Bonaventure

Articulus II. De modis tentationis in generali.

Consequenter quaeritur circa secundum articulum de modis tentationis in generali. Dividit autem Magister¹ tentationem in eam quae est ab hoste, et in eam quae est a carne. Sed cum de tentatione, quae est ab hoste, aliqualis possit haberi notitia per ea quae determinata sunt supra² de potestate daemonum; ideo hic quaeritur de tentatione, quae est a carne. Et circa hoc possunt quaeri tria.

Primo quaeritur, utrum carnis sit tentare.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum tentationem carnis a tentatione diaboli contingat separari.

Tertio quaeritur, cui istarum tentationum difficilius sit resistere.

Quaestio I. Utrum carnis sit tentare.

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod carnis sit tentare.

Fundamenta.

1. Iacobi primo³: Unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus; sed concupiscentia, quae maxime nos abstrahit et illicit, est concupiscentia carnis: ergo etc.

2. Item, Cassiodorus⁴ definiens tentationem dicit, quod tentatio est assimilatio boni ad fallendum;

sed appetitus carnalis facit, bonum ut nunc credi esse bonum simpliciter; et hoc decipit et fallit spiritum: ergo contingit, spiritum tentari a carnali appetitu.

3. Item, tentatio diabolica non est aliud quam eius suggestio; sed sicut diabolus suggerit homini mala, ita et carnis prudentia, quae est Deo inimica⁵: ergo si diabolus dicitur tentare, cum suggerit mala, eadem ratione et caro, cum spiritum trahit ad carnalia.

4. Item, diabolus impugnat nos tentando, nec est aliud diaboli tentatio quam eius impugnatio; sed sicut impugnamur a diabolo, ita etiam et a carne impugnamur et impellimur: ergo videtur, quod sicut tentamur a diabolo, ita vere et proprie tentemur a carne.

Sed contra:

Ad oppositum.

1. Hugo de sancto Victore⁶: « Tentare est callide experiri et quasi quibusdam blandis conatibus probare »; sed experimentum sumere hoc est solius substantiae rationalis: ergo non videtur esse carnis.

2. Item, tentans differt a tentato, nullus enim tentat se ipsum; sed qui tentatur est homo carnalis: cum igitur homo carnalis a carne sua non differat per substantiam, videtur, quod nullus homo tentetur a carne sua nec ab alia: constat ergo, quod nulla caro tentat.

3. Item, persuasio ordinata ad decipiendum potius est sophisticatio⁷ quam tentatio, — tentatio enim est persuasio ordinata ad sumendum experimentum — sed caro vitiosa directe inclinat ad malum et sua inclinatione seducit spiritum: ergo carnis propulsatio potius debet dici sophisticatio quam tentatio.

4. Item, quandocumque aliquis actus de aliquibus subiectis dicitur, dicitur secundum aliquod commune in eis repertum; sed Deus tentare dicitur in Scriptura⁸ et diabolus et homo et caro: ergo secundum aliquod commune debet dici. Sed caro non videtur aliquo modo communicare in aliquo cum Deo et cum spiritu angelico: ergo videtur, quod ei non possit competere tentatio; aut si competat, hoc erit aequivoce et secundum alium modum dicendi. — Quaestio incidens. Et si est, tunc est quaestio: secundum quem modum dicitur, et quare illa carnis impulsio tentatio appellatur?

Conclusio. Cum tentatio sit quidam tactus ad probandum ordinatus, et carnis concupiscentia nos impellit, ad cuius impulsum sequitur approbatio, vel improbatio hominis, recte caro dicitur tentare.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc vocabulum tentare multas habet acceptiones, sicut dicunt illi qui significationes vocabulorum studiose rimati sunt. Quid sit tentare. Si tamen velimus eius principalem et praecipuam significationem accipere, tentare probare est; unde tentatio dici potest quidam tactus, quo illud quod tangitur, probatur: sicut caecus dicitur tentare, quando suo tactu vult aliquam certitudinem habere de aliqua re, quam tangit. Per hunc modum in spiritualibus tentatio dicitur quidam tactus ad probandum ordinatus. — Quadruplex tentatio. Hoc autem potest esse quadrupliciter:

aut quia ille qui pulsat, intendit probare et approbare sive probatum ostendere; et hoc modo tentat Deus, secundum quod dicitur Sapientiae tertio⁹: Deus tentavit illos et invenit illos dignos se.

— Aut ille qui pulsat, intendit probare et reprobare, sive reprobum facere; et sic tentat diabolus, secundum quod dicitur Actuum quinto¹⁰: Cur tentavit Satanas cor tuum mentiri Spiritui sancto?

— Aut quia ille qui pulsat, intendit solum probare et experimentum sumere de eo quod est in homine; et sic tentat homo cautus; et de hoc Ecclesiastici decimo tertio¹¹: Ex multis loquelis tentabit te, et subridens interrogabit te de absconditis tuis.

— Ad quaestionem incidentem. Aut quia, etsi pulsans nihil intendit, ad eius tamen pulsationem sequitur approbatio vel reprobatio hominis; et sic tentat caro vel carnalis concupiscentia, de qua Iacobi primo¹²: Unusquisque tentatur a concupiscentia sua, abstractus et illectus. A carne enim sive a carnis concupiscentia homo pulsatur et quasi tangitur, cui tactui sive pulsationi si consentiat, probatur et reprobatur; si vero dissentiat, probatur et approbatur. Et sic recte et proprie Conclusio. carnis impulsio tentatio dici potest. — Unde rationes hoc ostendentes concedendae sunt.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud autem quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod tentare est experiri; dicendum, quod illa ratio ab Hugone non assignatur nisi proprie de tentatione diaboli. — Alia solutio. Si autem quis generaliter velit eam intel-

ligere, ut se extendat ad omnem tentationem, quae ad malum inclinat; tunc dicemus, quod intelligitur per causam, ut sit sensus, quod per tentationem fit experientia et probatio, utrum homo dignus sit approbari vel reprobari; et hoc non tantum fit a diabolo, sed etiam a carne. — Alia interpretatio. Si autem velit dicere, hoc essentialiter esse dictum; tunc dicemus, quod nomine carnis non intelligitur corpus solum, sed ratio carnalis; et idem ipse homo, secundum quod carnalis est et ad carnem conversus, se ipsum tentat, secundum quod spiritualis est et divinae legi subiectus¹³.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod tentans differt a tentato secundum substantiam; dicendum, quod sicut iudicare et iudicari sunt actus diversarum personarum, nihilominus tamen eadem persona secundum aliam et aliam sui portionem potest se ipsam iudicare, sicut semetipsum homo diiudicat¹⁴, et superior portio iudicat inferiorem; sic etiam intelligendum est, quod spiritualiter ipsa sensualitas tentare potest rationem, sive homo exterior interiorem; et ita, cum caro tentat spiritum, non idem tentatur a se, sed alius ab alio; illa tamen reperiri habent in eadem persona.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod persuasio, ordinata ad decipiendum, potius est sophisticatio quam tentatio; dici potest, quod tentatio large dicta comprehendit et sophisticationem et tentationem proprie dictam. Sophistica enim persuasione potest homo de alio experimentum sumere; et ita non valet illa obiectio, quia tentatio, secundum quod hic accipitur, contra deceptionem et sophisticationem non dividitur. — Alia solutio. Aliter tamen posset dici, quod tentationis nomen magis translatum est a tentatione materiali, in qua est quaedam palpatio, secundum quod caecus dicitur tentare, quam a tentatione illa, quae est in ratiocinationibus, per quem modum dividitur contra sophisticationem, ut dicatur alius syllogismus sophisticus, alius tentativus¹⁵.

4. Ad ultimum patet responsio ex praedictis. Aliquod enim commune reperitur in omnibus illis, de quibus dicitur actus tentandi, videlicet tactu quodam pulsare, ad quem consequitur pulsati probatio; et hoc prius explanatum est.

Article II. On the modes of temptation in general.

Next we inquire concerning the second article, on the modes of temptation in general. Now the Master¹ divides temptation into that which is from the enemy, and that which is from the flesh. But since some knowledge of the temptation which is from the enemy can be had through those things which have been determined above² concerning the power of demons, here we inquire concerning the temptation which is from the flesh. And concerning this three questions can be asked.

First it is asked, whether it belongs to the flesh to tempt.

Second it is asked, whether the temptation of the flesh can be separated from the temptation of the devil.

Third it is asked, which of these temptations is more difficult to resist.

Question I. Whether it belongs to the flesh to tempt.

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is shown that it belongs to the flesh to tempt.

Foundations.

1. James 1³: Each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence; but the concupiscence which most of all draws us away and entices is the concupiscence of the flesh: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Cassiodorus⁴, defining temptation, says that temptation is the likening of a good unto deception; but the carnal appetite makes a good as for now be believed to be a good simply; and this deceives and fools the spirit: therefore it happens that the spirit is tempted by the carnal appetite.

3. Likewise, diabolical temptation is nothing other than his suggestion; but as the devil suggests evils to man, so also does the prudence of the flesh, which is enemy unto God⁵: therefore if the devil is said to tempt when he suggests evils, by the same reason also the flesh, when it draws the spirit unto carnal things.

4. Likewise, the devil assails us by tempting, nor is the devil's temptation other than his assault; but as we are assailed by the devil, so also are we assailed and impelled by the flesh: therefore it seems that, as we are tempted by the devil, so truly and properly are we tempted by the flesh.

On the contrary:

To the opposite.

1. Hugh of St. Victor⁶: « To tempt is to test cunningly and, as it were, to prove by certain bland efforts »; but to take an experiment is of a rational substance alone: therefore it does not seem to belong to the flesh.

2. Likewise, the tempter differs from the tempted, for no one tempts himself; but he who is tempted is the carnal man: since therefore the carnal man does not differ from his flesh by substance, it seems that no man is tempted by his own flesh, nor by any other: therefore it stands that no flesh tempts.

3. Likewise, a persuasion ordered toward deceiving is rather sophistry⁷ than temptation, — for temptation is a persuasion ordered toward taking an experiment — but the vicious flesh inclines directly toward evil and by its inclination seduces the spirit: therefore the impulsion of the flesh ought rather to be called sophistry than temptation.

4. Likewise, whenever any act is said of several subjects, it is said according to something common found in them; but God is said in Scripture⁸ to tempt, and the devil and man and the flesh: therefore it ought to be said according to something common. But the flesh does not seem in any way to share anything in common with God and with angelic spirit: therefore it seems that temptation cannot belong to it; or if it does belong, this will be equivocally and according to another mode of speaking. — Incidental question. And if it is so, then there is the question: according to which mode is it said, and why is that impulsion of the flesh called temptation?

Conclusion. Since temptation is a certain touch ordered for proving, and the concupiscence of the flesh impels us, upon whose impulse follows the approval or disapproval of the man, the flesh is rightly said to tempt.

I respond: It must be said that this word tempt has many acceptations, as those say who have studiously searched out the significations of words. What it is to tempt. If however we wish to take its principal and chief signification, to tempt is to prove; whence temptation may be called a certain touch by which that which is touched is proved: as a blind man is said to tempt when by his touch he wishes to have some certainty about something which he touches. By this mode in spiritual matters temptation is said to be a certain touch ordered for proving. — Fourfold temptation. And this can be in a fourfold way:

either because he who strikes intends to prove and approve, or to show as proved; and in this manner God tempts, according to what is said in Wisdom 3⁹: God tempted them and found them worthy of himself.

— Or he who strikes intends to prove and reprove, or to make reprobate; and so the devil tempts, according to what is said in Acts 5¹⁰: Why has Satan tempted thy heart to lie to the Holy Spirit?

— Or because he who strikes intends only to prove and to take an experiment of that which is in the man; and so the prudent man tempts; and concerning this in Ecclesiasticus 13¹¹: From much speech he will tempt thee, and smiling he will question thee about thy hidden things.

— To the incidental question. Or because, even though the one striking intends nothing, upon his striking nevertheless follows the approval or reprobation of the man; and so tempts the flesh or carnal concupiscence, of which James 1¹²: Each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence. For from the flesh, or from the concupiscence of the flesh, the man is struck and as it were touched, to which touch or striking if he consents, he is proved and reproved; but if he dissents, he is proved and approved. And so rightly and properly Conclusion. may the impulse of the flesh be called temptation. — Whence the reasons showing this are to be conceded.

Solution of the opposing arguments.

1. To that, however, which is objected on the contrary, that to tempt is to test; it must be said that that account is assigned by Hugh only properly of the temptation of the devil. — Another solution. But if anyone wishes to understand it generally, so that it may extend to every temptation which inclines toward evil, then we shall say that it is understood by way of cause, so that the sense is, that through temptation occurs an experiment and proving, whether a man is worthy to be approved or reproved; and this is done not only by the devil, but also by the flesh. — Another interpretation. But if he wishes to say that this is said essentially, then we shall say that by the name flesh is understood not the body alone, but the carnal reason; and the same man, insofar as he is carnal and turned toward the flesh, tempts himself insofar as he is spiritual and subject to the divine law¹³.

2. To that which is objected secondly, that the tempter differs from the tempted by substance; it must be said that just as to judge and to be judged are acts of different persons, nonetheless the same person, according to one and another portion of itself, can judge itself, as a man examines himself¹⁴, and the superior portion judges the inferior; so also it is to be understood that spiritually sensuality itself can tempt reason, or the exterior man the interior; and so, when the flesh tempts the spirit, the same is not tempted by itself, but one by another; nevertheless these are found in the same person.

3. To that which is objected, that a persuasion ordered toward deceiving is rather sophistry than temptation; it can be said that temptation taken broadly comprehends both sophistry and temptation properly so called. For by a sophistic persuasion a man can take experiment of another; and so that objection is not valid, because temptation, in the sense in which it is taken here, is not divided against deception and sophistry. — Another solution. Yet otherwise it could be said that the name temptation is rather transferred from material temptation, in which there is a certain palpation — according to which a blind man is said to tempt — than from that temptation which is in ratiocinations, by which mode it is divided against sophistry, so that one syllogism may be called sophistic, another tentative¹⁵.

4. To the last the response is clear from what was said. For something common is found in all those of which the act of tempting is said, namely a certain striking by a touch, upon which follows the proving of the one struck; and this was explained before.