necessitate: si potest Spiritus sanctus esse Filius vel potuit, potest non esse Spiritus sive non spirari; et si potuit non spirari, potuit non esse; et iterum si potuit generari, potuit esse: et ita potuit fieri de ente non ens et de non ente ens, ac per hoc mutari.
Et sic13 patet ultimum, quia non dicitur mutari propter diversificationem proprietatum circa idem suppositum, sicut est in mutatione naturali, sed propter corruptionem et inceptionem eiusdem. Nec est illud simile: Pater potest generare et spirare sine sui mutatione: ergo Spiritus sanctus14 generari et spirari; quia non est inconveniens, unum principium pluribus modis producere, sed unum principiatum pluribus modis produci est impossibile et incompossibile; et ideo patet illud.
Dub. V.
Item videtur falsum dicere, cum dicit: Pater non est potens nisi natura; eius enim potentia est essentia, quia secundum hoc generare, quod nullo modo est essentiae, nullo modo esset potentiae.
Respondeo: Quamvis potentia, absolute considerata, sit idem quod essentia, tamen potentia, quia non est nomen adeo abstractum sicut essentia, trahitur ad personam. Unde potentia generandi non dicit naturam divinam simpliciter, sed naturam ut in tali persona, scilicet innascibili; ideo non est simile de hoc nomine essentia et de hoc nomine potentia15.
Dub. VI.
Item videtur male dicere ibi: Aliam significes potentiam, qua Pater potest gignere etc.; quia potentiae divisio sufficiens est per activam et passivam16; sed posse gignere dicit potentiam activam, posse gigni potentiam passivam: ergo non potest alia potentia significari. Si tu dicas, quod generare non est agere proprie, similiter nec generari pati; obiicitur, quod potentiae distinguuntur per actus17; sed aliud est gignere et aliud gigni: ergo alia est potentia huius et illius.
Respondeo: Ista distinctio, quam ponit Magister de potentia gignendi active et passive, fundatur super hoc, quod potentia potest considerari secundum id quod est; et sic dicit naturam, et sicut una natura est in generante et genito, sed alio et alio modo, sic eadem potentia. Potest iterum considerari secundum id ad quod est; et sic dicit modum existendi naturam in persona in comparatione ad alium, qui est principium vel principiatum. Et sic, cum diversi modi sint, diversae dicuntur proprietates posse generare et posse generari et distinguuntur secundum actus personales; sed primo modo non.
Dub. VII.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Filius habet potentiam, qua potest esse Filius sive qua potest gigni. Videtur enim dubium vel falsum, quia gigni omnino est a gignere, et gignere est a potentia Patris: ergo et gigni.
Respondeo: Sicut potentia gignendi in Patre non dicit nisi naturam in persona ut natam ex se producere aliam, sic potentia gignendi in Filio non dicit nisi naturam18 in persona ut natam produci ab alia; sicut enim hypostasi Patris convenit generare, sic hypostasi Filii convenit generari. Nec valet quod obiicitur in contrarium. Nam omne quod habet Filius, sive essentiale sive personale, habet a Patre. Ideo quamvis ipsum gigni sit a potentia Patris, non excluditur tamen19 quin potentia gignendi passiva sit in Filio. Sed illa potentia non est principium generationis, sed idoneitas sive hypostasis cum sua proprietate ad generari. Unde quod dicitur posse gigni, potentia potest intelligi originaliter, et sic est in solo Patre; vel formaliter, et sic ponitur esse in Filio; alio autem modo non.
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Doubts concerning the Master's text.
Doubt I.
In this part there arise doubts concerning the text, and the first is about that solution of the Master, in which he says that it does not follow: The Father can generate that which1 the Son cannot: therefore he can do something which the Son cannot; and he answers that to be able to generate is not to be able [to do] something subject to the divine power. But this seems not to solve but to aggravate the argument. For then, since to be able to generate2 is to be able [to do] the greatest thing, it seems that a greater unfittingness follows, and the power of the Son is more derogated, if he is deficient in this, than if [he were deficient] in things subject3 to the divine power.
I respond: It must be said that the Master solves [it] well. For the power of the Father can be compared to what is below and to what is equal, but not to what is above, since it has nothing above it. When it is compared to what is below, then it is essential power and essentially retained4, because it connotes a respect to the creature; and with respect to such a power it would be unfitting that the Father should be able to do something which the Son could not do, because then they would differ by essence. But when it is compared to what is equal, namely to a person, then it is drawn to the person; and then it is no unfittingness, if some personal property is in the Father, which is not in the Son. Therefore it does not follow that some power is in the Father which is not in the Son.
Doubt II.
Likewise, there is doubt about the statement that the generation of the Son is not [included] among "all things." For Richard of St. Victor5 seems to say the contrary, who says that because he is omnipotent, he cannot be excused from having generated the Son: therefore the generation of the Son is contained under omnipotence: therefore the Son is contained among all things and is [one of them].
I respond: It must be said that, as the Master says, the generation of the Son is not contained under omnipotence, unless omnipotence be taken by appropriation. And what Richard says is not to be understood6 as though the Son were among all things, but as though [he were] before all things; whence he argues a posteriori. For if the emanation of nature according to the rational order of the intellect precedes the emanation according to the rational order of the will, God would never be able to produce a creature through the will, unless he had also produced the Son through nature.
Doubt III.
Likewise, he seems to speak ill when he says that to be the Father is not to be something; because, since between something and nothing there falls no middle, if it is not to be something: therefore it is to be nothing7.
I respond: "To be something" is said in two ways: either commonly, with reference to essence and person; and so no middle falls, and in this sense to be the Father is to be something; in another way, insofar as it is drawn8 to the essence; and thus a middle falls between to be something and to be nothing, namely to be someone; for a person is predicated as who, not as what9.
Doubt IV.10
Likewise it is asked concerning this inference of the Master: The Holy Spirit could have been the Son, therefore he could have been changed, and there is added: For if he could have been born, he could have been the Son etc. This inference seems not to hold, because in creatures, where
a relation differs more from a supposit, it can be said that11 one similar [thing] can be dissimilar to another without its being changed: therefore, since filiation and spiration are relations, by parity of reasoning the Son could be the Holy Spirit, and conversely, without change. Likewise, every changeable thing is something besides that according to which it is changed, as if a non-white [thing] becomes white, it is other than the whiteness: therefore if the Holy Spirit be understood to be changed, if he were generated, then in him the generation would be one thing, and the one who is generated another; but this is false: therefore etc.
I respond: The case is otherwise in the relations of the creature and of God: because relations in creatures do not give the related things existence; whence without them the thing can exist and with them; but in the divine they give the persons existence; and therefore if it be understood in the persons that a property12 is in the hypostasis, it is understood that the hypostasis is, and likewise, if it is understood not to be in [it], it is understood that the hypostasis is not. Since therefore the Holy Spirit cannot be at once spirated and generated — because, although one person can produce in two modes, nevertheless one person cannot be produced except in one mode — it follows of necessity: if the Holy Spirit can be the Son or could have been, he can not be the Spirit or not be spirated; and if he could not be spirated, he could not be; and again if he could be generated, he could be: and so he could become a non-being from a being, and a being from a non-being, and through this be changed.
And thus13 the last point is clear, because [he] is not said to be changed on account of a diversification of properties about the same supposit, as is the case in natural change, but on account of the corruption and inception of the same. Nor is that similar: The Father can generate and spirate without his being changed: therefore the Holy Spirit14 [can] be generated and spirated; because it is not unfitting that one principle produce in many modes, but that one thing originated be produced in many modes is impossible and incompossible; and therefore that is clear.
Doubt V.
Likewise, he seems to speak falsely when he says: The Father is not powerful except by nature; for his power is essence, since according to this, "to generate," which in no way is of the essence, in no way would be of the power.
I respond: Although power, considered absolutely, is the same as essence, nevertheless power, because it is not a name as abstract as essence, is drawn to the person. Hence the power of generating does not signify the divine nature simply, but the nature as in such a person, namely the unbegotten one; therefore there is no parallel between this name essence and this name power15.
Doubt VI.
Likewise, he seems to speak ill there: That you should signify another power, by which the Father is able to beget etc.; because the division of power is sufficient by [its division into] active and passive16; but to be able to beget signifies active power, to be able to be begotten passive power: therefore no other power can be signified. If you should say that to generate is not properly to act, similarly neither is to be generated to undergo; it is objected that powers are distinguished by their acts17; but to beget is one thing and to be begotten another: therefore the power of this and of that is different.
I respond: This distinction which the Master sets down concerning the power of begetting actively and passively, is founded on this, that power can be considered according to that which it is; and so it signifies the nature, and as one nature is in the begetter and the begotten, but in one and another mode, so it is the same power. It can again be considered according to that to which it is; and so it signifies the mode of the nature's existing in the person in comparison to another, which is the principle or that which is originated. And so, since the modes are diverse, the properties to be able to generate and to be able to be generated are said to be diverse and are distinguished according to personal acts; but in the first mode, [they are] not.
Doubt VII.
Likewise it is asked concerning this, that he says that the Son has the power by which he can be the Son or by which he can be begotten. For this seems doubtful or false, because to be begotten is wholly from to beget, and to beget is from the power of the Father: therefore so is to be begotten.
I respond: Just as the power of begetting in the Father signifies nothing other than the nature in the person as apt of itself to produce another, so the power of begetting in the Son signifies nothing other than the nature18 in the person as apt to be produced from another; for as it belongs to the hypostasis of the Father to generate, so it belongs to the hypostasis of the Son to be generated. Nor does what is objected to the contrary hold. For everything that the Son has, whether essential or personal, he has from the Father. Therefore, although the very being-begotten is from the power of the Father, it is nevertheless19 not excluded that the passive power of begetting is in the Son. But that power is not the principle of generation, but the suitability or hypostasis with its property to be generated. Hence what is called the ability to be begotten, the power can be understood originally, and so it is in the Father alone; or formally, and thus is posited to be in the Son; but in no other way.
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- Supple hic et paulo infra cum codd. X dd et potest.Supply here and a little below, with codices X dd, and is able.
- Vat. confuse et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 Cum loco Tunc, et deinde prosequitur: enim generare cum posse sit posse etc.The Vatican edition, confusedly and against the older codices and ed. 1, [reads] Cum in place of Tunc, and then continues: for since to-generate, having-power is to be powerful etc.
- Vat. falso pro in subiectis ponit eum generare Filium esset aliquid subiectum et contra omnes codd. cum ed. 1, qui in eo tantum dissident, quod multi ut ACKGHIKMST etc. post quam minus bene omittunt si. Cod. O si enim in hoc deficit, plus deficit, quam si deficit in subiectis.The Vatican edition falsely, for in subiectis, puts that he should generate the Son would be something subject, and against all the codices with ed. 1, which differ in this only, that many such as ACKGHIKMST etc. after quam less suitably omit si. Codex O [reads]: for if he is deficient in this, he is more deficient than if he is deficient in things subject.
- Praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 praemittit Vat. effectum seu, ut paulo ante ponit tenta pro retenta.Beyond the witness of the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, the Vatican edition prefixes effectum seu, as a little before it puts tenta in place of retenta.
- Libr. III. de Trin. c. 4: Sed qui absque dubio omnipotens est, per impossibilitatem excusari non potest.Book III On the Trinity, c. 4: But he who is without doubt omnipotent cannot be excused on the ground of impossibility.
- Aliqui codd. intelligit; codd. HO intelligas. Paulo infra ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 post arguit substituimus a pro ex.Some codices [read] intelligit; codices HO intelligas. A little below, on the basis of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, after arguit we have substituted a for ex.
- Ita mss. cum ed. 1, sed Vat. si Pater non esset aliquid, ergo esset nihil. Resp. Dicendum quod esse etc.So the manuscripts with ed. 1, but the Vatican edition [reads]: if the Father were not something, therefore he would be nothing. Resp. It must be said that to be etc.
- Plerique codd. ut AFGKTUVY etc. cum ed. 1 contrahitur.Most codices, such as AFGKTUVY etc., with ed. 1 [read] contrahitur.
- Infra d. 23.Below, distinction 23.
- De hoc et sequenti dubio vide hic q. 3. et 4. cum Scholiis.On this and the following doubt, see here q. 3 and 4 with the Scholia.
- Vat. praeter finem mss. et ed. 1 addit idem.The Vatican edition, beyond the witness of the manuscripts and ed. 1, adds idem.
- De varia acceptione huius nominis proprietas, quatenus scilicet convenit cum relatione et ab ea distinguitur, sicuti et de relationibus in Deo vide infra d. 26. per totam. — Codd. hoc loco inter se non conveniunt; aliqui enim ut X cc post ideo si omittunt in personis, e contra cod. T cum ed. 1 addit divinis; mox post esse multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 omittunt hypostasim, quod cod. cc, interpunctione mutata, ponit loco hypostasi.On the various acceptations of this name property, namely insofar as it agrees with relation and is distinguished from it, just as on the relations in God, see below distinction 26 throughout. — The codices do not agree with each other in this place; for some such as X cc after ideo si omit in personis, while on the contrary codex T with ed. 1 adds divinis; soon after esse many codices with edd. 1, 2, 3 omit hypostasim, which codex cc, with the punctuation changed, puts in place of hypostasi.
- Plures codd. ut AGHIKSTWXZ ... sic, et paulo infra fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. diversificationem ponunt pro diversitatem.Many codices, such as AGHIKSTWXZ ... sic, and a little below almost all codices with ed. 1, against the Vatican edition, put diversificationem in place of diversitatem.
- Cod. dd addit potest.Codex dd adds potest.
- Plura de hoc dubio, sicut et de duobus seqq. vide hic q. 2. et 3. ac apud Richardum, hic q. 3.More on this doubt, as also on the two following, see here q. 2 and 3, and in Richard, here q. 3.
- Vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 17. et ibid. IX. text. 2. (IV. c. 12. et VIII. c. 1.).See Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 17, and ibid. IX, text 2 (IV, c. 12, and VIII, c. 1).
- Vide supra q. 1. fundam. 2.See above q. 1, fundamentum 2.
- Aliqui codd. ut T cc modo positivo in Filio dicit naturam. Cod. bb post persona addit Filii.Some codices, such as T cc, [read] in a positive mode in the Son it signifies the nature. Codex bb after persona adds Filii.
- Codd. omittunt tamen.The codices omit tamen.