Bonaventure

Quaestio II. Utrum daemones veras rerum formas inducere possint.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum verarum formarum inductio possit esse a spiritu maligno. Et quod sic, videtur:

Pro parte affirmativa:

1. Primo auctoritate sacrae Scripturae. Exodi septimo¹ dicitur: Fecerunt autem malefici similiter; sed constat, quod virga Moysi conversa fuit in verum draconem, alioquin non esset verum miraculum: si ergo malefici similiter fecerunt, et hoc non nisi virtute daemonum, ergo daemones veros serpentes de virgis possunt facere: ergo veras formas inducere.

2. Item, in Glossa² habetur ibidem: « Daemones discurrunt per mundum et subito semina afferunt, sicque novas rerum species producunt ». Ex hoc patet, quod specierum sive formarum inductio sit a spiritu maligno.

3. Item, maior est potestas daemonum quam hominum per artificium; sed homines, mediante arte alchimiae, diversorum metallorum species faciunt: ergo multo fortius hoc daemones possunt³.

4. Item, quod subiacet potentiae inferiori subiacet superiori; sed potentia daemonum per naturam superior est potentiis rerum naturalium, quia dicitur Iob quadragesimo primo⁴: Non est potestas super terram, quae ei possit comparari: si ergo natura inferior veras et novas species potest inducere et inducit, ergo et potentia daemonum.

5. Item, formae secundum seminales rationes latent in materia, ut habetur in littera et praedeterminatum est supra⁵; et ad hoc, quod fiant in actu, non indigent nisi extrinseco adiutorio: si ergo diabolus scit modum educendi et posse habet ad adiuvandum, ergo veras formas potest inducere.

6. Item, ordo universitatis est, ut superiora per naturam influant in inferiora, sicut patet, quod caelestia influunt in haec inferiora⁶; sed spiritualia sunt multo superiora respectu corporalium quam corporalia respectu corporalium: ergo si corporale adeo potest influere in corporale, quod sua influentia et virtute et actione educit formam de potentia in actum, sicut patet tam in actione elementorum quam corporum caelestium, ergo multo fortius potest hoc spiritus sive bonus sive malus.

Pro parte negativa:

Contra: 1. Exodi septimo⁷: Absorbuit virga Moysi virgas magorum; quod exponens Augustinus ait, et habetur in Glossa: « Moysi virga absorbuit virgas, non dracones. Absorbere enim potuit quod erant, non quod non erant »: ergo virgae, quae videbantur versae in dracones, erant virgae non versae in serpentes. Si ergo daemones tunc operati sunt ita excellenter ut potuerunt, videtur, quod species rerum non possint vere transmutare aut educere.

2. Item, secundae ad Thessalonicenses secundo⁸ dicitur, quod manifestatio antichristi erit in signis et prodigiis mendacibus secundum operationem satanae. Si ergo mendacia erunt prodigia et signa, ergo non vere faciet quod videbitur facere; sed tunc maxime operabitur diabolus secundum posse suum: ergo non potest veras formas inducere.

3. Item, super illud⁹: Immissiones per angelos malos, Glossa Augustini: « Ea quae mirabiliter in creaturis fiunt, attribuere malis angelis non audemus »; sed subito de virgis facere veros serpentes est miraculum, quia contra solitum cursum naturae: ergo hoc non potest malus angelus.

4. Item, ratione videtur hoc ipsum sic. Omne quod dat alteri speciem et actum, est ens actu respectu eius quod dat — hoc probat Philosophus et dicit in septimo Primae Philosophiae¹⁰: « Nihil enim dat quod non habet » — sed angelus malus nec genere nec specie convenit cum istis rebus corporalibus: ergo non potest eis formas et species dare.

5. Item, in productione sive in transmutatione rerum naturalium angelus operatur, aut ergo naturaliter, aut artificialiter. Si naturaliter; cum natura sit vis insita rebus, similia ex similibus procreans¹¹, tunc faceret angelos. Si artificialiter; sed quod est ab operante artificialiter est artificiatura: ergo formae, quas inducit, sunt artificiales. Sed asinus artificialis non est asinus vere, sed aequivoce, et similiter manus et consimilia: ergo nunquam inducit veras formas.

6. Item, si inducit veras formas, ergo facit vera miracula: ergo miracula non attestantur divinae potentiae: ergo non sunt in robur fidei Christianae. — Si dicas, quod differunt ab istis; quaestio incidens: quaeritur, quomodo differant, et quomodo haec possint discerni.

Conclusio.

Daemones formas artificiales inducere possunt per virtutem propriam, naturales vero non per propriam virtutem, sed tantum per alienam.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod quando quaeritur, utrum daemon possit inducere formas veras, aut transmutare de forma in formam; Conclusio 1: non est quaestio de forma artificiali — quia planum est, quod potest imagines et figuras facere, sicut homo — sed de formis naturalibus, utrum scilicet possit verum serpentem et veram ranam producere, et sic de aliis.

Ad hanc autem quaestionem respondendum est per distinctionem, quoniam, quod daemon formam inducat, dupliciter potest intelligi: aut quod virtute propria, aut quod virtute aliena. Si intelligatur, quod inducat virtute propria, sic absque dubio Conclusio 3: falsum est, et hoc dicit Augustinus¹²; si intelligatur, quod virtute aliena, scilicet per virtutem rerum naturalium, quas coniungit ad invicem, sic potest. Exemplum. — Sicut est exemplum in agricola, qui segetes, mediante semine iacto et terra germinante et aqua irrigante, fructificare facit; et hoc est virtute aliena, virtute autem propria generat sibi similem. Et ratio huius est, quia forma naturalis non producitur nisi a Conditore naturae, vel a natura condita, operante per modum naturae, et ideo rem naturalem virtute sibi indita producit; sed operando in agricultura operatur ut artifex, et ideo naturam potest expedire et adiuvare, sed rem naturae non potest producere.

Repetitio cum ratione: Dicendum igitur, quod maligni spiritus possunt formas artificiales inducere per virtutem propriam; et formas naturales per virtutem alienam, per propriam autem non possunt. — Et ratio huius est, quia operantur per modum artis in hoc et non per modum naturae; unde sicut natura non producit formam artificialem, sic nec ars formam naturalem.

Rationes ulteriores: Si quaeratur ratio huius, dico, quod est limitatio potentiae agentis ad talem et talem effectum secundum dispositionem Dei et primariam ordinationem causarum. — Rursus, si quaeras rationem, quare Deus sic disposuit; dico, quod ordo sapientiae hoc requirit. Triplex agens: Cum enim sit triplex agens, scilicet Deus, natura et intelligentia¹³, ista sunt agentia ordinata, ita quod primum praesupponitur a secundo, et secundum praesupponitur a tertio. Deus enim operatur ex nihilo; natura vero non facit ex nihilo, sed ex ente in potentia; ars supponit operationem naturae et operatur supra completum; non enim facit lapides, sed domum de lapidibus. Unde sicut natura non potest anticipare operationem Dei, quae est de nihilo producere; sic nec ars operationem naturae.

Quaestio incidens 2 solvitur: Sed tunc quaeres, quare non est e converso, ut ars praecedat naturam? Et dicendum, quod operatio naturalis per naturam prius est in eodem quam operatio artis. Et praeterea, alia ratio est, quia agens per naturam producit sibi similem¹⁴ secundum veritatem, sed agens secundum artem similem solum secundum speciem vel ideam vel exemplar. Quia ergo in productione rei naturalis sive formae naturalis agens aliquid impartitur passo, et nihil impartitur aliquid nisi illud, respectu cuius est in actu secundum veritatem; ideo formas illas de potentia in actum educere non potest nisi quod agit per modum naturae. In artificialibus autem nihil impartitur agens passo, sed aufert vel mutat secundum locum, sicut patet in forma compositionis et figura incisionis. Et hinc est, quod agens per artem non potest virtute propria formas naturales producere, nisi ille solus, qui est actus plenus¹⁵ et perfectus respectu omnium, tam in cognoscendo quam in operando, scilicet solus Deus.

Epilogus: Dicamus igitur brevius, quod has formas, de quibus loquimur, daemones possunt vere transmutare, non tamen virtute sua, sed naturae. Unde tantum sunt ministri, non principales agentes, quia, si essent principales agentes, cum non producant per conveniens nomine et specie¹⁶ producerent sicut creator, et ita essent creatores; quod Augustinus negat expresse.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1. 2. 3. Unde tres rationes primae verum concludunt, quoniam non probant, quod faciant virtute sua, sed virtute seminum adductorum.

Ad 4. Ad illud vero quod ostenditur, quod virtute propria, quia potentia eius est excellentior; dicendum, quod illa propositio non habet veritatem nisi de virtute, quae per omnem modum est superior; vel si in aliis habet locum, oportet intelligi in his, ad quae utraque virtus habet similiter ordinari. Aliter patet¹⁷ esse falsum. Homo enim potentior est asino, non tamen potest generare asinum, sicut asinus facit, quia virtus eius non est ad hoc. Similiter intellige in proposito.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod formae sunt in materia seminaliter; dicendum, quod illa ratio seminalis valde remota est ab actu completo nec potest ad actum reduci, nisi multa adminiculantia habeat, ex quorum influentia, sibi et naturae suae conveniente, proficiat, quousque in actum perveniat. Talis non est influentia spiritus propter disconvenientiam in forma et natura; influere enim potest ad motum localem et regimen, non ad generationem.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod spiritualia influant in corporalia, et superiora in inferiora; dicendum, quod influunt secundum proportionem unius ad alterum, et secundum quod competit naturae suscipientis. Aliter enim influit sol, aliter Angelus. Sol potest influere formalem¹⁸ proprietatem, communicando scilicet lucem et calorem; Angelus non sic potest influere in corporalia, sed solum localiter mutando, non ad formam, sed ad situm, cum non habeat convenientiam in forma et natura.

Ad argumenta pro parte negativa:

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod malefici nihil vere faciunt¹⁹, primo per glossae 'Moysi virga' virgas magorum;

dicendum, quod veritas est, quod glossae videntur sibi obviare ibidem; verumtamen hoc magis sonant, quod veros serpentes fecerunt; et denominant ibi serpentes a materia praeexistente, sicut serpentem Moysi vocant virgam, licet verus esset serpens; sic et de aliis intelligendum.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod antichristus faciet signa mendacia; dicendum, quod illud intelligitur, non quia non faciet aliqua signa veracia secundum transmutationem formarum; sed non erunt veracia, habendo aspectum ad finem sive ad intentionem, quia ad hoc faciet, ut mendacium et falsum persuadeat.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de glossa Augustini, dicendum, quod Augustinus non negat, quin aliquid possit daemonibus attribui, sed quod non omnia sunt eis attribuenda, immo quaedam tribuuntur bonis Angelis.

Ad 4. 5. Ad duas sequentes rationes non oportet respondere; verum enim concludunt, scilicet quod Angelus propria virtute non potest formas naturales transmutare sive inducere vel educere de potentia in actum.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur²⁰, qualitercumque educat, si vere educit, facit miracula: ergo miracula sunt signa fallibilia, ergo non sunt efficacia nostrae fidei testimonia; dicendum ad hoc, quod etsi sint vera opera, non tamen sunt vera miracula; quoniam miracula non sunt per vim naturae, sed per vim supra naturam, quae est agentis primi. Sunt enim supra facultatem naturae, et ideo attestantur omnipotentiae facientis²¹. Sed opera, quae faciunt daemones, etsi miracula videantur, quia fiunt in tempore imperceptibili, non tamen sunt vera miracula, quia fiunt vi naturae. — Et si tu obiicias, quod natura non potest ita cito operari; dicendum, quod verum est de hac natura per se, sed taliter potest esse adiuta et confota²² rebus convenientibus, ut quasi repente prorumpat in effectum; sicut patet de generatione ranarum, quas de quibusdam foliis in modico tempore nasci contingit.

Quaestio incidens — quomodo discernantur huiusmodi miracula.

Si autem quaeras, quomodo discernantur huiusmodi miracula; dicendum, quod etsi conveniunt in materia, differunt tamen quadrupliciter — ex parte principalis agentis et ex parte ministri et ex parte finis et ex parte facti.

Ex parte principalis agentis; nam in miraculis divinis operatur agens potentiae infinitae et supra naturam; in miraculis daemonum operatur virtus naturae, multipliciter adiuta per alias naturas²³. — Ex parte ministri: nam Dei miracula fiunt per publicam iustitiam secundum veritatem, vel secundum apparentiam; sed miracula daemonum fiunt per privatos contractus et quaedam arcana. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus²⁴: quod « boni faciunt miracula per publicam iustitiam », hoc est per fidem veram, quae vere iustificat, quam veritas omnibus praedicat; « mali christiani per signa publicae iustitiae », quia fidem habent et videntur habere opera; sed « magi per privatos contractus », et hoc est quod dicitur in Exodo²⁵ per incantationes et arcana quaedam. Huius signum est, quod ibi sunt tenebrarum opera, quia qui male agit odit lucem. — Ex parte finis similiter differunt, quia miracula Dei fiunt ad utilitatem et divinam gloriam²⁶; sed magorum ad deceptionem et ad gloriam vanam et excellentiam²⁷: unde sunt quasi inutilia. — Differunt etiam ex parte facti, quia daemones faciunt huiusmodi vilia et inutilia; miracula vero divina circa valde necessaria et utilia. Unde daemones maxime faciunt ranas et serpentes, quia haec de facili producuntur operatione naturae, et quia divino iudicio magis permittuntur ad prioris facti memoriam.

Reiectio Boni. Unde sic Deus temperat²⁸ potentiam et astutiam diabolicam, ut sic patiatur eum perverse imitari, ut in ipsa imitatione possit seducere malos iuxta eorum merita mala; possit etiam deprehendi a bonis, et ut fides simul cum miraculis habeat locum. Si enim solus Deus et eius servi miracula facerent, quis non credidisset in Deum, miraculis compulsus? Nunc autem, cum magi²⁹ faciunt et boni faciunt, qui divinitus illustrantur, ut inter haec possint discernere, per vera miracula adiuvantur et per daemonum miracula exercentur et probantur.

Scholion.

I. In hac quaestione attentione digna sunt quae dicuntur in corp. de differentia actionis in triplici agente, qui sunt Deus, natura, ars (cfr. hic dub. 3.); item, quae in solut. ad 5. pro parte affirm. occurrunt de ratione seminali, valde distante ab actu completo, et in fine de veris et falsis miraculis (cfr. infra d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3, d. 37. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4; IV. Sent. d. 12. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3. et a. 2. q. 3.). — In solut. ad 1. (pro parte negat.) tangitur quaestio de praestigiis magorum Pharaonis (Exod. 7. et 8.). Quidam dixerunt, serpentes et ranas a magis istis productos vel a daemonibus aliunde allatos et suppositos esse (ita Lyranus in Exod.), vel fuisse tantum phantasticas illusiones. Sed Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 43. m. 1.) putat, magos ope naturae et daemonum ea animalia vere produxisse, cui sententiae suffragantur S. Thom., B. Albert., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., Dionys. Carth., et favet etiam S. Bonav. De potentia daemonum respectu specierum intentionalium cfr. infra d. 8. p. II. q. 3.

II. In conclusionibus alii doctores satis conveniunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 43. m. 2, q. 18. m. 2. a. 2. — Scot. apud Hier. a Montefortino, t. II. q. 16. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1; S. I. q. 65. a. 4; de Potent. q. 6. a. 5; S. c. Gent. III. c. 103; de Malo, q. 16. a. 9. 10. — B. Albert., hic a. 6. seqq.; S. p. II. tr. 8. q. 30. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 3. a. 1.2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

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Question II. Whether demons can induce the true forms of things.

Secondly it is asked whether the inducing of true forms can be from an evil spirit. And that it can, it seems:

On the affirmative side:

1. First, by the authority of sacred Scripture. In Exodus 7¹ it is said: The magicians also did in like manner; but it is established that Moses' rod was turned into a true dragon, otherwise it would not have been a true miracle: if therefore the magicians did in like manner, and this only by the power of demons, then demons can make true serpents from rods: therefore they can induce true forms.

2. Likewise, in the Gloss² it is said on the same passage: « The demons run through the world and suddenly bring seeds, and thus produce new species of things ». From this it is clear that the inducing of species or forms is from an evil spirit.

3. Likewise, the power of demons is greater than that of men through art; but men, by means of the art of alchemy, make species of various metals: therefore much more strongly can demons do this³.

4. Likewise, what lies under an inferior power lies under a superior; but the natural power of demons is superior to the powers of natural things, since it is said in Job 41⁴: There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him: if therefore an inferior nature can induce true and new species, and does so, then much more so can the power of demons.

5. Likewise, forms according to seminal reasons lie hidden in matter, as is held in the letter and has been predetermined above⁵; and for them to come into act, they need nothing except extrinsic help: if therefore the devil knows the manner of bringing them out and has the power to help, then he can induce true forms.

6. Likewise, it is the order of the universe that superior things should naturally influence inferior things, as is plain in that celestial things influence things here below⁶; but spiritual things are much more superior with respect to corporeal things than corporeal things are with respect to corporeal things: therefore if a corporeal thing can so influence a corporeal thing that by its influence and power and action it brings forth form from potency into act, as appears both in the action of the elements and of the celestial bodies, then much more strongly can a spirit, whether good or evil.

On the negative side:

On the contrary: 1. Exodus 7⁷: Moses' rod swallowed up the rods of the magicians; expounding which, Augustine says, and it is held in the Gloss: « Moses' rod swallowed up the rods, not the dragons. For it could swallow what they were, not what they were not »: therefore the rods which seemed to have been turned into dragons were rods not turned into serpents. If therefore the demons then operated as excellently as they could, it seems that they cannot truly transmute or bring forth the species of things.

2. Likewise, in 2 Thessalonians 2⁸ it is said that the manifestation of Antichrist will be in signs and lying wonders according to the working of Satan. If therefore the wonders and signs shall be lying, then he shall not truly do what he shall seem to do; but then the devil shall work to the greatest extent according to his power: therefore he cannot induce true forms.

3. Likewise, on this⁹: Sendings through evil angels, the Gloss of Augustine: « Those things which are done miraculously in creatures we do not dare to attribute to evil angels »; but to make true serpents from rods suddenly is a miracle, since it is against the usual course of nature: therefore an evil angel cannot do this.

4. Likewise, by reason it seems thus. Everything which gives species and act to another is a being in act with respect to what it gives — this the Philosopher proves and says in the seventh book of First Philosophy¹⁰: « For nothing gives what it does not have » — but an evil angel agrees with these corporeal things neither in genus nor in species: therefore he cannot give them forms and species.

5. Likewise, in the production or transmutation of natural things an angel either operates naturally or artificially. If naturally — since nature is a force set in things, bringing forth like from like¹¹ — then he would make angels. If artificially — but what comes from an agent operating artificially is artificial: therefore the forms which he induces are artificial. But an artificial ass is not truly an ass, but equivocally, and likewise a hand and such things: therefore he never induces true forms.

6. Likewise, if he induces true forms, then he makes true miracles: therefore miracles do not bear witness to the divine power: therefore they are not for the strengthening of the Christian faith. — If you say that they differ from these; incidental question: it is asked how they differ, and how these can be discerned.

Conclusion.

Demons can induce artificial forms by their own power, but natural forms not by their own power, but only by another's.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that when it is asked whether a demon can induce true forms, or transmute from form into form; Conclusion 1: the question is not about artificial form — since it is plain that he can make images and figures, as a man does — but about natural forms, namely whether he can produce a true serpent and a true frog, and so of other things.

To this question one must respond by a distinction: that a demon induce form can be understood in two ways: either by his own power, or by another's power. If it is understood that he induces by his own power, then Conclusion 3: this is without doubt false, and Augustine says this¹²; if it is understood that by another's power, namely through the power of natural things which he joins together, then he can. Example. — As is the example in the farmer who, by means of seed cast and earth germinating and water irrigating, makes the crops bear fruit; and this is by another's power, but by his own power he generates one like himself. And the reason for this is that natural form is not produced except by the Author of nature, or by created nature operating in the manner of nature, and so by a power given to it produces a natural thing; but in working at agriculture he works as an artisan, and so can dispatch and help nature, but cannot produce the thing of nature.

Repetition with reason: It must therefore be said that evil spirits can induce artificial forms by their own power; and natural forms by another's power, but not by their own. — And the reason for this is that they operate in the manner of art in this and not in the manner of nature; whence just as nature does not produce artificial form, so neither does art produce natural form.

Further reasons: If the reason for this be sought, I say that it is the limitation of the power of the agent to such-and-such effects according to the disposition of God and the primary ordering of causes. — Again, if you ask the reason why God so disposed; I say that the order of wisdom requires this. Threefold agent: For since there is a threefold agent, namely God, nature, and intelligence (or art)¹³, these are ordered agents, so that the first is presupposed by the second, and the second by the third. For God works out of nothing; nature does not make out of nothing, but out of being in potency; art presupposes the operation of nature and works upon what is completed; for it does not make stones, but a house out of stones. Whence just as nature cannot anticipate the operation of God, which is to produce from nothing, so neither does art anticipate the operation of nature.

Incidental question 2 resolved: But then you will ask, why is it not the converse, that art should precede nature? And it must be said that the natural operation through nature is prior in the same thing to the operation of art. And further, another reason is that an agent acting through nature produces one like itself¹⁴ in truth, but an agent acting through art produces one like only in species or idea or exemplar. Since therefore in the production of a natural thing or natural form the agent imparts something to the patient, and nothing imparts anything except that with respect to which it is in act according to truth; therefore those forms cannot be brought forth from potency into act except by what acts in the manner of nature. In artificial things, however, the agent imparts nothing to the patient, but takes away or alters according to place, as appears in the form of composition and the figure of incision. And hence it is that an agent acting through art cannot by its own power produce natural forms — except him alone who is full¹⁵ and perfect act with respect to all things, both in knowing and in operating, namely God alone.

Epilogue: Let us therefore say more briefly that these forms of which we speak the demons can truly transmute, not however by their own power, but by nature's. Whence they are only ministers, not principal agents; for if they were principal agents, since they do not produce by what is fitting in name and species¹⁶, they would produce as the Creator, and thus would be creators — which Augustine expressly denies.

To the arguments on the affirmative side:

Ad 1, 2, 3. The first three reasons therefore conclude truly, since they do not prove that they do this by their own power, but by the power of the seeds brought in.

Ad 4. To that which is shown, that it is by their own power because their power is more excellent; it must be said that that proposition has no truth except concerning a power that is in every way superior; or, if it holds in other cases, it must be understood for things to which both powers stand in like ordering. Otherwise it is plainly¹⁷ false. For a man is more powerful than an ass, yet cannot generate an ass as an ass does, since his power is not directed to this. Understand likewise in the case at hand.

Ad 5. To that which is objected, that forms are in matter seminally; it must be said that that seminal reason is very far removed from completed act, and cannot be reduced to act unless it has many supports, by whose influence — agreeing with itself and its nature — it makes progress, until it comes to act. Such is not the influence of a spirit, on account of the disagreement in form and nature; for it can influence to local motion and direction, not to generation.

Ad 6. To that which is objected, that spiritual things influence corporeal things, and superior things influence inferior things; it must be said that they influence according to the proportion of one to another, and according to what befits the nature of the recipient. For the sun influences in one way, the Angel in another. The sun can influence a formal¹⁸ property, namely by communicating light and heat; the Angel cannot so influence corporeal things, but only by moving them locally — not to form, but to place — since he has no agreement with them in form and nature.

To the arguments on the negative side:

Ad 1. To that which is objected, that the magicians truly make nothing¹⁹, first through the gloss 'Moses' rod' [swallowed] the rods of the magicians; it must be said that the truth is that the glosses appear to be at odds with one another there; nevertheless they more strongly suggest that they made true serpents — and they name the serpents there from the preexisting matter, just as they call the serpent of Moses a rod, although it was a true serpent; and so it is to be understood of other cases.

Ad 2. To that which is objected, that Antichrist will make lying signs; it must be said that this is to be understood not as if he will not make any true signs by the transmutation of forms, but they will not be true with respect to their end or intention, since he will do this in order to persuade lying and falsehood.

Ad 3. To that which is objected concerning the gloss of Augustine, it must be said that Augustine does not deny that something may be attributed to demons, but rather that not all things are to be attributed to them — indeed, some are attributed to good Angels.

Ad 4, 5. To the two following reasons it is not necessary to respond; for they conclude truly, namely that an Angel cannot by his own power transmute or induce natural forms or bring them forth from potency into act.

Ad 6. To that which is last asked²⁰, in whatever manner he brings forth, if he truly brings forth, he makes miracles: therefore miracles are fallible signs, therefore they are not effective testimonies of our faith; it must be said to this that, although they are true works, they are nevertheless not true miracles; for miracles are not through the force of nature, but through a force above nature, which is that of the first agent. For they are above the capacity of nature, and so bear witness to the omnipotence of the doer²¹. But the works which the demons do, although they may seem miracles, since they are done in an imperceptible time, are nevertheless not true miracles, since they are done by the force of nature. — And if you object that nature cannot operate so quickly; it must be said that this is true of this nature taken by itself, but it can be so helped and planted²² by suitable things that it may, as it were, suddenly burst forth into effect — as appears in the generation of frogs, which it happens are born from certain leaves in a short time.

Incidental question — how such miracles are to be discerned.

But if you ask how such miracles are to be discerned, it must be said that, although they agree in matter, they differ fourfold — on the side of the principal agent, and on the side of the minister, and on the side of the end, and on the side of the deed.

On the side of the principal agent: for in divine miracles an agent of infinite power and above nature operates; in the miracles of demons the power of nature operates, in manifold ways helped by other natures²³. — On the side of the minister: for the miracles of God are done by public justice according to truth, or according to appearance; but the miracles of demons are done through private contracts and certain secret pacts. And this is what Augustine says²⁴: that « the good do miracles through public justice » — that is, through true faith, which truly justifies, which Truth preaches to all; « bad Christians, through the signs of public justice », because they have faith and seem to have works; but « magicians through private contracts » — and this is what is said in Exodus²⁵, by incantations and certain secret arts. The sign of this is that there the works of darkness are present, since he who does evil hates the light. — On the side of the end they likewise differ, because the miracles of God are done for utility and for the divine glory²⁶; but those of magicians for deception and for vain glory and self-exaltation²⁷: whence they are as it were useless. — They differ also on the side of the deed, because the demons do such vile and useless things; but the divine miracles concern things very necessary and useful. Whence the demons most of all make frogs and serpents, since these are easily produced by the operation of nature, and since by divine judgment they are more permitted as a memorial of the prior deed.

Rejection of [the merely-good explanation]. Whence God so tempers²⁸ the diabolical power and cunning that He so suffers him perversely to imitate, that in this very imitation he can seduce the evil according to their evil merits; and may also be caught out by the good — and that faith together with miracles may have place. For if only God and His servants did miracles, who would not have believed in God, compelled by miracles? But as it is now, since magicians²⁹ do them and the good also do them — who are divinely enlightened, so that they can discern between them — they are aided by true miracles, and tried and proved by the miracles of demons.

Scholion.

I. In this question what is said in the body concerning the difference of action in the threefold agent — God, nature, art — is worthy of attention (cf. here Dub. 3.); likewise, what occurs in the solution ad 5 on the affirmative side, concerning the seminal reason as very distant from completed act, and at the end concerning true and false miracles (cf. below d. 36. a. 3. q. 1. ad 3; d. 37. a. 2. q. 2. ad 4; IV. Sent. d. 12. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3 and a. 2. q. 3.). — In the solution ad 1 on the negative side, the question is touched on concerning the prodigies of Pharaoh's magicians (Exod. 7 and 8). Some have said that the serpents and frogs were produced by those magicians, or were brought from elsewhere and substituted by the demons (so Lyranus on Exodus), or were merely phantastic illusions. But Alex. of Hales (S. p. II. q. 43. m. 1.) holds that the magicians, by the help of nature and demons, truly produced those animals — a view supported by St. Thomas, B. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise, Richard of Mediavilla, Dionysius Carthusian — and St. Bonaventure also favors it. On the power of demons with respect to intentional species, cf. below d. 8. p. II. q. 3.

II. In their conclusions other doctors sufficiently agree: Alex. of Hales, S. p. II. q. 43. m. 2; q. 18. m. 2. a. 2. — Scotus, in Hier. of Montefortino, t. II. q. 16. a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 1; S. I. q. 65. a. 4; de Potent. q. 6. a. 5; S. c. Gent. III. c. 103; de Malo, q. 16. a. 9, 10. — B. Albert, here a. 6. seqq.; S. p. II. tr. 8. q. 30. m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3. a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4. q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 3. a. 1, 2. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Dionysius Carthusian, here q. 3.

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