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Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 2

Textus Latinus
p. 53

Quaestio II. Utrum in Deo ponenda sit personarum pluralitas.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum sit ponere in Deo personarum pluralitatem. Et quod sic, ostenditur supponendo de Deo quatuor: primum est, quod in ipso sit summa beatitudo; secundum est, summa perfectio; tertium est, summa simplicitas; quartum est, summa primitas.

1. Ex prima suppositione arguitur sic: si1 est ibi summa beatitudo; sed ubicumque est summa beatitudo, est summa bonitas, summa caritas et summa iucunditas. Sed si est summa bonitas, cum bonitatis sit summe se communicare2, et hoc est maxime in producendo ex se aequalem et dando esse suum: ergo etc. Si summa caritas, cum caritas non sit amor privatus, sed ad alterum: ergo requirit pluralitatem. Item, si summa iucunditas, cum « nullius boni sine socio sit iucunda possessio3 », ergo ad summam iucunditatem requiritur societas et ita pluralitas.

2. Item, ex secunda suppositione sic: si est ibi summa perfectio; sed « perfectionis est producere talem, qualis ipse est in natura4 »: ergo necesse est, ibi esse multiplicationem; sed hoc non potest esse secundum aliam essentiam: ergo oportet, quod sit secundum aliam personam sive suppositum.

3. Item, ex tertia suppositione sic: si est ibi summa simplicitas; sed simplicitatis est, quod aliqua natura sit in pluribus, ut patet in universali, sed ex defectu simplicitatis est, quod numeretur in illis5: ergo si in Deo est simplicitas in nullo deficiens, erit in pluribus non numerata essentia: ergo etc.

4. Item, ex quarta suppositione sic: si est ibi summa primitas; sed quanto aliquid prius, tanto fecundius est et aliorum principium6: ergo sicut essentia divina, quia prima, est principium aliarum essentiarum, sic persona Patris, cum sit prima, quia a nullo, est principium et habet7 fecunditatem respectu personarum; sed fecunditas in Deo respectu Dei non potest esse nisi actui coniuncta: ergo necesse est, plures esse personas.

Sed contra:

1. Videtur, quod ex eisdem suppositionibus posset argui contrarium, et ita destruuntur rationes et conclusio8. Si enim ibi est summa beatitudo, cum beatum per essentiam sibi soli sufficiat ad beatitudinem: ergo non est necesse ponere aliam personam ad beatitudinem sive iucunditatem.

2. Item, contra secundam suppositionem sic obiicitur9: si est ibi summa perfectio: ergo aeque plene et perfecte est essentia in una persona et in pluribus. Si ergo ultra perfectionem additio est superflua, pluralitas est superflua; et si hoc, cum in divinis nihil sit superfluum, pluralitas non est10 in divinis.

3. Item, contra tertiam rationem sic: si est ibi summa simplicitas, cum pluralitas opponatur simplicitati, et « opposita non possunt esse circa idem11 »: ergo si Deus est unus et in eo est simplicitas, non ergo pluralitas, cum per omnia sit simplex.

4. Item, contra quartam suppositionem sic: si ibi est summa primitas; ergo cum status sit in primo principio, et status est in unitate: ergo primitas non ponit pluralitatem, sed unitatem: ergo videtur, quod una tantum sit persona.

p. 54

Conclusio.

Personarum pluralitatem in divinis esse ponendam, et fides docet et argumentis congruentiae suadetur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in divinis est ponere personarum pluralitatem, sicut fides dicit et rationes praedictae ostendunt, si quis sine contradictione consideret. Nam ratione simplicitatis essentia est communicabilis et potens esse12 in pluribus. Ratione primitatis persona nata est ex se aliam producere; et voco hic primitatem innascibilitatem, ratione cuius, ut dicit antiqua opinio, est fontalis plenitudo in Patre ad omnem emanationem; et hoc infra patebit13. Ratione perfectionis ad hoc est apta et prompta; ratione beatitudinis et caritatis voluntaria. Quibus conditionibus positis, necesse est ponere personarum pluralitatem.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod beatum per essentiam sibi soli sufficit, ergo non indiget etc; dicendum, quod verum est, quod non indiget; nec ponitur14 alius propter indigentiam neque tanquam beatificans, sed in beatitudine communicans.

2. Similiter ad illud quod obiicitur, quod deitas aeque plene est in uno et in pluribus15; dicendum, quod etsi sit aeque plene, non tamen ita plene declaratur. Et praeterea, eo ipso quo plene est in Patre, redundat in alias personas redundantia perfectionis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod pluralitas repugnat simplicitati; dicendum, quod est quaedam pluralitas per additionem; et haec repugnat; quaedam per originem; et haec non addit nec componit nec repugnat simplicitati, sed potius solitudini; et sic est in divinis, ut infra patebit16.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in primo est status; dicendum, quod sicut in essentiis una est essentia prima, a qua sunt aliae et ad quam, sic et17 in personis est una persona, a qua sunt aliae et ad quam; et in illa est status originis, quia illa a nullo, et haec est persona Patris. Unde Augustinus18 illi personae appropriat unitatem, dicens: « In Patre unitas » etc.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether a plurality of persons is to be posited in God.

Secondly it is asked whether a plurality of persons is to be posited in God. And that it is so, is shown by supposing four things concerning God: the first is, that in him there is the highest beatitude; the second, the highest perfection; the third, the highest simplicity; the fourth, the highest primacy.

1. From the first supposition it is argued thus: if1 there is the highest beatitude; but wherever there is the highest beatitude, there is the highest goodness, the highest charity, and the highest joy. But if there is the highest goodness, since it belongs to goodness to communicate itself in the highest degree2, and this is most of all in producing from itself an equal and giving its being: therefore etc. If the highest charity, since charity is not a private love but [is directed] to another: therefore it requires plurality. Likewise, if the highest joy, since "of no good is the possession joyful without a companion3," therefore for the highest joy a society and so a plurality is required.

2. Likewise, from the second supposition thus: if there is the highest perfection; but "it belongs to perfection to produce one such as it itself is in nature4": therefore it is necessary that there be multiplication there; but this cannot be according to another essence: therefore it must be according to another person or supposit.

3. Likewise, from the third supposition thus: if there is the highest simplicity; but it belongs to simplicity that some nature be in many, as is clear in the universal, but it is from a defect of simplicity that it is numbered in those5: therefore if in God there is simplicity deficient in nothing, there will be in many an essence not numbered: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, from the fourth supposition thus: if there is the highest primacy; but the prior something is, the more fecund it is and a principle of others6: therefore just as the divine essence, because it is first, is the principle of other essences, so the person of the Father, since he is first, because from no one, is a principle and has7 fecundity in respect of the [other] persons; but fecundity in God in respect of God cannot be except joined to act: therefore it is necessary that there be several persons.

On the contrary:

1. It seems that from the same suppositions the contrary could be argued, and so the reasons and the conclusion are destroyed8. For if there is the highest beatitude, since the blessed by essence is sufficient unto itself for beatitude: therefore it is not necessary to posit another person for beatitude or joy.

2. Likewise, against the second supposition it is objected9 thus: if there is the highest perfection: therefore the essence is equally fully and perfectly in one person and in many. If therefore beyond perfection any addition is superfluous, plurality is superfluous; and if this, since in divine matters nothing is superfluous, plurality is not10 in divine matters.

3. Likewise, against the third reason thus: if there is the highest simplicity, since plurality is opposed to simplicity, and "opposites cannot be about the same thing11": therefore if God is one and in him is simplicity, then not plurality, since he is in all respects simple.

4. Likewise, against the fourth supposition thus: if there is the highest primacy; therefore since rest is in the first principle, and rest is in unity: therefore primacy does not posit plurality but unity: therefore it seems that there is only one person.

Conclusion.

That a plurality of persons is to be posited in divine matters, both faith teaches and is persuaded by arguments of congruence.

I respond: It must be said that in divine matters a plurality of persons is to be posited, as faith says and the foregoing reasons show, if one considers without contradiction. For by reason of simplicity the essence is communicable and able to be12 in many. By reason of primacy the person is born to produce another from itself; and I here call primacy innascibility, by reason of which, as the ancient opinion says, there is in the Father a fontal fullness toward every emanation; and this will be made clear below13. By reason of perfection it is fit and prompt for this; by reason of beatitude and charity, voluntary. With these conditions posited, it is necessary to posit a plurality of persons.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected on the contrary, that the blessed by essence is sufficient unto itself, therefore does not need [another] etc; it must be said that it is true that it does not need; nor is another posited14 on account of need, nor as one beatifying, but as communicating in beatitude.

2. Similarly to that which is objected, that the deity is equally fully in one and in many15; it must be said that although it is equally fully, yet it is not so fully declared. And moreover, by the very fact that it is fully in the Father, it overflows into the other persons by an overflowing of perfection.

3. To that which is objected, that plurality is repugnant to simplicity; it must be said that there is a certain plurality by addition; and this is repugnant; another by origin; and this neither adds nor composes nor is repugnant to simplicity, but rather to solitude; and so it is in divine matters, as will be clear below16.

4. To that which is objected, that rest is in the first; it must be said that just as among essences there is one first essence, from which the others are and toward which, so also17 among the persons there is one person, from which the others are and toward which; and in him is the rest of origin, because he is from no one, and this is the person of the Father. Hence Augustine18 appropriates to that person unity, saying: "In the Father is unity," etc.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omittit Vat. hic et in aliis tribus arg. particulam si.
    Against the faithfulness of the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican [edition] omits here and in the other three arguments the particle si.
  2. Vat. bonitatis summae sit se communicare, sed minus apte et contra auctoritatem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3; melius sane foret, si lectio Vat. et mss. inveniretur coniuncta, ita ut legeretur: bonitatis summae sit summe se communicare. Hanc lectionem confirmant verba Richardi, hic a. 2. q. 1: ad summam bonitatem pertinet se summe communicare. — Haec ratio fundatur in ista propositione ex Dionys., de Cael. Hierarch. c. 4. et de Div. Nom. c. 4. sumta: Bonum est diffusivum sui.
    The Vatican [edition reads] it belongs to the highest goodness to communicate itself, but less aptly and against the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3; it would surely be better if the Vatican reading and the manuscripts' were found joined, so that one would read: it belongs to the highest goodness to communicate itself in the highest degree. This reading is confirmed by Richard's words, here a. 2 q. 1: "to the highest goodness it pertains to communicate itself in the highest degree." — This reasoning is founded on this proposition taken from Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 4 and On the Divine Names c. 4: The Good is diffusive of itself.
  3. Seneca, I. Epist. ad Lucilium, epist. 6.
    Seneca, Book I of the Letters to Lucilius, letter 6.
  4. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4.). — In principio huius et sequentis argumenti Vat. omittit particulam Item et post suppositione addit arguitur; sed obstant mss. et ed. 1.
    Aristotle, On the Soul book II, text 34 (c. 4). — At the beginning of this and the following argument the Vatican [edition] omits the particle Item and after suppositione adds arguitur; but the manuscripts and edition 1 stand against [this].
  5. Aristot., VIII. Metaph. text. 45. (VI. c. 13.): Hoc enim dicitur universale, quod pluribus inesse natum est. Et I. Poster. c. 20. (c. 24.): Quantocumque utique magis secundum partes (seu particularis) est, in infinita cadit; universale autem in simplex et in finem. — Mox Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 nihilo pro nullo et est pro erit.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics book VIII, text 45 (VI c. 13): For that is called universal which is born to be in many. And Posterior [Analytics] book I, c. 20 (c. 24): In however much something is rather according to parts (or particular), it falls into the infinite; the universal, however, [resolves] into the simple and into the end. — Soon after, the Vatican [edition], against the older codices and edition 1, [reads] nihilo for nullo and est for erit.
  6. Cfr. libr. de Causis, prop. 1. et 17. — Cod. K nobilius vel fecundius.
    Cf. the book On Causes, propositions 1 and 17. — Codex K [reads] nobilius vel fecundius ["more noble or more fecund"].
  7. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1, interpunctione mutata, ponit a nullo est principio, habet; quae lectio vim dictis detrahit.
    The Vatican [edition], against the manuscripts and edition 1, with the punctuation altered, puts a nullo est principio, habet; which reading detracts from the force of what is said.
  8. Maior pars codd. ut AFGHLOTVWXYZ etc. cum ed. 1 refragatur Vat. ponenti conclusiones iam positae, et quidem iure, cum tantum una omnium rationum positarum sit conclusio. Aliqui mss. ut CS (AT a prima manu) etc. convictio loco conclusio. Cod. R omittit et conclusio. Paulo post auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. beatum substituimus loco beatus; idem infra in solutione huius obiectionis recurrit.
    The greater part of the codices such as AFGHLOTVWXYZ etc., together with edition 1, opposes the Vatican [edition] which puts conclusiones iam positae ["the conclusions already posited"], and rightly so, since of all the reasons posited there is only one conclusio. Some manuscripts such as CS (AT by the first hand) etc. [have] convictio in place of conclusio. Codex R omits et conclusio. A little later, on the authority of the manuscripts and the first six editions, we have substituted beatum for beatus; the same recurs below in the solution to this objection.
  9. Cod. cc arguitur. Paulo post Vat., obnitentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, aeque plena et perfecta... ut in pluribus. Si autem ultra.
    Codex cc [reads] arguitur. A little later the Vatican [edition], with the older manuscripts and edition 1 resisting, [reads] aeque plena et perfecta... ut in pluribus. Si autem ultra.
  10. Ex mss. et sex primis edd. substituimus est pro erit.
    From the manuscripts and the first six editions we have substituted est for erit.
  11. Aristot., II. Elench. c. 5. (c. 25.) et XI. Metaph. c. 4. (X. c. 5.). — Paulo ante cod. X sibi constans habet suppositionem pro rationem.
    Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations book II, c. 5 (c. 25), and Metaphysics book XI, c. 4 (X c. 5). — A little before, codex X, consistent with itself, has suppositionem for rationem.
  12. Cod. K et potest esse. Cod. O ut potens esse.
    Codex K [reads] et potest esse. Codex O [reads] ut potens esse.
  13. Disc. 27. p. I. q. 2. ad 3. — Mox post caritatis additur in Vat. eadem essentia divina est, quod abest a mss. et ed. 1. Cod. R verbo beatitudinis praemittit bonitatis.
    Distinction 27, part I, q. 2, ad 3. — Soon after caritatis the Vatican [edition] adds eadem essentia divina est ["the same divine essence is"], which is absent from the manuscripts and edition 1. Codex R prefixes bonitatis to the word beatitudinis.
  14. Restituimus lectionem fere omnium antiquorum mss. et ed. 1 substituendo ponitur loco ponendus est et addendo neque, quod Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc indebite omittit.
    We have restored the reading of nearly all the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 by substituting ponitur for ponendus est and adding neque, which the Vatican [edition], together with the more recent codex cc, unduly omits.
  15. Vat. hic, sicut supra, contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 aeque plena et perfecta est in uno ut in pluribus, licet ipsa in sequentibus semper adhibeat adverbium plene.
    The Vatican [edition] here, as above, against the older codices and edition 1, [reads] aeque plena et perfecta est in uno ut in pluribus, although it itself in what follows always uses the adverb plene.
  16. Disc. 8. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 23. a. 2. q. 1. et 2. — Paulo ante cod. X solum loco potius.
    Distinction 8, part II, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 23, a. 2, q. 1 and 2. — A little before, codex X [reads] solum in place of potius.
  17. In Vat. et recentiore cod. cc deest et, quod tamen in antiquis mss. et ed. 1 habetur, et quidem bene. Paulo post cod. X nulla pro nullo.
    In the Vatican [edition] and the more recent codex cc et is missing, which however is found in the ancient manuscripts and edition 1, and rightly so. A little later codex X [reads] nulla for nullo.
  18. Libr. I. de Doctr. christ. c. 5. n. 5: In Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu S. unitatis aequalitatisque concordia.
    Book I, On Christian Doctrine, c. 5, n. 5: In the Father is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the concord of unity and equality.
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