Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; each entry gives the Quaracchi note in Latin followed by an English rendering.

ARTICULUS II.

De formatione corporis assumti.

Consequenter quaeritur de secundo articulo, scilicet de formatione corporis assumti. Circa quod duo quaeruntur:

Primo quaeritur de ipso corpore assumto quoad principium formale.

Secundo, quantum ad principium materiale.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum corpus assumtum habeat veram formam corporis humani.

Quaeritur igitur primo, utrum illud corpus habeat veram formam corporis humani. Et quod ita sit, videtur:

1. Quia, cum appareat esse corpus humanum, aut est verum, aut est ibi error et deceptio; sed error et deceptio non competit Angelis sanctis: ergo cum assumunt corpora, quae videntur esse humana, vere habent formam humanam.

2. Item, ad corpus humanum nihil plus requiritur nisi aequalis complexio et debita organizatio, sicut dicunt naturales; sed corpus, quod Angelus assumit, debitam habet organizationem: si ergo organizatio praesupponit complexionem, ergo videtur, quod habeat totum, quod est de veritate humani corporis.

3. Item, quod Angelus vere possit formare corpus humanum, videtur. «Corpus humanum, sicut dicit Augustinus¹, est in rationibus seminalibus, sicut et alia corpora»; sed quia formae quorundam animalium, ut serpentium et huiusmodi, habent rationes seminales dispersas in rebus: ideo dicit Augustinus, «quod ministerio daemonum vere educuntur»: ergo pari ratione, ut videtur, et corpora hominum. Quodsi tu dicas, quod non valet, quia maior requiritur dispositio ad producendum corpus humanum; hoc non solvit, quia quod potest disponere a remotis in principio operationis, continuando actionem, cum non sit distantia infinita, poterit venire ad dispositionem immediatam: ergo si Angeli possunt veloci operatione producere corpora animalium minus perfecta, ergo et pari ratione corpora animalium magis perfecta: ergo et corpus humanum.

4. Item, si aliquod agens indifferenter se habet ad aliqua producenda, qua ratione potest in unum, potest in alterum; sed Angeli non habent maiorem convenientiam in² corporibus serpentium quam in corporibus hominum, immo magis e converso: ergo si possunt auxilio naturae producere vera corpora serpentium, possunt auxilio naturae producere vera corpora hominum, ergo et assumere.

5. Item, quod potest in maius potest in minus; «sed anima, quantumcumque sit modicae nobilitatis, excellit nobilitatem cuiuscumque corporis», sicut dicitur in octavo de Civitate Dei³ et in aliis multis locis: cum ergo ministerio Angelorum educi possint et educantur animae vegetabiles et sensibiles quorundam animalium, multo fortius producere possunt vera corpora hominum.

Ad oppositum sic — Fundamenta: 1. Eiusdem virtutis creatae est corpus formare et informare, quia vis formativa est ab informativa sive perfectiva⁴; sed nullus spiritus angelicus potest humanum corpus perficere: ergo nec formare.

2. Item, Angeli nihil possunt operari circa creaturas nisi adiutorio naturae; sed nulla natura potest generare corpus humanum, nisi illa quae est similis in specie⁵: ergo Angelus non potest formare verum corpus humanum nisi mediante homine. Sed homo non potest corpus humanum educere nisi generando: ergo nec Angelus vera corpora humana formare nisi per generationem hominis. Sed cum assumit corpora, non indiget humano auxilio: ergo nunquam assumit vera corpora humana.

3. Item, si possunt corpus de novo formare, ergo pari ratione et corruptum reparare: ergo possunt mortuos suscitare, quod est solius Dei proprium.

4. Item, si corpora assumta ab Angelis essent vera corpora humana, haberent appetitum ad animam rationalem; sed Deus complet appetitum naturae: ergo statim infunderetur eis anima rationalis.

5. Item, si vera corpora humana assumerent, aut secundum statum gloriae, aut secundum statum viae. Non secundum statum gloriae; hoc constat, quia iam ulterius corpus illud non esset corruptibile nec ab Angelo separabile. Si ergo assumunt, hoc est secundum statum viae; sed corpora humana secundum statum viae sunt ponderosa et gravia, sive in statu naturae corruptae, sive in statu innocentiae: ergo non essent habilia ad motum nec ad velox ministerium: ergo si non assumunt corpora nisi propter ministerium, ergo non assumunt vera corpora humana.

CONCLUSIO.

Corpora ab Angelis assumta non habent veram formam et complexionem corporum humanorum nec completam organizationem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod —Conclusio.— corpora assumta ab Angelis non habent veram formam et complexionem corporum humanorum, nec etiam organizationem completam, sed solum effigiem.

Ratio duplex. Et ratio huius est duplex: una, quia non competit Angelis tale corpus ad ministerium, sicut nunc

ultimo ostensum est; alia ratio est, quia Angelus non potest educere formam naturalem in esse, nisi adiutus a virtute naturae, sicut habitum fuit in praecedenti distinctione⁶. Triplex modus producendi corpora. In virtute autem naturae est producere corpora omnium animalium, verumtamen aliter et aliter. Ad quaedam enim educenda sufficit causa universalis sine adiutorio agentis particularis, consimilis in specie naturae, cuiusmodi sunt animalia, quae generantur per putrefactionem⁷. Quaedam autem sunt, ad quae non sufficit, nisi adiuvetur ab agente consimilis speciei, sicut sunt corpora animalium, quae producuntur solummodo per propagationem; et istud planum est ad sensum.

Ratio prima. Si autem quaeratur ratio huius, prima est divina institutio, secundum quam est limitatio in virtutibus et naturis rerum: et hoc secundum legem, quam indidit eis ab initio. Unde sicut dixit⁸: Germinet terra herbam virentem, non dixit, quod germinaret hominem; homini autem dixit, quod se multiplicaret. Sic terra germinat herbam, et homo generat hominem. — Ratio secundaria. Duplex imperfectio quorundam animalium. Haec autem lex sive institutio non est absque ratione, quia quaedam sunt animalia imperfecta tam in organizatione quam in duratione; quaedam vero perfecta utroque modo. Quia vero quaedam corpora animalium sunt imperfecta et in organizatione et complexione; ideo non indiguerunt agente tantae virtutis, sed potuit virtus productiva ipsorum dari terrae tanquam matri, et soli tanquam patri⁹, cum adiutorio aliorum corporum simplicium, tam elementarium quam caelestium. Quia vero sunt imperfecta duratione et aliquando pereunt; ideo oportuit hoc communicari agenti alterius naturae; quia ad hoc data est vis generativa rebus, ut dicit Philosophus¹⁰, «ut perpetuentur in esse». — Animalia perfecta utroque modo. E contrario est de animalibus utroque modo perfectis; et ideo virtus productiva ipsorum maiorem exigit actualitatem, et ratio seminalis cum maiori difficultate profertur in actum; ideo maiori indiget adiutorio. — Corollarium. Illa igitur animalia, sive eorum corpora, quae ad primum genus spectant, educi possunt ab Angelis, mediante naturae adiutorio, velociter et quasi subito, veraciter tamen, quia, per vim naturae. Sed animalia et eorum corpora, quae spectant ad secundum genus, educi non possunt veraciter nisi cum auxilio naturae et cum diuturnitate et tempore¹¹. Et quoniam assumtio corporum ab Angelis est velociter et quasi repente, ideo vera corpora humana non assumunt, quia non possunt illa per se formare veraciter; et cum alterius adiutorio non possunt facere, quod exeant in esse velociter. — Aliae rationes. Et esto quod educerentur, adhuc non competerent, sicut tactum est in obiiciendo, tum propter appetitum, quem haberent ad animam rationalem, tum propter gravitatem; quae duo repugnant fini illius corporis. Nam si haberet animam rationalem, non esset competens signum ad apparendum; si haberet gravitatem, non esset competens instrumentum ad operandum, maxime ad motum; non esset etiam competens habitaculum ad inhabitandum. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes probantes, quod Angeli non assumunt vera corpora humana, sive boni sive mali.

Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod est ibi error et deceptio: dicendum, quod falsum est, quia non assumunt illa corpora, ut ostendant, se esse homines et veros homines, sed ut ostendant se rationales; et quoniam illa corpora significant, ipsos esse rationales, et ad hoc formata sunt finaliter; ideo vera sunt, quamvis non sint vere humana, sicut in primo libro¹² dictum fuit de igne et de columba.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est ibi organizatio¹³ et aequalis complexio; dicendum, quod falsum est. Non enim est ibi vere organizatio, quae competit corpori humano, quae quidem est a virtute formativa, cum seminibus delata, sed potius quaedam lineamentorum protractio secundum illius conformitatem; et haec non praesupponit aequalitatem complexionis, quia talis protractio potest fieri ab artifice in ligno et lapide. Nec quaecumque qualitas mixtionis est illa quae facit ad veritatem corporis humani, sed illa quae habet virtutem specificatam, hominis completivam et directivam¹⁴.

Rationes seminales. 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corpus humanum est in rationibus seminalibus: iam patet responsio, quia quamvis sit ibi, nunquam tamen educitur, nisi concurrat virtus agentis exterioris, quae residet in lumbis viri et in matrice mulieris; et ideo sine his nunquam potest illa ratio seminalis ad actum perfectum educi. — Et si obiiciat, quod potest disponere dispositione remota etc.; dicendum, quod illud habet locum, ubi dispositio remota fit necessitas¹⁵ sola intensione; tunc enim sufficit virtutis activae continuatio et intensio; non autem, quando requiritur novae formae, vel alterius formae secundum speciem operatio; et sic est in proposito.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod indifferenter se habet Angelus ad omnia corpora animalium; dicendum, quod etsi hoc verum sit de ipso Angelo in se, non tamen est verum de virtute naturae, ex cuius adiutorio Angelus operatur. Et ideo, sicut Angelus per se non potest educere corpus humanum,

ita nec corpus alicuius animalis; et sicut natura quaedam potest faciliter, quaedam cum maiore difficultate, ut prius visum est; sic et Angelus ipsius virtute adiutus.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod potest in magis nobile; dicendum, quod illud non habet semper veritatem, quia homo potest generare hominem, qui est nobilior, et non potest generare asinum; maxime autem tunc deficit, quando et¹⁶ res nobilior est facilioris productionis, sicut frequenter contingit. Et sic in proposito; nam facilius educitur anima vegetabilis vel sensibilis animalis per putrefactionem educti, quam educatur et organizetur verum corpus hominis.

Article II.

On the formation of the body assumed.

Consequently the second article is taken up, namely, the formation of the body assumed. Concerning which two things are asked:

First, it is asked about the assumed body itself with regard to its formal principle.

Second, with regard to its material principle.

Question I.

Whether the body assumed has the true form of a human body.

It is asked, then, first, whether that body has the true form of a human body. And that it does, it seems:

1. Because, since it appears to be a human body, either it is true, or there is error and deception in it; but error and deception do not befit the holy Angels: therefore when they assume bodies which appear to be human, they truly have a human form.

2. Likewise, for a human body nothing more is required than an equal complexion and proper organization, as the natural philosophers say; but the body which an Angel assumes has the proper organization: if then organization presupposes complexion, it seems that it has the whole of what belongs to the truth of a human body.

3. Likewise, that an Angel can truly form a human body, it seems. «The human body, as Augustine says¹, is in the seminal reasons, as are other bodies»; but because the forms of certain animals — such as serpents and the like — have their seminal reasons dispersed throughout things, Augustine therefore says «that by the ministry of demons they are truly brought forth»: therefore by parity of reasoning, as it seems, also the bodies of men. And if you say that this does not hold, because a greater disposition is required for producing a human body — this does not solve it, because what can dispose from afar at the beginning of an operation, by continuing the action, since the distance is not infinite, will be able to come to immediate disposition: therefore if Angels can by swift operation produce the bodies of less perfect animals, then by parity of reasoning also the bodies of more perfect animals: therefore also a human body.

4. Likewise, if some agent is indifferently disposed to producing various things, by the same reasoning by which it can produce the one, it can produce the other; but Angels do not have greater fittingness with² the bodies of serpents than with the bodies of men — rather the contrary: therefore if they can with the aid of nature produce true bodies of serpents, they can with the aid of nature produce true bodies of men, and therefore also assume them.

5. Likewise, what can do the greater can do the lesser; «but the soul, however small its nobility, exceeds the nobility of any body whatsoever», as is said in book VIII of On the City of God³ and in many other passages: therefore since by the ministry of Angels the vegetable and sensitive souls of certain animals can be and are brought forth, much more can they produce true human bodies.

On the opposite side — Fundamenta: 1. To form a body and to inform it belongs to the same created power, because the formative power proceeds from the informative or perfective⁴; but no angelic spirit can perfect a human body: therefore neither can it form one.

2. Likewise, Angels can do nothing concerning creatures except by the aid of nature; but no nature can generate a human body except one which is similar in species⁵: therefore an Angel cannot form a true human body except through the mediation of a man. But a man cannot bring forth a human body except by generation: therefore neither can an Angel form true human bodies except by the generation of a man. But when they assume bodies, they do not need human aid: therefore they never assume true human bodies.

3. Likewise, if they can form a body anew, then by parity of reasoning they can also repair a corrupted one: therefore they can raise the dead, which is proper to God alone.

4. Likewise, if bodies assumed by Angels were true human bodies, they would have an appetite for a rational soul; but God fulfills the appetite of nature: therefore a rational soul would immediately be infused into them.

5. Likewise, if they were to assume true human bodies, this would be either according to the state of glory or according to the state of the way. Not according to the state of glory: this is clear, because then that body would no longer be corruptible nor separable from the Angel. If therefore they do assume them, this is according to the state of the way; but human bodies according to the state of the way are heavy and weighty, whether in the state of corrupted nature or in the state of innocence: therefore they would not be fit for motion nor for swift ministry: therefore, if they do not assume bodies except for ministry, then they do not assume true human bodies.

Conclusion.

Bodies assumed by Angels do not have the true form and complexion of human bodies, nor complete organization.

I respond: It must be said that — Conclusion. — bodies assumed by Angels do not have the true form and complexion of human bodies, nor even complete organization, but only an outward appearance.

The reason is twofold. And the reason for this is twofold: one, that such a body does not befit Angels for ministry, as has just now

been shown in the last place; the other reason is that an Angel cannot bring forth a natural form into being unless aided by the power of nature, as was held in the preceding distinction⁶. The threefold mode of producing bodies. Now within the power of nature lies the production of the bodies of all animals, yet in differing ways. For the bringing-forth of some, the universal cause suffices without the aid of a particular agent similar in species in nature — such are the animals which are generated by putrefaction⁷. There are others, however, for which it does not suffice unless it is aided by an agent of similar species, such as the bodies of animals which are produced only by propagation; and this is plain to the senses.

First reason. If the reason for this be asked: the first is the divine institution, according to which there is a limitation in the powers and natures of things; and this according to the law which He laid upon them from the beginning. Hence as He said⁸: Let the earth bring forth the green herb, He did not say that it should bring forth man; but to man He said that he should multiply himself. So the earth brings forth the herb, and man generates man. — Second reason. Twofold imperfection of certain animals. This law or institution is not without reason, because some animals are imperfect both in organization and in duration, while others are perfect in both modes. Because some bodies of animals are imperfect both in organization and in complexion, they did not need an agent of such great power, but their productive power could be given to the earth as a mother and to the sun as a father⁹, with the aid of other simple bodies, both elementary and celestial. And because they are imperfect in duration and at times perish, it was fitting that this be communicated to an agent of another nature; for to this end the generative power was given to things, as the Philosopher says¹⁰, «that they might be perpetuated in being». — Animals perfect in both modes. The contrary holds of animals perfect in both modes; and so their productive power requires a greater actuality, and the seminal reason is brought forth into act with greater difficulty; therefore it needs greater aid. — Corollary. Those animals, therefore, or their bodies, which belong to the first kind, can be brought forth by Angels — with the aid of nature mediating — swiftly and as it were suddenly, yet truly, because by the power of nature. But the animals and their bodies which belong to the second kind cannot be brought forth truly except with the aid of nature and with length of time¹¹. And since the assumption of bodies by Angels is swift and as it were sudden, therefore they do not assume true human bodies, because they cannot form them by themselves truly; and with the aid of another they cannot bring it about that those bodies come into being swiftly. — Further reasons. And granted that they were brought forth, still they would not be fitting, as has been touched on in the objections, both on account of the appetite they would have for a rational soul and on account of heaviness; which two things are repugnant to the end of that body. For if it had a rational soul, it would not be a suitable sign for appearance; if it had heaviness, it would not be a suitable instrument for operating, especially for motion; nor would it be a suitable dwelling for inhabiting. — Therefore the arguments must be conceded which prove that Angels do not assume true human bodies, whether good or evil.

Solution of the opposed arguments. 1. To that which is objected to the contrary, that there is error and deception there: it must be said that this is false, because they do not assume those bodies in order to show themselves to be men and true men, but in order to show themselves to be rational; and since those bodies signify them to be rational, and were finally formed for this end, therefore they are true, although they are not truly human — just as was said in the first book¹² concerning fire and the dove.

2. To that which is objected, that there is organization¹³ and equal complexion there: it must be said that this is false. For there is not truly the organization there which belongs to a human body — which indeed comes from the formative power conveyed in seeds — but rather a certain drawing of lineaments according to a likeness of that [body]; and this does not presuppose equality of complexion, because such a drawing can be made by a craftsman in wood and stone. Nor is just any quality of mixture that which makes for the truth of a human body, but rather that which has a specified power, completive and directive of man¹⁴.

Seminal reasons. 3. To that which is objected, that the human body is in the seminal reasons: the answer is already plain, because although it is there, it is never brought forth unless the power of an external agent concurs, which resides in the loins of the man and in the womb of the woman; and therefore without these the seminal reason can never be brought forth into perfect act. — And if one objects that it can dispose by remote disposition, etc.: it must be said that this holds where the remote disposition becomes a necessity¹⁵ by intensification alone; for then a continuation and intensification of active power suffices; but not when a new form, or the operation of another form according to species, is required; and so it stands in the case proposed.

4. To that which is objected, that the Angel is indifferently disposed to all animal bodies: it must be said that, even if this is true of the Angel in himself, it is not true of the power of nature by whose aid the Angel operates. And therefore, just as the Angel by himself cannot bring forth a human body,

so neither the body of any animal; and just as some nature can do this easily and another with greater difficulty, as was seen before, so also the Angel aided by its power.

5. To that which is objected, that it can [extend] to what is more noble: it must be said that this does not always hold true, because a man can generate a man — who is more noble — and cannot generate a donkey; and it fails most of all when¹⁶ the more noble thing is of easier production, as frequently happens. And so it is in the case proposed; for the vegetable or sensitive soul of an animal is more easily brought forth from a thing brought into being by putrefaction than the true body of a man is brought forth and organized.