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Dist. 21, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 21

Textus Latinus
p. 499

Quaestio II. Utrum tentatio carnis a tentatione diaboli possit separari.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum contingat, tentationem carnis a tentatione diaboli separari. Et quod sic, videtur.

Fundamenta.

1. Quaecumque dividuntur ex opposito, unum potest esse sine altero sive separari potest ab altero1; sed tentatio carnis dividitur contra tentationem hostis: ergo etc.

2. Item, diabolus tentavit hominem primum et tentavit Christum2: sed nec caro Christi, nec caro hominis primi ad malum impellebat: ergo neuter a carne tentabatur: igitur cum tentarentur a diabolo, tentatio, quae est a diabolo, separatur a tentatione, quae est a carne.

3. Item, esto, quod diabolus nunquam nobis mala suggereret, nihilominus sensus nostri ad malum ab adolescentia proni essent3: ergo omni tentatione diaboli circumscripta, adhuc homo tentaretur a carne propria.

4. Item, aliud est inquinamentum carnis, et aliud inquinamentum spiritus4; sed diabolus impellit ad peccata spiritualia, caro vero ad peccata carnalia: ergo cum peccatum spirituale possit esse sine carnali, et e converso, videtur, quod tentatio carnis sequestrari habeat a tentatione diaboli.

5. Item, quaecumque duo sic se habent, quod in uno contingit mereri et in alio demereri, illa contingit ab invicem separari; sed tentatio hostis est materia exercendae virtutis, tentatio vero carnis

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semper est a culpa vel cum culpa, sicut dicit Magister5: ergo una istarum sequestrari habet ab altera.

6. Item, tentatio carnis et hostis differunt, sicut dicit Magister in littera6, sicut tentatio exterior et interior; sed quod est exterius sequestrari habet ab eo quod est interius: ergo et tentatio carnis ab ea quae est a diabolo. Quodsi tu dicas, quod tentatio, quae est ab hoste, est ita interior, sicut tentatio, quae est a carne; per hoc non effugitur, quia, cum Deus fidelis non permittat hominem tentari supra id quod possit7, et alter istorum modorum ad exercitandum sufficiat, nec homo simul possit esse intentus circa diversa; videtur, quod alio et alio tempore fiat circa nos tentatio carnis et tentatio diabolica.

Sed contra:

Ad oppositum 1. de tentatione carnis.

1. Quod tentatio carnis non habeat esse sine tentatione hostis, videtur. Super illud Psalmi: Diverte a malo et fac bonum, Glossa Hieronymi8: « Mala omnia ab instinctu diaboli procedunt, sicut bona ab instinctu Dei »: ergo nullum peccatum fit, in quo diabolus non interponat partes suas; si ergo tentatio carnis via est ad peccatum, videtur, quod non possit esse sine tentatione diaboli.

2. Item, motus instrumenti non est sine motu principalis motoris; sed caro est sicut instrumentum in tentando respectu diaboli, sicut dicitur super illud Iob nono9: Terra data est in manus impii, id est, caro in manus diaboli: ergo titillatio carnis non est absque impulsione diaboli: si igitur haec est tentatio, patet etc.

3. Item, etsi non sit ponere primum malum, quod non sit ab alio, est tamen ponere malum, quod est initium omnis mali, sicut dicitur Ecclesiastici decimo10: Initium omnis peccati superbia. Si igitur diabolus rex est super omnes filios superbiae et pater omnis mendacii, videtur, quod nullum sit peccatum, quod aliquo modo non procedat ab ipso, et ita ad nullum malum impellit caro absque diabolo: ergo tentatio carnis non separatur a tentatione hostis.

Item de tentatione hostis.

4. Item, quod tentatio hostis non separetur a tentatione carnis, similiter ostenditur. Ad Galatas quinto11: Manifesta sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio, adulterium, contentiones, aemulationes, irae, rixae, invidiae, etc.; ibi enumerantur peccata carnalia et spiritualia: ergo videtur, quod omnia peccata procedant a carne: igitur ad nullum malum inclinat tentatio hostis absque tentatione carnis.

5. Item, generatio transfertur a corporalibus ad spiritualia; sed in corporalibus impossibile est, generari aliquid a patre absque matre: ergo nec in spiritualibus. Sed pater omnis peccati dicitur esse diabolus, mater vero caro sive concupiscentia: ergo etc. Prima per se patet; secunda manifestatur per illud quod dicitur Ezechielis decimo sexto12: Pater tuus Amorrhaeus, et mater tua Cethea. Per Amorrhaeum enim intelligitur diabolus, per Cetheam vero concupiscentia. Et expressius dicit Gregorius super Leviticum, decimo nono: « Concupiscentia est mater omnis peccati, et diabolus pater »: ergo etc.

6. Item, diabolus non potest tentare bonum Angelum nec malum nec spiritum separatum, sed solum spiritum carni coniunctum: ergo videtur, quod aditum non habeat ad mentem nisi per carnem: ergo absque carne non tentat: ergo non contingit, tentationem diaboli a tentatione carnis separari.

Conclusio. Si consideratur tentatio, ut est a movente primo, tentatio carnis nunquam potest esse absque tentatione hostis, tentatio vero hostis interdum est absque tentatione carnis. Si autem tentatio consideratur ut a movente proximo, utraque ab altera et formaliter et temporaliter separari potest.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum dicimus, tentationem esse a carne vel ab hoste, hoc Dupliciter intelligitur. dupliciter potest intelligi: aut sicut a movente primo, aut sicut a movente proximo et immediato. Si sicut a movente primo, sic tentatio carnis nunquam potest Conclusio 1. esse absque tentatione hostis, quia omnis tentatio carnis est ex eius corruptione, quae ortum habuit a prima hostis tentatione. Tentatio tamen hostis potest Conclusio 2. esse absque tentatione carnis, tunc potissime, quando is tentatur, in quo non est carnis corruptio, sicut fuit in Adam et in Christo, vel quando ex illa

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tentatione nulla oritur incurvatio13. Quando vero tentatio hostis ad peccatum pertrahit, cum nullum peccatum sit in nobis, quod non habeat ortum ex concupiscentia aliqua; sic tentatio diaboli a tentatione Conclusio 3. carnis non potest separari. — Sic igitur iudicandum est, secundum quod tentatio dicitur esse a carne, vel ab hoste tanquam a movente primo.

Si autem sic dicatur esse, sicut a movente proximo et proprio, sicut accipit Magister in littera14, Conclusio 4. sic sequestrantur et distantia formali et distantia temporali. Distantia formali, quia alio modo tentat caro, et alio modo diabolus; et ad aliud vitium impellit haec, et ad aliud ille, et primum movens est aliud et aliud. Sequestrantur etiam distantia temporali, quia aliquo tempore vexat diabolus et instigat ad aliquod vitium, ad quod non inclinat caro; et aliquando potest esse e converso. — Et sic isto ultimo modo accipiendo proprie tentationem carnis et tentationem hostis, ut accipit Magister in littera, conce-Conclusio generalis. dendum est, eas ab invicem separari, ut non solum inter unam et alteram sit differentia, sed etiam una possit esse sine altera. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae hoc probant.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod omne malum est ab instinctu diaboli; intelligendum est, sicut a movente primo, non sicut a motore15 proximo. Nam absente diabolo, peccatum potest esse a libero arbitrio vel voluntate propria, vel a trahente carnis concupiscentia.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caro movet sicut instrumentum; dicendum, quod hoc verum est, quando diabolus vexat carnem, et vexando carnem vexat spiritum; et tunc tentatio carnis et diaboli non ponunt in numerum. Contingit tamen, carnem mediante sensualitate sibi coniuncta spiritum nostrum ad malum inclinare, etiam diabolo non movente; et tunc non movet sicut instrumentum, sed sicut movens primum; et hoc modo habet sequestrari a tentatione diaboli.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccatum diaboli est initium omnis mali; dicendum, quod hoc non est intelligendum, quod sit principium immediatum respectu cuiuslibet peccati, sed quia ante peccatum eius non fuit aliud, et ipsum fuit initium illius peccati originalis, ex quo est inclinatio16 ad omne malum.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnia peccata sunt a carne; dicendum, quod caro ibi sumitur large pro omni concupiscentia, quae inhaesit animae ex coniunctione sui ad carnem; et sic nomine carnis intelligitur concupiscentia, quae est mater omnium malorum, et sine hac diabolus non generat in nobis aliquod peccatum17.

5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequens obiectum de generatione spirituali. Accipitur enim ibi caro et concupiscentia large, sicut ostensum est. Ex illo tamen non sequitur, quod tentatio diaboli non possit esse absque tentatione carnis; non enim omnis tentatio diaboli est peccati generatio, frequenter enim tentat, ita quod nulla sequitur culpa.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non tentat nisi hominem carnalem; dicendum, quod hoc non est, quia tentatio diaboli pendeat a tentatione carnis, sed quia non potest aliquem tentare, nisi quando habet vertibilitatem liberi arbitrii et est in statu merendi vel demerendi, et in quo potest seduci. Et hoc solum est, quando spiritus rationalis est coniunctus carni mortali. Ex illa tamen ratione non concluditur, quod caro in tentatione diaboli sit causa praecipua, sed solum causa sine qua non18.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the temptation of the flesh can be separated from the temptation of the devil.

Secondly it is asked whether it occurs that the temptation of the flesh be separated from the temptation of the devil. And that it does, seems clear.

Foundations.

1. Whatever things are divided in opposition, the one can be without the other, or be separated from the other1; but the temptation of the flesh is divided over against the temptation of the enemy: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the devil tempted the first man and tempted Christ2; but neither the flesh of Christ nor the flesh of the first man was impelling unto evil: therefore neither was being tempted by the flesh: therefore, since they were being tempted by the devil, the temptation which is from the devil is separated from the temptation which is from the flesh.

3. Likewise, granted that the devil should never suggest evils to us, nevertheless our senses would be prone to evil from adolescence3: therefore, with every temptation of the devil set aside, man would still be tempted by his own flesh.

4. Likewise, the defilement of the flesh is one thing, and the defilement of the spirit is another4; but the devil impels unto spiritual sins, while the flesh impels unto carnal sins: therefore, since a spiritual sin can exist without a carnal one, and conversely, it seems that the temptation of the flesh ought to be sequestered from the temptation of the devil.

5. Likewise, whichever two things stand thus, that in one it occurs to merit and in the other to demerit, those it occurs to be separated from one another; but the temptation of the enemy is the matter of exercising virtue, while the temptation of the flesh

is always from fault or with fault, as the Master says5: therefore the one of these ought to be sequestered from the other.

6. Likewise, the temptation of the flesh and of the enemy differ, as the Master says in the text6, as exterior and interior temptation; but what is exterior ought to be sequestered from what is interior: therefore also the temptation of the flesh from that which is from the devil. But should you say that the temptation which is from the enemy is just as interior as the temptation which is from the flesh; by this it is not evaded, because, since God is faithful and does not permit a man to be tempted beyond what he can bear7, and either of these modes suffices for the exercise [of virtue], nor can a man at the same time be intent upon diverse things; it seems that the temptation of the flesh and the diabolical temptation occur about us at one and another time.

On the contrary:

To the opposite, 1. concerning the temptation of the flesh.

1. That the temptation of the flesh cannot exist without the temptation of the enemy seems clear. Upon that of the Psalm: Turn away from evil and do good, the Gloss of Jerome8: « All evils proceed from the instigation of the devil, just as goods from the instigation of God »: therefore no sin occurs in which the devil does not interpose his parts; if therefore the temptation of the flesh is a way unto sin, it seems that it cannot exist without the temptation of the devil.

2. Likewise, the motion of an instrument is not without the motion of the principal mover; but the flesh is as an instrument in tempting with respect to the devil, as is said upon that of Job 99: The earth is given into the hands of the wicked one, that is, the flesh into the hands of the devil: therefore the titillation of the flesh is not without the impulsion of the devil: if therefore this is temptation, the rest is clear etc.

3. Likewise, even if there be no first evil which is not from another, there is nevertheless an evil which is the beginning of every evil, as is said in Ecclesiasticus 1010: The beginning of every sin is pride. If therefore the devil is king over all the sons of pride and father of every lie, it seems that there is no sin which does not in some way proceed from him, and so the flesh does not impel unto any evil without the devil: therefore the temptation of the flesh is not separated from the temptation of the enemy.

Likewise concerning the temptation of the enemy.

4. Likewise, that the temptation of the enemy is not separated from the temptation of the flesh is similarly shown. To the Galatians 511: The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, adultery, contentions, emulations, wraths, strifes, envies, etc.; there are enumerated carnal and spiritual sins: therefore it seems that all sins proceed from the flesh: therefore the temptation of the enemy inclines unto no evil without the temptation of the flesh.

5. Likewise, generation is transferred from corporal to spiritual things; but in corporal things it is impossible that anything be generated from a father without a mother: therefore neither in spiritual things. But the father of every sin is said to be the devil, and the mother the flesh or concupiscence: therefore etc. The first is plain in itself; the second is manifested by that which is said in Ezekiel 1612: Thy father was an Amorite, and thy mother a Cethite. For by Amorite the devil is understood, and by Cethite concupiscence. And more expressly Gregory says on Leviticus, [book] 19: « Concupiscence is the mother of every sin, and the devil the father »: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the devil cannot tempt a good Angel, nor an evil one, nor a separated spirit, but only a spirit joined to flesh: therefore it seems that he has no access to the mind except through the flesh: therefore without the flesh he does not tempt: therefore it does not occur that the temptation of the devil be separated from the temptation of the flesh.

Conclusion. If temptation is considered as it is from the first mover, the temptation of the flesh can never exist without the temptation of the enemy, while the temptation of the enemy is at times without the temptation of the flesh. But if temptation is considered as from the proximate mover, each can be separated from the other both formally and temporally.

I respond: It must be said that when we say that temptation is from the flesh or from the enemy, this It is understood in two ways. can be understood in two ways: either as from the first mover, or as from the proximate and immediate mover. If as from the first mover, thus the temptation of the flesh can never Conclusion 1. exist without the temptation of the enemy, because every temptation of the flesh is from its own corruption, which had its origin from the first temptation of the enemy. The temptation of the enemy, however, can Conclusion 2. exist without the temptation of the flesh, then most of all, when he is tempted in whom there is no corruption of the flesh, as it was in Adam and in Christ, or when from that

temptation no curvature arises13. But when the temptation of the enemy draws unto sin, since no sin is in us which does not have its origin from some concupiscence; thus the temptation of the devil cannot be separated from the temptation Conclusion 3. of the flesh. — Thus therefore it must be judged, according as the temptation is said to be from the flesh or from the enemy as from a first mover.

But if it is said to be such, as from the proximate and proper mover, as the Master takes it in the text14, Conclusion 4. then they are sequestered both by formal distance and by temporal distance. By formal distance, because the flesh tempts in one way, and the devil in another; and the one impels unto one vice, the other unto another, and the first mover is one and another. They are sequestered also by temporal distance, because at one time the devil vexes and instigates unto some vice unto which the flesh does not incline; and at another it can be the converse. — And thus, taking properly in this last mode the temptation of the flesh and the temptation of the enemy, as the Master takes it in the text, it must be General conclusion. conceded that they are separated from one another, so that not only is there a difference between the one and the other, but also the one can exist without the other. — Whence the reasons which prove this are to be conceded.

Solution of the opposing arguments.

1. To that which is first objected on the contrary, that every evil is from the instigation of the devil; it is to be understood as from a first mover, not as from a proximate15 mover. For with the devil absent, sin can be from free will or from one's own will, or from the drawing concupiscence of the flesh.

2. To that which is objected, that the flesh moves as an instrument; it must be said that this is true when the devil vexes the flesh, and by vexing the flesh vexes the spirit; and then the temptation of the flesh and of the devil do not count for two. It happens, however, that the flesh, by means of the sensuality joined to it, inclines our spirit unto evil even when the devil is not moving; and then it does not move as an instrument, but as a first mover; and in this manner it has to be sequestered from the temptation of the devil.

3. To that which is objected, that the sin of the devil is the beginning of every evil; it must be said that this is not to be understood as that it be the immediate principle with respect to every sin, but because before his sin there was no other, and that very [sin] was the beginning of that original sin, from which there is an inclination16 unto every evil.

4. To that which is objected, that all sins are from the flesh; it must be said that flesh is there taken broadly for every concupiscence which has adhered to the soul from its conjunction unto the flesh; and so by the name of flesh is understood concupiscence, which is the mother of all evils, and without this the devil does not generate in us any sin17.

5. And by this is clear the response to the following objection concerning spiritual generation. For flesh and concupiscence are there taken broadly, as has been shown. From that, however, it does not follow that the temptation of the devil cannot exist without the temptation of the flesh; for not every temptation of the devil is the generation of sin, for he frequently tempts in such a way that no fault follows.

6. To that which is objected, that he tempts no one save the carnal man; it must be said that this is not because the temptation of the devil depends upon the temptation of the flesh, but because he cannot tempt anyone except when [the man] has the convertibility of free will and is in the state of meriting or demeriting, and in which he can be seduced. And this is only when the rational spirit is joined to mortal flesh. From that account, however, it is not concluded that the flesh in the temptation of the devil is a principal cause, but only a sine qua non cause18.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Colligitur ex definitione oppositorum, de quibus Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. 10.) ait: Quaecumque susceptivo amborum non contingit simul adesse, haec opponi dicuntur, aut ipsa aut ex quibus sunt. Fuscum namque et album simul eidem non insunt etc.
    It is gathered from the definition of opposites, concerning which Aristotle, V Metaphysics text 16 (IV c. 10) says: Whatever things it does not occur to be simultaneously present to a thing receptive of both, these are said to be opposed, either themselves or those of which they consist. For dark and white are not simultaneously present in the same thing etc.
  2. Gen. 3, 1. seqq.; Matth. 4, 1. seqq.
    Gen. 3:1 ff.; Matt. 4:1 ff.
  3. Gen. 8, 21: Sensus enim et cogitatio humani cordis in malum prona sunt ab adolescentia sua. — Vat. sunt pro essent.
    Gen. 8:21: For the sense and thought of man's heart are prone unto evil from its adolescence. — The Vatican edition has sunt in place of essent.
  4. Epist. II. Cor. 7, 1: Mundemus nos ab omni inquinamento carnis et spiritus.
    2 Corinthians 7:1: Let us cleanse ourselves from every defilement of flesh and of spirit.
  5. Hic c. 6. — In maiori aliqui codd. bis omittunt in.
    Here c. 6 [of the Master's Sentences]. — In the major [premise] some codices twice omit in.
  6. Hic c. 6. — In pluribus codd., inter quos F T V Y aa ee, verba sic sunt transposita: sicut tentatio interior et exterior, et immediate post in cod. F sic: sed quod est interius separatur ab eo quod est exterius.
    Here c. 6. — In several codices, among them F T V Y aa ee, the words are transposed thus: as interior and exterior temptation, and immediately after, in cod. F thus: but what is interior is separated from what is exterior.
  7. Epist. I. Cor. 10, 13: Fidelis autem Deus est, qui non patietur vos tentari supra id quod potestis. — In fine arg. pro diabolica plures codd. et ed. 1 diaboli.
    1 Corinthians 10:13: But God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able. — At the end of the argument, in place of diabolica several codices and ed. 1 have diaboli.
  8. Psalm. 33, 15. — Hieronym. ad hunc locum adnotat: Mala omnia a diaboli instinctu procedunt, sicut bona a Dei.
    Ps. 33:15. — Jerome notes at this place: All evils proceed from the instigation of the devil, just as goods from [the instigation] of God.
  9. Vers. 24. — De Glossa in haec verba Iob, Gregorii, vide supra pag. 232, nota 1. — Pro in manus quae impii est et in manus diaboli plurimi codd. in manu impii et in manu diaboli. Conclusio: ergo titillatio etc. illustratur verbis Magistri hic in lit. c. 6: Nam et diabolus invisibiliter mala suggerit, et ex carnis corruptione suboritur motus illicitus et titillatio prava. — Quoad maiorem cfr. Aristot., I. Polit. c. 3. (c. 2.).
    Verse 24. — On the Gloss on these words of Job, of Gregory, see above p. 232 note 1. — In place of in manus quae impii est and in manus diaboli very many codices have in manu impii and in manu diaboli. The conclusion: therefore the titillation etc. is illustrated by the words of the Master here in the text, c. 6: For the devil also invisibly suggests evils, and from the corruption of the flesh an illicit motion and a depraved titillation arises. — As to the major [premise] compare Aristotle, I Politics c. 3 (c. 2).
  10. Vers. 15. — Seq. textus est Iob 41, 25, ubi Vulgata universos pro omnes. — Textus exinde cit. est Ioan. 8, 44: Quia mendax est et pater eius. — De hoc arg. cfr. etiam August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 3. — De prima parte maioris cfr. supra d. 1. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.
    Verse 15. — The following text is Job 41:25, where the Vulgate has universos in place of omnes. — The text cited thereafter is John 8:44: Because he is a liar and the father thereof. — On this argument compare also Augustine, XIV On the City of God c. 3. — On the first part of the major [premise] compare above d. 1, p. I, a. 2, q. 1.
  11. Vers. 19. seqq. Vulgata textum ampliorem exhibet.
    Verse 19 ff. The Vulgate exhibits a fuller text.
  12. Vers. 45. — De expositione huius textus cfr. Origenes, in Ezech. hom. 6. n. 3, et August., in Ioan. tract. 42. n. 10. seqq. Ad verba Ezechielis: Pater tuus Amorrhaeus, Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 101. m. 2. ad 3. adnotat: « Unde dicitur ibidem super illud [Iacob. 1, 2.]: Concupiscentia, cum conceperit, parit peccatum, interlinearis [Glossa]: Cum diabolus incentiva immittit, vel cum caro suavia sibi quaerit ». Glossam seq. super Levit., quam plures codd. et edd., necnon B. Albert. hic a. 5) Gregorio attribuunt, Gul. Mara simpliciter sine auctoris nomine affert, pro numero decimo nono substituto numero vigesimo et omissis ultimis verbis et diabolus pater. Glossa, sic abbreviata, ex Hesychii, Hierosolymitani presbyteri († a. 433 vel, sicut alii volunt, a. 472 vel 473 Commentario in Levit̄icum (20, 14.) sumta est, ubi sic legitur: Quia omnis peccati mater concupiscentia est, oportet et hoc praecaveri, ut si qua nobis peccati concupiscentia sit, usque ad hanc stemus et non ei coniungamus actionem. Cfr. etiam Glossa in Deut. 25, ubi idem dicitur. — Pro vocula enim post Per Amorrhaeum multi codd. cum edd. 1, 2 vero; in cod. aa neque enim neque vero.
    Verse 45. — On the exposition of this text compare Origen, on Ezekiel hom. 6 n. 3, and Augustine, on John tract. 42 n. 10 ff. To the words of Ezekiel: Thy father was an Amorite, Alex. of Hales, S. p. II q. 101 m. 2 ad 3, notes: « Whence it is said in the same place upon that [of James 1:2]: Concupiscence, when it has conceived, brings forth sin, the interlinear [Gloss]: When the devil sends in incentives, or when the flesh seeks for itself things pleasant ». The following gloss on Leviticus, which several codices and editions, as well as Bl. Albert (here a. 5), attribute to Gregory, Gul. Mara cites simply without the author's name, with the number vigesimo substituted for decimo nono, and with the last words et diabolus pater omitted. The Gloss, thus abbreviated, is taken from Hesychius, presbyter of Jerusalem († a.d. 433 or, as others would have it, 472 or 473), Commentary on Leviticus (20:14), where it reads thus: Because concupiscence is the mother of every sin, this also must be guarded against, that if any concupiscence of sin be in us, we should stop at this point and not join an action to it. Compare also the Gloss on Deuteronomy 25, where the same is said. — In place of the particle enim after Per Amorrhaeum many codices, with edd. 1, 2, have vero; in cod. aa there is neither enim nor vero.
  13. Nonnulli codd., II ee et ed. 1 subiiciunt carnis.
    Some codices, II ee and ed. 1, subjoin carnis [so that the reading is tentatione carnis nulla oritur incurvatio].
  14. Hic c. 6. — Pro et proprio Vat. et proprie, cod. aa et immediato. Paulo inferius cum cod. cc et ed. 1 substituimus primum movens pro principium movens, quod in Vat. legitur. Deinde ed. 1 sequestrari pro separari.
    Here c. 6. — In place of et proprio the Vatican edition has et proprie, cod. aa et immediato. A little below, with cod. cc and ed. 1, we have substituted primum movens for principium movens, which is read in the Vatican edition. Further on, ed. 1 has sequestrari in place of separari.
  15. Codd. T V ee movente.
    Codices T V ee have movente.
  16. Vat. initium.
    The Vatican edition has initium.
  17. Cfr. August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 3. seq.
    Compare Augustine, XIV On the City of God c. 3 ff.
  18. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.
    See the scholion on the preceding question. ---
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