Dist. 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 2
Quaestio III. Utrum numerus divinarum personarum sit infinitus.
Consequenter tertio loco quaeritur, utrum in divinis personis sit ponere infinitatem. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.
1. Quia creatura est1 finita, et quidquid est in ipsa, est actu finitum: ergo ab oppositis, quia divina essentia est infinita, quidquid est in ipsa, est infinite; ergo cum in Deo sit numerus personarum, erit infinitus; et ita erunt personae infinitae.
2. Item, cum duplex sit infinitas, virtualis et numeralis2, infinitas virtualis est in Deo: ergo pari ratione infinitas numeralis: ergo in Deo sunt infinitae personae.
3. Item, infinita virtus, cum emanat3 secundum suam totam infinitatem, non tantum producit infinitum intensive, sed etiam extensive; sed virtus Patris in productione personarum emanat secundum omnimodam sui potestatem: ergo non tantum producit personas infinitas in virtute, immo etiam4 infinitas in numero.
4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur sic: multiplicatio personarum aut est virtutis, aut non. Si non; ergo non debet in divinis poni; si est virtutis per se: ergo maior multiplicatio erit maioris virtutis, et summae virtutis infinita multiplicatio: ergo etc.
Contra hoc ostenditur quadruplici conditione, quae sumitur ab hoc quod semper Deo est attribuendum quod nobilius est, quod necesse est ponere finitatem personarum. Prima est distinctio, secunda ordo, tertia connexio, quarta summa completio5.
1. Ex prima conditione ostenditur sic: si est ibi distinctio, non ergo confusio; sed ubi est infinitas, ibi est confusio: ergo etc.
2. Item, ex secunda sic: ubi est ordo, ibi est terminatio, quia ubi deficit terminatio, deficit et6 mediatio et per consequens ordo; sed ubi est terminatio, non est infinitas: ergo si in personis divinis est ordo, non est infinitas.
3. Item, ex tertia sic: ubi est connexio, necesse est, quod omnes personae procedant ab una; nam si una ab alia et ita consequenter, tunc est infinita distantia inter primam et ultimam; sed7 hoc est inconveniens: ergo omnes ab una: aut ergo eisdem modis, aut diversis. Si eisdem: ergo nulla distinctio; si diversis, sed diversi modi emanandi sunt finiti: ergo etc.
4. Item, ex quarta sic: si est ibi summa completio, ergo nata est divinitas alia complere: ergo cum completio personarum sit in beatitudine, nata est beatificare8. Sed si essent personae infinitae, impossibile esset aliquem beatificari a Deo; cognitio enim cuiuslibet personae est de substantia beatitudinis, cum tota bonitas, quae est substantiale praemium, sit in qualibet personarum; ergo aut anima omnes cognosceret, aut non esset beata; sed impossibile esset9 omnes cognoscere, cum virtus eius sit finita: ergo etc.
Conclusio. Numerum divinarum personarum esse finitum, et fides tenet et ratio suadet.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in divinis personis quantum ad numerum non est ponere infinitatem, sed finitatem.
Ratio autem huius est, quia infinitas numeralis repugnat perfectioni et ordini, quia est per recessum ab unitate sive ab origine sua. Similiter et10 infinitas molis; et ideo neutrum est in Deo. Infinitas autem virtutis est per accessum ad unitatem et originem; et ideo, cum ista sit perfectionis, ponenda est in Deo, alia non.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1, 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod quidquid est in Deo, est infinite; dicendum, quod verum est infinite, sed non qualicumque11 infinitate, sed illa qua Deus est infinitus; et haec est infinitas immensitatis, et tali modo est Trinitas infinita, non infinitate numerali, quae non congruit Deo12.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod infinita virtus, infinite13 emanans, producit infinita; dicendum, quod divinae virtuti non convenit productio nisi perfecti; et ideo non convenit ei productio alicuius infinitatis nisi illius, quae stat cum summa perfectione. Haec autem non est infinitas numeralis, et ideo non est in Deo.
Ad 4. Ad ultimum quod obiicitur, quod potentiae est se multiplicare; dicendum, quod non omni modo14 est potentiae, sed perfecte multiplicare se potentiae est; et ideo non sequitur: ergo magis se multiplicare est maior perfectio, nisi intelligatur perfecte; sed infinite se multiplicare secundum numerum est imperfecte; et ideo non convenit Deo.
I. Communiter triplex distinguitur infinitas, scil. numeralis, quae est in quantitate discreta, molis, quae est in quantitate continua, et virtutis sive immensitatis; cfr. infra d. 19. p. I. a. I. q. I. et 2. — Pro faciliore intelligentia quatuor argumentorum in fundam. haec notamus. Istae quatuor proprietates divinitatis, saltem tres primae, ita inter se connexae sunt, ut secunda (ordo) supponat primam (distinctionem) et tertia (connexio) utramque. Primum arg. ex distinctione sumtum sic procedit: si Deo attribuendum quod nobilius est, et si ibi est distinctio, ipsa distinctio debet esse sine confusione, cum confusio sit imperfectionis; sed ubi infinita multitudo, ibi est confusio: ergo etc.; cfr. infra d. 43. a. I. q. 3. Secundum arg. procedit ex hoc axiomate, quod, ubi est ordo, ibi necessario est primum et ultimum (terminus) et medium. Tertium arg. est satis perspicuum. In quarto arg., quod sumitur ex summa completione, i. e. plenitudine perfectionis, S. Doctor supponit cum sententia communi, quod « cognitio cuiuslibet personae est de substantia beatitudinis ». De hoc tamen Scot. (I. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.) dubitat et opinatur, non esse, absolute loquendo, impossibile, quod in caelo aliquis fruatur essentia Dei, non vero personis. De qua sententia videri potest Macedo, Collationes doctrinae S. Thom. et Scoti, collat. 3. differ. 3.
II. Circa ipsam quaestionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 43. m. 6., ubi latius fund. 1. et 2. explicantur. — Scot., hic q. 5. et 7. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 30. a. 2. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. quaest. S. p. I. tr. 9. q. 41. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. 9. — Durand., I. Sent. d. 10. q. 2. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 10. q. 1.
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Question III. Whether the number of divine persons is infinite.
In the third place, consequently, it is asked whether infinity is to be posited in the divine persons. And that it is so, is shown in this way.
1. Because the creature is1 finite, and whatever is in it is actually finite: therefore from the opposites, since the divine essence is infinite, whatever is in it is infinite; therefore since in God there is a number of persons, it will be infinite; and so the persons will be infinite.
2. Likewise, since infinity is twofold, virtual and numerical2, virtual infinity is in God: therefore by parity of reasoning numerical infinity also: therefore in God there are infinite persons.
3. Likewise, an infinite power, when it emanates3 according to its whole infinity, produces an infinite not only intensively but also extensively; but the power of the Father in the production of persons emanates according to its all-encompassing potency: therefore it produces persons not only infinite in power, but rather even4 infinite in number.
4. Likewise, this very point is shown thus: the multiplication of persons either belongs to power, or it does not. If not, then it ought not to be posited in the divine; if it belongs to power per se: therefore a greater multiplication will belong to a greater power, and an infinite multiplication to the highest power: therefore etc.
On the contrary, this is shown by a fourfold condition, which is taken from this, that there must always be attributed to God what is more noble, namely that it is necessary to posit a finitude of persons. The first is distinction, the second order, the third connection, the fourth supreme completion5.
1. From the first condition it is shown thus: if there is distinction there, then there is no confusion; but where there is infinity, there is confusion: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, from the second thus: where there is order, there is termination, since where termination is lacking, mediation also6 is lacking, and consequently order; but where there is termination, there is no infinity: therefore if in the divine persons there is order, there is no infinity.
3. Likewise, from the third thus: where there is connection, it is necessary that all persons proceed from one; for if one proceeds from another and so on consequently, then there is an infinite distance between the first and the last; but7 this is inconvenient: therefore all proceed from one: either, then, by the same modes, or by diverse. If by the same: therefore no distinction; if by diverse, but the diverse modes of emanating are finite: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, from the fourth thus: if there is supreme completion there, then divinity is fitted to complete other things: therefore since the completion of persons consists in beatitude, it is fitted to beatify8. But if there were infinite persons, it would be impossible for anyone to be beatified by God; for the cognition of every person belongs to the substance of beatitude, since the whole goodness, which is the substantial reward, is in each of the persons; therefore either the soul would know all of them, or it would not be blessed; but it would be impossible9 to know all of them, since its power is finite: therefore etc.
Conclusion. That the number of divine persons is finite, both faith holds and reason persuades.
I respond: It must be said that in the divine persons, with respect to number, infinity is not to be posited but finitude.
The reason for this is that numerical infinity is repugnant to perfection and to order, because it is by recession from unity or from its origin. Likewise also10 infinity of mass; and therefore neither is in God. But the infinity of power is by access to unity and origin; and therefore, since this belongs to perfection, it is to be posited in God, but the others are not.
To the arguments:
To 1 and 2. To that which is objected, that whatever is in God is infinitely; it must be said that it is true that it is infinite, but not by any kind11 of infinity, but by that by which God is infinite; and this is the infinity of immensity, and in this way the Trinity is infinite, not by numerical infinity, which does not befit God12.
To 3. To that which is objected, that infinite power, infinitely13 emanating, produces infinite things; it must be said that to the divine power no production befits except of a perfect thing; and therefore there does not befit it the production of any infinity except that which stands together with supreme perfection. But this is not numerical infinity, and therefore it is not in God.
To 4. To the last objection, that it belongs to power to multiply itself; it must be said that not in every way14 does it belong to power, but to multiply oneself perfectly belongs to power; and therefore it does not follow: therefore to multiply oneself more is a greater perfection, unless it be understood perfectly; but to multiply oneself infinitely according to number is imperfectly; and therefore it does not befit God.
I. Commonly infinity is distinguished into three kinds, namely numerical, which is in discrete quantity; of mass, which is in continuous quantity; and of power or immensity; cf. below d. 19, p. I, a. I, q. 1 and 2. — For an easier understanding of the four arguments in the fundamenta we note these things. These four properties of divinity, at least the first three, are so connected with one another that the second (order) presupposes the first (distinction) and the third (connection) presupposes both. The first argument, taken from distinction, proceeds thus: if to God is to be attributed what is more noble, and if there is distinction there, the distinction itself ought to be without confusion, since confusion belongs to imperfection; but where there is infinite multitude, there is confusion: therefore etc.; cf. below d. 43, a. I, q. 3. The second argument proceeds from this axiom, that where there is order, there is necessarily a first and a last (term) and a middle. The third argument is sufficiently clear. In the fourth argument, which is taken from supreme completion, i.e. the plenitude of perfection, the Holy Doctor supposes, with the common opinion, that "the cognition of any person belongs to the substance of beatitude." Concerning this, however, Scotus (I. Sent. d. 1. q. 1.) doubts and is of the opinion that it is not, absolutely speaking, impossible that someone in heaven should enjoy the essence of God but not the persons. On this opinion one may consult Macedo, Collationes doctrinae S. Thom. et Scoti, collat. 3, differ. 3.
II. Concerning the question itself: Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 43, m. 6, where fundamenta 1 and 2 are more fully explained. — Scotus, here q. 5 and 7. — St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 30, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following question, Summa p. I, tr. 9, q. 41, m. 3. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 53, q. 9. — Durandus, I. Sent. d. 10, q. 2. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 10, q. 1.
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- Ita codd. et ed. I, dum Vat. creatura cum sit finita. Paulo post cod. cc infinitum pro infinite. Mox codd. A W loco infinitus habent infinite; aliqui autem codd. ut M T V X cum ed. I minus apte erunt infinitae pro erit infinitus; sed nihil mutandum duximus.Thus the codices and ed. I, while the Vatican has creatura cum sit finita ["since the creature is finite"]. A little later cod. cc has infinitum for infinite. Soon afterward codices A W have infinite in place of infinitus; some codices, however, such as M T V X with ed. I, less aptly have erunt infinitae in place of erit infinitus; but we have judged that nothing should be changed.
- Cfr. August., de Quant. animae c. 3. et seqq. — Cod. R hic non male addit si.Cf. Augustine, On the Quantity of the Soul, c. 3 and following. — Cod. R here not unsuitably adds si.
- Sensu et mss. cum ed. I ita exigentibus, mutavimus emanet, quod habet Vat.Since the sense and the manuscripts together with ed. I demanded it, we have changed emanet ["should emanate"], which the Vatican has [to emanat].
- Faventibus antiquioribus codd. et ed. I, supplevimus etiam.With the older codices and ed. I in favor, we have supplied etiam ["even"].
- Id est, plenitudo perfectionis.That is, the plenitude of perfection.
- Auctoritate vetustiorum mss. et ed. I hic adiecimus et ac paulo infra personis a Vat. et cod. cc minus recte omissa.On the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. I we have added here et ["also"] and a little below personis, which were less correctly omitted by the Vatican and cod. cc.
- Vat. contra mss. et ed. I. hic et circa finem argumenti post si diversis ponit et loco sed.The Vatican, against the manuscripts and ed. I, here and near the end of the argument, after si diversis ["if by diverse"] places et in place of sed ["but"].
- Sensus videtur esse: Deus omnia complet sive perfecta facit; sed personas, i. e. intellectuales naturas sive supposita, beatificando complet: ergo proprium Dei est beatificare. — Vat. illas complere pro beatificare et paulo ante personas complere et loco alia complere; ergo, quae lectio omnibus codd. et ed. I contraria est et progressum argumentationis aufert. Paulo post cod. A cum ed. I loco aliquem habet aliquam, supple personam.The sense seems to be: God completes all things, that is, makes them perfect; but persons, i.e. intellectual natures or supposits, he completes by beatifying: therefore it is proper to God to beatify. — The Vatican has illas complere ["to complete those"] for beatificare ["to beatify"], and a little before personas complere ["to complete the persons"] in place of alia complere ["to complete other things"]; therefore this reading is contrary to all the codices and ed. I and removes the progress of the argumentation. A little later cod. A with ed. I in place of aliquem has aliquam, supplying personam.
- Plures codd. ut T Y est et forte melius.Several codices such as T Y have est ["is"], and perhaps better.
- Desideratur hic in Vat. et, quod mss. et ed. I exhibent. Paulo post ex codd. et ed. I adiecimus verba et originem ac alia non, quae Vat. prave omittit. Item codd. et ed. I neutrum loco neutra, quod habet Vat.Here in the Vatican is wanting et ["also"], which the manuscripts and ed. I exhibit. A little later, from the codices and ed. I, we have added the words et originem ["and origin"] and alia non ["the others not"], which the Vatican depravedly omits. Likewise the codices and ed. I read neutrum in place of neutra, which the Vatican has.
- Codd. A T aliique cum ed. I pro qualibet, quod exstat in Vat., exhibent distinctius qualicumque.Codices A T and others with ed. I, against pro qualibet ["for whatsoever"], which stands in the Vatican, exhibit more distinctly qualicumque ["whatsoever-kind"].
- Fide omnium mss. et ed. I expunximus propositionem sequentem: Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum, scilicet quare infinitas numeralis non est ponenda in Deo, sicut virtualis, quae hic a Vat. ad ordinem solutionum servandum additur. Sed semel pro semper notandum, quod saepe saepius specialis responsio ad obiectionem a S. Doctore omittitur, quando ipsa iam in praecedentibus, sicuti v. g. hic in corp. articuli, clare continetur.On the authority of all the manuscripts and ed. I we have expunged the following proposition: And by this is clear the response to the second, namely why numerical infinity is not to be posited in God, as virtual is, which is here added by the Vatican to preserve the order of solutions. But once for all it is to be noted that very often a special response to an objection is omitted by the Holy Doctor when it is already clearly contained in the preceding, as for example here in the body of the article.
- Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. I, in infinitate pro infinite.The Vatican, against the manuscripts and ed. I, has in infinitate ["in infinity"] for infinite ["infinitely"].
- Codd. cum edd. I, 2, 3 omittunt hic in Vat. additum multiplicare se, quod facile suppletur. Paulo infra Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc, contrariantibus aliis mss. et ed. I, interpunctione mutata ac posito convenit Deo loco ideo, habet et convenit Deo: non sequitur ergo, magis. Dein circa finem responsionis ex mss. et ed. I ante ideo adiecimus particulam et.The codices with editions 1, 2, 3 omit here what is added in the Vatican, multiplicare se ["to multiply itself"], which is easily supplied. A little below, the Vatican with the more recent cod. cc, against the other manuscripts and ed. I, with the punctuation changed and convenit Deo placed in place of ideo, has et convenit Deo: non sequitur ergo, magis. Then near the end of the response, from the manuscripts and ed. I, we have added before ideo the particle et.